As a public service,

THE LAUCKS FOUNDATION

from time to time calls attention to published material that might contribute toward clarification or understanding of issues affecting world peace. The accompanying reprints constitute Reprint Mailing No. 83.

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The following is quoted from "THE WORLD IN CRISIS: What's the Problem? What's the Answer?" from GLOBAL REPORT, Center for War/Peace Studies, No. 21, Summer, 1986:

"Nobody, of whatever political persuasion, would deny that the world is in a state of crisis, seemingly of ever increasing magnitude. But as to the cause, there are various answers:

- The Reagan administration contends that the instigator is an 'evil empire,' headed by the Soviet Union and seeking world domination by communism.
- The U.S.S.R. charges that the basic troublemaker is the 'imperialistic West,' dominated by the trigger-happy United States.
- The Third World, and most of the independent peace movement, hold both superpowers at fault, declaring that their insane arms race will do in not only them but the rest of the world as well.

The globalist view is that none of these three arguments goes to the fundamental roots of the planetary crisis. The problems that hit us in the face in every day's headlines grow out of the unprecedented phenomenon of technology, particularly military, developing at a geometrical rate while world political institutions are scarcely advancing at all.

In these circumstances, it is not surprising that most people and governments are hypnotized by the growing numbers and sophistication of weapons, and see the weapons per se as the primary problem. Even if the matter is looked at in this perspective, it seems clear that the U.S. and Soviet governments are on sharply different tacks on how to approach the issue."

PROGRAM: REDEFINING NATIONAL SECURITY

Traditional arms control efforts continue to fail. Not one treaty between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. has forced either to relinquish *any* weapons system which its possessor really wanted. Each arms-control treaty has been both preceded and followed by an intensive buildup of both nuclear and nonnuclear arms -- as when President Carter approved the MX in return for military support of the already-doomed SALT II treaty. Today, American military spending alone is costing nearly ten-thousand dollars per second, yet is not visibly making anyone more secure, either militarily or economically.

Traditional arms controllers have indeed become managers of an unabated arms race. The classic example of this syndrome is the book *Living With Nuclear Weapons*, in which highly respected Democratic centrists suggest, as part of their program for stability, the "modernization" of the whole strategic arsenal. Driven both by powerful constituencies and by internal dynamics -- the weapons labs' technological imperative, the military planners' worst-case assumptions, and unfettered U.S./Soviet competition -- the military-industrial complex of which President Eisenhower warned is continuing to create its own supply *and* demand without any limiting equilibrium.

Merely reactive policies do little. The Freeze campaign has swayed some public opinion against the arms race, but has not eliminated any weapon system nor changed the nature of our concept of security. The anti-bomb movement capitalizes on a fear of apocalypse, but has neglected Americans' real and pervasive fear of Soviets. These efforts have yet to crystallize a coherent alternative vision within U.S. public consciousness.

Americans will reject, time and again, the reactive and the gloomy in favor of the visionary and optimistic. The Strategic Defense Initiative illustrates the power of visionary politics: the emotional value of a supposed "nuclear umbrella" is overwhelming concerns about infeasibility, cost, treaty abrogation, and risk. Equally visionary *alternative conceptions of security* -- practical and cheap to implement, simple to explain, heartening in mood, and authentically speaking to people's everyday experience -- are the critical missing link in the peace movement. It is this need which Rocky Mountain Institute's Security Program seeks to address.

Some Early Steps

Two major and several minor philosophies are emerging as thoughtful people seek replacements for the failed dream of traditional arms control. One, the New-York-based Exploratory Project on the Conditions for Peace (EXPRO) headed by George Rathjens of MIT, is a working group of experts, mainly academics. Rathjens argues that because nuclear bombs are so widespread and destructive, only *political* solutions to global tensions are possible -- not "technical fixes." EXPRO therefore advances long-term, nontechnical, multilateral solutions to the arms race.

Dietrich Fischer, in *Preventing War in the Nuclear Age*, and Robert Nield, formerly of SIPRI, instead suggest *uni*laterally restructuring economic, foreign, and military policies to enhance stability and reduce aggression. They argue for defensive and against offensive weapons; for policies which consistently reward good and punish bad interna- →

tional behavior; and against inflexible, binding alliances. Their work includes, and even concentrates on, the hardware components of such defensive stability.

