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from time to time calls attention to published material that might contribute toward clarification or understanding of issues affecting world peace. The accompanying reprints constitute Reprint Mailing No. 74.

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"The arms race has not been driven by technology itself, but by the mistaken human conviction that ultimate solutions will come only from laboratories and defense plants. And the solution to the arms crisis will not come until we understand that the way we perceive our relationship to the rest of the world is what has put us into our dangerous predicament."

—Quoted from a letter to the editor of The Wall Street Journal of June 28, 1985, by Marianne Allison, San Jose, California.

# NOTEBOOK

The gods of the empty horizon

By Lewis H. Lapham

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author)

Religion consists in believing that everything which happens is extraordinarily important. It can never disappear from the world, precisely for this reason.

—Cesare Pavese

After World War I it was generally assumed that all the gods were dead. Most of them had been reported missing on the western front; the few that survived the armistice of 1918 soon perished in a succession of purges mounted by enemies as various as Marxism, psychoanalysis,

quantum mechanics, and Dadaist aesthetics. For the next thirty years, professors of history as well as literature informed their students that it was no good trying to find the lost light in the well of metaphor or the wine of orgy.

The vogue for modernist cynicism dissolved in the explosion at Hiroshima. At first, of course, not everybody understood what had happened, and for another twenty years the professors continued to teach the language of Joyce and the doctrines of Freud. As long as the nuclear weapons were neither too numerous nor too available, it was still possible to believe that they might not be divine, that maybe they weren't too different from crossbows or howitzer shells.

But the equations of destruction now stored in the world's arsenals, together with the sophistication of the guidance systems that can cast the fires of heaven as accurately as Capitoline Jupiter, make it impossible for the secular authorities to pretend that the miraculous birth at Los Alamos somehow failed to take place, that the makers of modern physics hadn't also succeeded in making an appropriately modern religion. In consecrated ground on three continents, as serene in their indifference as Aztec or Delphic stone, the gods of the empty horizon wait patiently for the end of the world. Their fierce silence has imposed on the world what can be fairly described as the forty years' peace.

Even the blasphemous heathen who never have seen a cruise missile or an ICBM can infer the divinity of the weapons from the nature of the discussion that attends their deployment and use. President Reagan speaks of the Strategic Defense Initiative (known to the vulgar as Star Wars) as if it had been shown to him in a prophetic dream. The apologists for the more orthodox dogma (known as mutual assured destruction) rely on an equally inspired acquaintance with the truth.

Once recognized as theological discourse, the weapons debate takes its place among the gospels of Revelation. Knowing that it is by paradox that the gods declare themselves, the nuclear clergy has devised at least six proofs of their presence.

1. What was irrational becomes rational. The dogma of mutual assured destruction, which has governed American strategy for thirty years, implies a threat so monstrous, so beyond reason, that it offers, in the words of its proponents, the only benign and rational policy. The United

States preserves civilization by promising to obliterate civilization.

The theory of the impregnable defense guarantees, in President Reagan's words, "security against all contingencies," which, in its divine presumption, is an assurance as monstrous and as beyond reason as the promise of utter annihilation.

2. What was real becomes magical. The analysts of all sects concede that nuclear weapons no longer retain a practical military use. They have become so frightful that nobody, not even Patrick Buchanan, conceives of sending them against either a strategic or a tactical objective; these lesser purposes give way to the higher purpose of sustaining the myth of omnipotence. The logic of deterrence, like that of the Strategic Defense Initiative, requires an arsenal that stands as both symbol and embodiment of absolute power.

3. What was static becomes dynamic. By increasing its store of weapons, the United States hopes to reduce the burden of arms. The doctrine assumes that the Soviet Union will negotiate disarmament only if it feels itself intimidated. The United States thus has no choice but to pile missile upon missile, laser beam upon laser beam, bomb upon bomb. The tower of hideous strength must always overreach the competitive icon raised up by the Soviet Union.

The impious ask, What is the point of building so many weapons when it needs no more than a few thermonuclear displays to poison the earth? As always, the impious fail to make the leap of faith. Deterrence is never constant, and cannot be measured out in what the Pentagon calls "mere numbers" (either of warheads or of casualties); it resides in the always shifting "interaction of capabilities and vulnerabilities," i.e., in an unutterable mystery.

