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(The following is an excerpt from "The Overreaching Reagan Doctrine" by Christopher Layne, from The Wall Street Journal 4/15/87):

Iran-contra happened because the Reagan Doctrine's backers were not willing to live with the outcome of the democratic process. It was not an aberration, it was a scandal waiting to happen. A policy of ultimate ends legitimizes the use of any means, and the doctrine's underlying ideological ethos led its adherents to believe they had a monopoly on defining the true national interest. They thought they were justified in arrogating to themselves the right to ignore political and legal norms in the pursuit of morally transcendant objectives; something as vital as the crusade against communism was not to be hampered by such abstract notions as the popular will or constitutional propriety. . . .

. . . No principle in American political discourse permits the governing elite to claim openly it knows better than the people what is best for the country. . . .

. . . Moralistic, crusading foreign policies like the Reagan Doctrine instill in policy makers a hubris whence disasters like Iran-contra spring. When policy makers place their personal convictions above their constitutional responsibilities, they do more than discredit themselves and their aims. They disturb, as Taft pointed out, the considered allocation of responsibilities among the branches of government that the Founders laid out for the type of nation they had in mind.

Mr. Layne, a Los Angeles lawyer, has written widely on foreign policy. He is an adjunct scholar of the Cato Institute.

(The following is an excerpt from Richard Reeves' column appearing July 28, 1987 in the Santa Barbara News-Press, p.A7):

The lies-are-truth, truth-is-lies nature of Poindexter's public reasoning was captured during questioning by Sam Nunn, the senator from Georgia.

"After reading the denials by the White House issued since your testimony, do you still believe the president would have approved the decision (to divert Iran arms sales proceeds to the Contras) if you had asked him?"

"I do . . ."

"So the denials from the White House have had no effect on your testimony?"

"No, they have not."

"That means, admiral, you must believe the White House is now misleading the American people."

"No, I, I . . . I don't think so."

"How can it not be?"

"At this point I can't speak for the White House. I don't know what they've got in mind over there."

"Well, I would just observe, admiral, and you can refute this if you like, the White House statements directly contradict your testimony, and you're standing by your testimony, so your testimony directly contradicts the White House statements."

"That is correct. That appears to be obvious . . ."

That dialogue might have challenged the imagination of George Orwell. Perhaps Poindexter, calculating or fantasizing his own coup d'etat, had scripting help from Lewis Carroll. I did not know whether to laugh or cry.

(The following is quoted from James Reston's column appearing August 4, 1987 in the Santa Barbara News-Press):

"If this no-fault government the people chose not once but twice were any better we wouldn't deserve it, and if it were any worse, we couldn't bear it."

(NOTE: This article appeared nearly 20 years ago. It is reprinted now courtesy of Theodora Cogley Farrell)

U.S. 'salvationism' seen leading to disasters

WHAT BEGINS as "mystique" ends as "politique," the French Catholic writer Charles Peguy once said. That, I believe, is what has happened to the American commitment to worldwide responsibility made in the wake of the Second World War.

John Cogley

Our original motivation was idealistically propelled, a determination to rebuild the broken world, share the benefits of our own technical progress, and lay the groundwork for security and peace everywhere. Because of the Communist drive for ideological expansion, however, we found ourselves engaged in the cold war almost before the program got under way.

In no time the way to sell an idealistic program, whether the Marshall Plan or wheat for India, was to insist on its anti-Communist value. In time, military assistance and support were all out of proportion to the amount spent on reconstructing have-not nations. The Pentagon grew in power and gradually, slowly, almost imperceptibly, America became a military-minded nation.

Now, less than 25 years after the greatest war in history, we are a changed people. Everything is being sacrificed to the ambiguous claims of the military. Our cities are rotting at the core while our wealth is being poured into a military venture thousands of miles away. Our youth more and more are becoming alienated from the nation's purposes, while we carry out the self-imposed task of telling the rest of the world how to live and arm any kind of government that will do our bidding. We are on the verge of a disastrous civil war at home while our main effort is going into expanding a civil war abroad.

Somewhere along the line, a preoccupation with security was allowed to grow into an obsession. The slogans and myths of the cold war were turned into policy; genuine concern for the freedom of others was transformed into the idea that we Americans infallibly know what is best for people everywhere. A sincere desire to keep peace in the world was changed into a kind of self-righteous salvationism.

RECENTLY I heard a Vietnamese spokesman say that his nation's greatest need is to be "saved from salvation." What he meant was that our efforts to preserve Vietnam from the fate that by our official accounting would be the most dire thing that could happen to it, has led to the destruction of that country; nothing, he said, could be worse than the ordeal our brand of salvation has brought about.

Ironically, as the emphasis on militarism has grown in the United States and the stockpiles have grown, the nation has actually become less powerful.

The "most powerful nation in the world" is now bogged down in a struggle with a tiny country of undereducated, underdeveloped, underfed peasants, and there is no end in sight. We are terrified at the thought of having to fulfill military commitments in other trouble spots in the world -- Korea, the Middle East, Latin America. We are in fact at the mercy of undereducated, underdeveloped, underfed peasants around the globe. We may be as "secure" as our obsessive accumulation of nuclear weapons promised to make us, but there is no promise that our children, their children, or even their children will not be faced with conscription, warfare, even death in some far-off place as they reach maturity. Some security, that.