Other analysts, ranging from Randall Forsberg to Richard Barnet and from Gene Sharp to Michael Shuman, are also turning away from arms control and towards new political and military concepts. Yet neither they nor the EXPRO and Fischer/Nield schools have probed deeply into the economic causes of instability, and more generally into what kind of society would help its people, and other people, to be and feel secure. Several analysts are beginning to explore security from an end-use perspective, but with reference more to military power than to the fabric and function of the society itself. Arguments about which military deployments could increase crisis stability are leagues ahead of the arcane but still prevalent nit-picking about throw-weight; yet they still fall far short of the real issue: What causes people to feel insecure enough to go to war? or conversely, What conditions would cause leaders to feel that they will gain nothing and lose much by starting a war?

Spurred by these issues, Rocky Mountain Institute's Security Program is exploring the fundamental nature of security through a new lens: *advanced techniques for the efficient and sustainable use of resources.* RMI's analyses of resource efficiency, both by specific findings and by incisive new methodologies, appear to illuminate what attributes and actions can make a society truly secure.

New Questions, New Insights

For a decade, RMI's principals have been providing original, provocative, and persuasive analyses of certain security issues -- notably nuclear proliferation, terrorism, climatic change, and energy vulnerability. Now RMI seeks to blend this experience, and that of an innovative new senior staff member, with its pioneering work in end-use/least-cost resource analysis. The same approach and the same unique information which RMI is already applying to energy, water, agriculture, and other elements of sustainable local economies (such as health and shelter) can help penetrate to the roots of how to build real security. RMI's flair for synthesis and integration places this work beyond the scope of the specialists who dominate academia. RMI's approach also holds the promise of transcending rancorous ideological disputes by building on empirical fact and market economics.

The links between RMI's resource-efficiency work and security are apparent even under the most orthodox conception of security. Compare, for example, recent developments in least-cost energy strategies with the role of the military forces now assigned to protect or seize oil-rich regions of the Mideast:

* Just *one year's* budget for the Rapid Deployment Force, put into well-designed weatherization programs, would about eliminate U.S. oil imports.
* Just the *increase* in annual U.S. energy supply from renewable sources since 1979 exceeds all the Arab oil which Americans burned in 1984.
* Either weatherization of buildings or accelerated replacement of gas-guzzlers by efficient cars could more than eliminate *all* U.S. oil imports, before a power plant or a synthetic-fuel plant ordered now could deliver any energy whatever, and at a tenth the cost.
* There is now abundant evidence that America's allies -- many, like France and Japan, singularly rich in cost-effective opportunities to harness renewable energy -- can free themselves from oil dependence more cheaply and quickly through efficiency and renewables than by any other means.

These examples illustrate how broadening the concept of security beyond a military perspective can bring to light a wide range of practical security options which are at once stabilizing, peaceful, consensus-commanding, and highly cost-effective. RMI's Security Program is now going beyond energy security and Mideast volatility to take a new look at how to make a society like ours truly secure. RMI will construct from diverse literature and experience a comprehensive approach to building real security --

from the bottom up, through individual and community action in the marketplace, rather than from the top (the Pentagon) down. Such a society would return to, and fulfill, the dictionary definition of "security": *freedom from fear of privation or attack.*

What makes people safe? What makes people *feel* safe? Real security starts at home: with reliable and affordable supplies of necessities (water, food, energy, shelter, materials), being healthy in a healthful environment, having a sustainable local economy and a legitimate system of government, enjoying basic human rights and certain cultural and spiritual assets. Of course, anyone who enjoys these tangible and intangible elements of Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness can keep them only by ensuring that others have them too: that is, one becomes more secure by making one's neighbors *more* secure, not less, whether on the scale of the village or the globe.

More efficient, sustainable, and equitable use of resources would be a long step toward reducing global tensions. It is, however, a necessary but not a sufficient condition for peace, since conflict can still arise from ideology, religion, xenophobia, or madness. A truly secure society in a world of fallible and occasionally malicious people, therefore, should include some system of defense. Other analysts are doing exciting work, on which RMI will draw, about alternative force structures which may offer effective defense at low cost -- approaches which emphasize defensive strength and corresponding offensive weakness. RMI may also reexamine the mission of present military forces in light of new and emerging resource realities: whether, for example, technologies like roof insulation can make the Rapid Deployment Force's potential mission of seizing Mideast oilfields obsolete, and whether new developments in materials science are making many other supposedly "strategic" materials less vital to an advanced economy. The more widely the potential for such revisions of military purposes and structures is understood, and the more nonmilitary means of acquiring real security can be effectively substituted for threats of violence, the less paranoid our neighbors (at home and abroad) will become. In the nuclear age, American security is inextricably linked to the security of the Soviet Union. Only policies which increase American security *without* reducing Soviet security will be stabilizing. The myriad forms of modern resource efficiency, ranging from saving energy and water to making farming and local economies sustainable, offer exactly that hope.