In his speech announcing the advent of Star Wars, President Reagan observed that "the defense debate is not about spending arithmetic." Not only is it mystery, but it exists in a realm beyond the tawdry stink of commerce.

4. What was human becomes divine. The construction of a nuclear weapon depends upon as brilliant a work of the human imagination as

the world has ever seen. Over the course of centuries the collective genius of hundreds of thousands of mathematicians, physicists, and engineers has gathered the wonder of the universe in a space not much bigger than a hatbox.

But the nuclear religion transfers the qualities of human courage and resourcefulness to supernatural objects. The substitution diminishes the men who make the objects; having become pygmies, they find their response to emergent political occasions reduced to the primitive shout: "Our gods will destroy your gods."

5. The unknown takes precedence over the known. As the weapons become more dangerous and more complex, it becomes more impossible to predict what would happen if they were to escape and walk abroad among the nations of the earth. What savage race would rise from the ashes? What fish would still swim in the oceans?

Nobody can answer the questions, and so the preachers of descriptive sermons can find nobody to quarrel with their visions of hell. Carl Sagan's nuclear winter is as plausible as the day of judgment advertised on network television. The strategists in both the United States and the Soviet Union make pictures on computer screens, but their calculations bear comparison to the paintings of Hieronymous Bosch.

6. What was temporal becomes spiritual. Statesmen come and go, but the nuclear fires abide. The congregations worship the terrible magnificence of the idols at rest in their sanctuaries, adorning them, as if they were statues of Apollo, with the votive gifts of higher accuracies and greater quotients of power. Despite the immense sums of treasure and intelligence offered in rituals of sacrifice, nobody can expect to live to see the result of his handiwork.

Among people accustomed to a religious understanding of the world, this final paradox permits a measure of peace. In New York a few months ago to speak to a university audience about the landscape of Armageddon, a Jesuit priest dismissed as irrelevant a question about the extent of the nuclear inventory. "These things are not of this world, my son," he said. "They belong to the afterlife." ■

Richard Burt

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# The Pershing II Missile: A Defense


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The United States, absent an arms agreement in the Geneva talks which would make such a step unnecessary, is to begin deployment to Europe of a new intermediate-range missile later this year, the Pershing II. Like the ground-launched cruise missile, which is also scheduled for deployment this year, the Pershing II has a range sufficient to reach targets in the Soviet Union.

The deployment of the Pershing II would fulfill an American commitment to our NATO allies to respond to the massive Soviet buildup of SS20 missiles. It would, of course, be unnecessary if the Soviets accepted President Reagan's offer to eliminate this entire category of nuclear weaponry. The Soviet Union, not surprisingly, would prefer a different outcome: the Soviets keep their missiles, while we not deploy our own. The Soviets have mounted a major political and propaganda effort to forestall deployment of the Pershing II. They have alleged that this missile is a uniquely dangerous terror weapon, that it has a "first-strike" capability against Soviet strategic forces, and that, in consequence, the Soviet Union will have to adopt a "launch-on-warning" policy if the Pershing is deployed.

None of these charges bears serious scrutiny. The Soviet Union's choice of this line of argument, however, does reveal a good deal about its view of Western Europe and about the relationship it would like to establish between European security and that of the Soviet Union.

Any nuclear-armed missile is, of course, a terrifyingly destructive weapon. Therefore, alleged Soviet concerns over the Pershing II have to be put into some perspective. This American missile is considerably less destructive than the SS20. It has a much shorter range, 1,800 vs. 5,000 kilometers. It has only one warhead, as compared with the three warheads on each SS20. That single



*"The essence of Soviet arguments against the Pershing II . . . is that it is unacceptable for them to have to face a threat from Western Europe comparable to the threat they pose to Western Europe."*

Pershing warhead is less powerful than any one of those on the SS20. The Pershing flies no faster than the SS20. It could reach targets in the Soviet Union no more quickly than Soviet land-based missiles can presently reach targets anywhere in Western Europe, or than Soviet sea-based missiles can presently reach targets in the United States. Finally, there will be, at the conclusion of U.S. deployment, only 108 Pershing II missiles and 108 warheads deployed. There are 351 SS20s deployed today, with 1,053 warheads, and the number continues to grow. Clearly, then, there is nothing uniquely threatening about the Pershing II.