The fact is we have imperceptibly become a militaristic people and have suffered the brutalization that inevitably accompanies militarization.

Three decades ago we were horrified and shocked by the brutalities of the Spanish Civil War. Today we watch equally barbarous behavior on television carried out under U.S. auspices -- and then calmly return to our martinis. We read about military operations carried out by our own forces and the development of fiendish weapons by our technologists and scientists -- and flip quickly to the sports pages. The death of women and children is dismissed without anguish as the inevitable cost of carrying out our salvationist purposes.

The only problems we recognize are those caused by the protests against this moral madness. No matter how wicked the weapon developed, how outrageous the military operation carried out, how much carnage we leave along the salvation trail, our official apologists are ready to condone them. The "others" are just as bad, we hear -- or they would be just as bad if they had the power to carry out their own evil desires. What choice, then, do we have?

Self-deception, the blunting of moral sensibilities, self-righteousness, moral blindness have infected us with their deadly virus.

The trouble is that we still think of ourselves as virtuous by definition. Something that would be horrendous in others becomes good when we do it; an act, like the dropping of the atom bomb, that would put others outside the pale of civilized men becomes morally acceptable when we carry it out. Our behavior is no longer measured by any standard beyond the soothing definition of ourselves as a nobly motivated people with lofty purposes.

We have gone a long way down the road to corruption since 1945. In a certain bitter sense, it might be said that we were defeated by our enemies--the fascists, Nazis, Japanese militarists, and Communist ideologues we overcame.

Our rhetoric now has an imperialistic flavor, subtly mixed with homegrown pietism, that would not be wholly unfamiliar to the Italians of Mussolini's day. We share more than we are ready to admit with the Nazis, who intended to build "a thousand years of peace" by superior force. Our present trust in military power would find sympathizers among the Japanese militarists who bombed Pearl Harbor. Our Anti-Communism, uppercased as it has been institutionalized in the military-industrial-university complex that keeps the armaments factories humming, has become no less ideological than the perverse movement that gave rise to it.

The big difference is that we still have the freedom to write columns like this one. There is, then, still hope, because there is nothing deliberately evil about the turn American life has taken. We haven't chosen militarization and brutalization as much as we have slipped into them, with the mindless innocence so often characteristic of individual corruption.

NOTEBOOK

(Reprinted from Harper's Magazine May 1987, pp. 8-11, with permission of the Editor)

Fade to black

By Lewis H. Lapham

The public good requires us to betray, and to lie, and to massacre: let us resign this commission to those who are more pliable, and more obedient.

—Montaigne

As expected, the Tower Commission's report depicted the President of the United States as a matinee idol held captive by his retinue of zealous, vain, and remarkably inept subalterns. Although muffled in the language of bureaucratic euphemism, the text makes it plain enough that President Reagan knew as much about the Iranian arms deals as he knows about the dark side of the moon. The National Security Council did as it pleased—trading weapons for hostages, ignoring whatever laws it didn't care to understand, furnishing the President with the lies that he obligingly and uncomprehendingly read into the television cameras.

If with regard to the habitual somnambulism of the Reagan Administration the report confirmed what had been obvious for some years, it raised further and more difficult questions about the paranoid mechanics of any American presidency. Why is it that so many seemingly enlightened politicians (a.k.a. "the leaders of the free world") insist on making mockeries of their own dearest beliefs? How does it happen that they repeatedly entangle themselves in the coils of scandal and the nets of crime? How does it come to pass that President Kennedy approves the doomed invasion at the Bay of Pigs and sets in motion the idiot *Realpolitik* of the Vietnam War, or that President Johnson sponsors the escalation of that war with the contrived incident in the Tonkin Gulf, or that President Nixon orders the secret bombing of Cambodia and entrusts his reputation to the incompetent thugs sent to rifle a desk at the Watergate?

At least some of the answers follow from two sets of fantastic expectations assigned to the office of the presidency.

1. *The two governments.* In response to the popular but utterly implausible belief that it can provide all things to all people, the American political system allows for the parallel sovereignty of both a permanent and a provisional government. The permanent government—the Congress, the civil and military services, the media, the legion of Washington lawyers and expensive lobbyists—occupies the anonymous hierarchies that remain safely in place no matter what the political truths voted in and out of the White House on the trend of a season. It is this government—sly and patient and slow—that writes the briefing papers and the laws, presides over the administrative routine, remembers who bribed whom in the election of 1968, and why President Carter thought it prudent to talk privately to God about the B-1 bomber.

Except in the rare moments of jointly opportune interest, the permanent government wages a ceaseless war of bureaucratic attrition against the provisional government that once every four or eight years accompanies a newly elected president to Washington. The amateur government consists of the cadre of ideologues, cronies, plutocrats, and academic theorists miraculously transformed into Cabinet officials and White House privy counselors. Endowed with the virtues of free-booting adventurers, the *parvenu* statesmen can be compared with reasonable accuracy either to a troupe of actors or to a swarm of thieves. They possess the talents and energies necessary to the winning of elections. Although admirable, these are not the talents and energies useful to the conduct of international diplomacy.

