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from time to time calls attention to published material that might contribute toward clarification or understanding of issues affecting world peace. The accompanying reprints constitute Reprint Mailing No. 93.

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1988 Presidential Race — A Rerun of 1960?

by Jerome Grossman

The 1988 presidential election has some striking parallels with the 1960 election of John F. Kennedy. Then as now, an extremely popular elderly president was completing his second term, ailing physically and politically. Eisenhower's Administration began its two terms by threatening the Soviets with "massive nuclear retaliation," yet Eisenhower ended up negotiating with moderate Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev for a nuclear test ban. President Reagan allowed Alexander Haig, his first secretary of state, to threaten "limited" nuclear war and demonstration nuclear explosions to show U.S. resolve. Now Reagan is negotiating nuclear weapons reductions with Mikhail Gorbachev, the second coming of Nikita Khrushchev.

This year, for the first time since 1960, each party has a big field of candidates seeking the nomination, even though the entire Democratic first team — Ted Kennedy of Massachusetts, Hart of Colorado, Cuomo of New York, Bumpers of Arkansas, and Bradley of New Jersey — has decided not to run. In 1960 a new generation of Democratic politicians led by John Kennedy came to the fore, a parallel with the emerging leadership of another son of Massachusetts, Governor Michael Dukakis. Vice President George Bush is trying for a victory that eluded Vice President Nixon in 1960.

The Eisenhower Administration was wounded by the Sherman Adams corruption scandal and the U-2 incident. The Reagan Administration lost its reputation for honesty and competence after a series of scandals and after being snookered by the Ayatollah Khomeini. Nevertheless, the Republican candidates will have to run on Reagan's record and claim peace and prosperity.

1960 1988

Prosperity may be too uneven for them to sell. It is largely confined to the East and West coasts. The gap between the rich and the poor is growing, though unemployment is holding at six percent. A recession did take place in 1960, but recessions in an election year are unusual, given the tendency of incumbent administrations to rev up the economy at election time.

The bull market of the 1950s, which declined in 1960, might have cost Nixon the election. If the current bull market continues, it will mollify the upper and middle classes, who have also benefitted from lower income taxes and supply-side economics and who form the majority of the 53 percent who vote in the general election.

Peace and nuclear weapons control will be important issues in both the primary and the general elections. Public opinion polls consistently show that virtually all voters consider nuclear weapons control one of the most important issues, and 25 percent regard it as the most important.

The Soviets are likely to help the Republicans by concluding the treaty eliminating intermediate range nuclear (INF) missiles and perhaps agreeing on deep cuts in their strategic nuclear offensive arsenals — in time for the election. The Soviets seem to have asked themselves if they would get a better deal from hawks under pressure from doves or from doves under pressure from hawks. They appear to have decided to go with the Reagan Administration's hawks under pressure from doves rather than gamble on some future dovish president. Gorbachev seems to realize that getting an arms treaty with a conservative Republican administration could open the way to additional deals with the next administration, be it Republican or Democratic.

When Reagan and Gorbachev sign their treaty, the political importance of arms control will match its importance for human survival, probably for the first time. If President Eisenhower had completed a nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviets, Richard Nixon would probably have been elected.

In 1960, John F. Kennedy read public opinion as hawkish and offered to close the fictitious "missile gap." Public opinion changes. The voters now are intensely concerned about nuclear war and the federal deficit. The candidate of either party who seizes the opportunity to focus on ending the nuclear arms race can capture the minds and hearts of the voters. Peace and prosperity would be a difficult combination to beat.

For a free copy of *The Major 1988 Presidential Candidates: Their Records on Arms Control and the Military Budget*, write to Council for a Livable World Education Fund, 20 Park Plaza, Boston, MA 02116.

Jerome Grossman is president of Council for a Livable World.

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Public Discourse and the Reinvention of Politics in the USSR

by Robert Karl Manoff

Perhaps only journalists and politicians believe that there is a single truth to be imparted about the complex phenomena of the world, among which I certainly count the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. But it is precisely because the truth about the USSR is so complex that we are so badly in need of brilliant journalism about that country and so poorly served by what for most of the last seven decades we have, in fact, got.