The Soviet claim that the Pershing II represents a first-strike threat has even less substance. Ninety percent of Soviet strategic forces will be out of range of the Pershing II. Soviet strategic command and control links, centered on Moscow, will also be out of range of the Pershing II. In any case, the 108 Pershing IIs to be deployed are so few, when compared with the 2,350 currently deployed Soviet strategic ballis-

tic missiles, that the concept of the Pershing II's use for a preemptive strike against the Soviet strategic force is ludicrous.

It is consequently difficult, to take seriously the Soviet threat to move to a launch-on-warning policy as a result of Pershing II deployments. Given the much greater vulnerability of the U.S. ICBM force to Soviet strategic missiles, it also seems unlikely that Americans will feel much sympathy for the comparatively minor complications that the Pershing II will introduce for Soviet strategic planners.

Soviet arguments are not designed, however, to persuade Americans to cancel production of the Pershing II. Rather, their arguments are designed to persuade Europeans to halt its deployment. The Pershing has been singled out in this effort because, unlike the cruise missiles, which are intended to go into Italy and the United Kingdom this year, and into Belgium, the Netherlands and West Germany in subsequent years, Pershing II will be deployed in only one country, West Germany. If the Soviets can succeed in blocking Pershing II deployments in Germany, they will knock out a major element of NATO's December 1979 decision, and put themselves in a much stronger position to then block deployment of cruise missiles in all these countries, including West Germany.

The essence of Soviet arguments against the Pershing II, and against the whole concept of NATO's INF deployment, is that it is unacceptable for them to have to face a threat from Western Europe comparable to the threat they pose to Western Europe. For the Soviets to build and deploy new missiles with the mission of targeting all Western Europe from Soviet territory is, they imply, a fact of life, to which Western Europe must acquiesce. For NATO to respond by stationing missiles in Western Europe of comparable capability somehow is a "provocation" that the Soviet Union cannot accept. Western Europe must realize, the Soviet

Union insists, that its security is less important than that of the Soviet Union. European security is explicitly subordinated, in Soviet thinking, to that of the Soviet Union.

This Soviet view of European security makes the Soviet reaction to the NATO decision of 1979 to deploy American intermediate-range missiles to Europe much more comprehensible. The current objective of Soviet policy is to employ its geopolitical advantage and its regional nuclear superiority to intimidate Western Europe and force Western European accommodation to Soviet interests. The deployment of 572 new American missiles, capable of reaching only limited areas of the Soviet Union, has little impact upon the U.S.-Soviet balance, at a time when both sides have over 10,000 warheads, deliverable on short notice, to any location in the other's country. Yet by firmly linking American power to European security, this deployment will prevent the Soviet Union from making Western Europe a nuclear hostage, and thus achieving its objective of enforcing the subordination of European security to that of the Soviet Union.

This is why the Soviet Union has reacted so strongly against NATO's 1979 decision. This is why the Soviet Union has put forward its implausible, and otherwise inexplicable, case against deployment of 108 Pershing II missiles. This is why Western European leaders, recognizing true Soviet motivations, have invested so much of their own political capital in maintaining the decision agreed upon in 1979. The Soviet Union seeks to force its view of European security upon Europe. Europe's leaders, on the other hand, are determined, whether through arms control or deployment, to ensure that the security of Europe is not accorded a lower priority than that of either of the superpowers.

*The writer is assistant secretary of state for European affairs.*

## THE ARGUMENT AGAINST THE PERSHINGs

by

Michael Crowe\*

June 1983

The article by Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Richard Burt, defending the deployment of Pershing II and Cruise missiles in Europe this year (Washington Post, April 10) is probably the most reasoned and considered pro-missile argument to date. It rationally deflates ill-considered pacifist arguments that 108 Pershing II's will constitute a serious first-strike threat either to the Soviet ICBMs, most of which will be out of Pershing range, or to the SS-20s, all of which could easily be moved out of range. Considering the sheer size of superpower arsenals, the idea of 108 Pershing IIs being used for a pre-emptive strike against thousands of Soviet weapons, is, as Mr. Burt puts it, ludicrous. To quote Mr. Burt: "The deployment of 572 new American missiles, capable of reaching only limited areas of the Soviet Union, has little impact upon the U.S.-Soviet balance, at a time when both sides have over ten thousand warheads, deliverable on short notice, to any location in the other's country." This is a reasonable and accurate assessment.