An American presidential campaign resembles a forced march through enemy country, and the president's companions-in-arms—whether Robert Kennedy, John Mitchell, Hamilton Jordan, or William Casey—inevitably prove to be the sort of people who know how to set up advance publicity in a shopping mall, how to counterfeit a political image or bully a congressman, how to buy a vote or rig a stock price. They seldom know anything of history, of languages, of literature, of political economy, and they lack the imaginative intelligence that might allow them to understand any system of value that can't be learned in a football stadium or a used-car lot.

The president and his confederates inherit a suite of empty rooms. The media like to pretend that the White House is an august and stately institution, the point at which all the lines of power converge, the still center of the still American universe. The people who occupy the place discover that the White House bears a more credible resemblance to a bare stage or an abandoned cruise ship. The previous tenants have removed everything of value—the files, the correspondence, the telephone numbers, the memorabilia on the walls. The new repertory company begins at the beginning, setting up its own props and lights, arranging its own systems of communications and theory of command, hoping to sustain, at least long enough for everybody to

profit from the effect, the illusion of coherent power.

All other American institutions of any consequence (the Chase Manhattan Bank, say, or the Pentagon) rely on the presence of senior officials who remember what happened twenty years ago when somebody else—equally ambitious, equally new—proposed something equally foolish. But the White House is barren of institutional memory. Maybe an old butler remembers that President Eisenhower liked sugar in his tea, but nobody remembers the travel arrangements for the last American expedition to Iran.

Because everybody in the White House arrives at the same time (all of them contemporaries in their newfound authority), nobody, not even Nancy Reagan, can invent the pomp and majesty of a traditional protocol. The ancient Romans at least had the wit to provide their triumphant generals with a word of doubt. The general was allowed to ride through the streets of the capital at the head of a procession of captured slaves, but the Senate assigned a magistrate to stand behind him in the chariot, holding the wreath over his head and muttering into his ear the constant reminder that he was mortal. But who in the White House can teach the lessons of humility?

Within a week of its arrival in Washington, the provisional government learns that the world is a far more dangerous place than anybody had thought possible as recently as two months ago, when the candidate was reciting the familiar claptrap about the Russians to an airport crowd somewhere south of Atlanta. Alarmed by the introductory briefings at the Defense Department, the amateur statesmen feel impelled to take bold stands, to make good on their campaign promises, to act.

Being as impatient as they are vain, they know they have only a short period of time in which to set up their profitable passage back into the private sector (i.e., to make their deals with a book publisher, a consulting business, or a brokerage firm), and so they're in a hurry to make their fortunes and their names. Almost immediately they find themselves checked by the inertia of the permanent government, by the congressional committees, by the maze of prior agreements, by the bureaucrats who bring up the niggling reasons why a thing can't be done.

Sooner or later, usually sooner, the sense of frustration incites the president's men to "take it inside" or "move it across the street," and so they make of the National Security Council or the White House basement the seat of "a loyal government" blessed with the will to dare and do. The decision inevitably entails the subversion of the law and excites the passion for secrecy. The technological possibilities presented by the available back channels, map overlays, and surveillance techniques tempt the would-be Metternichs to succumb to the dreams of omnipotence. Pretty soon they start speaking in code, and before long American infantrymen begin to turn up dead in the jungles of Vietnam or the streets of Beirut.

2. *The will to innocence.* Every administration has no choice but to confront the world's violence and disorder, but the doctrines of American grace oblige it to do so under the banners of righteousness and in the name of one or another of the fanciful pretexts ("democracy," "civilization," "humanity," "the people," etc.) that preserve the conscience of the American television audience. The electorate expects its presidential candidates to feign the clean-limbed idealism of college sophomores, to present themselves as honest and good-natured fellows who know nothing of murder, ambition, lust, selfishness, cowardice, or greed. The pose of innocence is as mandatory as the ability to eat banquet food. Nobody can afford to say, with Talleyrand, that he's in it for the money, or, with Montaigne, that a statesman must deny himself, at least during business hours, the luxuries of conscience and sentiment.

After having been in office no more than a few months, the provisional government no longer knows when it's telling the truth. The need to preserve the illusion of innocence gets confused with the dream of power, and the resident fantasts come to believe their own invented reality—the one they made out of smoke and colored lights when they first arrived in Washington.

During the early years of the Reagan Administration, the President's advisers were wise enough to remember that they had been hired to work on a theatrical production. They staged military pageants in the Caribbean, the eastern Mediterranean, and New York harbor, sustained the illusion of economic prosperity with money borrowed from the Japanese, dressed up the chicanery of their politics in the sentiment of Broadway musicals. They were as lucky as they were clever, and for a surprisingly long time their enemies in the permanent government stood willing to judge the show a success.

