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from time to time calls attention to published material that might contribute toward clarification or understanding of issues affecting world peace. The accompanying reprints constitute Reprint Mailing No. 65.

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RETURN TO CENTRAL AMERICA

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IT HAS BEEN only six weeks since we last wrote about Central America. In the intervening time, the newly elected president of El Salvador, José Napoleón Duarte, visited Washington and persuaded Congress to gamble with another increase in aid to El Salvador. He was assisted in his quest by the long-blocked trial, and swift conviction, of five national guardsmen for the "aggravated homicide" in 1980 of the four American church women. Congress continued to balk, however, at a further $21 million dollop of aid for the Nicaraguan *contras*. The conflict between the Sandinistas and the Catholic hierarchy in Nicaragua took another turn for the worse. The CIA was again seen as trying to force the ex-Sandinista Eden Pastora to abandon his objections to joining a united front of *contras* including former Somoza henchmen. Unknown parties tried to blow Pastora up at a press conference, killing seven and putting the insurgent leader out of action in Venezuela. George Shultz made a surprise visit to Managua, setting off rumors of a renewed U.S. interest in negotiating a settlement but provoking prompt denials from Washington that anything had changed.

It is true that the epicenter for the latest tremors of world war is not south of the American border but in the Persian Gulf. And it is true that the impact of the U.S. prime rate on third-world debt may cause more suffering than all the death squads and guerrillas in Central America. Yet Central America occupies our attention for special reasons. It is an area where the historical presence of the United States has been great. It is an area that tests not only our will, as the administration seems to think, but also our intelligence and our self-understanding. The fundamental question facing the U.S. in Central America concerns not what that region should be, but what kind of a country the U.S. should be. And what is true for the U.S., furthermore, is doubly true for the Catholic church.

Concentrating on Central America is also urgent because our approach toward the region is on the verge of sinking irretrievably into double-think. Washington righteously accuses the Salvadoran guerrillas of doing things, e.g., economic sabotage, that the U.S. is paying the *contras* to do in Nicaragua. Indeed, not long ago, stung by events in the Middle East, the U.S. issued a major denunciation of something called "state-sponsored terrorism"; but for Nicaragua — unless the numerous reports of *contra* depredations against civilians are completely false — this is precisely what the administration has been asking Congress to fund. After crowing about El Salvador's free elections, the administration was compelled to admit that we had secretly spent $1.4 million to influence the outcome. (Jesse Helms's complaints on behalf of Robert D'Aubuisson provoked the usual spate of half-lies as in the case of the mining incident. The pertinent congressional committees had apparently been informed as procedure required, however; and that plus the general satisfaction at Duarte's victory seems to have dampened any congressional

The following is quoted from "Mr. Reagan's War Down South" by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., from The Wall Street Journal, May 21, 1984:

> "It has been some time since any U.S. administration had much knowledge of or sympathy for Latin America. But ignorance has never stopped us from blundering into other people's problems. We are as untutored about the history and inner meaning of Latin America today as we were a generation ago about Vietnam or a year ago about Lebanon, and with even less excuse."

desire to probe further about the CIA's electioneering.) If the secret funding undermines the claims about a democratically elected president in El Salvador, in Nicaragua the CIA seems determined to undermine what credibility Eden Pastora retains as a Sandinista opponent with an heroic anti-Somoza record by pressuring him to join hands with the *somocista* guardsmen among the *contras* in Honduras. We are nearing the point when the only thing one will feel confident believing about Central America is the worst.

All this makes it vitally important to say as clearly as possible what we know about Central America — and also admit what we don't know. Start with Nicaragua:

The Nicaraguan revolution is now five years old. At five, revolutions are frequently far more fixed in their ways than this one. The French had run through a couple of constitutions, executed their king, gone to war, nationalized the church and installed the goddess of Reason, undergone civil war, bled through the terror, and were entering a period of Thermidorean reaction. The Russians had abolished first monarchy and then parliamentary liberalism, signed away national territory, suffered foreign invasion and famine, conducted a brutal civil war, crushed rebellions of formerly loyal workers, peasants, and servicemen, and veered through a couple of economic systems. In a much shorter span yet, Cuba moved firmly into the Soviet camp — and Soviet economic dependency. Compared to all these experiences, the Nicaraguan situation remains strikingly fluid. Nicaragua is by no means the totalitarian nation that its fierce critics in Washington would insist.

On the other hand, Nicaragua is far from the brave new seedbed of social justice that its fervent defenders, many of them church people, would portray. This is a vexing point. So many people in the church in Central America have borne up under the cruelest persecution, have prayed, sacrificed, and died on behalf of those societies' victims, that one hesitates to counter their hopes or question their political witness. But insofar as that hope and witness has been identified closely with the Sandinista-led revolution, it seems to us misplaced.

This point, we said, is vexing. It is vexing because different judgments on the Nicaraguan case often appear to rest very little on disagreements about the facts. Very roughly speaking, much of the basic history of this half decade can be agreed upon: the Sandinista breakthrough in attempting to provide health and literacy programs; their mixed and increasingly faltering record in economic policy; their censorship of the media; their attempt to mobilize the entire population in a network of Sandinista associations, from neighborhood groups to the military; their alignment with the Soviet bloc and the military buildup; the threat of U.S.-backed insurgency and invasion; the still undetermined character of their promised elections. What is not agreed upon is the interpretation to be given these developments. Indeed, frequently the same phenomena are given entirely different readings. In the eyes of some, the neighborhood Sandinista Defense Committee or the "meet-the-people" meetings with Sandinista leaders recall barn raisings and New England town meetings. For others, they cast the shadow of Big Brother, regimentation, and manipulation. The difference seems to arise from the larger ideological and historical framework in which the revolution is viewed.