Let us now apply this same rational argument to the prospect of the Soviet Union installing one hundred SS-5s or SS-20s in Cuba and Nicaragua. These missiles also would have an absurdly limited capacity to launch a first strike against thousands of American ICBMs. Moreover, they could easily be countered by targeting a larger number of American Pershings on Cuba and Nicaragua, thus achieving a regional nuclear balance highly favourable to the U.S. To claim that these Russian missiles would post a serious threat to U.S. survival, or would even significantly alter the nuclear balance would be, to use Mr. Burt's word, ludicrous. Why then the American hysteria over this prospect both in 1962 and in the writings of Mrs. Jean Kirkpatrick this year, when she raised the spectre of a repeat of Soviet missile deployment in Cuba?

The only explanation is that the cool, rational calculations of military threat, so ably analysed by Mr. Burt, are in practice meaningless: they are overwhelmed by irrational fears which depend on quite obsolete factors such as geographic nearness. President Reagan recently tried to frighten Americans by showing them pictures of a Soviet MiG in Cuba. From any rational standpoint, this is ludicrous: a Soviet ICBM in Central Asia could reach Washington in half the time of a MiG flying from Cuba. Yet the scare partly worked: our minds are still dominated by geography. It is as though the threat of nuclear annihilation, which we try to keep as abstract as we can, becomes

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terrifyingly concrete by drastically reducing the geographic distance from which it is posed. Is it beyond the American imagination to comprehend that the Soviets feel an irrational fear at the prospect of Pershing IIs next door in West Germany, precisely parallel to the irrational American fear of Soviet missiles in Cuba? From any rational, military perspective, the two threats are precisely the same: a marginal addition to grotesque superpower levels of overkill. It is not, however, rational calculations which determine our levels of fear.

NATO strategists argue that Europe is in the same position at the moment under the threat of Soviet SS-20s. But Europe does not have the same relationship of global rivalry, tension, and mutual nuclear terror with the USSR that America has. Europe and the USSR have only one potential casus belli—a land invasion across the German border. Between Russia and America, competing globally, there are, in contrast, a dozen potential flashpoints around the world. There is no guarantee that in a nuclear war arising from any of these flashpoints, theatre nuclear weapons would not be used, irrespective of whether the crisis occurred in that particular theatre. Hypothetical Cuban missiles or Euromissiles could equally be used in a Soviet-American war over Korea, Lebanon or the Persian Gulf. No verbal assurances to the contrary would be believed by the other side. It was this that made the Cuban missiles intolerable to Kennedy—and it is this that makes American missiles in Europe intolerable to the USSR. In any Soviet-American nuclear war over any issue anywhere on earth, the Russians would have to assume that the American missiles in Europe might be used, and act accordingly—that is, wipe them out first. They could not afford not to.

This brings us to the major point of Mr. Burt's argument: that the Soviet object in trying to block the missile deployment in Europe is "the subordination of European security to that of the USSR." Europeans who are neither pacifist nor pro-Soviet may take a parallel view of the consequences of deployment—the subordination of their security to that of the United States. From now on Europe will not exist in the Soviet mind as a group of nations separate from America, with an independent foreign policy: it will be viewed by the Soviets as a mere launching pad for American missiles, which must automatically be targeted in any Soviet-American nuclear exchange. Deployment of American missiles in Europe under American control will mean the end of even a theoretical European option of neutrality in a Soviet-American war. Even the bitterest European disagreement with American foreign policy in Asia, Latin America or the Middle East will not prevent us being annihilated for American sins in these regions. If Americans are shocked that many Europeans should even want to retain the option of neutrality in a Soviet-American nuclear war, then they should ask themselves seriously what they mean by an alliance, and whether they are not misreading the whole concept.

A defensive alliance is a promise to defend a partner against direct aggression: it is not a promise to go to war every time a partner goes to war. The U.S. did not go to war with Argentina when Britain did, nor with Egypt when

Britain and France did in 1956: nor did Britain, Germany or Holland join the Vietnam war. If America or any other partner chooses to get into a war in the Middle East or Asia, it is basically on its own. It may be helped by its partners on the merits of the case: nothing in the NATO alliance binds such help. It is this pragmatic and rational limitation to the meaning of alliance which will be totally overturned by the deployment of American-controlled missiles, capable of hitting the Soviet Union, in Europe. From now on, European dissociation from an American war will be strictly meaningless. If such a war ever escalates to a nuclear exchange between the USSR and the USA, the European-based American missiles will automatically be destroyed by the Soviet Union, whether or not Europe happens to agree with American policy. Given the plan to disperse and conceal the Cruise missiles throughout their host countries in times of crisis, a very large number of Soviet warheads will be required to eliminate them. Europe will from now on face annihilation for an American foreign policy which it may wholly disagree with, and over which it has never had the slightest degree of control.