The media's applause prompted the President and his companions to mistake the world behind the footlights for the world outside the theater. Flattered by a claque of increasingly belligerent and literal-minded ideologues (among them Vice Admiral John Poindexter, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, and Patrick Buchanan) and encouraged by the pretensions of his wife, Reagan came to imagine himself a real, not a make-believe, president. He took to wearing his costume in the street, delivering his lines to passing strangers (among them Mikhail Gorbachev and the Ayatollah Khomeini) with the fond expectation that they would respond with dialogue appropriate to the scene. The most recent reports from Washington suggest that he apparently believed he was leading a Republican renaissance in America, that he had gathered around him not a gang of petty charlatans but a host of selfless idealists, and that in exchange for a Bible and a key-shaped cake, the Iranian despotism would abide by the rules of decorum in effect at the Los Angeles Country Club.

Despite having been repeatedly warned of his possible assassination that last weekend in November 1963, President Kennedy went to Dallas in the firm belief that he couldn't be killed. President Reagan invited the Tower Commission to examine his nonexistent foreign policy and his sentimental variations on the theme of America the Beautiful in the belief that his enemies would accept his ignorance as proof of his virtue. ■

(Reprinted from the Toronto Globe and Mail May 27, 1987)

Contras' deeds don't match noise

MANAGUA

PAUL KNOX

In NICARAGUA

"OUR PLAN," contra leader Adolfo Calero said on Jan. 7, "is to be . . . like a good guerrilla army, everywhere and nowhere throughout Nicaragua, to bring about consciousness of the war to the civilian population."

"In two months," contra leader Indalecio Rodriguez said on Feb. 6, "all the fighters will be inside Nicaragua, then all the operations will be conducted there."

"The destruction of electrical pylons will continue," contra leader Enrique Bermudez said on April 4, "because we are going to paralyze the country in this way, since the Sandinista regime has not given the people the right to paralyze it in a civil manner."

Five months into 1987, most of the contras have indeed infiltrated into Nicaragua from their haven in neighboring Honduras. But these U.S.-financed marauders have been thwarted in their efforts to establish forward bases there, and they are a long way from paralyzing anything.

In March, it was made known in Washington that the Central Intelligence Agency had given the contras plans of bridges, dams, telephone exchanges and power stations. Since then, the rebels have damaged several hydro-electric substations and some chemical storage tanks.

Otherwise, there is little new about their activities. The standard contra attack is still a raid on a farming co-operative in which militiamen and perhaps a few unarmed civilians are killed.

Contra chief Bermudez, a former colonel in the National Guard of dictator Anastasio Somoza, implied that power lines were a target equal to the contras' abilities, and the suggestion seemed reasonable. "Surely anybody can blow up a power pole," a European diplomat said.

Well, not necessarily. Four contras were killed last week trying to do something similiar. The idea was evidently to cut the telephone service to the town of Rama, at the end of the strategic road running through south central Nicaragua. But the rebels were surprised by a Sandinista patrol and routed after a brief skirmish.

The Government failed to cover itself with glory, however. It put out the word in Managua that the rebel group had been trying to blow up a bridge on the Rama Road.

Even if unsuccessful, that would have been a significant step. But it turned out to be a flight of fancy on the part of someone in the army information office. The incident left at least one Canadian correspondent a day older and a good deal wiser about the Sandinistas' propaganda capabilities.

From a strictly logistical point of view, it would make sense for the contras to forget about the big targets until they had the skills and the popular support to carry them off. But despite Mr. Calero's comment about being "everywhere and nowhere," they are not really interested in the classic guerrilla strategy of building support for a political program that in turn nourishes their military effectiveness.

Instead, their campaign is oriented toward continuing the U.S. aid that launched it in the first place. And with that issue set to come before the U.S. Congress again in September, the contras want to show they can produce results.

The fact is, however, that there are not really very many military targets in Nicaragua. Half a dozen regional barracks, military headquarters in Managua, a port or two and a couple of airfields would just about complete the list.

And in this underdeveloped, sparsely populated country there aren't all that many important economic targets. Half the households have no running water. Telephones are non-existent or virtually useless outside Managua and half a dozen other centres. Power lines reach all but the smallest towns, but they are easily repaired if severed.

Nipping around the fringes of Nicaragua, the contras can make some noise. But the targets that would make a difference are hard to attack. Under pressure to show their strength, the rebels risk living beyond their military means.

(The following is quoted from "The Four Pillars" by Richard J. Barnet, from The New Yorker March 9, 1987, p.86):

"Sometimes we talk about the campaign of economic warfare and military operations against Nicaragua as if it were a crusade for good government. But if that were the motive, and this nation had a mandate to remake other nations, there are at least forty or fifty countries that should be considered for our attentions ahead of Nicaragua."

"New thinking" in the Kremlin

Internal debate on the nuclear testing moratorium provides evidence of the controversy stirred within the Soviet leadership by Gorbachev's political efforts to reduce confrontation with the West.

by Franklyn Griffiths

A CHANGED EMPHASIS in Soviet thinking about security has begun to unfold under the slogan of "new political thinking." By the time of the twenty-seventh Soviet Communist Party Congress in February 1986, the Soviet leadership had evidently decided to give greater weight to the political element in their military doctrine. Indeed, at the Congress Gorbachev made some unusual specific references to this doctrine. Possibly recognizing that it had contributed to or was being used in the West to heighten the image of the Soviet Union as a nuclear war-fighting state, he claimed that Soviet military doctrine was defensive and wholly consistent with Soviet efforts to build international security and to rid the world of nuclear weapons.[1] These words, which might be dismissed as designed largely for foreign consumption, nevertheless demand respect in the Soviet Union. In associating military doctrine directly with the Soviet state's *political* efforts to reduce confrontation, the leadership may have reduced the ability of the professional military, the near-monopolists of military-technical expertise, to shape the discussion of national security policy. By the same token, it may have opened the way to a widened policy role for civilian analysts of international security affairs.

