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"When the Reagan administration speaks of a new commitment to nuclear weapons, its plans have little to do with defense. It is clearly trying to create a margin of superiority that will re-establish American nuclear firepower as an instrument of political influence. The first time Americans accepted the folk culture of nuclear weapons, they did so innocently, with no notion that they were also accepting an imperial role for the United States. If they accept that folk culture again—if at this point in history they allow their leadership to expand the nuclear arms race—they cannot claim innocence as an excuse. They will be supporting a national security policy that in return for increased vulnerability will give them only an illusory feeling that America can once again be a great empire."

—Quoted from "Nuclear Fundamentalism Reborn" by Alan Wolfe, World Policy Journal, Fall 1984, p.106.

(Reprinted by permission of the Editor,
Harper's Magazine, March 1985, pp.55-60)

THE BEWILDERED AMERICAN RAJ

Reflections on a democracy's foreign policy

By Michael Howard

There may still be Europeans who feel culturally superior to Americans, but I am certainly not one of them. After a prolonged stay in the United States last year, I returned to England with two impressions. The first was of the sheer richness of contemporary American culture. America leads the world in every branch of science and technology, every field of scholarship and the arts. New York City is in a state of continuous creative ferment, while across the country a score of smaller cities compete, like Italian Renaissance states in conspicuous cultural display, each trying to outdistance the others with its orchestras, its museums, its universities, its civic centers, and, not least, its restaurants.

But amid all this wealth and excellence I perceived a mood of resentment on the part of most Americans, a mood that, I believe, helped bring the Reagan Administration to power and has helped keep it there. Why, Americans ask, are our achievements not universally recognized and admired? Why does American generosity not evoke more gratitude? Why have American economic power and military strength not brought more influence in the world? Why are small countries in Southeast Asia and the Middle East able to defy the United States, and to gain such widespread support when they do? Why is the United States always in a minority at the United Nations, which it did so much to create and still does so much to sustain?

These are justifiable questions. The United States does not enjoy the place in the world that it should have earned through its achievements, its generosity, and its goodwill since World War II. This is especially true in the Third World, where anti-Americanism is almost a lingua franca. In Central America, for example, anti-*Yanqui* sentiment appears to be the bedrock on which revolutionary nationalist movements base their popularity. But anti-Americanism surfaces even in Western Europe, to an extent deeply embarrassing to the allied governments. Throughout the world, the United States is widely seen not as a model and a protector but as a powerful and alien threat to indigenous values—a menace to that very "freedom" it claims to defend.

This disparity between America's accomplishments and the wider world's appreciation of them derives largely from the particular qualities that have made the achievements possible. If the tragedy of human life is that people are undone as much by their noble qualities as by their defects, then there is a real element of tragedy in America's relations with the wider

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

world—an element that must be understood before anything can be done to remedy the situation.

The most important circumstance complicating America's relations with the wider world is the one of which Americans are most deeply and properly proud: the United States is a genuine *democracy* from the grass roots up, of a kind that exists in few other parts of the world. In Western Europe, for example, there remain traces of a traditional deference to the foreign policy bureaucracy: people are prepared to leave the conduct of external affairs largely in the hands of specialists in the diplomatic services who have to live with the job full time. In the United States those specialists are in the State Department and the National Security Council—that is, they are members of the executive branch—and are closely watched by a jealous and suspicious Congress which, as Jeane Kirkpatrick has pointed out, has no institutional expertise in or continuing responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs. Still more important, foreign policy specialists are controlled *within* the executive branch by presidential nominees who, like Kirkpatrick herself, do not necessarily have much expertise in the conduct of foreign affairs. American diplomats and foreign policy specialists are as fine as any in the world, but the real decisions in matters of great importance are made not by them but by people whose chief qualification for the job is that they command the confidence of the president, who in turn is president because he commands the confidence of the electorate. America's foreign policy is thus made by people who are not professionals in the field, and it is conducted on a basis of discontinuity that makes doing business with American governments very difficult indeed. Still, it cannot be denied that it is conducted by people genuinely responsive, and responsible, to the mood and will of the electorate. This is part of the price that has to be paid for democracy.

