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from time to time calls attention to published material that might contribute toward clarification or understanding of issues affecting world peace. The accompanying reprints constitute Reprint Mailing No. 72.

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"Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those commoner natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never have rest from their evils—no, nor the human race, as I believe—and then only will this our State have a possibility of life and behold the light of day."

—Plato: Republic V; Great Books of the Western World, 1952; Volume 7, p. 369.

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Our Four Great Challenges

U.S. responsibility and a world survival strategy

KURT WALDHEIM

The inauguration of a new administration in the U. S. always provides an incentive to take stock of the world situation. The overwhelming global dominance of the U.S. following World War II has diminished as other countries have grown, but on the basis of my ten years as Secretary General of the United Nations I can state with conviction that this relative change in weight does not diminish the worldwide importance of U.S. policies. Its unique combination of military and economic might is a powerful force to be guided with care, and it entails an awesome responsibility.

At a time of increasing international difficulties and tensions, people throughout the world now look to the U.S. for leadership in facing global issues. It is a subtle and challenging task to provide the style of leadership required in a divided, complex, and uncertain world. This may appear to some to be a thankless and unwanted responsibility, especially under the pressure of urgent domestic concerns.

But for the U.S. there are no easy options either of unilateral action or of disengagement. The future of the U.S. is intimately linked, in both economic and political terms, to that of the world community. Conversely, the future of the world depends to a considerable degree on the quality, sensitivity, and vision of the leadership of the U.S.

GLOBAL ISSUES SERIES

Former UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim is chairman of the InterAction Council of Former Heads of Government in Vienna. His article is the fourth in our 10th-anniversary series on global issues as seen by leaders abroad.

Campbell/Sygma

Nigerian farmers — "Efforts to contribute to development cooperation are in decline."

In discussing the global issues of our time, the first difficulty is selection. There are acute regional problems that have major repercussions for the wider world. For example, world opinion is now preoccupied with the disaster of millions of people in Africa faced with starvation and disease. Continuing tensions in the Middle East, Central America, and Kampuchea (Cambodia) are further examples of regional issues with global implications.

There also are sectoral problems, such as the international debt that calls into question the stability of the world monetary and trading systems. I do not intend to catalogue such problems. Rather, I will outline four major issues that I believe are at the root of our difficulties. The *first* of these is, inescapably, the confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, which has led to the polarization of two blocs commonly — but not accurately — identified as the East and the West.

The arms race is a symptom of the more basic problems of tension, rivalry, and the breakdown of trust and communication between East and West. This polarization has negative repercussions far beyond the realm of armaments. A vital and truly global issue for this generation is, therefore, whether and how some mutual understanding and collaboration can be created between East and West despite their profound differences in ideology, method, and objectives.

Imagine for a moment that this polarization did not exist. We would then be living in a world where many problems could be solved that are presently considered insoluble. We could mobilize our energies, before it is too late, to address the problems faced by the developing world. We could direct to constructive purposes a portion of the $800 billion or more that is spent each year on armaments. We could lift the cloud of pessimism that hangs over the world, and create conditions in which international cooperation would be regenerated.

Those of us who have experienced the hard realities of international relations know how unreal this is. Nevertheless, it is important to stand back occasionally from daily preoccupations and to recognize that things do not have to be the way they are. The year 1985 is a particularly appropriate one in which to consider this vital matter because it is the anniversary of the conclusion of World War II, when the Soviet Union and the U.S. were allies and when the UN was created.

One learns quickly in international diplomacy to avoid excessive optimism and, more slowly, to avoid excessive pessimism. A position unacceptable at one time can, after a decent interval,

become acceptable. Let us hope for a revival of cooperation between the superpowers, perhaps through a perception of common concerns.

In encounters with top officials on both sides of this relationship, I have been struck by the fact that they appear trapped in an increasingly dangerous process that neither side wishes to continue. In each country important domestic interests and complex internal relationships drive the arms race forward, largely unopposed by effective countervailing pressures to restrain the growth of armaments. These domestic pressures are compounded by the dynamics of superpower relations, leading to the view that it is necessary to increase nuclear arms levels to reduce them. To those who do not study the intricacies of this relationship this is incomprehensible.

