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THE LAUCKS FOUNDATION

from time to time calls attention to published material that might contribute toward clarification or understanding of issues affecting world peace. The accompanying reprints constitute Reprint Mailing No. 99

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The following is an excerpt from a letter received from Don G. Bates, M.D., Ph.D., publisher of THOUGHTS ON PEACE AND SECURITY, 559 Lansdowne Ave., Westmount, Quebec, H3Y 2V5 Canada:

"In 1989 we are faced with an apparent contradiction. 'Peace' in the sense of an absence of war, or the threat of war, is making some headway. And yet our security continues to diminish. The reason is clear to all of us. However much they may be inter-related, international peace does not assure a decline in militarism; a reduction in militarism does not end hunger and disease; an end to hunger and disease does not guarantee protection of the environment. Yet all these things must happen if we are to be secure. And none of them will happen unless people care."

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GORBACHEV IS MAKING THE WASHINGTON PUNDITS LOOK RIDICULOUS

Watching the pundits before the Gorbachev speech, one would have thought, as one observer put it, that they preferred Brezhnev. When McNeil/Lehrer lobed up soft pitches of the form: "Is he as important as Peter the Great?", Henry Kissinger, looking exceptionally dour, said it was not clear whether Gorbachev was a "statesman" or a "juggler," and that he could not figure out Gorbachev's "architecture".

Gorbachev's speech to the U.N. should end that kind of carping. No American President has made a speech like that since John F. Kennedy. (And the New York Times compared it to Woodrow Wilson's 14 points in 1918 and Churchill's Atlantic Charter in 1941.) America may have come out of the cold war with an enormous economic and ideological lead over the Soviet Union but, ironically, it is a Soviet voice that is now thrilling the U.N. audience. One delegate there said the speech was "magic".

The only complaint the Administration spin control specialists could come up with was "timing"; it amounted to the absurd query of asking why his U.N. speech was scheduled during the transition when we could not effectively "answer" it.

Actually, the transition was a boon to both Reagan and Bush. Neither was, really, put on the spot to answer the speech because, in this interregnum, each of them can duck it.

And duck it, the Alliance will. NATO will "pocket" the unilateral reduction. It will argue that the Soviets had their own reasons for the unilateral reduction to make their forces "leaner and meaner". It will argue that the Soviets still have a big advantage despite the fact that 50,000 of the 500,000 demobilized are coming out of Eastern Europe with a great deal of equipment. It will argue that the reduction is deliberately undermining Western defense expenditures. By the time NATO analysts get done, the uninitiated will think that this maneuver was an effort to gain strategic advantage through unilateral reduction. Indeed George Will warned that Gorbachev's act might produce such a "pell-mell, bipartisan U.S. retreat from defense spending" that Gorbachev might achieve a "relative enhancement of Soviet military power".

But one interesting and useful result of the speech is this; it will be much harder for Western analysts to link the START agreement to future agreements on conventional forces as was the line before. In this sense, Gorbachev may have saved strategic reductions through conventional initiatives.

A Pragmatic Visionary

In any case, no one can doubt anymore that Gorbachev is the real thing—what our CIA once called a "pragmatic visionary". Without any question, he will be awarded, next October, the Nobel Peace Prize. Probably only a desire to avoid disrupting our election processes prevented the Nobel Peace Prize Committee from giving the award this October to Gorbachev and Reagan for the INF agreement. By next year, however, Gorbachev may get it all by himself.

As Mrs. Thatcher put it, the wonderful thing about Gorbachev's speech was how he put the arms race and his own problem in a context of the entire world. Through his own instincts, and the desperate economic plight of his own country, he has become the first superpower statesman to champion the new world trends and developments. These have been, thus far, obscured by the general preoccupation with the arms race.

His speech notes how "radically different" the world is even from that of 1950. This is not only because "mankind's survival and self-preservation" is now at issue but because economic, food, energy, environmental, information and population problems, "which only recently we treated as national or regional ones", have become global problems.

When have we last seen our leaders talking of "new realities" that call for "radical review" of approaches to the "totality of the problems of international cooperation as a major element of universal security".

(Continued) ⟶

WESTERN ADVANTAGES: SEVEN EXTRA DAYS

Senator Sam Nunn made a major contribution to the debate over Gorbachev's speech when he pointed out the significant bottom line to the military advantages provided by Gorbachev's unilateral reduction.