Yet it is not always realized in this country how high that price is. The growth of self-government, wherever it has occurred, has made the conduct of international relations progressively more difficult. It is not only that people tend to pursue their own interests and to take a somewhat cavalier attitude toward the interests of others, but that they are generally unable to understand the attitudes, traditions, and perceptions of foreign cultures. They can develop such understanding only by the kind of cultivation and education for which most people—and Americans are not in the least unique in this—have neither the inclination nor the time. So as societies become more democratic, their foreign policy becomes not less but more ethnocentric. The assertion of the popular will makes mutual understanding between peoples more difficult, not less.

As democracy developed in Western Europe in the nineteenth century, so also did nationalism; even today, democratic pressures make effective economic and military cooperation between European nations very difficult. (We need look no further than the Common Market for the prime example.) Indeed, were the Soviet Union miraculously transformed into a representative democracy on a Western model, there is no reason to suppose it would be any easier for the West to deal with. The paranoia, the xenophobia, the clumsy bullying that distinguish the foreign policy of the Politburo are probably as much a reflection of cultural circumstances as a result of deliberate governmental policy, and an entirely representative Russian government might find it even more difficult than does the present one to establish friendly relations with the outside world.

As has often been pointed out, the isolation of the United States for a century and a half after independence—the fact that the country did not need to deal with powerful but culturally diverse neighbors—meant that America never developed a strong foreign policy tradition. But this isolation had a broader cultural impact as well. While the history of Europe certainly provides a perfect model of how *not* to conduct international rela-

Illustrations by David Suter

tions, at least there has always been, among European governments and peoples, an awareness that there was a problem—that there were *foreigners* with whom we had constantly to interact, people who looked at matters in different ways and whose languages we had to learn if we were to cope with them effectively. Europeans have always been conscious of the pressures of a multicultural society, and of the skill and subtlety required to flourish in it. Diplomatic and linguistic abilities are still highly prized in Europe; foreign offices still attract the best of the elites. This was not so in the United States until half a century ago, and it is not fully so even today. American culture has been more concerned with emancipating itself from foreign influence than with assimilating it.

The West's political hegemony ended, but its cultural and economic dominance remain, largely taken over by the United States

Further, the United States' lack of any significant experience as a colonial power has proved as much a disadvantage as an asset. Of course the Europeans' *de haut en bas* relationship with their colonial "subjects" provides a very imperfect model: it inhibited full understanding of native cultures and engendered more enmity than empathy. Nevertheless, mutual understanding did develop in some countries and has survived decolonization: England's relationship with India and France's with its former colonies in North Africa are outstanding examples of this. Indeed, U.S. relations with Central America might be better if the United States had once been responsible for ruling the area. Americans would better understand the cultures of the region and better appreciate the nature of their problems. Above all, the United States would have learned firsthand the limitations of its influence and power.

Nor has the teaching of international politics in the United States taken sufficiently into account the essential point that international relations is about dealing with *foreigners*, people with different cultural backgrounds and perceptions embodied in diverse languages. *Our* language and the concepts it expresses are as foreign to these peoples as theirs are to us. And if this presents a problem of communication among the closely interwoven cultures of the West, all derived as they are from a common Judeo-Graeco-Roman root, how much more will this be the case when the West tries to interact with the great traditional cultures of India, China, Japan, or the Islamic countries?

This problem is intensified by a further difficulty the West experiences in dealing with the non-Western world, what I call a *vertical* cultural gap. This gap began to open during the nineteenth century when scientific and technological developments transformed Western culture in two ways. First, they revolutionized our living standards so that, by any indicator—life expectancy, health, literacy, diet—we were in a different league from the rest of the world. Second, these changes made available to Western peoples—entire peoples, not simply the upper classes—fast, comfortable, and cheap means of transport. So as the West drew culturally apart from the rest of the world, it began to interact physically all the more closely with it. Until the nineteenth century, European contact with other cultures had been made primarily by merchants and travelers who felt themselves culturally equal to—or even, as with those who journeyed to Asia, culturally inferior to—the civilizations they explored. These small groups of Westerners, far from their native lands, had to learn the languages and habits of their hosts if they were to survive and flourish. In the nineteenth century, Europeans began to interact with other cultures not as equals who could appreciate diversity but as representatives of a superior culture, *de haut en bas*. The understanding of "native" cultures and languages came to be left to specialists. Indeed, the very word *native* became derogatory. The growing technological superiority of the West made military conquest and imperial rule easier. The epoch of political hegemony eventually ended, largely as a result of Europe's own civil wars, but Western cultural and economic dominance remain, although they have largely been taken over by the United States. That the United States can dominate so much of the world economically without having to take into account the cultural diver-

The United States has preserved unsullied the ideals of the Enlightenment, but much of the history of Europe has been a reaction against *precisely those values*

sity that would go with *political* control does much to explain its unpopularity. People find themselves economically dependent on an alien and remote power that does not seem to appreciate their problems and that they are themselves unable to influence reciprocally.