Both world wars have taught us that even with conventional arms it is almost impossible to maintain the effective, considered management of a wide-scale conflict. This historic fact is now compounded by the development of supertechnologies of which the complexities and the costs — and the risks — continue to increase. We have created a monster that seems to have escaped our control, with the threat of annihilation for all of us whether or not we are directly involved.

We must be encouraged by recent steps to initiate high-level contacts between the superpowers. If the atmosphere of distrust is to be reduced, these contacts must be widened so that the officials and the peoples of the two nations can begin to understand one another. There will always be competition between the superpowers, and they always will disagree on issues such as human rights and economic management. But these differences must be subsumed in a pattern of cooperation and communication in their mutual interest, and in the interests of the world.

The prospect of nuclear war between the superpowers — and now its related problem of "nuclear winter" — is in the forefront of public concern. The polarization between East and West, however, has pernicious implications beyond the risks of conflict between them. That nuclear war has so far been avoided is not sufficient justification for the present arms escalation.

Besides the risk of conflict between them, the confrontation between the superpowers aggravates tensions and conflicts throughout the world. Partly for this reason the prospects for steady economic and social progress in many developing countries are destroyed by internal or external conflicts.

The origins of most conflicts in the developing world are rooted in poverty, inequality, and economic and social stagnation or decline. This potential for conflict might in many cases be capable of resolution in an international climate of cooperation and trust. Superpower rivalry aggravates the problems endemic to underdevelopment and inhibits progress throughout the world, producing a vast reservoir of resentment and tension with ominous implications for world peace.

"For the U.S. there are no easy options of either unilateral action or disengagement."

A further implication of superpower rivalry is the blockage of the international machinery established in good faith by the world community to resolve conflicts and promote human advancement. From its inception, the UN has suffered from the superpowers' unwillingness to respect the decision-making process as envisaged in its charter. This traditional problem is aggravated by a new phenomenon: Important governments, frustrated by their inability to resolve international problems or to obtain international support for their views, find it convenient to blame the UN and other international organizations.

Stauber/Suddeutsche Zeitung/Munich

I am particularly aware of the need for improvement and reform of many international institutions, some of which were set up to achieve objectives that have now changed and some of which have lost their early vigor. It is, however, important to keep reminding governments that it is they who dictate the policies, the activities, and the methods adopted by intergovernmental organizations. International civil servants can do much to improve performance, but they cannot and should not cast themselves in the role of decisionmakers. This role properly belongs to governments.

I am convinced that institutional reform can be achieved through diplomacy and sustained pressure for improvement. As the implications of growing interdependence among nations become more widely perceived, increasing efforts must and will be made to modernize existing international machinery to meet the needs for effective cooperative action.

In this connection, one should draw a distinction between real power and apparent power. Membership of the UN has grown from its initial fifty-one states to its current 159. Inevitably, the votes of developed countries are less significant than in the early days.

Despite widespread public perception, however, this does not imply that once votes are taken practical results in the real world are achieved against the wishes of the major countries. In the complicated process of multilateral decisionmaking and action, there are countless opportunities for decisions to be adjusted, delayed, ignored, or reversed. While formal votes in the General Assembly are often dramatic and are open to public scrutiny, the realities of the UN are very different.

Another profound implication of the polarization and tensions between East and West is the widespread pessimism and sense of futility that afflicts our civilization, especially the younger generations. They are confronted with a world gone mad, in which billions are spent on weapons to destroy them over issues in which they do not feel in-

volved. There appears to be little prospect, from their viewpoint, that the situation will improve. This problem is crippling the vitality of young people throughout the world — a resource on which the future depends.

The *second* global issue to which I would draw attention is the failure of the governments of developed countries to achieve sustainable economic growth compatible with the needs and aspirations of the wider world community. In the 1960s and early 1970s there was a widespread feeling of optimism that economic problems, at least for Western countries, could be solved.

Their people began to believe that growth and progress are the natural state of an advanced industrial society, and that the painful transformation in economic and social structures required by progress and technological change would be manageable in a situation of increasing disposable resources. There was also a widespread presumption, at least in the Western countries, that their progress would engender growth throughout the developing world.

How different the world is today! A number of major Western countries continue to face levels of unemployment previously considered unacceptable. Protectionism is on the rise, and serious imbalances call into question the future of world trade and of the monetary system. The certainties of domestic economic management are gone, and cooperation among major economic powers is diminished.