Initiated as an official theme in Gorbachev's address to the French Parliament in 1985 and affirmed in his report to the party Congress, the "new" thinking about security has certain Soviets now speaking the language of Western and particularly American liberals. Indeed, the thrust of some Soviet comment, Gorbachev's remarks included, is not out of keeping with Jonathan Schell's *The Fate of the Earth.* Although there is a fair bit of the old mixed in with the new, it would all be rather unbelievable were it not for the fact that exponents of the new have undoubtedly exposed themselves to significant political risk within the Soviet Union.

The new thinking represents an apparent sudden access of planetary consciousness. The very existence of the human species is now said to be at stake in a perilously overarmed world where "saving the earth" is a task for all, and where nuclear combatants can expect "agonizing death resulting not even from a counterstrike but from the effects of the explosion of their own warheads."[2] As Gorbachev put it to the Congress, "The character of present day weaponry leaves no country with any hope of safeguarding itself solely with military-technical means, for example by building up a defense, even the most powerful. To ensure security is increasingly seen as a political problem, and it can only be resolved by political means."

At the same time, the modern world is said to be complex, contradictory, and increasingly interdependent and integrated. The "human community" is called upon to take these considerations into account in dealing with global problems of pollution, disease, poverty, and backwardness. In short, the new thinking claims that humanity could solve the world's problems by cooperating in the development of an all-embracing international security system, were it not for those —above all in the United States—who rely on the balance of terror, notions about gaining strategic superiority, and the like. For its part, the Soviet Union in its varied proposals for arms reduction and disarmament is said to be encouraging a new awareness of global realities.

Clearly there is old thinking at work here. Consistent with the long-standing reformative tendency in Soviet foreign policy,[3] the regime is attempting to put together an unusually broad coalition of Western and Third World political forces against the "war party" in the West. On the one hand, Moscow aims to lend strength to liberal, antimilitarist, ecological, neutralist, pacifist, and anti-American opinion by actively reinforcing these views and by encouraging a more relaxed public assessment of Soviet intentions. At the same time, in advancing a series of evidently negotiable proposals that are then turned down, Moscow is endeavoring to expose and weaken Western exponents of military strength as suicidal advocates of belligerence. The new political thinking is thus in part a manifestation of the traditional Soviet practice of marshalling the resources required to overwhelm and suppress opposition, of striving to build a favorable "correlation" of political forces that serve to split the opposition and isolate its most recalcitrant elements.

There is, however, more to it than this. In addition to arguing the case for a reassuring international political posture, spokesmen for the new thinking have been saying unsettling things about security to their Soviet confreres. Anatoli Dobrynin, the Central Committee secretary and ex-ambassador to Washington, has insisted, for example, that national and international security have become indivisible, and that in pursuit of security one has to begin not from narrow self-interest but from the common interest.[4] In this he echoed Gorbachev's comment to the Congress: "Today it's impossible to ensure one's own security without considering the security of other states and peoples." Similarly, Georgi Arbatov and Vitali Zhurkin, the former a leading

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member of the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies in Moscow and the latter a Central Committee member, have replayed Gorbachev in declaring that security can only be mutual and must not be gained at the expense of the other side's interests.[5] The effect of such claims has been to question the adversarial assumptions that underpin traditional Soviet political thought and military doctrine.

THE MILITARY implications of the new political thinking are that the United States is already effectively deterred, and that the Soviet Union need not invest heavily in strategic nuclear forces. Gorbachev has claimed that it has never been more widely recognized that nuclear war cannot be waged or won.[6] As Aleksandr Bovin, the noted *Izvestiya* commentator, put it, "He who shoots first dies second. This is how the matter stands, and the Americans realize it."[7] Inadvertent nuclear war remains a real and growing problem, but that, too, is best dealt with by political as well as military means.

This line of thinking has been marked by comments that directly reduce the salience of the military and technical in Soviet thinking about security. For example, Dobrynin wrote last June: "The character of present day weaponry does not leave a single state the hope of defending itself only by military-technical means." And Zhurkin stated in September: "The security of states must not be insured only through military-technical means. . . . Solutions must be sought in the political sphere." Preferred approaches have entailed "compromise," a concept not openly discussed in the Soviet Union since the Khrushchev years; "flexibility;" and "restraint."