It was once widely believed that as international travel and communication became easier, international understanding would grow. It has not. Today, wherever we go in the world, we seldom have to leave our own environment and adjust to that of anyone else. Jumbo jets take us from airport to identical airport; air-conditioned buses take us from Holiday Inn to indistinguishable Holiday Inn, whether in Berlin or Bangkok. Western tourists in Asia, Africa, or the Caribbean return, in spite of their bulging photograph albums, as ignorant as when they set out. Worse, we do not realize how ignorant we are. A parasitical industry has arisen throughout the world to cater to Western tourists; workers in this industry run hotels and restaurants, learn our languages, care for our comforts. At a deeper level, there are now groups of professionals—scholars, businessmen, scientists—who apparently interact with their Western peers on an equal basis. But they enter into *our* culture, not we into theirs. They learn to speak *our* languages, not we theirs. Through knowing them and their families, we often feel that we know their countries. But we do not.

Indeed, in our relationships with these people there often lie the seeds of tragedy. The more Westernized they become and the more they come to share our values, the further they grow from their own roots and the more alienated they become from their own people. Meanwhile, resentment of these Westernized groups may, without our knowledge, be assuming formidable proportions. This resentment may in turn breed anti-Western counter-elites, groups that pride themselves on their rejection of our values. And then there can be a debacle.

The greatest modern example of such a debacle was the Russian Revolution, when aristocrats, landowners, and professionals who felt themselves culturally part of Western Europe—many of them spoke German or French or English among themselves—were massacred or driven into exile by revolutionaries whose influence and power derived far more from their credentials as populists than as socialists. There have been other grim examples since: the reaction against the Westernized elites in China in the 1940s; the expulsion of the Vietnamese boat people; the Islamic revolution in Iran, when the entire Westernized class was overthrown in a volcanic upheaval. All too often Westerners believe they are extending the undoubted blessings of their more advanced culture—greater health, wealth, and fullness of life—when in fact they are creating the conditions for bitter internecine conflict. This has been the central tragedy of the interaction between the West and the wider world over the past hundred years.

Europeans are less resentful of this situation than Americans, for we have experienced violent reactions against Western liberal values in our own history. For 200 years the United States has preserved almost unsullied the original ideals of the Enlightenment: the belief in the God-given rights of the individual, the inherent rights of free assembly and free speech, the blessings of free enterprise, the perfectibility of man, and, above all, the universality of these values. But much of the history of Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been a reaction *against* precisely these values. There was the growth of nationalism, the search for value systems rooted in a unique historical past: Fichte's defiant challenge to French universalism during the Napoleonic wars; the bombastic assertion of German cultural supremacy by Treitschke and his disciples in the early part of this century. There was the revolt against the inadequacies and superficialities of rationalism and the search for deeper springs of human action, led by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, which stressed the dominance of the will and the value of action, ultimately of violence, as a

liberating force. There was the reaction against the cruelties and inequalities of unrestricted capitalism, which found expression in various forms of socialism (it is remarkable how few Americans know that communism was originally a *Western European* phenomenon). Many of these trends and influences came together in monstrously exaggerated form in the National Socialism of Hitler's Germany, the appeal of whose ideology was far more widespread in Europe than is generally realized. The leading part played by the United States in the defeat of Nazism made possible the reassertion in Europe of the creed of eighteenth-century democracy in its pristine form. American dominance also ensured that the United Nations was established within a Western ideological framework, eliciting lip service to the ideals of the Founding Fathers from some very improbable people.

The point is that the whole of European development over the past two centuries has led to a far greater recognition among Europeans than among Americans of the relative nature of the rights of the individual as against those of the community, and of the central role inevitably played in the community by the state. The rejection of liberalism as an alien creed, the belief that strong state power must create and enforce communal values of social justice at the expense of individual liberties, the search for a unique national or racial identity, the preference for the values of social egalitarianism—all these characteristics of so many Third World states are vivid in European history in a way that they are not in American. And while Europeans may not view the development of various kinds of national socialism in Third World countries with any particular favor, it does not especially surprise them, and they have little difficulty understanding it.