If this is not subordination, then nothing is. American foreign policy in any part of the world will henceforth commit European lives as fatally as it commits Americans—and we do not have a vote in American elections. Whenever Americans decide to risk their own annihilation, they will be deciding to risk ours too, and without consulting us. We have only to look at the Reagan government's disdain for European views on Central America or the Middle East to know how much influence we will have over American foreign policy in the future. The knowledge that an American blunder in the Caribbean will lead to Russian missiles raining down not merely on America, but on Europe, cannot fail to increase tensions and wrangling within the NATO alliance to the point of break-up. If this deployment, recklessly decided, and held to now out of fear of losing face, goes ahead in October, it will perhaps be the last act of unity NATO will ever be capable of.

The folly of this deployment is only made more glaring by a glance at the reasonable, non-pacifist alternatives available. Chief among these is to leave NATO's primary missile delivery system what it has always been—a submarine-based system. While air-borne systems have steadily declined in penetration ability, more than half the NATO nuclear warheads judged capable of hitting the Soviet Union are at present based on the U.S. Poseidon C3 submarines assigned to NATO command. Poseidon missiles are not as accurate as Pershing II or SS-20s—though they have double the range of the former. The newest American submarine-launched missile, the Trident C4, is, however, almost as accurate as any land-based missile, and could replace or supplement the Poseidons in Europe to the level needed to balance the SS-20s. The supreme advantage of a submarine-launched missile over a land-based one is that it does not invite nuclear attack on land

targets with consequent civilian casualties: it can only be eliminated by conventional naval action, and then only with great difficulty. The absurdity and danger of the Pershing II and Cruise missile deployment is their extreme vulnerability to an SS-20 first strike. It is paradoxically the vulnerability of a weapon which makes it destabilising, through encouraging the "use it or lose it" mentality, or its assumption in the enemy's calculations. An extremely vulnerable weapon is almost by definition a weapon of first use, since it could not survive for any other use. And there will be no missile on earth more vulnerable than the Pershing II in Germany, facing an SS-20 of far longer range, targeted on it from well outside the Pershing's range. It is this vulnerability which must give the Russians pause: a weapon which patently cannot survive a first strike can only be intended to launch one. What worries the Russians is not any inability to destroy the Pershing II first, but that they may be rushed prematurely into doing so, by betting on the Pershing II's imminent first use, and thus precipitate Armageddon. Their recent threat to move to launch on warning is an attempt to convey to us the new time pressure they will be under.

In contrast with this, the Trident C4 submarine-launched missile is the perfect weapon of retaliation. Though accurate enough to hit military targets, it is not vulnerable to a first strike, and will therefore not provoke one, on the routine expectation of first use. Paradoxically, NATO would assure the Russians of its purely defensive intentions by arming itself with a better, longer range, and less vulnerable missile—one that did not have to be used first in order to survive. And at the same time, the possibility of these sea-based missiles being used in a strictly Russian-American war over the Caribbean, for example, would not lead to a pre-emptive Russian nuclear strike at Europe—since this could not hit submarines. In the event of a Russian-American war outside the European sphere, in which Europe did not consider its interests involved, NATO could simply reassign its Trident submarines back to U.S. national forces, while individual European nations retained the option of remaining neutral, according to the merits of the case (as the U.S. did in the Falklands War). We would thus achieve the desirable combination of strengthening NATO's nuclear capability, while European countries retained their sovereign right to make war or refrain from doing so. If Americans cannot see that this fundamental stabilisation and equalisation of the relationship between Europe and America is in the interests of the long-term firmness of the Atlantic Alliance, then they misread the European mind. The current wave of right-wing governments in Europe has accepted these land-missiles, and the disastrous corollary of Europe's loss of sovereignty. These governments will not last forever. When the opposition comes back to power in Britain and Germany, there is every possibility that the inevitable demand for the withdrawal of these missiles will lead to the break-up of NATO itself.