According to Nunn, if the cuts are "fully and honestly implemented", they "could give NATO seven extra days to prepare for a Soviet short-warning attack." This, he said, would provide a "meaningful reduction in the Warsaw Pact's short-warning threat." He went on to list in his December 18 article six different major ways in which the west could use the extra time. These included the moving forward of NATO forces, calling up of reserves, installing of minefields, flying 500 fighter aircraft to airfields in western Europe, and so on. ■

Mikhail Gorbachev

Here in Washington, the locals continue to see their role as nothing more nor less than debunking Gorbachev. The *Washington Post* op-ed page, under the caption "Gorbachev's Gambit", produced an immediate response of four hostile articles. In addition to Will's article, Deputy Editorial Page Editor Stephen Rosenfeld warned that the Cold War could not be considered over until Eastern Europe was "exercising the choices it was promised at Yalta". Soviet Emigre Dimitri Simes said we should offer Gorbachev only "grudging admiration—the sort reserved for honorable opponents bravely fighting against considerable odds—and not the support one would give a new-found friend". And Charles Krauthammer called Gorbachev's speech "guff" except for the military reduction whose significance he called "indeterminate". These commentators have not the least sympathy for the problems Gorbachev faces. When, in his first meeting with Gorbachev, Andrei Sakharov presented a long list of demands, Gorbachev responded that "I don't think that even you, Andrei Dimitrievich, think that I can jump over stages and achieve all this at once." Sakharov agreed. But these commentators do not. They want to know why the new Constitution has no "constitutional provision for a multi-party system". And if you asked them why they are not focusing such attacks on the many other countries without multi-party systems, China, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, they would not know.

Business as Usual in Washington

Watching the Washington scene respond to Gorbachev, one cannot be too cynical. The establishment that bought the "window of vulnerability" moved on to applauding the "strategic defense initiative" and now, faced with what can only be described as a long awaited millennium in Russia, can only say that it "moves in the right direction." The public is warned not to expect too much less the bottom fall out of the Western alliance.

A distinguished study group of Washington experts, with participation of dozens of experts, has not been able to include in its voluminous recommendations and observations, any answer to the question on everyone's lips: "Is it in our interests to have Gorbachev's reforms succeed and what, if anything, should we do about it?". Asked why this central question of our period has not been answered, the organizers say it has been answered "implicitly" because the paper says that: "Americans should act in America's interests". But if this delphic solution says anything, it says we ought not do anything. Meanwhile, throughout Western Europe, the leaders understand quite well that Gorbachev should be encouraged.

It is not only the careerists who have trouble with any suggestion of linking their fate to Gorbachev's future. It is also the progressives. A distinguished group of them has decided to settle all arms questions quite unilaterally without regard to negotiation with Gorbachev. They also fear linking their view—that all of this military junk is not necessary if it ever was—to the future of Russia or the viability of negotiations. Thus, both wings of American opinion would just as soon deal with Gorbachev at arms length.

But the public may save the day. And if Gorbachev accepts President Reagan's invitation to visit California and shows himself to Americans, it may produce a transformation of American politics and leave the business-as-usual commentators out in the cold.

Even without that, on-going trends too numerous to mention are bringing the arms race to a halt.

- Glasnost is providing more and more U.S. experts and observers with a first-hand view of the poverty and intellectual confusion inside the Soviet Union. This is having the usual tranquillizing effect on their otherwise overheated speculations.
- The U.S. military-industrial complex can no longer be expected, even by the naive, to produce, reliably, the kinds of weapons that would advance the present state of the art. Two fleets of bombers (B-1 and B-2) are both in trouble. Almost two decades ago, Richard Stubbings observed that the mean time to failure of weapons would shrink as they got ever more highly electronic and complicated. In the present era, the military industrial complex is just producing junk.
- Budget pressures have finally gotten to the point where the long held specter of "guns or butter" is really biting.
- Fears of America's decline and of world environmental problems are now competing with fears of the Soviet Union.

Until now, among the ways of evading the reality of Gorbachev, many observers have suggested that we wait to see if he is going to last. But as Princeton Sovietologist Stephen Cohen observed recently, Gorbachev has been in office now for four years—how long do we wait? □

—Jeremy J. Stone

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KISSINGER ON GORBACHEV: "TRUSTED EMISSARIES"

Henry Kissinger's contribution to the debate on Gorbachev's speech was accurate when it said:

"The problem is not his challenge but the Western response, which threatens to jeopardize the opportunities that may be represented by the conjunction of a Soviet internal crisis and a realistic Soviet statesman."