American scholars and diplomats have little difficulty understanding it either, but for all the reasons I have indicated their influence in shaping public attitudes and making foreign policy is quite limited. The American public and the politicians who speak for them have less patience with the phenomenon. The reactions of both American conservatives and American liberals to the failure of non-Western societies to conform to Western democratic models are equally inappropriate. Conservatives grade these societies according to the incidence of "communism," when in fact some degree of social and economic *dirigisme* and some myth of socialist nationalism may be necessary, especially in African tribal societies, for the creation of social cohesion. Liberals, on the other hand, assess such societies according to Western criteria of human rights, which, uncritically applied, may make strong and orderly government in turbulent multiethnic societies quite impossible—as well as being entirely alien to indigenous cultural traditions.

It is understandable that the assertion of global cultural diversity and the repudiation of the principles Americans believed were generally accepted after World War II should be seen by some Americans as a "loss of power." In fact, it is a loss of illusions, especially in the Third World. Certainly these developments are unrelated to American military strength, or the lack of it; and to attribute them to "Soviet subversion" is little short of infantile. In many Third World countries there is clearly an instinctive sympathy with the Soviet Union, whose modern problems and experiences—its underdevelopment, its inefficiency, and its endemic corruption—are not entirely remote from their own. But Soviet leaders have hitherto shown themselves even more incapable than Americans of understanding cultural diversity. The frustrations of State Department experts in working with their political masters in the White House must be as nothing compared with the problems experienced by their opposite numbers in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In dealing with foreign nations, military power is certainly important, and economic strength still more so. But neither can be effective without the third leg of the triad, which I term cultural empathy—an *understanding* not only of the economic interests and military strength of foreign peoples but also of their cultures, their perceptions, what the French call their *men-*

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

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talité. Without such an understanding, both economic and military aid are likely to do considerably more harm than good. The former only increases pauperization; the latter simply channels weapons into the hands of America's enemies, as it did in China in the 1940s, in Vietnam in the 1960s, and seems likely to do in Central America in the 1980s.

The twentieth century is replete with disastrous examples of such failures of understanding. If German leaders had listened to the warnings of their representatives in London in 1914, they would have known that the British would never have remained spectators while German armies overran Western Europe; twenty-five years later, if British leaders had listened to those who understood the demonic quality of Nazism, they could never have supposed that Hitler's ambitions stopped short at remedying the injustices of Versailles. So not only democracies are prone to such errors, and not only the United States. But, in the case of the United States, this weakness is all the more tragic, because it frustrates so many tantalizing opportunities opened up for America by its wealth and strength. And it is a weakness for which no amount of military power—certainly not nuclear power—can ever make up.

The problem cannot be changed overnight. It may be that the United States has to live with the psychological distance stemming from its historical isolation, and that all it can do is to recognize and make due allowance for it. On the other hand, there are some hopeful signs. For a generation past, young Americans have been trying to break out of their cultural envelopes, shunning guided tours, trying to understand in depth cultures other than their own. More important, in every major American university interdisciplinary cultural and area studies are being developed, especially studies of the Soviet Union and the Islamic world. The arid, analytic approaches to the study of world politics that characterized the 1950s and 1960s have a very dated look.

But these are changes that so far affect only the elites, whose influence on the American political process is, as we have seen, quite limited. The problem has to be tackled at a more basic level of education and culture, through the media and through the schools. But the growing bias in American education toward technology and away from the humanities is unhelpful: understanding foreign cultures—making our own less provincial—is what the humanities are all about.

Perhaps the most encouraging factor is the growing acceptance and understanding of ethnic diversity *within* the United States. Ethnic minorities are no longer being pressured into abandoning their cultural heritage and accepting a common "Americanism"; the number of bilingual Americans is sharply on the increase. The ease and speed with which the United States established close relations with Italy during and after World War II (something watched with envy by the British) were largely a result of the skillful use of Italian-Americans in the Allied military government. The growing voice of blacks in the United States has led to a greater concern in American policy for the interests of the peoples of black Africa. Is it too much to hope that the increasing influence of Hispanic-Americans will lead to a fuller understanding, and a wiser handling, of relations with the southern neighbors of the United States?