*The following is the report of the speech of Admiral Eugene J. Carroll, published in the Proceedings of the Conference on Strategies for Peace and Security in a Nuclear Age, held October 27-30, 1983, at the University of Guelph, Ontario, Canada. (Reprinted by permission of Prof. Henry Wiseman, Conference Co-Chairman.)*

**Admiral Eugene J. Carroll**

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Washington D.C.*

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in Europe and the Middle East*

Admiral Carroll said that the largest split on the subject of military power and balance is not between the superpowers, but between President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher. Both have agreed that the year is 1937 and that the western world must be roused to build peace through strength. But they are bitterly divided over the question of who should play the role of Winston Churchill. President Reagan says that he is better qualified to play the part because of his professional training, on the other hand, Prime Minister Thatcher has the right accent and has just about the right height.

On a more serious note, Admiral Carroll said that this was not 1937 because the West is not weak. The western democracies are certainly not as weak and unprepared to fight a war as they had been in 1937. For that matter, there is considerable equality in military strength between the two blocs. Both are too strong in terms of nuclear power. NATO has more people in uniform than does the Warsaw Pact, and NATO has more nuclear weapons than the opposing Warsaw Pact.

The good news is that everyone recognizes that we have too many nuclear weapons in our respective arsenals. President Reagan recently stated that we must reduce nuclear weapons to levels that "no longer threaten the survival of both of our nations."

President Brezhnev stated before his death, "there is no weapon in the Soviet arsenal which would not be surrendered for the cause of peace." This was reiterated by Chairman Andropov.

These are encouraging words. However, neither side knows how to reduce. The only way to reduce seems to be to build more. Prime Minister Trudeau pointed to the incongruous situation last night when he said that the West has increased its nuclear arsenal in order to reduce it one day.

The U.S. "peace through strength" is a very positive approach. The U.S. is prepared to respond at every plausible level of nuclear war with the Soviet Union, and intends to prevail in a prolonged nuclear war. The only problem is that to do so the U.S. must build a further 17,000 new nuclear weapons and spend \$450 billion in the process. The NATO allies are constantly urged to share in the conventional force build-up.

The Soviet response to this was given at this conference by the two speakers from the Soviet Union, Drs. Podlesney and Ivanov. The Soviet Union will not accept an inferior position in the world or at the bargaining

table, a fact which did not surprise Admiral Carroll at all. The Soviet Union, the Admiral pointed out, is going to keep up with the western effort to strengthen its military capabilities.

Both sides have tried arms control negotiations to halt the arms race, but never very seriously, and therefore without much effect. Whenever an agreement was reached it was primarily one that established a fragile ceiling limiting the number of aircraft or missiles, while at the same time leaving plenty of room under the ceiling so each side could build all the weapons it planned to build with the new technology available, seeking an advantage over the other.

Negotiations cannot be productive if one side always tries to gain the upper hand over the other. Admiral Carroll stated that the U.S. put forward a totally unrealistic proposal at the Geneva talks. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, saw in the negotiations an opportunity to drive a wedge between the U.S. and the West European NATO allies using the Euromissiles as the divisive issue. "No one's hands are clean at Geneva," emphasized Admiral Carroll. "It is a charade, with each side trying to obtain an advantage, while blaming the other side for the lack of progress in the negotiations. At the same time each side is trying to justify the introduction of new weapons systems. Thus we have arrived at a ludicrous position. The U.S. maintains that the U.S.S.R. will not negotiate seriously while the new missiles (Pershing IIs and Cruise missiles) are deployed in Europe, while the Soviet Union maintains that it will not negotiate once the planned NATO modernization program is initiated. It is a frightening situation."

Today's situation could not be compared to 1937, but "try 1912," suggested Admiral Carroll. In 1912 everyone knew that a war could break out between the major powers in Europe. "What did they do?" asked Admiral Carroll. "Did they try to prevent it? No, they prepared to fight it". Admiral Carroll believes this is the condition the world is in today. "We are preparing to fight a war which no one knows how to win."

The cost to prepare for such a war is staggering, said the Admiral. "The U.S. military budget soon to be announced by the Pentagon will call for nearly two trillion dollars in the next five years. The Soviets themselves do not spend an inconsequential sum on the military, although they never tell us how much. The Soviet effort is approximately twice that of the U.S., in terms of national resources. Worldwide the amount spent annually on arms is over \$600 billion. Inga Thorsson, the real expert on the subject, will talk more about the subject in the next session," Admiral Carroll said.