Confronted by this situation, we are asked to hope that the recovery of the U.S. under present conditions will prove sustainable, and that this will lead within a reasonable time to the sustained growth of the rest of the world. It is now becoming apparent, however, that the vast deficit of the U.S., approaching $200 billion a year, coupled with a vast trade deficit, call into question the continuation of the present situation.

Many observers believe that in the absence of rapid and effective action by the U.S. Congress and the Executive Branch the U.S. recovery will soon slow. This has drastic implications for other countries as well. The U.S. recovery so far has had little or no effect on many nations and for some, the beneficial effects of increased trade have been more than offset by the effects of high interest rates and the strong dollar.

The recovery of developed countries and the economic progress of developing countries cannot be viewed as a sequence — first one, then the other — or as an alternative. A strategy is required in which the policies for recovery of the developed countries are conceived together with policies to promote the development of the developing countries, as two related components of the sustained progress of the world economy. In this way the self-sustaining growth of the developing countries can contribute positively to strengthening the world economy and to the growth of the developed countries.

> "The attempt to negotiate new approaches within the UN has achieved almost nothing."

Confronted by this depressing economic situation, one would expect cooperative efforts by the Western governments to insure that their policies contribute to broadly based, sustainable growth of the world economy, and to seek imaginative new solutions to their problems. One would hope to see active and practical efforts on the part of developed countries to assist the billions of people in developing countries.

What we currently see was most clearly expressed by Britain's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Speaking in 1984 in advance of the London Summit of the seven key industrial nations, she stated, "Blessed are they who expect nothing, for they shall not be disappointed."

The *third* global issue is the slowing, or even the breakdown, of development progress in many developing countries. In recent years two aspects of this problem have achieved exposure in Western countries. One is the indebtedness of some important developing countries. As a result of strenuous efforts by the governments, banks, and international organizations concerned, a major crisis has been averted but the problem has not by any means been solved.

The other development issue to arouse public concern is the crisis in the Least Developed Countries, particularly in Africa. Many of us have known for many years of the desperate problems of poverty, hunger, and underdevelopment faced by these countries. But the crisis has now reached the point of stimulating international concern and public support. It is unfortunate that a crisis of the current magnitude must develop to provoke effective international action.

In regard to both international debt and the crisis in Africa, it is imperative that the world community undertake coherent longer-term programs. Ad hoc measures in response to crises are necessary, but alone they are an ineffective way of addressing fundamental problems. Here again the decline in international cooperation inhibits effective international action. No agreed response to either problem is in sight.

These two problems are symptoms of the much more extensive development dilemma. Continued population growth, for example, has major long-term implications for economic progress and for the political stability and political attitudes of a growing number of developing countries and thus for the whole world.

The long, frustrating attempt to negotiate new international approaches within the framework of the UN to meet the needs of the modern world has achieved almost nothing. I fear that, as a consequence, the underlying assumptions on which international affairs have been based since World War II are becoming invalid. People worldwide are no longer convinced of the virtues of international cooperation and law, or of the feasibility of solving problems through negotiation, consensus, and concerted action.

We would expect to see the governments of developed countries searching for constructive solutions in cooperation with the developing world. Regrettably, the political will to reach agreements to assist the developing world and to implement them has all but evaporated in many key countries.

Developed countries that do wish to help the developing world are finding it increasingly hard to justify their

policies to their electorates when other major countries are reducing their efforts. Here again we are faced with a sad contradiction. At a time when increased cooperation, tolerance, and restraint are essential, the world is moving toward ideological confrontation and the advancement of short-term national interests. Indeed, the efforts of many developed countries to contribute to development cooperation are actually in decline.

The *fourth* issue, which seems to me of fundamental importance, is the problem of environmental constraints on human activities. Concern with the environment emerges in different ways in different places, but it is a truly global problem.

In Africa desertification is widening at an alarming rate, brought about in part by natural catastrophe but also by human activities. The increase in the price of energy, for example, has forced people in many areas to increase their use of firewood, destroying the natural ecology. Another ominous trend is the rapid reduction in forest resources throughout the world. At the local level this leads to increased erosion and the destruction of the natural habitat. At the global level, it raises questions about the climate and the composition of the atmosphere.

Such problems are endemic to the developing world, but, with global implications, have their parallel in developed countries, where solutions to the problem of chemical and radioactive wastes have not even been defined, let alone implemented. The effects of acid rain and pollution on the environment in developed countries are now a matter of intense concern to a large part of their populations. The political implications are now felt directly in a number of countries.