Growth of ethnic diversity brings its own problems, not least the danger that the United States will more than ever become the focus of exile politics. It may become hard for America to discern its own interests amid the babble of conflicting exile and ethnic lobbies. But even this would be preferable to conducting foreign policy grounded, ultimately, in the ignorance of an all-powerful electorate of what the rest of the world is really like. So long as that ignorance remains widespread, the hands of American policymakers will continue to be tied, and America will be denied the influence in the world that the wealth, the energy, and the goodwill of its people deserve. ■

(Reprinted by permission of the author, The Land Report, Spring 1985, pp.12-13.)

Farm Debt

Wes Jackson

The farmer and the farm, as a unit, stands between the voiceless environment and the vociferous public. Farmers are not exactly quiet, of course, but because they are such a dispersed minority, in effect, they are. If we were to look at the American farm and farm family the way we look through a prism that organizes light into bands, we would see most of the visible spectrum of all environmental problems. That few have made the connection between the farm and the environment as a whole is not surprising. Even in the analogy, the average student who looks at light through a prism has to be told that those bands of color are the glaring white light coming from the other side.

It doesn't matter that numerous farmers who have gone or will go bankrupt have had or still have millions of dollars worth of assets. If we were to do a proper accounting, nature has trillions upon trillions of dollars worth of assets and is in trouble. What if we had to pay the energy cost for the solar irrigation we call rain, for example? The potential for exploitation has always been the most lucrative where the assets are greatest. It doesn't take a computerized cost-benefit analysis to show that to roll a beggar is a waste of time.

Even as the exploitation of the environment and farmer is going full bore, we vote money to "preserve" the air and the water and we vote money to "preserve" the farmer and the farm. Our success at both is about what one would expect when only money is thrown at a problem. The farmer and the farm *and* "the environment" are essential for our lives but taken for granted by the larger public. We love the farm and the environment, *mostly*, I suppose, because we are their children. We came out of both. Most of what we call the environment is what is left of the wilderness that we all came out of. All of us are but a few generations off the farm. And so we love the environment and the farm and the farmer in about the same way that we love Indians. It is a form of condescension; a poorly masked way of despising our source. We don't really want to live in wilderness except perhaps during vacation. But we do want clean air and water as a pristine vestige of wilderness. Most of us don't want to *live* on a farm either, though most of us would like to *reside* there. Most of us don't want to live with the Indians, or live the way they did prior to being on reservations.

Farm debt is a derivative of society's attitude toward the farm and farmers. Farm debt is like environmental debt except that with farm debt, the farmer gets hurt directly and can complain. But because farmers are so few and so dispersed, they are scarcely heard. The farmer and the farm, like "the environment," are looked upon as a way to offset short term interests--like national balance of trade deficits. It is a place where we can externalize costs. For example, the cost of pesticides to the farmer and the cost of pesticides to the soil and groundwater are regarded similarly by the public: "a serious problem that something ought to be done about." Land prices, equipment prices, and fuel prices generate overdrafts when prices are low or yield is down. Talk within the smoked glass cubicles at the bank is serious then. Voices are low. (Now bankers are in trouble. It becomes a farm crisis when the banks are in trouble, not when the Russians back out of a grain deal.) An overdraft of fossil groundwater brings less discussion in Washington. The increased cost for deeper pumping will bring howls of protest, but the aquifer in decline can't protest even when 8,000 pounds of fossil water are withdrawn to grow the grain necessary to produce a pound of hamburger on a feedlot above it. In the longer run, the overdrafts at the bank and the overdrafts of the aquifer are the same.

Nitrates in the water from the commercial feedlot and over-fertilized fields are harmful and even deathly to baby pigs and baby people. The well is tested. The well is shut down. But long before the farm couple is regarded as cranky or strident about their "bad luck," their voices shut down and they scrape up enough money to buy into the rural water district subsidized by the Farmers Home Administration. The "new" water supply may already be showing signs of nitrate and pesticide pollution. Still Nature is speechless.

The farm problem is not a financial crisis so much as a failure of culture. It will not be--cannot be—solved by a new farm program so long as the farm family is the primary locus for receiving money. The farm family cannot exist in any dignified sort of way without rural community. It is like giving Indians monthly government handouts as they muddle along in a reservation that is the epitome of a destroyed culture. The very existence of such an abstraction, as a reservation boundary, has destroyed the chance for the return of Indian culture. Today's reservations are as lethal as measles, smallpox epidemics, and cavalry charges were earlier. And so Indians live on subsidy, without dignity. The abstract wall created Indian dependency. For today's farmers, the descendants of the white settlers who ruined Indian life, disaster takes the form of destruction of rural community by the industrial state.