Although the ensuing political strategy has included an effort to oppose Western hard-liners with an unusually broad international security coalition, some have evidently come to believe that the common threat to the human species is such that the Soviet Union must stop thinking primarily in terms of opposed forces. In the September 15 *Izvestiya,* for example, Eduard Ambartsumov, an economist and prominent champion of orthodox opinion, cited "Lenin's well-known idea that the interests of all mankind and of social development as a whole are superior to the interests of the proletariat." This of course is not a well-known idea at all. Nor was Ambartsumov's statement an aberration. Gorbachev put his own authority behind it when he said:

> In his time V.I. Lenin expressed an immensely profound idea: It concerned the fact that the interests of social development and pan-human values take priority over the interests of any particular class. Today, in the nuclear missile age, the significance of this idea can be felt particularly keenly. It is much to be desired that the thesis of the priority of the world's pan-human values over all others to which different people may be committed be also understood and accepted in the other part of the world."[8]

Dobrynin was more cautious. He affirmed the old in the new by arguing: "New political thinking in no way means a rejection of a class analysis of war and peace," but added: "It does presuppose a unification of our interests, to use Marx's expression, in real humanism . . . with the strivings of all social strata coming out in defense of the general interests of humanity, for the saving of civilization." As for Bovin, "The capacity of humanity for suicide has depreciated and made nonsense of many previous political and military-strategic stereotypes."

All of this new thinking has been contentious enough to evoke muffled opposition from within the military and elsewhere in the country. Asked at Reykjavik whether a failure to obtain an arms deal would increase obstruction of Gorbachev's internal reforms, Bovin replied, "The two groups are not 100 percent the same. But they do have a common denominator. This is that they are both composed of men of the past. It is the men of the past who oppose the economic reforms and who oppose Secretary Gorbachev's initiatives on arms control."[9]

Current Soviet civil-military relations appear to be stable but distant. Gorbachev's phrasing, "I myself and our military comrades,"[10] suggested a certain distance—as did General N. Chervov's assessment:

> Here in the Soviet Union, the unified Communist Party is the leading and directing force of our society. Military people are full and equal members of the CPSU, have a unified Marxist-Leninist world outlook, and are of like mind in solving military-political problems and matters of military construction. This does not mean that we do not have different opinions and views on these complex issues. But this is an internal matter for us. The desire of certain circles in the West to find some kind of 'chinks' between the Soviet political leadership and military leadership is, quite frankly, a futile waste of time.[11]

Institutionally, the military seems effectively subordinated. The defense minister, Marshal S.L. Sokolov, remains only a candidate member of the Politburo, and the chief of the general staff, Marshal S. Akhromeyev, has been visible in supporting the leadership's peace effort at Reykjavik on nuclear testing, the Stockholm Conference, and related issues.

Nevertheless, the "different opinions and views" within the military, and between some officers and some in the party apparatus, have been evident. The military press has continued to depict the Reagan administration in terms suf-

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ficiently harsh to question implicitly the value of doing business with Washington, to say nothing of the value of new political thinking. The administration has been viewed as wholly committed to the pursuit of strategic superiority, to the denial of Soviet negotiating proposals, and to the use of the arms race to weaken the Soviet economy by obliging Moscow to take military countermeasures.

There is evidence of debate on the timing and extent of these countermeasures. Sokolov stated that the government was ready, presumably when called upon in the future, "to make every effort to strengthen the country's defense might." Similarly, Akhromeyev noted that Soviet defense capabilities were being "maintained at proper levels," and Marshal A.N. Yefimov acknowledged that "at present our Air Force has everything necessary to defend against and frustrate aggression." Army General V. Shabanov, on the other hand, asserted: "The [Party] and the Soviet Government are forced to take the necessary and, frankly, obligatory measures to strengthen the country's defense capability and prevent military superiority on the part of the United States." Similarly, Army General Ye. Ivanovski affirmed that the Army and fleet "should be maintained" at a level to exclude superiority by the West, implying that such may not have been the case at present.[12]

These latter views could have been shared within the Politburo. The chairman of the Council of Ministers, Nikolai Ryzhkov, has declared: "The socialist states are capable of accomplishing their economic development tasks and at the same time strengthening their defense capability,"[13] whereas the thrust of Gorbachev's effort had been to stress the primacy of national economic renewal.

THE CONTROVERSY surrounding the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing, which ran for 18 months until the Soviets announced in December 1986 that the moratorium would end after the first U.S. test in 1987, offers direct evidence of national security debate. In reassuring the West about Soviet intentions, those who favor the new thinking also found it necessary to reassure and otherwise counter their compatriots who questioned or opposed nuclear testing restraint. The result was an unusual public airing of internal differences over foreign and military policy. These differences no doubt reached into the leadership, since it was widely acknowledged that the decision to extend the moratorium in August 1986 was "not simple," and had been even "extremely crucial and difficult."[14] Since the issue was the central one of Soviet restraint, differences of opinion over the moratorium probably reflect wider misgivings about the direction of Soviet security policy under Gorbachev in recent months.