A final ecological point that brings home the real environmental limits to human activities is the growing appreciation that intensive farming methods, based on the use of large amounts of fertilizer and of pesticides, are subject also to the iron laws of diminishing returns. This raises questions about the longer-term productivity and scale of agricultural activities in the U.S. and other advanced countries.

A decade ago global environmental questions were an issue of top priority to the world community. Today they have a lower priority as a result of urgent preoccupation with economic growth and related problems. But it is important to remember that environmental constraints ultimately will determine the scale and shape of human activities throughout the world.

It may appear that the world situation is hopeless — that humankind has reached the point where its problems are too complex to be understood and too vast to be resolved, and where the forces of rivalry and discord preclude collaboration and effective international action. I do not believe this to be the case, provided that action is taken soon. In the absence of such action I see dim prospects for the future.

This leads me to one final concern — the need for international leadership. We are confronted by immense problems in an interdependent world that lacks imaginative leadership. It is not sufficient to plead that domestic considerations take priority, and that in a democracy they must be dealt with before international problems.

Domestic and international problems are intricately interwoven. Governments must accept that it is essential to treat domestic and international problems together, not in sequence, and they must adapt to make this possible. The 1930s demonstrated the disastrous effects of policies focused on short-term national advantage.

It also is not an adequate response to say that the ad hoc workings of the market and the efforts of the private sector can solve the problems we face. Indeed, leaders of large private-sector companies recognize the need for clear and effective government policies as a framework within which to carry on their own activities.

We have drifted into these problems, but we will not simply drift out of them. Cooperative leadership and action are required from the nations of the world, using the international machinery available — reformed as necessary — if we are to create a better world.

Those of us who have been involved in international affairs are aware of the difficulty of achieving results through the formal intergovernmental processes. We also know how difficult it is for heads of government and other leaders to pay sufficient attention to longer-term strategic issues under the pressure of urgent day-to-day affairs. I believe that more attention must be directed to new styles of international cooperation with more flexibility than is allowed by official channels.

In this perspective, a group of thirty people who have held posts as heads of government or heads of state have undertaken an international initiative. They have come together from Western developed countries, from centrally planned economies, and from developing countries to create the InterAction Council, united by their deep concern over the dangerous problems that confront the world. The Council is supported by another group, the InterAction Policy Board, which comprises leaders in government, industry, banking, unions, science, and education.

The Council plans to consult with current heads of government, top officials, and other world leaders through a series of high-level missions. It also intends to promote the support of public opinion and of interest groups for constructive change to address the issues that I have discussed here. I believe that the Council demonstrates the potential of new approaches to international cooperation.

It is within our power to solve our problems. All nations, developed and developing alike, have a stake in the outcome. We have the resources and ability. What we need is the will and the courage to break with the past and to deal with the great issues of our time in a global perspective. That is the only road to prosperity and peace. □



"Is it reader-friendly?"

The Bulletin/Sydney

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WEEKLY, February 10, 1985

American Inconsistencies over ABM

By Walter Pincus

IF the Reagan administration means to go ahead with its Star Wars proposals, it ought to think twice about objecting to the Soviet Union's deployment of new radar facilities on the grounds that they violate the 1972 antiballistic missile (ABM) treaty.

The objections that the Reagan administration are raising have some validity, but a future president, wanting to move Star Wars along, may regret that Reagan pressed the complaints.

The 1972 treaty bars placing a particular type of large, sophisticated radars in the interior of a nation, prohibits introduction of smaller, mobile radars and limits to 100 the number of ABM launchers a nation can have around its one permitted ABM site. The Soviets, U.S. officials have said, are doing all those things in a program that could permit them to "break out" of the treaty limits in coming years and quickly move to a nationwide ABM system, something also barred by the treaty.

PRESIDENT REAGAN last week sent Congress a new report alleging up to 20 Russian violations of existing arms agreements. Most conspicuous is the allegation that the Russians have breached "unmistakable language" in the 1972 anti-ballistic missile treaty in beginning to construct a huge new radar installation at Krasnoyarsk. Although the Russians make reciprocal charges, most notably at present about the Stars Wars defensive research plan, the U.S. is insistent that the other side has systematically breached ABM and Salt II agreements.