There are signs, however, that this may now be changing, simply because, like all ideological work, journalism, to be effective, must conform to the truth of matters even as it distorts it. And so, as the Soviet Union changes under Mikhail Gorbachev, American journalists are being dragged into the Gorbachev era by the force of events even as



their Soviet colleagues are being herded thereto by the force of the state. Nevertheless, having returned from the Soviet Union in February, I was struck by the fact that the American news media still have not succeeded in communicating the meaning of what is taking place in that country. I would like to suggest to you what that might be.

Political jokes are a form of expression that is far more developed in the USSR than on these shores, since that society requires indirect political discourse more than our own. Laughter is corrosive, nevertheless, and I have even had it put to me by Russians—only half in jest—that the CIA has a special department that does nothing but think up and plant jokes to get the Soviets laughing at each other.

The following example of Soviet humor is not so much funny (to our ears) as it is instructive. It sums up and caricatures seventy years of Soviet history in an improbable tale about a train, carrying all of the Soviet Union's important leaders, that suddenly, out in the middle of nowhere, comes to the end of its track. Lenin, the great revolutionary, is the first to take the situation in hand. He strides to the front of the train and delivers a speech. To no avail. Next comes Stalin. He pulls out a pistol and shoots the engineer. Khrushchev, in Soviet popular culture remembered as a slightly wacky figure, thereupon orders everyone out of the train to tear up the track behind the train and

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lay it out in front of it. Next it is Brezhnev's turn to try; his solution perfectly captures the popular perception of what happened to the country during the latter years of his stewardship. He tells everybody to get back on the train, pull the curtains closed and rock back and forth. And now it is Gorbachev's turn. Like Khrushchev, he orders everyone off the train, but this time has them run to the front of the engine and wail in unison, "There's no more track, there's no more track!"

This story is funny to Soviets because it mocks their leaders' pretensions of being able to solve the country's problems. It also perfectly captures the sense in which Mikhail Gorbachev is attempting to draw upon the Soviet revolutionary tradition (both he and Lenin resort to speech in order to get the train moving), while at the same time placing him in Khrushchev's lineage because he relies on mass mobilization (both of them call out the crowds to get the job done). This is good history, but we are left asking ourselves, as the Soviet citizen is, whether this is any way to run a railroad.

It would be a relatively simple matter for me to report—as much of the American press corps has tended to do—that, glasnost notwithstanding, not much has really changed in Moscow. For evidence I would need only to cite what happened during my first two hours on Russian soil, when a customs inspector opened my bag, found a couple of books and a file of photocopied articles I had brought along to work with, and after prolonged scrutiny and consultation with several colleagues, confiscated 57 of these pages and two books as "anti-soviet" material, which is indeed proscribed.

While these gentlemen were certainly not experts in American sovietology, they evidently read sufficient English to distinguish articles on Soviet politics from one on Soviet soccer, which they did not keep. Yet I cannot help noting the irony that prominent among the material they took was work by Seweryn Bialer, Stephen Cohen, and Jonathan Sanders, and a new book by Martin Walker, the *Manchester Guardian*'s Moscow correspondent, who was undoubtedly eating a quiet dinner only several miles away as his weighty words were being judged too dangerous to allow onto Soviet soil. Yes, it would be a simple matter to conclude that all is as it has always been in the land of the commissars.

This is, in fact, the conclusion that many readers and viewers in this country now must be drawing from the reports in our news media. There are exceptions, of course, but taken as a whole the press has tended to dismiss whatever changes it does report as little more than actions undertaken for their propaganda value in the West, their economic utility, or their usefulness in the struggle that all Soviet leaders are said to have to wage solely in the interest of consolidating their personal power.

This is a serious misreading of what Mikhail Gorbachev has set out to accomplish. We have had some two years to take his measure, and I think we now have grounds for believing that he has undertaken perhaps the final destalinization of Soviet life. Khrushchev began this process by eliminating mass terror as a tool of politics and by criticizing the personality cult developed by his predecessor. Now, several decades later, Mikhail Gorbachev appears determined to continue the long march through the institutions begun three decades ago.