"Making Freedom Affordable"

To focus this new approach, RMI seeks initially to compile, for *Foreign Affairs* or a similarly influential journal, an article designed to be a seminal work in shifting perceptions of what constitutes real security. The article will summarize the best present knowledge of *how to provide each of the elements of a truly secure society, at far lower cost than the present military budget -- and often at a negative net cost.* (For example, least-cost approaches to providing energy and health could together save trillions of dollars by 2000.) The article will describe, to the extent possible, what an inherently secure society -- one free from fear of privation or attack -- would look like; how much money it would cost or save compared with present arrangements; and what is known or needs to be found out about how to achieve it. We believe this work would fill a critical gap in present thinking about peace and security, and would be well timed to leapfrog the security debate far beyond which weapons systems to buy.

Because the elements of real security are so diverse and in some cases ill-defined, and because end-use methodologies have not yet been applied in the security arena (other than for energy), this work is exploratory, and some frustrations and false starts can be expected. What would otherwise be dauntingly ambitious research, however, has already been done for many of the required areas in the microcosm of Rocky Mountain Institute's Economic Renewal Project. This head start should permit "Making Freedom Affordable," given adequate support, to emerge in fairly polished form in 1986.

(Reprinted by permission of George Bain, the author, and The Globe and Mail, Toronto, from the June 1985 issue of the Report on Business Magazine of The Globe and Mail)

WHY WASHINGTON'S DREADNOUGHT STRATEGY IS DEAD IN THE WATER

Reagan considers 'Star Wars' a crucial step ahead in the arms race. Which was the way Britain's First Sea Lord felt about the dreadnought in 1910

BY GEORGE BAIN

The trouble with Star Wars—or one of the troubles—is that it has been tried before. Not the system itself, obviously, but the idea inherent in it that, if only a long enough leap forward can be achieved, the other side will be left with nothing to do but contemplate the error of its ways. It is an idea with a record that does not inspire confidence.

Ronald Reagan has referred to his Strategic Defence Initiative, to give the thing its proper name, as "the most hopeful possibility of our time." On March 2 in Washington, in a statement addressed to critics, he said that even if the system were only, say, 80% effective as a shield against incoming missiles "it would make any Soviet attack folly." Thus, he went on, "even partial success would strengthen deterrence and keep the peace." Lovely.

Unfortunately, it doesn't just seem to me I've heard that song before; I *know* I've heard that song before. I know it in part because I recently plucked *The Arms Race* by Philip Noel-Baker off the shelf while looking for something else. That book was published in 1958, and for 30 years before that Philip Noel-Baker had been campaigning for disarmament, in speeches in and out of the British House of Commons and in books and pamphlets everywhere. An early chapter in *The Arms Race*, headed Keeping A Lead, is on how the arms race works. The chapter contains several illustrations of efforts to keep ahead of the pack by adapting to new developments. The lesson is that keeping a lead is desperately difficult because the other side historically has shown a tendency not to want to be taken a lead on.



British dreadnought H.M.S. *Inflexible*: thought capable of sinking the German fleet

The best illustration is supplemented by a footnote drawn from a 1927 book called *Navies and Nations of the World* by H. C. Bywater, which evidently contained an extended account of the efforts of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, First Sea Lord 1904-10, to reform (current equivalent: upgrade) the Royal Navy as the First World War approached. This is part of that footnote: "He (Lord Fisher) hoped to render the German fleet obsolete at a single stroke by building a type of battleship so superior to all existing types that Germany, as he supposed, could not imitate it for lack of the requisite resources, financial if not technical."

Not only was that objective eerily similar to President Reagan's—at a swoop to render it folly for the other side to breathe a hostile breath by facing it with weapons that it could not hope (at least in theory) to overcome—but so was the premise, namely that the leap being undertaken would be so great that the opponent would be incapable financially and technically of matching it. So what happened?