The treaty also, however, prohibits development, testing or deployment of *space-based* ABM components, devices that would be at the heart of President Reagan's proposed defensive system if research on it is successful over the next five to seven years.

Last month in Geneva, Secretary of State George P. Shultz told Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko that some Soviet activities violate provisions of the 1972 ABM treaty. Underlying the Shultz complaint was the appearance in central Russia of a giant, almost-completed, phased-array radar, smaller transportable radars that have turned up in other areas and a new ground-to-air launcher system that could attack incoming missile warheads as well as aircraft.

But Shultz also carried another message to Gromyko in Geneva, one that the president repeated in his second inaugural address as he argued for defensive systems against nuclear missiles. The goal of some future U.S. space-based defensive system, the president said, would be "a security shield that will destroy nuclear missiles before they reach their target".

Indeed, he said it was a moral issue for the United States to turn away from a doctrine that calls for deterring war by threatening to kill people with offensive nuclear weapons and substituting instead an effort to develop a system that "would render nuclear weapons obsolete".

How do we rationalize what the president has declared as the broad moral goal of promoting competition for a system that "wouldn't kill people; it would destroy weapons" with his administration's parallel campaign to halt what U.S. officials say is Moscow's present effort to develop such a system?

The first and basic answer is, as one administration official put it, that "it is illegal for them to do it," because the Soviets are acting in violation of a treaty that strictly forbids development of a nationwide ABM system. The president's Star Wars research, on the other hand, will not violate provisions of that treaty, U.S. officials have said, at least not in the next five years.

The 1972 treaty established a standing consultative commission based in Geneva to which both sides take their complaints about the other's alleged violations of the agreement. The Soviets to date have failed to satisfy U.S. arguments over ABM violations, calling the giant radar a space-tracking facility. On the other side, American representatives have similarly denied Soviet allegations that U.S. activities have violated testing prohibitions.

Shultz has said of his Geneva discussion that he wants "to reverse the erosion of the ABM treaty".

"We want to keep it pristine," one official said, "at least until sometime in the future" when it comes time to bend the treaty's language to fit whatever nationwide ABM system some future U.S. president may want to deploy.

Reagan and Shultz have both said that before any elements of such a future system could be tested or deployed — steps now barred by that same ABM treaty — the United States would discuss amending the language of the agreement to fit the proposed system. That moment when laser devices or particle beam weapons have proven feasible on paper and are ready for the testing of a prototype, will come years after the Reagan administration has left office, in 1992 or even later.

And what will that future president do if the Soviet Union's leaders, looking back at what Reagan did to block their system in 1985, decide they will not negotiate changes to accommodate a space-based American ABM system?

The current American position that U.S. research for a future nationwide ABM system is permissible but Soviet development of present technology is a treaty violation, is far from the first philosophic inconsistency in the confused world of nuclear weapons.

It should, however, give Reagan administration officials enough pause to cause them to reconsider their approach. If defense is in fact a worthy moral goal, it might be better to try to negotiate modifications of the present treaty to allow and even encourage both nations to step up the development of defensive systems.

The U.S. approach raises the question of whether the president believes the world could be made safer by *both* sides pursuing strategic defense rather than offense, or whether he thinks world safety depends on the United States developing a defense against Soviet missiles before Moscow develops one against American ICBMs.

Gromyko, in his unusual two-hour, televised press conference Jan. 13, mused on this point. He talked of Reagan's desire to "create a shield to protect them [the Americans] from . . . the Soviet Union" but was reassured that the United States "does not have the intention of striking a blow at the Soviet Union". Therefore, Gromyko said he was told, Moscow had no need for such an ABM system.

Gromyko then said he asked Shultz, "If we were to mentally trade places with you, the United States of America . . . If we were trying to create such [an ABM] system . . . would our corresponding statements [that the Soviets had no intention of attacking the United States] . . . be sufficient for you?"

The response, Gromyko said, was "silence, silence".

The following are excerpts from "The Future of Arms Control" by Robert C. Johansen (WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, Vol. II. No. 2, Spring 1985) Copyright 1985, World Policy Institute, 777 United Nations Plaza New York, N.Y. 10017: (p.203; pp.225-27)

"It is hard to imagine a set of arms policies more damaging to the future of arms control than those that the Reagan administration has implemented. Underlying these policies is a strategic doctrine that not only shapes the administration's weapons procurement policies but also establishes its arms control agenda. This doctrine bodes no better for future arms control efforts than does the record of arms development during Reagan's first term.