Here is what he told the plenary session of the Communist Party Central Committee in January, for example, in the course of defining for it, and for the country, the meaning of what our press calls the "reforms" with which he is attempting to rouse the country. (We would understand more of what he has in mind if we were to speak, as he does, of "restructuring," or "reorganization," with a strong overtone of "renewal.") Here is part of what he had to say on the subject: "Reorganization is reliance on the creative endeavor of the masses, all-around extension of democracy and socialist self-government, encouragement of initiative and self-organized activities in all fields of public life, and high respect for the value and dignity of the individual." Talk is cheap, of course, but much of this does sound more like Reagan than Lenin. Both Reagan and Gorbachev, in fact, have been running and ruling on the same platform: the pledge to get government off our backs, to restore national pride, economic dynamism, and a sense of individual well-being. Gorbachev, of course, is not a Republican; he is a Marxist-Leninist. But I would argue that he bears watching precisely because he is in the process of redefining what, in practical terms, it means to be one.

Gorbachev is now attempting to encourage from the top the seizure of initiative by those at the bottom.

One of the ways we can tell that Gorbachev is up to something big is that signs of opposition to him have been visible everywhere, as the country obeys one of the fundamental laws of political life, no matter what the system, which is that action of any sort is met by an equal and opposite reaction. This is very much on the minds of the Soviets themselves. A year ago, in fact, one of those rumors swept through Moscow of the sort that periodically appear in all capital cities and that tell us less about the facts than about the state of mind of those whose business it is to govern, and who therefore find some meaning in repeating the story. This rumor, quite simply, was that Gor-

bachev, during a trip far to the east of Moscow, had been shot. Soon it was being said that Gorbachev had only been shot at, but that Raisa, his wife, had been wounded in the attempt, while he had escaped. Another version had both unscathed but their bodyguards dead. Moscow was plainly jittery.

More recently, Gorbachev's opposition—which rumors such as these implicitly acknowledge, although they do not describe—this opposition was given voice from the safe distance of Prague by the Czechoslovak leadership, known as among the most hard-line in the Eastern bloc. In February, in fact, in the midst of a state visit to the country by Marshal Sergei Sokolov, the Soviet defense minister, the secretary of the Czech Central Committee told the annual Ideology Congress that reform of communism was "a convenient cover for anti-socialist tendencies." He hoped, as he said, that Gorbachev did not intend to "change the fundamental rules of communism."

Gorbachev is depoliticizing culture and repoliticizing politics as an activity that gives priorities to values realized in the public sphere.

At about the same time, Alexander Bovin, a leading political commentator who is close to Gorbachev, wrote one of his very personal columns for *New Times*, recalling that as a young man he had taken heart from Khrushchev's reform proposals, but that "my generation and I watched with bewilderment, pain, and a disgusting sense of our own impotence as the ideas . . . kept seeping through the bureaucratic sand." Speaking of the present moment, he issued a warning that was still being discussed weeks later. "I cannot escape from the feeling," he said, "that we underestimate the scale and power of resistance that is opposed to our strategy."

One who does not underestimate it, incidentally, is Vladimir Posner, the Soviet journalist with the New York accent who has been appearing on American television for the last couple of years, and who co-hosted the Phil Donahue programs from Moscow. Criticized, if not reviled, on this side of the Atlantic by those who see him as nothing but a wily propagandist, Posner is, like many other Soviets, caught up in the present struggle over the fate of his country. "If Gorbachev loses, I'm dead. I'm just dead," he told me. He has cast his lot, publicly and repeatedly, with Gorbachev and the reformers, and he stands to lose a great deal (although not literally, any longer, his life) if the "progressives"—as they often refer to themselves—do, indeed, fail. It is a complex struggle in which they are engaged, and they are waging it on many fronts. It was the progressives, in fact, who resisted the suggestion that Soviet television show "Amerika," the ABC miniseries. They feared that seeing the program would only inflame anti-American sentiment, making it much more difficult for Gorbachev to reach the arms control agreements with the United States that he and they so clearly want and need.