Admiral Fisher thought, and evidently said—or so the German Kaiser thought—that the one new British dreadnought would be capable of sinking the entire German fleet. (There were eventually eight: Winston Churchill said the Admiralty wanted six, the treasury offered four, so they compromised on eight.) It was no great step from there to the Kaiser discovering that

CONTINUED

the requisite financial and technical resources were not so lacking as the British thought and a brisk competitive dreadnought-building ensued. The result of the introduction of a lot of new dreadnoughts and super-dreadnoughts into the navies of the opponents was not only to render the existing German fleet obsolete at a stroke, but to do the same to all the existing British battleships and cruisers, and there were more of those—in fact, what had been a comfortable superiority of them. In the end, to return to the Noel-Baker footnote: "In 1914 (when the First World War began), the strength of the British navy as against the German had declined by 40 to 50 per cent."

In "our time" (to quote President Reagan, whose "our time" is rather longer than mine, which in turn is longer than a lot of other people's), as comfortable a situation as we have enjoyed was in the period after the Second World War when we, as represented by the United States, had the atom bomb and the other people didn't. At least those of us with no direct control of events—which is to say everybody not belonging to the superpowers—had to worry only about one of them doing something crazy, not two.

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union proved no more willing to accept U.S. nuclear superiority as the guarantee of the world's peace than Kaiser Wilhelm had been Britain's ability to blow his fleet out of the water if he got out of line. (The Russians, like the Germans of another era, seemingly clung to some illusion of their equal virtue.) In any case, the Russians, after the Second World War, left no stone (or prospective scientist-defector) unturned until they had achieved a bomb of their own. And the means of delivering it. Finally, they had the bad taste to go beyond that and to gain, via Sputnik in 1957, superiority in space. Needless to say, all right-thinking people denounced the satellite as wickedly destabilizing—which is to say that the Russians had taken a lead that the United States felt obliged for its own security to overtake.

Which, of course, has been the history of the past century, not just of the nuclear age. You introduce conscription to overwhelm our smaller professional army, and we will conscript more men for longer periods; you mount guns on an automobile chassis and we will give you back the tank; you face us with a ship with more guns, greater range, heavier armor, and we will build two of them. The dreadnought in itself was great. Philip Noel-Baker writes: "As a move in the arms race, the construction of the dreadnought was a brilliant achievement, putting Britain for the moment far in the lead." Unfortunately for the national interest "it turned out to be a serious, almost catastrophic mistake." So, obviously, would the Strategic Defence Initiative be a brilliant achievement. It is the beyond that requires the looking at. ◆

(Reprinted by permission of The Manchester Guardian
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The lessons are all on Earth

THERE is only one way to read this week's devastating report on the destruction of the space shuttle Challenger: with bleak humility. Everything that could go wrong, went wrong. Every system and every decent human instinct failed or floundered in bureaucracy. The seven astronauts did not go to their deaths; they were sent to their deaths because safety routines were neglected for lack of cash, because the agency feebly bit off far more than it could chew — and because repeated and agonised warnings about the sealing of Challenger's booster rockets were shrugged aside.

The trouble with such a catalogue of woe is that — emotionally — it far outweighs the positive things the Rogers Commission wants done. That list of recommendations, of course, takes all of the mistakes and seeks, creating checking bodies here and monitoring agencies there, to make sure such errors don't occur again. But nothing in Mr Rogers's 256 glossy pages lends credence to the belief that the true horror of Challenger — the human blend of politics and patriotism and pressure — can in any way be fundamentally addressed. Quite the contrary. Set the clinical passages of Rogers beside the eulogy that President Reagan delivered at mission control on the day after the disaster.

> *"We promise Commander Dick Scobee and his crew that their dream lives on, that the future they worked so hard to build will become a reality. The dedicated men and women of Nasa have lost seven members of their family. Still, they must forge ahead with a space programme that is effective, safe, efficient, but bold and committed."*

Not a word (how could there be?) for the men who, by their indifference, sloth, and cowardice, made the dream tawdry. Not a thought for the pressure that such simplistic patriotism brings. It was a blend of that pressure, decked with PR trimmings, that sent Christa McAuliffe, the school teacher and mother of two children, to her death in Challenger: not as a heroine, but as a victim of the need to add a tabloid touch of glamour.

Humility, of course, is mandatory for Nasa today. It's not the shuttle alone that has died within the past year. Two Titans and a Delta rocket have exploded, too: the satellite launching programme is at a despairing standstill. Toss Chernobyl into the account and there has been no grimmer period in modern history for high technology — with admitted "human error" linking East and West. Are there such things as space or nuclear power station programmes which are "safe and efficient" as well as "bold and committed"? The question is a completely open one. It can only begin to be answered when the past imperatives on Nasa are lifted; and when — for Chernobyl is a relevant disaster — the benefits of cooperation rather than competition become more manifest.