But the rest really misgauged Gorbachev and showed a kind of paranoia. Unlike Senator Nunn who analyzed the reductions, Kissinger simply raised a fog of questions about them and concluded, remarkably, that "the general perception that Gorbachev has put forward unilateral concessions is nonsense, or true in only a highly formal sense." Why? Because "his proposals will surely generate pressures for counter concessions all over NATO." In sum, America should view unilateral initiatives as more dangerous than Soviet stand-patism—which, on conventional force reductions in Europe is definitely our policy.

He goes on to attack the notion that we are seeking a balance of force by saying "Does equality of forces enhance stability?" In sum, if Gorbachev is so diabolic as to remove Soviet conventional force advantages and asymmetries, we might claim that our theory has changed and we need superiority of our own!

New Way of Thinking vs. Machiavelli

Gorbachev is a statesmen with a new way of thinking and Kissinger invariably tries to interpret it as if Gorbachev were Machiavelli. Thus: "Gorbachev may be betting that his policy will disintegrate NATO more rapidly than the same policies plus perestroika will dissolve the cohesion of Eastern Europe" and is trying to "push" the U.S. out of Europe.

In the end, predictably, Henry Kissinger seeks to drive the debate away from what he calls "public relations spectacles" into a private dialogue between "trusted emissaries"—and who do you think that ought to be?

Henry Kissinger has met his match in Mikhail Gorbachev but not because Gorbachev is trying to best him or outmaneuver the West. He would negotiate with the West if it could get itself together to negotiate; the mood in Moscow is desperate for agreements. But if the West continues to show itself as too disorganized to negotiate with Gorbachev, it will get just what it deserves—that terrible medicine that Kissinger fears: unilateral initiatives that will "disarm" the West! What a world we live in.

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Viewpoint

The recent initiative announced by Mikhail Gorbachev at the United Nations has given new impetus to the improving relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is crucial that the Bush administration not allow the momentum created by the INF Treaty and this latest initiative to slip away.

Thus we hope that President Bush will move briskly to resume the Strategic Arms ReductionTalks (START). As noted in the accompanying article, there are difficult issues remaining to be hammered out before such a treaty becomes reality. But we see no immediate obstacle to doing so, provided both sides are willing to engage in the appropriate give-and-take.

For our part, we believe that completion of the START treaty ought to be the administration's top priority in the arms control area in the months ahead, and we will be undertaking various efforts to move events in that direction. Although START may not provide the sweeping cuts advocated by some, it is a crucial precedent, establishing the framework for future efforts. Most important, it will reduce ballistic-missile warheads on both sides, especially the SS-18, which for years has been considered the most threatening weapon in the Soviet arsenal.

It will be critical that the public, including all UCS sponsors, demonstrate continued support for a program of arms reductions. A recent investigation by one of our allied organizations, the Council for a Livable World, indicates that a START agreement would be embraced by Congress, and furthermore that it is perhaps the most readily achievable arms reduction agreement possible over the near term.

The danger here is that, without broad public support for the treaty, President Bush could fail to move forward decisively. If the United States succumbs to complacency based on the success of the INF Treaty, a far more significant agreement could be doomed. It is also important to remember that, given the demise of the never-ratified SALT II Treaty during the Reagan term, at present there are no bilateral constraints on the strategic nuclear arsenals of the superpowers.

Today, the vigor of our national defense is not in question. Coupled with this, we have as our bargaining partner the most forthcoming Soviet leader ever. In this atmosphere of confidence and opportunity, we can afford to—indeed, we cannot afford not to—press forward with the START negotiations.

What START Would Do

	Delivery Vehicles		Warheads	
United States	Current	START	Current	START
Intercontinental ballistic missiles	1000		2373	4900
Submarine-launched ballistic missiles	640		5632	
Bombers	362		4884	1100
Totals	**2002**	**1600**	**12,889**	**6000***
Soviet Union				
Intercontinental ballistic missiles	1386		6412	4900
Submarine-launched ballistic missiles	978		3698	
Bombers	185		820	1100
Totals	**2549**	**1600**	**10,930**	**6000***

*In practice, warheads would exceed the 6000 ceiling due to special counting rules applied to bomber weapons.

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Congressional Budget Office, Department of Defense; as cited in "START: A Preliminary Assessment," by Hans Binnendijk, in *The Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 1988.

REMOVING THE ROADBLOCKS TO START

AS GEORGE BUSH ENTERS the White House, the chances for a reversal of the nuclear arms race hang in the balance. If he shows the necessary leadership, the new president should be able to sign a historic arms reduction treaty within a year or so. Otherwise, the Geneva negotiations will continue to mark time, as they have since last summer, and the prospects for arms cuts will plummet.