Along with writers, intellectuals and professionals, representatives of the media have been strenuously courted by Gorbachev. The Soviet Union does not have a democratic politics, but it does have public opinion that carries some weight. From the first, Gorbachev let it be known that he was looking to journalists in particular to implement what has become known as glasnost, which is usually translated as "openness" but which in a literal sense means "voice-ness"—a new attribute of the Soviet system proposed by Gorbachev whereby it will literally have a voice. This has meant, in practice, repeated exhortations by Gorbachev and others in the leadership urging that the news media publish and broadcast bad news as well as good; resist secrecy claims, even if offered by the party; reform stereotyped party writing and argumentation; and, above all, try out new ideas. This is easier said than done, of course, and neither we nor Soviet journalists themselves know precisely what the limits of glasnost really are.

But aside from the extent of debate and degree of diversity in the press having in fact increased in response to this invitation, there is an additional, and fascinating, suggestion of just how radical this renewal could conceivably be when it comes to journalism and to political debate. This suggestion reportedly appeared in an announcement last winter that a special commission had been appointed to revise the penal code of the Russian republic and particularly to study Article 70, which proscribes "anti-soviet agitation and propaganda" and which has been used against a wide variety of dissidents and nonconformists. Although some circles in Moscow may be talking about its abolition, even its revision (along with a reduction in penalties for its violation) would send an important signal concerning the status of political speech within the Soviet system.

In fact, although you would not necessarily know it from our press, what I think is going on in the Soviet Union at this moment is a struggle to reinvent political discourse itself. This has happened before in modern Russian history. The events of 1917 revolutionized political speech and promised to create a meaningful political community, a public, for the first time in Russian history—a brief episode that was brought to an end as the Soviet state consolidated its power over civil society in the 1920s. As this happened, all spheres of life came to be charged with political meaning except

politics itself, which was actually depoliticized. "All forms of activity, whether economic, scientific, or cultural, were imbued with political meaning," Seweryn Bialer has written. But the political process itself was reduced to a question of "pure administration"—first under the control of one man and then under the guidance of the Party as a whole.

This is precisely the state of affairs that Gorbachev has set about to reverse. He is depoliticizing culture and, to a certain extent, the economy. And he is repoliticizing politics as an activity that gives priorities to values that will be realized in the public sphere. At its most radical, what this means is that he is encouraging the creation out of atomized public opinion (as expressed, for example, in the 2,000 letters that *Pravda* receives each day) of a true public, composed of individuals who sense their own collective power as the subject of history.

Of course, from Ivan the Terrible through Peter the Great to the Bolsheviks, significant change in Russian history has been a top-down affair. And so it is at this moment. But Gorbachev is now attempting to do something similar to what Mao attempted in China in the 1960s: to encourage from the top the seizure of initiative by those at the bottom. Mao lost control of the process during the Cultural Revolution. From all appearances, on the other hand, Gorbachev, working with the Russian people instead of the Chinese, acting on a society that has been ruled by a Communist Party for seven decades instead of two, is having some difficulty getting the process underway. That is why the press plays such an important role in the new scheme of things—simply because it is only through the press that he can appeal directly to Party cadres and to members of the public at large.

Given the state of the Soviet press, however, doing so is a formidable task. The Soviet press has been a blunt instrument designed for other work, not to promote political discourse but, on the whole, to squelch it. Gorbachev has put new people in control, met with journalists, exhorted them to greater activity and greater responsibility, and this activity has produced modest results. People who had long ago given up reading *Pravda* now eagerly scan it for the latest news. *Ogonyok*, a weekly pictorial literary magazine, now disappears from the newsstands the day it appears because its editor, V. A. Korotich, has become something of a political avatar.

Moscow News, once nothing but a propaganda sheet, has now become a principal outlet for the new thinking. To fulfill this role, however, it is having to reinvent the rules of political discourse and to teach them to its readers. This means, for example, that while the paper can now print a half-page interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security adviser to Jimmy Carter, it must explain why it is doing so, since readers do not yet fully understand the new discursive rules governing political debate. And so the paper introduced the interview with a short lesson in journalism when it ran in February. "The unwritten journalist's law does not allow the interviewer to argue with the interviewee," the paper noted in an introduction printed in large type. "The reporter's function is to ask questions and report the answers with maximum accuracy."