Nasa was in a triple bind: anxious to show results to keep the politicians sweet and the funds flowing; hamstrung by plants strewn randomly across the pork-barrel face of America; determined — in the profit-making business of satellite launches — to win contracts and present simultaneously the acceptable faces of heroism and capitalism. It all became too much. The agency simply cracked under the strain. And yet, within a year, the whips will be on again. America is more or less out of the satellite trade, whilst Mr Reagan unflaggingly pursues his own dream of a Star Wars, an uninvented system of defence against nuclear attack which depends for its credibility on a level of technical efficiency that no country on earth has been able to attain.

If you wished to tackle the conundrum root and branch you would have to go far beyond the tightened nuts and bolts of Rogers. You would have to think about structures. You would have to separate the commerce from the exploration: let many different agencies — privatised as well as nationalised — compete for the satellite trade: keep the weaponry of war out of space: and try to make the challenge of exploration more a challenge for mankind, cooperating, and less of a litmus test for patriotic superlatives. Very warily, the Russians, with their spacecraft, seem to be edging towards that view. There is, indeed, a "dream" in space, a frontier which cannot be neglected or forgotten. But it is not, at heart, the dream of narrow politics or national prestige; and if we continue to let it become so, then the sad pages of this week's report will be repeated time and again as we spread human vanities and human failings across the cosmos.

SCIENCE Vol.232,p.1338, 13 June 1986

Soviet, U.S. Scientists Reach Seismic Agreement

An unprecedented agreement to establish seismic monitoring stations near the U.S. and Soviet test sites is aimed at moving the superpowers toward a comprehensive ban

In a decision of substantial interest to U.S. seismologists, the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. has agreed to allow independent monitoring of seismic signals in the vicinity of the principal Soviet nuclear test site. The agreement, which was reached in Moscow in late May with representatives of the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), a private environmental group, calls for the establishment of three seismic stations manned jointly by U.S. and Soviet scientists at different sites within 200 kilometers of Semipalatinsk, in south central Russia.

The stations, which are to be established within the next few months, will operate at least into autumn and probably longer, according to Thomas Cochran, a nuclear physicist who works for NRDC in Washington. In exchange, he said, a team of Soviet researchers will be invited to staff three similar seismic monitoring posts to be established near the U.S. nuclear test site in southern Nevada.

The principal goal is "to perfect seismic techniques" needed for verification of a nuclear testing moratorium or comprehensive ban, the agreement states. Bilateral negotiations on a test ban treaty were terminated by the Reagan Administration in 1982, in part because of concerns about verification but more importantly of the need for additional nuclear tests to modernize and expand the present U.S. arsenal, and to develop a defensive nuclear shield. The Soviet Union has pressed for their resumption.

Several weeks before the delegation from NRDC traveled to Moscow, senior Administration officials cautioned that the proposal might play into the Soviets' hands. They also asserted that data from the monitoring station would not resolve uncertainties in the United States about the yields of Soviet detonations, a point that NRDC did not dispute. The group decided to proceed anyway, Cochran says, in order to demonstrate that on-site monitoring in the Soviet Union poses no obstacle to a test ban treaty, and to obtain baseline seismic data for a verification network.

The arrangement is clearly unprecedented. Both countries agreed to test site inspection as a verification measure in a pair of treaties limiting nuclear test yields during the 1970's, but neither treaty has been ratified by the U.S. Senate, and the inspections were to have been of limited duration. The agreement is also novel in that the cost of the necessary equipment—including at least two sophisticated U.S. accelerometers and velocity meters at each site—will be shared by NRDC and the Soviet Academy, as will all travel expenses and construction costs. Contributions of money and scientific expertise from the U.S. government are welcome but essentially irrelevant. (NRDC hopes to obtain $500,000 in private financing before 18 June.)

A monitoring site in the Soviet Union "will definitely provide interesting information."

The plan was hatched by Cochran in relative secrecy last January. After preliminary discussions with the Soviet embassy in Washington, he presented it to a delegation of visiting Soviet scientists in April, and finally to a scientific workshop in Moscow chaired by Yevgeniy Velikhov, the vice president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Seismologists from India and Sweden attended the workshop as observers. On 28 May, the agreement was signed by Velikhov and Adrian DeWind, a New York tax attorney who chairs the NRDC board.