All evidence suggests that the current administration believes in the nearly universal utility of military power as a threat in international diplomacy or as an instrument of combat. As Reagan officials see it, the geopolitical "setbacks" of the late 1970s resulted from Washington's declining ability to wield military power with impunity. Since the end of World War II, the United States had taken this ability for granted. But after the Soviet Union had gained rough military parity in the 1970s, the U.S. threat to use nuclear weapons against Soviet forces began to lose credibility in any situation other than an attack on the United States itself. To regain this credibility seemed to require recapturing a degree of U.S. military superiority—a technological edge over the Soviet Union that would allow the United States to dominate combat at any level. Thus the impetus for the most recent military buildup came not from a belief that the Soviet Union was about to attack the United States or its allies, but from a desire to reverse the gradual decline in U.S. postwar military *superiority.*"

"... Reagan officials ...

possess a single-minded reliance on military instruments that is almost unprecedented in U.S. history and indeed in any country's experience in the nuclear age. Military fundamentalism grips the U.S. government and, to varying degrees, the minds of many other national security experts, journalists, and opinion leaders. Whether Republican or Democrat, in the White House or not, with careful intention or careless inadvertence, U.S. policymakers in recent years have been establishing the practice and custom of an ever deeper militarization of U.S. policy and international life—a development that future generations will profoundly regret.

As military fundamentalists, many officials take quite literally the gospel that the only way to prevent war is to be prepared to win it—even if chronic preparation for war increases its likelihood. Yet as long as the administration's military policies increase the threat to the Soviet Union, its arms control policies will be unable to reduce the threat to the United States. If nothing else, the Reagan administration has made it clearer than ever that "bargaining from strength" is a weak, self-deceiving approach to enhancing security. Its main products are an accelerated pace of weapons acquisition and frightful plans for fighting nuclear war. During three of the four decades of negotiations since World War II, Washington possessed unassailable military advantages over Moscow. If superior U.S. military strength were the key to reversing the arms buildup, then disarmament should have occurred long ago. The attempt to strengthen nuclear deterrence with ever more threatening weapons while trying to enhance security through arms control simply does not work.

(continued)

"After almost 40 years, the realities of the nuclear age are yet to be reflected in U.S. policy. Unlike during the first half of this century, a choice must now be made between unlimited military strength and mutual security—between the unilateral power of offensive weapons and the shared power of mutual control over all weapons. In today's world of hair-trigger weapons of mass destruction—when the detonation of a few hundred of the most destructive warheads could bring nuclear winter to the northern hemisphere—the United States cannot have both military superiority and security.

That is why the Reagan administration's bargaining-from-strength posture is unnecessarily destabilizing, calloused, and cynical—and why all the publicity given to the resumption of negotiations is misleading. It draws public attention away from the most important point: the United States by itself can take major steps to increase its security and to improve the prospects for establishing international restraints on the possession and uses of military power. Even if the administration's pursuit of a military edge prevents it from taking these steps, Congress and the public possess sufficient independent power—if they also possess the wisdom—to redirect U.S. priorities toward what has here been called conflict control. Congress may remember, even if the administration has forgotten, that the Soviet Union and the United States are not enemies.[54] By restraining and, where possible, changing the current U.S. approach to arms procurement, strategic doctrine, and U.S.-Soviet relations, Washington can begin to move this country and the Soviet Union toward a mutual security regime to prevent war and gradually demilitarize all international relations.

A historical opportunity exists for this generation, this session of Congress, and this administration: to build a mutual security regime by taking independent initiatives to step away from an expansive, war-fighting form of nuclear deterrence and toward world security institutions. Given the redundancy of nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal, great diplomatic leeway exists for U.S. officials to test Soviet interest in a more stable relationship. If the public and Congress put aside current preoccupation with accumulating bargaining chips, they can turn U.S. restraint into a diplomatic tool with Moscow. And if officials subordinate preoccupation with the Soviet threat to an emphasis on the two countries' common interest in avoiding war and expanding trade, then they can lay the basis for a more lasting security partnership.