As you might imagine, not everybody likes the new rules. The same issue of the paper, as a matter of fact, carried a letter to the editor from a man who identified himself as a Party member since 1939 and criticized "political errors in the ideological stance of the newspaper," warning that "glasnost needs wisdom." In the long reply, the editor, Yegor Yakovlev, an important voice in Moscow, admitted that his newspaper could not now avoid irritating "a certain group of people." The reader thought he was complaining about the newspaper, he wrote, but he was actually complaining about the times. "A battle of ideas is under way," he continued, now referring to the joke that everyone had heard, but this reader would rather "take a seat in a train, pull down the curtain, imagine movement, and throw accusations at everyone who is trying to take him out of this state."

"This letter," he went on, "indicates that it is absolutely necessary and extremely urgent for us to learn democracy. To learn to work in conditions of unfolding democracy. To learn that democracy which makes it possible to see people with an opposite point of view as worthy opponents and not to brand them as enemies."

This is the process by which political discourse—indeed, politics itself—is now being recreated in the USSR. By our standards there is much yet to be done, and I suspect that this is true by Gorbachev's, as well. But these are important developments, and observing from afar this attempt to renew Soviet politics, it strikes me that these events impose upon us a parallel obligation within our own political system: to reexamine our own discourse about the Soviet Union. For it is only by comprehending what is taking place there that we will be able to recognize the possibilities for moderating our geopolitical competition, managing the nuclear threat, and avoiding the war that I hope no one wants. □

Gorbachev bears watching because he is in the process of redefining what it means to be a Marxist-Leninist.

THOUGHTS
ON PEACE AND SECURITY

July/August 1987, Volume 3, Number 4

The Changing Strategic Environment

For almost forty years, East-West confrontation has followed a fairly consistent pattern, composed of differing political systems and ideologies, opposing military alliances, and an adversarial relationship of friends *vs* enemies. Trade, cultural and scientific exchanges, and people-to-people interchanges have never been extensive, and always sensitive to the general political and military climate. Though waxing and waning in intensity, East-West relations have generally been marked by mutual suspicion and hostility, military and economic competition in other parts of the world, and an arms race. Dominant in all of this have been the two superpowers, their nuclear arsenals, and the concept of nuclear deterrence.

It has often been difficult to imagine how, in purely practical terms, this strategic environment could be altered. Recently, however, a different East-West relationship has become at least conceivable, if still far from a reality.

Both superpowers appear to be in decline

Some changes are taking place gradually. Both superpowers, for instance, appear to be in decline, increasingly less able to dominate their respective alliances, economically and politically. There is also a growing feeling, both in and out of governments, that the present strategic structure cannot continue without precipitating a nuclear war. Perceptually, while both sides still regard each other suspiciously, they are becoming much more accessible to and interested in each other, with a concomitant breakdown in simplistic "enemy" images.

Much more rapid and basic change, however, could come from the initiatives of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Policies like "glasnost" are accelerating changes in perception and increasing opportunities for East-West exchange. His concessions on arms negotiations are making actual reductions possible. But, most important, his declarations about the future offer the prospect of deeper revisions in the very structure of East-West relations.

What all this could lead to is some form of common security, in which there is an institutionalized system of cooperation in military and related matters between the two sides. Essential to common security is the belief, on the part of each opponent, that it cannot unilaterally provide security for itself, but can attain it only by assuring the security of its would-be adversary. On the strength of this conviction, the relationship is managed by a regime of mutual agreements about such things as weapons limits, force deployments, and procedures for verification, establishing norms and definitions, reaching consensus about future changes, the interpretation of past agreements, and the like.

Unlike arms control, which usually becomes a means of regulating an ongoing arms race, an "East-West cooperative strategic regime," as it is sometimes called, has a built-in incentive to reduce rather than to increase arms. On the other hand, such an arrangement is not the same as general and complete disarmament, either. Although considerable disarmament would be an integral feature of it, and would be, in fact, much easier because of it, a cooperative regime has as much to do with reforming the management of military forces in place as it has with removing them. On the short term, such a regime is far more attainable and, in fact, is surely a necessary step along any path that leads to more general disarmament.