The Soviets' principal motivation is apparently not scientific. Seismic experts consulted by *Science* said that Soviet scientists would probably gain little new information from the monitoring station in the United States, because seismic signals from locations nearer the Nevada test site are routinely recorded and published by the U.S. Geological Survey. U.S. scientists, in contrast, will probably learn a great deal from their site in the Soviet Union. The nearest existing U.S. seismic station is believed to be in China, more than 400 kilometers from Semipalatinsk, and there is a relative dearth of information in the west on seismic propagation in that region.

"It will definitely provide interesting information," says James Hannon, the program manager for seismic monitoring at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. "Everyone will be anxious to look at it." The data will reveal the regional characteristics of so-called high-frequency seismic waves, above 30 hertz or so, presently considered one of the most interesting topics of seismological research. They will also provide helpful clues to overall regional seismicity, earthquake mechanisms, and seismic wave propagation. As such, the data may help determine the number of monitoring stations needed to verify a comprehensive test ban, as well as the optimal design for each station and the optimal frequency at which seismic signals should be recorded, Hannon says.

Ironically, the existence of a related Soviet arms control effort—a unilateral test moratorium begun last August—will slightly diminish the value of the information gleaned from the monitoring experiment. Information about the local geology will perforce be drawn from signals generated by more distant events, including U.S. and French bomb tests. But Cochran stresses that "NRDC is not interested in the intelligence-gathering aspects of the experiment. Our primary goal is simply to demonstrate that Soviet and American scientists can work together and establish these stations in their respective countries." In any event, the experiment will probably continue beyond August, when the Soviet moratorium is expected to end, Cochran says. All of the collected data will be published openly, he adds.

Apparently, the only potential hitch is active Administration opposition. If it wanted to, the State Department could deny the Soviet research team the visas necessary for travel to the Southwest. But this would probably be too embarrassing, as the Soviets have promised to allow the American group in even if their own group is excluded. In addition, the Administration has already invited the Soviets to visit the Nevada test site itself, so travel to an area several hundred kilometers away can hardly be deemed sensitive. The Commerce Department could also prohibit the export of the appropriate seismic equipment to the Soviet Union. But NRDC deliberately plans to use off-the-shelf seismic equipment similar to that purchased by the Soviet Union in the past. "Nobody gave us any hope of pulling this off," Cochran says. "We are as surprised as anyone." ■ R. JEFFREY SMITH

(Reprinted by permission of the Editor, Edna Ruth Johnson)

The Eagle

(with sincere apologies to the late Edgar Allen Poe)

ONCE UPON A TIME of trouble, when my dreams burst like a bubble,
And I pondered o'er the days of yesteryear;
While I contemplated napping suddenly there came a tapping,
As of someone sort of rapping, rapping at my bedroom door;
'Tis the CIA, I muttered, tapping at my bedroom door,
Only that and nothing more.

Presently I felt no fearing, though I knew someone was peering,
Peering through the keyhole of my bedroom door;
But I summoned up my courage to investigate that rapping,
That constant tap tap tapping
That eerie sound I'd never heard before,
Only that and nothing more.

Suddenly the din abated as I cautiously awaited
To see what 'twas disturbed my reverie;
Filled with guarded apprehension at the source of all my tension,
Charily, I opened up my bedroom door;
There before me was an Eagle, armed and looking for a war,
Only that and nothing more.

In his talons held he weapons - arrows, guns and missiles, too,
And his mien was stern and somber and I could not help but wonder
At the hate that emanated from his eyes;
And so with awe and trepidation at this symbol of our nation,
I queried: "Must we always live with war?"
Quoth the Eagle, "Evermore."

Then I spake: "Oh bird judicious, do you really want to wish us
A life of constant pain and death and gore?
Can't you see the desolation that will ravage every nation
Through accident or planned atomic war?"
Then I asked in terms expectant: "Will peace on earth return again once more?"
Quote the Eagle, "Nevermore."

"Prophet!" said I, still undaunted by the evil eyes he flaunted,
Will the works that God and man created finally be decimated?
One more query I would ask thee, Oh fowl so stern and stately -
"Can any life survive another war?"
And he responded, "Nevermore."

M. R. HAGERTY

Mr. Hagerty, a freelance writer, lives in Phoenix, Arizona.
The woodcut print is by Fritz Eichenberg, born in Cologne, Germany, in 1901. He became a Quaker, lives in the USA.

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