The critics appear to have believed that the moratorium was ill-advised on both military-technical and political grounds. Akhromeyev, who straddled the debate, acknowledged that the Soviet Union had accepted "a certain degree of detriment," and placed itself "at a definite disadvantage" in extending the moratorium. He added that reliability testing was "to some extent" a real consideration.[15] Others alluded to additional advantages foregone when they discussed the aims of the U.S. nuclear testing programs—new and improved warheads for the MX, Midgetman, Trident II D-5 missile, advanced cruise missiles, tactical missiles, and artillery; survivable communications and targeting devices; nuclear-pumped lasers; and so on. Questions were also raised about a possible strategic advantage to the United States and a negative effect on Soviet defense capabilities, and whether the sword should not be met with the sword. Clearly the recommendation from this side of the house was for continued reliance and not diminished reliance on nuclear weapons.

Even more pointed questions were posed about the political message that the moratorium was sending to the Soviet people as well as to Washington. Concerns were raised about the "lulling" of vigilance, projecting a sense of "weakness" and "demobilization," prompting the United States to heighten its demands, and ultimately creating a situation that could be "worse than 1941."[16] Indeed, Gorbachev himself was reportedly asked whether the Soviet Union wasn't being "too soft."[17]

The advocates of the moratorium and the new political thinking replied, in essence, that the political advantages of unilateral restraint outweighed the military-technical disadvantages. They agreed that strategic parity was stable and that the country had sufficient reserves of strength to maintain its security for a limited period of time without testing. They ruled out surprise attack by the United States, in view of the consequences of the inevitable Soviet retaliation. Akhromeyev endorsed the idea that neither side should conduct reliability tests. And Gorbachev argued that a comprehensive test ban, as a goal of the moratorium, would mean that both sides would cease to improve their already more than sufficient nuclear stockpiles.[18]

Opponents of the moratorium believed that it would strengthen the "war party" in the United States, whereas supporters thought that it would improve the Soviet image, change thinking about nuclear weapons, and build trust. Gorbachev implied that vigilance would be maintained when he affirmed that Soviet security would not be compromised.[19] He also contended that "restraint is not softness."[20] The effect of Soviet restraint, Gorbachev and others suggested, would not be to escalate American demands but to increase pressure on the "war party" and to prompt less prejudicial perceptions of the Soviet people. These effects were anticipated in part because the Soviet Union "not only makes proposals but acts on them, too, and partly as the result of decreasing suspicions as to Soviet intentions. The thought of meeting sword with sword was dismissed outright as belonging to the "pre-nuclear era."[21] In short, Soviet military-technical restraint and positive political reassurance would encourage American realism and not American adventurism.

THE RECORD OF THE LAST few months indicates that the discussion of national and international security in the Soviet Union is thus in a state of flux. Dissonance

has been readily evident in Soviet commentary on the new political thinking and on the nuclear test moratorium issue in particular. The advocates of a postnuclear perspective on questions of war and peace do, however, seem to be on uncertain ground: whatever one might think of the substance of the new thinking—I view it on the whole as a positive development that deserves encouragement—it is not fully convincing as an internal political proposition. Not only are its advocates attempting to heighten the importance of political over military and technical considerations in the calculus of security, but their view of the political places unusual emphasis on threat reduction, unilateral restraint, and collaboration with adversaries. They are thus doubly suspect in the Soviet Union. Although some might merely be going through the motions of seeking to stabilize relations with the United States in order to facilitate negotiation of an improved position in Europe and the Far East, the new thinking in Moscow is heavily focused on relations with the United States and is ultimately dependent upon U.S. reciprocation.

There is more than a little irony in the fact that at a time when some in the West are coming to favor the Soviet notion of "correlation" of social and political as well as military forces, over the conventional notion of the balance of power, some in Moscow are attempting to move beyond such thinking to an alternative framework that stresses mutuality and reciprocity in international security affairs. The new political thinking is most trustworthy for the challenge it offers to the opposed-forces assumptions that have guided Soviet behavior since the formation of the Bolshevik Party. Although there are antecedents for the new in the views of Lenin himself, security and international success have traditionally been sought in patiently accumulating physical capabilities and political positions until adversaries have no choice but to accept Soviet terms. The Soviets seem to have viewed alternating bouts of détente and heightened tension essentially as alternative forms of a continuing struggle in which tactical agreements are wholly permissible as long as they do not compromise the capacity to wage the larger conflict.

We are now witnessing the assertion of a contrasting perspective that would have the nation endeavor to improve its international position and prospects more by accepting the outer world than by warring against it. The old antagonism would be supplemented, not replaced, by greater readiness to resolve those conflicts that can be resolved and a heightened awareness that where nuclear war was concerned, adversaries had to join together to defeat the shared threat. Meanwhile, the effects of the old attitudes would continue to be felt at home and abroad, and must surely be factored into the conception of the new by its supporters. The Soviet Union will be obliged to maintain its competitive position relative to adversaries who will persist, among other things, in exploiting the potential of advanced nonnuclear military technologies. The varied efforts of those who favor the new will thus constitute one tendency among several at play in Soviet policy.

Although the development of Soviet security policies is unlikely to conform to the more radical variants of the new political thinking, Soviet internal debate and outward behavior indicate that arms control is now accorded a higher place in Soviet practice than has been the case at any time since the Khrushchev era. While reduced reliance on nuclear weapons could well escape the present leadership, it would appear to be heavily favored by some as an opening position that maximizes benefits and minimizes the burdens on a regime that would adapt simultaneously to its domestic and external environments. Should current trends in Soviet security policy continue, military doctrine stands to become less preoccupied with physical security considerations, and more with the political requirements of unilateral and mutual threat reduction.