There has already been considerable experience with this approach in specific circumstances. When the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty was signed in 1972, it provided for a Standing Consultative Commission, made up of a small number of technical experts from the two superpowers, who quietly ironed out day-to-day difficulties in interpreting the treaty, issues of compliance, etc. The more recent Stockholm agreement on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe furnishes a second example of multilateral management. Among other things, it requires that major troop movements be declared in advance, that military exercises be subject to on-site inspection, and that various kinds of military data be accessible to the other side. The verification regime of the new intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) treaty, if ratified by the U.S. Senate, will furnish yet another element in what could grow into a comprehensive regime.

However, there remain some major questions. Will the United States respond positively to such overtures from the Soviet Union? Is Mr. Gorbachev sincere? If he is, can he rally his country behind him? If the answer to any of these is "no", there is much less hope for change, at least for a while.

SHARED FATE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

by Robert Jay Lifton

Robert Jay Lifton, psychiatrist and noted author, was one of several speakers at SANE's forum on the ABC miniseries "Amerika," held on February 18 at the National Press Club in Washington, DC. He is the author of the National Book Award winner "Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima" and, most recently, "Nazi Doctors." A selection from his remarks that evening follows.

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Whenever arms control is seriously discussed in this country, you always hear someone say that we shouldn't appease the Soviet Union now, as we appeased Nazi Germany at Munich. But I've just finished a study on Nazi doctors and published a book by that name, and I take a different lesson from Munich and World War II and the Nazis. The appeasement at Munich consisted of lacking both the courage and the imagination to confront evil and danger. Evil and danger now reside in nuclear weaponry and the entire wiring of the doomsday system of nuclear weapons throughout the world. The direct equivalent of appeasement today would be the failure to take bold and imaginative action against that danger.

Nuclear weapons stockpiles are dangerous, obviously, because of their explosive power. They are also dangerous because they are invariably accompanied by scenarios of winning. No matter how much we take in about the truth of nuclear winter and the destructive power of nuclear weapons—that, in fact, there can be no winning—we always have a scenario of winning. The scenario proceeds on three different levels.

One level is winning the arms race by bankrupting your adversary. The trouble with this scenario is that their budget seems to be in no worse shape than ours.

The second level is winning the actual nuclear war. That means fighting a limited nuclear war and prevailing. What a wonderful word—"prevailing." People in power still haven't realized that the only way to prevail in a nuclear war is not to fight in a nuclear war.

The third level is winning the battle for survival. You've seen those survivalist groups out in northern Idaho and in nearby places. They are not just survivalists. They are also neo-Nazis, Nazis with a difference. Their plan is that, following a nuclear holocaust, which they welcome, they will impose a Nazi system on the United States. Then there are these fundamentalists who literally see the nuclear holocaust as biblical realization and, more than that, as specifically equated with the Second Coming. What a tragic and convoluted image—taking a great spiritual vision and equating it with the most corrupt and evil sort of action that could destroy all of humankind and its works.

We have to reject all three scenarios. I want to say just a word about consciousness and imagination, what we are expected to believe and what we have to reject. For a long time, Herman Kahn and the scenario writers and strategists had the nation convinced that normal, reasonable behavior consisted of planning and anticipating limited (or not-so-limited) nuclear wars—and to protest that idea was unreasonable, abnormal, and in some way aberrant.

Now there is a new image of normality, one presented in a book edited by some of the leading figures of Harvard University, called *Living with Nuclear Weapons*. That outrageous book, outrageous intellectually and morally, ends with the statement that we have to learn to live with nuclear weapons and we have to learn to risk nuclear war if that becomes necessary. Let's be moderate, they say, don't build too many weapons and make it dangerous; but also, don't get rid of too many weapons, let's be cautious.

Then along comes Star Wars with the great promise of a shield in the heavens. Isn't it abnormal and unreasonable to refuse the protection of a shield? Well, I'll say very little about Star Wars except that we have had this illusion, but in piecemeal, before: the illusion of protection, the illusion of preparation for nuclear war with evacuation plans or protection with fallout shelters, the illusion of stoic behavior under attack and, above all, the illusion of recovery. Now they have rolled all these into one great grand illusion: Star Wars, the grand illusion of our time. It is a crusade, a Sisyphian crusade, because its central element is a falsehood, denial of the truth of the nuclear age, which is absolute, total vulnerability.