"The real cost of the arms race is the loss of security we experience with more sophisticated armaments. This is a violent world. Some 40 wars of varying degrees are currently being waged involving some 45 countries. Thirteen countries receive the bulk of their military equipment from the Soviet Union, 20 countries receive the major share of their arms from the U.S. We are already fighting proxy wars, a fact that does not make anyone on earth more secure. The chance for the escalation of these conflicts is immense.

"We are not that far away from Armageddon," said Admiral Carroll. "The superpowers are in a dangerous cycle. Each builds weapons that create fear on the other side. The U.S. fears the Soviet Union's desire to take over the world, the Soviet Union fears American power and the U.S. determination to defeat communism wherever it may appear. Each country is so suspicious of the other that each commits stupid acts like the invasion of Afghanistan or the seizure of Grenada. This demonstrates that each side is reacting out of fear that the other side could gain advantage somewhere in the world." The Admiral repeated Prime Minister Trudeau's observation that "The superpowers breathe a different air than we do. They can sense danger even in the most remote corners of the world."

"The worst characteristic of the arms race is that it guarantees failure of deterrence. Both sides argue that they are not going to fight a nuclear war, that they are building these costly weapons to enhance deterrence."

The U.S. military position is that preparing for war ensures peace. "Let me tell you", emphasized Admiral Carroll, "we are ensuring the hell out of it. The U.S. and the Soviet Union are building weapons that in and of themselves increase the danger of war and guarantee the failure of deterrence. Deterrence rests on three assumed conditions and these three conditions must exist at all times. Not once can you fail in nuclear deterrence."

First, you assume that everyone with nuclear weapons is rational. One cannot deter a madman. Therefore, one must assume that the other is as rational as our own side. But this is a weak assumption to make when fear enters the equation. When we build the new first strike systems, and deploy thousands of cruise missiles and new battlefield systems, we will be living in a constant crisis situation. We probably could not survive another Cuban missile crisis because one side, most likely out of fear, would use the weapons that it built to deter war.

Second, you assume that a rational adversary will never miscalculate what you do. In other words, the one side will always recognize the other side's vital interests. To demonstrate the fragility of this assumption, Admiral Carroll referred to a war of pure miscalculation, the Argentine-British conflict over the Falkland Islands.

It proved to be a "successful" war for one side, but, he asked, "How would you like a rerun of the war with both sides having nuclear weapons?" Miscalculation can occur all over the world: in Lebanon, Iran or Iraq. "Somewhere, sometime we are going to become involved in a war," Admiral Carroll said emphatically. "It will most likely take place step by step and one or both superpowers will eventually find themselves involved in a conflict in which their vital interests are involved." Admiral Carroll adheres to the position voiced by the former West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who said he was not so much worried about war starting in Central Europe: it was the Sarajevos that occur from time to time that had him worried.

Third, you assume that no accidental threat or injury takes place on another nuclear power. This, however, is more likely to happen if horizontal proliferation is allowed to run its course. At least 11 nations are well advanced in acquiring nuclear weapons, and these countries include such bastions of political instability as Libya, Palestine, Iraq, South Africa and South Korea. Admiral Carroll asked, "What would have happened if South Korea had had a nuclear device this past September when the South Korean airliner was downed?"

These assumptions, which should ensure that deterrence works, are subject to failure as we move up the nuclear ladder. In Admiral Carroll's judgement (and he hoped to be proven wrong) nuclear war by 1990 seemed likely; and almost certain by the year 2000. "This is the consequence of the arms race. As in a Greek tragedy, we can see it coming, but we can't seem to stop it." As Dr. Ivanov stated earlier, each step makes sense; it makes sense for the Soviets to build more nuclear weapons and it makes sense for the U.S. to build more.


Not willing to end on this pessimistic note, Admiral Carroll said people are going to change things. Governments must find ways to turn things around. Quoting Mr. Trudeau, he said that the superpowers at present lack a political vision of the world in which nations can live in peace. He called this the principle of mutual security. Our future and our survival is in the hands of the Soviets; similarly, their future and survival is in our hands. We can end it all in 30 minutes. Thus, the safer we can make the world for the other side, the safer we will be.

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"In our society it is the absence  
of an agreement to protest, rather  
than an agreement to approve,  
which validates the acts of  
government."

—Quoted from "Consent of  
the Governed—Silence"  
by John M. Swomley, Jr.,  
The Churchman, June/July  
1985.

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