Skeptics will undoubtedly answer that a U.S.-Soviet security partnership is not possible. They may be correct. But at least a possibility remains that they are wrong, as they themselves must quietly hope. In any case, there is little to lose by testing the prospects for conflict control. U.S. security would not be compromised by reciprocating the Soviet-initiated moratorium on ASAT testing or by initiating a conditional moratorium on the testing of nuclear explosives or intermediate- and intercontinental-range missiles. Even confirmed skeptics should see that such measures carry few risks and enormous promise. Unlike the prevailing approach to arms control, initiatives of this sort could open the door to major changes in superpower relations and the structure of international security."

[54] The two countries do not have territorial disputes between them, conflicts over each other's resources, or bitter ethnic or racial antagonisms, which commonly characterize enemies. Their conflicts are about how they treat citizens within their societies—hardly a justification for war—and about the extension of power and influence outward from their homelands. The latter problem is certainly real enough, yet the Soviet desire to dominate its allies and to extend its power outward is only exacerbated when the United States projects its power closer to the Soviet Union and deploys ever more threatening weapons, whether in Europe or a half-world away.

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MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WEEKLY, April 7, 1985

What does Mr Reagan really want?

"A YEAR ago we were told to vote for the MX because the Russians were not at the bargaining table. Today we are told we have to vote for the MX because the Russians are at the bargaining table." Thus, Congressman Jim Wright of Texas, House of Representatives majority leader, reflecting on the closest of close-run things, and looking forward to next year when 48 more MX missiles, costing some 74 billion dollars, will be demanded with an unforeseeable variation on the White House argument. Drive the Russians away from the bargaining table? Keep them there? Bring them back?

In its last, frenetic moments, the 1985 MX vote made the Oscar awards seem relatively low key. Mr Ronald Reagan, in person, was muscling individual, obscure Congressmen like a latterday Dale Carnegie. Mr Max Kampelman, chief of Geneva negotiations, was flown back from Switzerland to testify to the havoc an adverse verdict might bring. Even so, it was a fine shave. Six votes at the final tally. MX lived to fight another day secure only in the knowledge that the other day would be one hell of a fight. And meanwhile in Washington, on the same morning after, public opinion — or, at least, an up-to-the-minute ABC News/Washington Post public opinion survey — was allowed its say. Here support for MX was shown to have gradually eroded, so that it is now narrowly opposed overall. But that, for the Reagan administration, has to be set in a more ominous context. Whilst (and this, one guesses, is in straightforward conflict with European sentiment) the advent of Gorbachev has made Americans more rather than less gloomy about prospects for world peace, there is now a clear public opposition to the everlasting growth in American defence spending. 53 per cent, now seek "substantial cuts."

Mr Reagan is barely out of the glades and into the trees yet. But, from a European perspective at least, the most fascinating part of the defence struggle has been conducted in a peripheral clearing well away from the din of Capitol Hill. In his widely syndicated column, Mr George Will (a witty Reaganite who helped coach the President for his 1980 TV election appearances), reflects on the Star Wars dust-up between Sir Geoffrey Howe and Mr Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary for Defence. His article is entitled "Papier-Mâché Secretary."

Mr Will, who condenses his thoughts more pithily than Mr Perle, accuses Sir Geoffrey — with all his grey doubts about SDI — of "pre-emptive empathetic paranoia." There have, he says, been 8,000 extra Soviet warheads since the arms control



process began in 1969; 4,000 since Salt II in 1979. Russia has shamelessly, endlessly violated the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty and deployed 13,000 surface-to-air launchers. These "combined with unprecedented expansions of Soviet offensive weapons superior in quantity and quality to US weapons, designed to menace the US retaliatory capacity, which is the US deterrent." What price Sir Geoffrey's "serene belief in Soviet acquiescence in mutual vulnerability?" Soviet ABM research has "raced ahead" since the treaty was signed in 1972. "Soviet treaty violations have become brazen." Today's Soviet aim in Geneva, George and Richard declare, is to "induce similar unilateral paralysis in US strategic defence." Why, pray, "Does the Iron Lady suddenly have a papier-mâché Foreign Secretary?"

In paraphrasing, alas, one may do less than justice to the fine, full fury of an argument fully represented at the table in Geneva. But the thrust is clear enough. The Russians are arming for world domination. But Allied weakness is one of our fatal flaws. Even the British Foreign Secretary — up to his passive neck in treaty violations, brazen lies and evil gambits — cannot see the reality of the threat.