The next time somebody says to you, "What about the Russians?" I suggest you answer something like this—the answer is not ideological, it is really pragmatic—the answer is, "If they die, we die. If they survive, we survive." Shared fate. Shared fate is the beginning of something else more profound, what I call the species self—a sense of self in the true psychological sense of being bound up with every other single self, individually and collectively, on the globe. The beginnings of that growing awareness have been forced upon us by our technology of destruction. It doesn't mean I stop being an American or, in my case, a psychiatrist, a Jew, a fanatical tennis player, a sometime bird cartoonist, a father, a husband, and a few of the other things my enemies have called me. But it does mean that each of these becomes combined with a sense of species self that is bound up with all other selves in the universe. I think that is an important psychological process to cultivate. A sense of shared fate and of the species self, psychologically and politically, is an idea whose time has come.

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Arms and the Men

The news of the arms control agreement shone like the proverbial candle in the night. It was not the end of the arms race—only a few thousand missiles removed in a sea of many thousands more—but the symbolism was enormous. At least the direction was down, not up; and the manner in which the agreement was concluded had a degree of professionalism as well as an absence of the political grandstanding that had marred previous attempts. Each of the two national leaders could rightfully claim substantial credit and, at the same time, each was pushed by historical forces to adjust to positions that were a long way from what he had initially demanded.

No one will claim that this first step will by itself bring permanent peace, but it is reassuring that the two leaders are not talking just about this agreement but also about the next steps needed to exploit the positive atmosphere. In this development, however, some realism in regard to the limitations of arms control and the true causes of wars had better be introduced.

One horror in the nuclear age, improbable but realistic enough to cause millions of dollars to be spent and to require eternal vigilance, is the preemptive strike. A plethora of arms widely dispersed decreases the likelihood of success for a first strike; therefore, one could argue that reducing arms increases the temptation for such an act. However, there are still so many arms so widely deployed that the surgical strike is likely to fail. Even the most hardened military professional could not expect his glistening hardware to operate perfectly when a German youth flies into Red Square or the U.S.S. *Stark* fails to defend itself against a routine attack.

The second and more probable scenario is a step-by-step escalation to Armageddon. The Falklands war was a model and warning of this danger: Country A grabs a little real estate, reasoning that Country B could not possibly care about some acres of farmland and a few sheep; Country B replies with diplomatic thunder, "Get out or else!" reasoning that tiny Country A will buckle under to threatening words from a larger military power. From that point on, the rhetoric becomes louder and fleets mobilize until both sides discover to their horror that they must act out their words or lose all credibility at home and with allies. Such an escalation could easily occur in the Middle East, Europe, or Central America. The fact that it has not happened so far between major powers may be because of the prospect of a nuclear holocaust, which has kept the peace among such powers for the longest period of modern times. Those living on a precipice become more cautious about a misstep. Ironically, arms control may enhance the chance of war if nations conclude that they can be more reckless now that we have returned to what might be called the comfortable old world of conventional warfare.

Arms control, therefore, offers a step back from the precipice that we cannot afford to waste. It will be valuable only if we seek to understand and defuse the causes of war. One of the problems of our times is the fact that designing military hardware presents such intriguing intellectual challenges: cruise missiles, satellite photography, submarine detection—marvelous scientific challenges with elegant solutions. Understanding aggressive behavior, global economic pressure, and nationalistic pride is far more difficult and less likely to lead to clean, brilliant solutions. Yet studies on those topics must be attempted if we are to maintain and enlarge our fragile peace.

A penetrating economic analysis might well show that mutual reduction in the number of troops together with a guarantee of open markets gives a far better bottom-line return than any conquest of territories. In-depth psychological studies could possibly tell us that proper education can direct national pride from jingoistic competition to constructive cooperation. A treaty of the future, therefore, might require the exchange of information between peoples, perhaps through television programs, just as the countries of the world now exchange ambassadors.