At stake is the fate of the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START). These talks are aimed at cutting US and Soviet long-range nuclear forces—intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, heavy bombers, and the nuclear warheads they carry—by up to 50 percent. A START agreement would dwarf last year's Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in scope and significance, tackling the weapons that are at the heart of the superpower arms race. Unlike INF, it would remove weapons targeted directly at US territory, including half of the most potent and threatening Soviet missiles, the 10-warhead SS-18s. Combined with steps to restructure the remaining US nuclear forces, the treaty would reduce the risk of war and enhance American security.

But the success of START cannot be assumed. Though the treaty is mostly complete, the Geneva talks remain blocked by several thorny disputes that will not be resolved without a high-level commitment from both countries. Equally important, START lacks a firm political base in this country. Despite widespread public support for further nuclear reductions, the expert policy community views the treaty with considerable ambivalence. A number of influential figures—including Henry Kissinger and Bush's own national security adviser, Gen. Brent Scowcroft—have questioned aspects of the proposed treaty and even the wisdom of deep nuclear cuts per se.

A START agreement would dwarf last year's INF Treaty in scope and significance, tackling the weapons that are at the heart of the superpower arms race.

In short, serious roadblocks to START must yet be overcome. The following discussion reviews the main issues on which agreement must be hammered out, both at Geneva and within the US political system, if the new administration is to gain a treaty.

The ABM Connection

The linkage between START and the control of antiballistic-missile (ABM) weapons has stymied progress on nuclear reductions from the beginning. But there is a good chance to break this impasse if Bush and Gorbachev are willing to take steps to modify the policies of their predecessors.

The main problem has been the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)—the US "Star Wars" program to develop a space-based shield against nuclear missiles. The Reagan administration stubbornly protected SDI from any limitations at the bargaining table, insisting that the program was non-negotiable. The Soviets, in turn, have demanded a reaffirmation of the 1972 ABM Treaty—which bans testing or deployment of Star Wars defenses—as a condition of strategic arms reductions.

But SDI's fortunes have dimmed at home—its budget capped and its testing program reined in by Congress—and the new administration will likely reassess the program's overambitious schedule and goals. If the US becomes willing to negotiate specific limits on space testing—resisting inevitable pressure from the hardcore SDI lobby—it should be possible remove this obstacle to START.

A second ABM-related issue is the notorious Soviet "early warning" radar at Krasnoyarsk, begun during the Brezhnev regime. Though of scant military significance, the radar is in technical violation of the ABM Treaty because of its location inland from the Soviet border, and as such provides US opponents of further arms control with a convenient lever. But here again there are grounds for optimism. Gorbachev, tacitly acknowledging the violation, has stopped construction on the radar and hosted an inspection of the site by US experts and members of Congress. During his December 1988 New York visit, he appeared to inch closer to accepting the US demand that the facility be dismantled.

Mobile Missiles

Another START dispute that needs to be resolved concerns the treatment of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Citing verification difficulties, the US has called for a ban on such weapons, which have so far been deployed only by the Soviet Union. There is no prospect that the Soviets will agree. Moreover, a ban is not desirable, since mobile missiles can make a contribution to nuclear stability. Because they are less vulnerable than missiles based in fixed silos, they are less likely to invite preemptive attack—or to be fired hastily to avoid preemption—during a severe crisis.

At last year's Moscow summit the US indicated it would soften its opposition to mobile ICBMs if effective monitoring arrangements could be worked out. The Bush administration should pursue an accommodation whereby mobile missiles would be permitted within restricted deployment areas, subject to special procedures for verifying their numbers.

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Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles

Sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs)—low-flying, motor-driven missiles that can be launched from surface ships or submarines—pose a far more daunting challenge to the START negotiators. Control of these weapons is especially difficult because they are smaller and more easily concealed than ballistic missiles and may carry either nuclear or conventional warheads.

Here it is the Soviets who have pressed for limitations while the US, which now holds a technical edge in these weapons, has dragged its feet. While agreeing in principle to a numerical ceiling on nuclear SLCMs, the US has opposed any limits on conventional ones (which the Navy plans to deploy in large numbers); at the same time, it rejects the intrusive shipboard inspections needed to distinguish between the two. This catch-22 has effectively blocked progress on the SLCM issue, which has emerged as perhaps the key stumbling block to a START agreement.