Well, perhaps. Let us, benevolently, accept every last adjective of the Perle and Will tirade. That done, there is only one awkward question left. Why, if the Russians are as Mr Will describes them, sit down at Geneva at all? Nothing they say can be trusted. No agreement reached can be realistically policed. No summit can be based on anything but desperate lies. Any talks are bound to induce "unilateral paralysis." It is a no-win game better not indulged in, unless the pressures of poor, deluded public opinion — at home and abroad — dictate some kind of public relations charade. But don't let anyone, and particular Sir Geoffrey, believe in the necessary shenanigans for a second.

And the trouble with this thesis — a real thesis, promulgated by influential people who command the President's ear and eye — is that no-one can yet tell whether, in his heart of hearts, it is also Mr Reagan's thesis, too. On balance (only on balance) the current guess is: not quite. More likely, the President would rather seek some cautious balance with the Kremlin. But — and here's the catch — he can only intellectually extricate himself from the problems of the present by an SDI jump into a scientifically unprovable future which will either come to pass or be proved utterly worthless forty years after he is in his grave. That is the fundamental lunacy of the Star Wars debate, of American insistence on pledges of long-range fealty, of the ancient — and refusable — bait of the research contracts for leaders of other countries who don't laugh out loud. It is a lunacy which extrapolates the spectacle of a US Congress voting for something it doesn't want and won't need in order (notionally) to do away with it in accords that can't be relied on far into the 21st century. This is becoming a real, possibly climactic, cuckoo waltz. Give us papier-mâché Foreign Secretaries any time.

SCIENCE

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Science: Matters of Scale and Purpose

At a recent symposium honoring the late Allen Astin, remembered for his integrity under political fire as head of the National Bureau of Standards, a speaker observed that Astin knew something about the "advancement of science" that tends to be obscured now. He knew that science advances not always by leaps and hurdles but more often on its hands and knees. The texture of his science was a texture of wonder, not of the imperium.

What shapes the public understanding of science under present conditions is science's new centrality in the fast lanes of competition for national security and economic advantage. Resources—human, financial and organizational—are massed to advance political and economic goals through science and engineering. It is not easy for the layman to disaggregate the mass and recognize the creative elements that keep science going. This could partially explain the stuttering response to serious infirmities in science and mathematics education. With the floodlights beamed on weapons systems, prophecies of technological salvation in the nuclear age, orbiting stations in space, smart tools for the information era, and a banquet of benefits through biotechnology, science's image as a laborious process of search, disappointment, surprise, and discovery is in some peril of becoming an image of thaumatology. This we do not need.

Before much time passes, a deep and pensive look must be taken at the emerging formation of our scientific and engineering directions. The gratifying upward spiral of federal funds for research and development is bound to slow or level off soon because consensus politics demands that deficits be dealt with. If the defense budget alone proposes to consume 72 percent of federal research and development funds in 1986, with built-in commitments that promise to drive the share ever onward and upward, downstream displacement impacts on other sectors of research are predictable. As resources are taken for preferred scientific and technical goals while the spectrum of general science recedes for want of support, scientific and technical manpower distributions are certain to respond to the pull of the tides. Where such outcomes might leave this country's claims to excellence in many areas of science is no idle question.

Straightforward answers to these problems of choice are hard to come by. Trade-offs among strategic requirements and general science are judgmental rather than explicit. The process for arriving at them is shaky at best. Yet, to allow policies for science to edge toward deadlock is to store up trouble. If the superpowers were to come to terms that might abate the mutual surge in weapons research and development, or if the United States and its international partners would agree to pool investments in such expensive areas as space, high energy physics, and long-range investigations of energy alternatives, the approaching crunch might ease. None of this relief will come easily or soon, and some of it may not come at all.

The realization that science and engineering are increasingly embodied in the pursuit of imperatives of national security and national interest puts a new coloration on the scale and the purposes of the research enterprise. Science, it appears, has transited its long postwar stage of lively and eclectic growth into the stage of instrumentalism for mega-objectives. That this evolution is setting the long-term pattern seems, on the evidence, clear. That it will define public and legislative expectations for science and engineering, in the absence of balancing policies, is no less likely. What it signifies for a world with unmet human needs and an increasingly fragile environment bears sober thinking.—WILLIAM D. CAREY

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