Utopian? Yes. But no more fantastic than sending photographs back from Mars, synthesizing cholesterol in the laboratory, or diagramming genes. We might even learn to understand ourselves, once it becomes clear that it is the only way that we are going to survive.—DANIEL E. KOSHLAND, JR.

Missile Defense Systems

The following is an excerpt from "A Conversation with Andrei Sakharov and Elena Bonner" published in SIPIscope, Vol. 15, No. 2, June/July 1987, pp.7-8. The conversation took place in Moscow May 28, 1987, with Alan McGowan, President of The Scientists' Institute for Public Information.

Q: You have publicly opposed SDI. Can you outline your views?

Sakharov: I feel very negatively about the creation of SDI by either the United States or the USSR. I feel such a system cannot be effective. It would be destroyed very early in a war, even before the thermonuclear stage is reached. Moreover, the destruction of SDI could provoke a thermonuclear response. Destroying SDI is much simpler technically than creating it. The system would have a relatively small number of observation stations that would be very vulnerable. Some projects employ mirrors, but they too, would be vulnerable.

As for systems that would be deployed after an attack—x-ray lasers and so on—they would be rendered ineffective just by shortening boost-phase time. Studies show that by cutting boost-phase time in half, missiles would not be able to respond in time.

Until SDI is deployed, space will remain international. But recently, Gorbachev said in a speech that so-called "near-earth space" over the territory of the Soviet Union could be declared to be in Soviet jurisdiction. So if SDI platforms pass through that part of space, the Soviet Union would feel justified in knocking them down.

SDI will introduce new elements into the question of space law. But that's only one side of the issue. SDI is not cost-effective. Neutralizing SDI will cost the Soviet Union significantly less than it will cost the United States to deploy it, and the Soviet Union will no longer be bound by conventions like SALT-1, SALT-2, and other arms control agreements. This is another way that SDI is provocative and will make the situation more perilous. You cannot say that the danger is just for the Soviet Union or just for the United States. The danger is common. That's why I feel it's a very bad idea.

All this was perfectly clear back in1972 when the ABM treaty was concluded. Both sides felt that an anti-missile defense would be destabilizing and that it had to be limited. I think that in order to cut through this knot of diplomatic, psychological, and strategic issues, the Soviet side must decide the question of disarmament independently of SDI. SDI will inevitably die its own death if the Soviet Union takes this position. It is a mistake for the USSR to tie it into a "package" with other proposals for arms control.

> "I do not feel that defensive systems, and certainly not those on such a grand scale as SDI, serve a stabilizing function."

Q: Is it your belief that any kind of ballistic missile defense would be destabilizing?

Sakharov: I do not feel that defensive systems, and certainly not those on such a grand scale as SDI, serve a stabilizing function. As for offensive systems, they too have destabilizing factors; in particular, in the Soviet Union, the vast majority of nuclear potential is concentrated on ICBMs [Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles]. Now that multiple warheads have been created, MIRVs [Multiple Independent Re-Entry Vehicles] could destroy almost all of the Soviet Union's ICBMs. This situation has arisen from the deployment of MIRVs. ICBMs have become an important destabilizing factor. The Soviet leaders could be afraid that unexpectedly all their ICBMs will be destroyed, and they will be left unarmed. This fear could push the Soviet Union into using their ICBMs for a first strike.

Thus, the current technological situation could provoke the USSR into launching a first strike. I think that the nuclear stockpile is too large. It can be cut in half and still retain the guarantee of mutual annihilation. The Soviet Union should scrap its ICBMs. If the Soviet Union would scrap its ICBMs in order to reduce the number of its strategic weapons, and replaces them with mobile missiles, which are not first-strike weapons, that would be beneficial.

When I was working on the hydrogen bomb, I was working toward those goals that I considered incredibly important. Now we have the situation of guaranteed, mutual annihilation. While everyone agrees that this is a dangerous and unstable situation, it has for some time kept the world from a third world war. We are now in a very difficult transition period in which we will try to use political means to achieve a lasting peace without nuclear weapons. For that, the openness of Soviet society is very important.

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

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