The Bush administration should reassess the US stand on SLCMs. Failure to limit these weapons would leave a large loophole in any arms reduction agreement. It could also confront the US with a serious future security threat if the Soviets deploy SLCMs off US coasts, where they could attack key US installations virtually without warning. Nuclear SLCMs should be restricted in numbers and confined to designated classes of vessels.

Verification

As the above suggests, START verification will be complex and extensive. It will be a more difficult job than under the INF Treaty because of the greater numbers and variety of weapons covered, and because START will establish numerical ceilings for categories of weapons rather than banning them outright. Hence the infrastructure of weapons production and testing will continue to operate, increasing the risk that missiles in excess of the allowed levels could be produced and maintained in secret.

To deter such cheating, START will provide for several kinds of direct inspections to supplement the remote monitoring (mainly by satellite) that has long been the mainstay of treaty verification. These include "baseline" inspections to verify existing deployments of the weapons to be reduced, follow-up visits to confirm the elimination of weapons, and continuous on-site monitoring of certain missile plants; and short-notice "challenge" inspections of installations.

An important unresolved issue is the scope of these challenge inspections. The problem is to strike a balance between the right to investigate suspicious activities that may be in violation of the treaty, and the right to protect military secrets against espionage conducted under the guise of treaty verification. Overruling some Pentagon officials, President Reagan last fall decided not to press for a blanket right to inspect any facility deemed suspect by one party or the other. Only facilities specified in advance would be subject to inspection at will; in other cases, the challenged country could refuse access to inspectors, but would have to take some action to satisfy the other party. This is a reasonable approach and one that President Bush should maintain.

Stability and US Force Structure

Uncertainty about the shape of US strategic forces under a START agreement has been a major worry of domestic critics of the prospective treaty. The big concern here is the US silo-based ICBM force, whose theoretical vulnerability to Soviet attack has inspired years of debate but no consensus on a solution. START may force the issue; indeed, failure to resolve the future of US ICBMs could doom the treaty politically in this country.

Without some restructuring of US land-based forces, START reductions could result in greater vulnerability. This perverse result would occur if the US elected to retain its force of Minuteman III and MX missiles (carrying three and ten warheads, respectively) in their existing silos while retiring several hundred older, single-warhead Minuteman IIs. This would amount to concentrating our remaining eggs in a few, vulnerable baskets.

But the US need not and should not cut its forces in a such a self-defeating way. Instead, it should move toward a post-START force of single-warhead missiles. These would pose less inviting targets than multiple-warhead missiles, and could be dispersed over a larger number of silos. Alternatively, they could be deployed in a mobile-basing scheme. Either option, when combined with the 50 percent cut in Soviet SS-18 ballistic-missile warheads, would result in a dramatic increase in the survivability of US ICBMs.

Fears of Denuclearization

Behind much of the expert criticism of START lies the worry that the treaty will lead to "denuclearization," eroding the postwar foundation of deterrence and stability without a clear vision of what is to replace it. This fear exaggerates the impact of START reductions, while ignoring the need to begin the process of reducing our reliance on nuclear weapons.

By itself, START will require no drastic change in our basic deterrence strategy. Much deeper reductions would indeed begin to have serious implications for existing security arrangements and strategies. START offers a kind of plateau from which to survey these more far-reaching changes while monitoring developments in the Soviet Union, progress in conventional arms reductions, and other factors that are crucial to very deep cuts in nuclear arsenals.

In short, START is a firm step in the right direction, but not a reckless plunge over the brink. As such, it deserves broad support from the public and the nuclear-policy community alike. — *Peter Clausen*

Peter Clausen is director of research for UCS.

DEFICIT INDUCES ARMS CONTROL

A recent comment by Sen. Sam Nunn, the conservative chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, suggests that the Pentagon budget will have to pay its share in reducing the nation's budget deficit. During a discussion of the future of the B-2 Bomber on "Face the Nation," Sen. Nunn stated, "We have started far too many programs to complete." This remark, coming from a staunch military advocate, points out the severity of the fiscal disorder left behind in the wake of the Reagan Presidency.

The driving force in squeezing programs from the defense budget in 1989 will be the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) deficit reduction targets which must be reached to avoid automatic cuts, otherwise known as sequestration in the Washington lexicon.