Of course, the farmer and the rural communities bought into the industrial state willingly, but in much the same way that Indians traded for whiskey and smallpox-contaminated blankets willingly. Temporary relief to farmers came in the form of legislatively altered depreciation schedules and tax breaks so that this already over-capitalized segment of the society would continue to buy ever more equipment and other production inputs and keep equipment manufac-

turers solvent, even as the farmer and the farm was treated like a quarry (Maurice Telleen's term) and was mined deeper and deeper into debt. For a long time, the farmer thought that the pinch he was in was his own fault, and to a large extent it was, and so he didn't complain even behind the smoked windows of the bank cubicle. Ironically, the hat he was wearing carried an agri-business decal which advertised the fertilizer company or the seed house or the pesticide company or the farm machinery company partly responsible for putting him in that smoky glassed chamber. It is symbolically positioned to show who owns his frontal lobe. Whiskey and smallpox were faster.

Society is currently structured to accommodate the capitalist economy. This is why the Environmental Protection Agency can't protect the environment, the Bureau of Indian Affairs cannot protect decultured Indians, and the USDA cannot protect farmers. I am not saying we should get rid of any of the bureaus. They may help the environment and Indians and farmers cope within the capitalist structure, but none of them will solve the problems they are charged to solve. If we were really serious about protecting the environment, the discharge pipes and stacks of industry would all plug directly into the intake side, and costs would not be externalized to a voiceless environment. If we were really serious about helping the farmer, we would treat agriculture as inherently biological and cultural, not industrial. We would see more crop rotation, strip cropping, more animals on the farm and none in large feedlots, manure on the fields, and we would see more rural schools, rural churches, and rural baseball.

If the government is interested in continuing to subsidize agriculture, it should concentrate on supporting farmers as part of rural communities, instead of passing money through the farmer to subsidize agricultural businesses. Without rural community, the money paid as a direct subsidy to the farmer quickly finds its way back to the larger places. The government could pay the difference between the price of gas and groceries in the small communities and what they pay for both in the larger towns, thus keeping it circulating in the rural areas. But even that would be only a partial answer. Farm debt and ecological debt on the farm stands as a foreshadow of what is to come for our entire culture and the environment as a whole, unless we change, and fast. For the farmer and the farm, problems are still being added to the visible spectrum, problems which had their genesis decades and even centuries ago. Most of the rest of the American culture, though, still living in the white light of affluence, is so dazzled by the brilliance which emanates from a high energy society, that it is not yet able to see the full spectrum of environmental and economic problems. Until we begin to acknowledge that giving the green light to capitalism prevents us from really solving the problems, the environment will remain speechless, soil will erode, and farmers will remain broke, dispersed, and relatively quiet.

I've said bad things about capitalism, but I have just about as many bad things to say about the socialist arrangements in the world. The point is, we need a new economic order which respects biological and cultural diversity. Our current economic order is better designed to exploit all of the bad situations than alleviate them.

Agriculture is over-capitalized and farmers have debt largely because the extraction or mining economy has moved to the fields. We need economic models which will account for the cycling of materials and handle the flow of energy--but not just any energy--contemporary energy (sunlight, non-fossil, non-nuclear) in an orderly and non-disruptive manner. This model can be found in nearly all natural ecosystems of the planet and is trustable because it was hard won in particular places over the globe during billions of years of evolution. Sometimes to cope is to change, but not often enough. We need to be carrying economic models of sustainability in our heads that can be found in nature or in primitive cultures, so that a proposal for a change to help farmers cope with a bad situation can be evaluated against some standard of permanence. In such a manner we may be able to change the context for every citizen and for the environment, rural or urban. Until then, nearly all that we spend on a problem--the environment, Indians, farmers--will be more for the purpose of coping than for change.

"Drought and famine have propelled African misery onto TV screens and into headlines, but although bad weather accelerates the crisis, it is at root man-made."

—Quoted from "Across Africa, Nations Are Sliding Backward at Accelerating Speed" by Lee Lescaze and Steve Mufson, Wall Street Journal July 15, 1985, p. 1.



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