Indications of internal dissent over the thrust of recent Soviet security policies serve, however, to underline the provisional nature of current developments in Soviet military thought. It is not difficult to envisage domestic or international setbacks that would oblige the leadership to yield to a perspective that once again clearly stressed the narrow national interest in physical security. It is difficult to see how such a turn of events would benefit international security or the security of the Western alliance. □

1. *Political Report of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee to the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union . . . February 25, 1986* (Moscow: Novosti, 1986), pp. 75–76.
2. "Statement by M.S. Gorbachev," *Pravda*, Aug. 19, 1986.
3. See Franklyn Griffiths, "The Sources of American Conduct: Soviet Perspectives and Their Policy Implications," *International Security,* vol. 9, no. 2 (Fall 1984), pp. 3–50.
4. Anatoli Dobrynin, "Za bez'yadernyi mir, navstrechi XXI veku" [For a non-nuclear world, toward the twenty-first century], *Kommunist* (June 1986), p. 25.
5. Georgi Arbatov in *Trud* (Sofia), Sept. 3, 1985, as carried in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: USSR* (hereafter FBIS), Sept. 11, 1986, p. AA 7; Vitali Zhurkin, *Izvestiya*, Sept. 6, 1986, in FBIS, Sept. 15, 1986, p. CC 6; *Political Report,* p. 73.
6. Mikhail S. Gorbachev, "Replies to *Rude pravo,*" *Izvestiya,* Sept. 9, 1986, in FBIS, Sept. 9, 1986, p. AA 2.
7. Aleksandr Bovin in *New Times*, Sept. 8, 1986, in FBIS, Sept. 10, 1986, p. AA 16.
8. Mikhail S. Gorbachev, conversation at Issyk-kul Forum, *Literaturnaya gazeta,* Nov. 5, 1986 in FBIS, Nov. 7, 1986, p. CC 23.
9. Richard Gwyn, "Gorbachev Gambling for High Political Gains at Home," *Toronto Star,* Oct. 12, 1986.
10. Gorbachev, "Replies to *Rude pravo,*" p. AA 9.
11. Col. Gen. N. Chervov, "Specialists' Commentary," *Sovetskaya Rossiya,* Aug. 23, 1986, in FBIS, Aug. 26, 1986, pp. AA 15–16.
12. FBIS, Aug. 6, 1986, p. V 2; FBIS, Sept. 11, 1986, p. AA 2; Marshall A.N. Yefimov, Air Force Day speech, Aug. 17, 1986, FBIS Wire Service 038; FBIS, Aug. 25, 1986, p. V 2; FBIS, Sept. 16, 1986, p. V 1.
13. Nikolai Ryzhkov, *New Times,* Sept. 26, 1986, in FBIS 186, p. CC 10.
14. Gorbachev, "Replies to *Rude pravo*"; Marshal S. Akhromeyev at MFA press conference, Aug. 18, 1986, in FBIS, Aug. 26, 1986, p. AA 4; V. Korionov, *Pravda*, Sept. 18, 1986, in FBIS 186, p. AA 2.
15. Akhromeyev at MFA press conference; Akhromeyev, *New Times,* Sept. 8, 1986, in FBIS, Sept. 11, 1986, p. AA 2.
16. Aleksandr Bovin, *New Times,* Sept. 8, 1986, in FBIS, 177, p. AA 15; Chervov, "Specialists' Commentary."
17. "Report on Activities in Krasnodar," *Krasnaya zvezda,* Sept. 19, 1986, in FBIS 189, p. R 7.
18. "Statement by M.S. Gorbachev."
19. Gorbachev, "Replies to *Rude pravo.*"
20. "Report on Activities in Krasnodar," p. R 7.
21. Ibid., p. R 6.

(*The following is an excerpt from "The Four Pillars" by Richard J. Barnet, from The New Yorker March 9, 1987, p.80/p.79*):

"In our domestic politics, we use the Soviet Union as a symbol of all manner of evil, as a simplifier of world events, and as a mobilizer of our energies. To a great extent, the Cold War has defined our national purpose. Could we do without the Soviet Union as an enemy? President Reagan said he told Mikhail Gorbachev at the Geneva summit that the Cold War would . . . end when the two superpowers joined forces against some extraterrestrial threat. Do we lack the imagination to see that we already face a common threat, much closer at hand? Until we decide what our war aims for the Cold War are—short of an unconditional surrender that we cannot even imagine—both the Cold War and the nuclear arms race will go on . . .

. . ."Until now, complacency about nuclear weapons and lack of imagination have kept nations from even thinking seriously about what a nuclear-free world would be like. The discussions at Reykjavik revealed how little serious thought President Reagan had given to the idea of a nuclear-free world, which he had been hinting at for the last four years. The most critical national-security task is to conceive the political and military changes necessary to create the confidence that such a world would be substantially less dangerous than the one we have and the one we are likely to have if the arms race goes on."

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