Under GRH, if the budget deficit is not cut, or revenues raised by $32 billion dollars next year to meet the projected budget deficit target of $100 billion, the difference will be made up through the sequestration process by which equal cuts in domestic and defense spending will take effect. This would mean a reduction of 50% of whatever amount remains over the target. If spending exceeds the target by the the full $32 billion, for example, $16 billion will come from defense and $16 billion from domestic programs. Yet, the Pentagon has been planning its budget for next year under the assumption that there will be 2% real growth (above inflation) for a total of $319 billion. This means that defense would not pay for any of that $32 billion deficit reduction mandated by law, and ignores realistic projection of the total dollars available for defense.

Even Inflation Increase Uncertain

Political reality suggests that the Pentagon will be lucky to get an increase to account for inflation or $312 billion in budget authority, though many in Congress will advocate a freeze at the current level of $299 billion.

Contributing to the budget squeeze for Pentagon programs is the "bow wave" of sharply increased spending associated with the decision to enter full-scale production of weapons systems. Procurement is typically a far more costly proposition than the earlier phase of research and development. Among the programs scheduled for procurement during President Bush's first term are the Trident II missile, the Stealth Bomber, the SSN-21 submarine, the C-17 cargo plane, the Advanced Tactical Aircraft, the LHX helicopter, the Advanced Tactical Fighter, and two new aircraft carriers. If these programs are completed, Ronald Reagan will have succeeded in force feeding the defense budget long after his term in the White House expires.

While non-budgetary factors, including improved U.S.-Soviet relations and progress on negotiations of a START treaty and a Chemical Weapons Convention contribute to an environment which bodes well for arms control, it is the budget deficit and the "bow wave" which will undoubtedly be the driving force in forcing the Congress and the White House to confront the question neither party has addressed for eight consecutive years: Can the United States afford every system proposed for the U.S. nuclear arsenal, no matter how defective or redundant? When Congress returns in January, it will begin the painful process of answering this question by deciding how to proceed with several weapons programs. Several approaches might be taken including stretch-outs, cancellation of weapons programs or force structure cuts.

One system which is certain to come under pressure is the B-2 "Stealth" Bomber, the subject of the November PIR. This strategic nuclear bomber designed to supplement and eventually replace the B-1 and B-52 is estimated to cost upwards of $60 billion for production of 132 planes, and will be a prime candidate to be trimmed next year. It will be difficult to justify its procurement at $500 million per copy when the plane hasn't even flown yet.

A decision to build either 50 additional MX missiles, to be deployed in a rail garrison mode or the "Midgetman" road-mobile missile system, will confront President-elect Bush. With competing forces of significant political stature advocating each system, it is difficult to predict the outcome. However, there is no doubt that the $46 billion cost for both systems isn't there, and the budget squeeze could force a more definitive resolution this year.

SDI Deployment Fading

And funding for deployment of a Phase One for the Strategic Defense Initiative, technical difficulties notwithstanding, appears even more remote than ever. With the Pentagon brass chafing at other defense cuts already coming down the line, it is unlikely that there will be much pressure from the military to put substantially more resources into SDI. The price for a Phase I deployment—one that would be a very "leaky" defense which would still allow 9,000 warheads to penetrate the United States—could cost between $69 and $150 billion. Funding for deployment of a Phase I SDI system is unlikely to receive serious consideration any time soon.

While budget problems will probably slow spending on new strategic offensive and defensive forces, other problems will add to the financial pressures on the Pentagon. The B-1 Bomber, once heralded as the saviour of the bomber force, has a repair bill of approximately $8 billion to make the plane perform to specification. And, the nuclear weapons production complex, which has been managed for forty years through policies of secrecy and neglect, has now been fully exposed as a national disaster with a repair, modernization and environmental cleanup bill to surpass $200 billion.

Ronald Reagan is leaving town just in time. His bills are past due and the credit limit has been surpassed. Now, the Democratic Congress and the new Republican President will be left to make the tough choices. The time has come. □

—David Feltman

The following is quoted from "A New Era of Peace Struggles To Be Born" by columnist Flora Lewis. (Santa Barbara News-Press, December 27, 1988):

"On the extraordinary occasion earlier this month when the Soviet Nobel Peace laureate Andrei Sakharov and the Polish laureate Lech Walesa met in Paris in celebration of the 40th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Walesa said they could both still feel 'the breath of Stalin' at their backs.

"But Walesa also said he found 'no spirituality' in the West. Westerners 'have wealth and civil liberties but don't seem to believe in anything,' he said.

"The old panaceas of ideology have failed, the older ones of religious absolutism exacerbate conflict and often cruelty. The way has yet to be found to combine the human need for a sense of higher purpose and community with the need for tolerance, respect for the dignity of others and the aspirations of the individual. This is the human dilemma, it is what peace is about."

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

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