One of the sticking points in this clash of frameworks is the Marxism-Leninism of the Sandinista *comandantes*. Does it matter? If one were to judge by the attitude of many religious defenders of the Sandinistas, it does not. If they advert to this Marxism-Leninism at all, it is usually in passing or to warn (sometimes with justification) against America's reflexive anti-Communism.

To us, on the other hand, the Marxism-Leninism of the Sandinista leaders matters a great deal. It is an outlook they have openly acknowledged. In its variant forms (Soviet, Cuban, Chinese), it guided and sustained them through long and perilous years of guerrilla struggle. It is a powerful view assuring the Sandinistas that a tiny core of active revolutionaries who understand and act upon the laws of history may justly claim to rule in the name of the oppressed. It also instructs them that such rule must be defended without quarter, that "bourgeois" liberties are masks for class domination, and that real change will not be achieved unless the means of communications and the groupings of society at every level are mobilized in service of the party's goals. Since the interests of the party, the oppressed, and society itself are essentially the same, the grounds for providing institutional space so that a variety of interests might organize and clash peacefully are at most tactical and temporary. The Marxism-Leninism of the Sandinistas is not only a powerful doctrine; it has been the organizing thread of their socialization as political leaders. It has given them rhetoric, loyalties, allies, and models — drawing, to a large extent, on the Soviet and Cuban views of the world.

As long as one refuses to take the Sandinistas' Marxist-Leninist convictions seriously, there is no explanation for many of their actions. They rushed to embrace Soviet foreign policy on questions like Poland, Afghanistan, and Kampuchea at a time when the Carter administration was trying to overcome congressional opposition to Nicaraguan assistance. From the first, they expected to rely on Moscow for arms and aid — even to Moscow's embarrassment. Their swift relegation of non-Sandinista forces to the margins of political life, the imposition of censorship, the organization of the country not in *state* but *party* structures, the indoctrination of young people — it is simply straining the evidence to adjudge all these and many other distressing developments as merely reactions to U.S. hostility. They are, for the *comandantes*, not regrettable but necessary aberrations; they are at the heart of their concept of what a real revolution is about.

It is possible to make too much of this. The Sandinista leaders have clearly differed among themselves. Their doctrine and experience still leave room for a degree of pragmatism, flexibility, invention. Seldom do beliefs determine everything — as Christians know very well. Other forces, from nationalism to personal ambition, will play their parts in Managua as elsewhere. Marxism-Leninism undergoes striking local transformations. Regimes that equally adhere to it have nonetheless gone to war with one another.

But the core beliefs of the Sandinista leadership cannot be ignored either. They are justification enough for making at least one framework for the evaluation of events in Nicaragua the unhappy history of Eastern Europe, the poor record of the Soviet model in producing even material well-being, the descent to the Gulag in Russia itself. This history, as well as the history of Sandino, the U.S. Marines, and Somoza, is now background against which Nicaragua must be viewed. Czeslaw Milosz and Milan Kundera now become part of the litera-

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ture of Latin America, with Pablo Neruda and Gabriel García Marquez. To ignore this is to look at history with one eye closed.

NONE OF THIS is meant to suggest a condemnation of what has transpired in Nicaragua as all-embracing as the enthusiasm of some Sandinista supporters. In its anti-oligarchical radicalism and its legitimation of the needs of the poor, the Nicaraguan revolution has carved a kind of benchmark into Central American history. The French Revolution ended in Napoleon, but it also established a new starting point for democratic struggles in Europe. In that sense, the Nicaraguan revolution is larger than the Sandinista one. The two are far from working out their overlapping and conflicting impulses.

Americans, liberals as much as conservatives, are in the bad habit of assuming that history is all a pre-established progress toward constitutional democracy, separation of powers, and the two-party system. Only malign and unnatural interventions make the drama deviate from the existing script, and if they are quickly countered, everything will get back on track. In fact, history — and revolutions — are never so neat. It is worth remembering that Calvin Coolidge ordered the Marines into Nicaragua on the grounds of protecting it from the "Bolshevism" of Mexico — the Mexico we now want to protect from the Communism of Nicaragua.

It is facts like these that lead us to argue for a carefully limited view of what are truly vital U.S. interests in Latin America ["Central America: the Way Out," May 4], and therefore more flexibility in trying to encourage rather than to compel. The problem for the church in Nicaragua is more complicated, however. It cannot withdraw. It would be unwise to set itself frontally against Nicaraguan national feeling. It must not deny the new benchmark of social equality that the revolution has established at least in principle. And yet it has real reason to fear penetration and absorption by Sandinista ideology and to resist being caught up in national mobilization. From afar, the politics of the Nicaraguan bishops appear clumsy and lurching; their specific objectives seem obscure. But their basic desire to assert the force of the church as an independent reality, as long as political space remains for such assertion, is understandable. The tendency of the "people's church" to back the regime in a virtually unqualified fashion does not appear any more promising. But this is an area where we frankly admit our uncertainty and lack of good information. American Catholics would be wise not to leap to conclusions about the divisions within the Nicaraguan church.

THE SITUATION IN El Salvador is somewhat the reverse of the one of Nicaragua. In Nicaragua, a party with a totalitarian outlook heads a regime that is not, for now, totalitarian. In El Salvador, a newly elected moderate democrat heads a regime that remains, for now, immoderately anti-democratic. If the Sandinistas' admirers tend to treat the *comandantes'* Marxism-Leninism as peripheral, the Reagan administration does the same with the fiercely, even murderously, anti-democratic convictions of the circles that still retain effective power in El Salvador. The death squads and what they represent ideologically are not elements outside the government, against which the "forces of democracy," as the administration has termed the recipients of U.S. support in El Salvador, are pitted. They are entrenched within the government, the military, and the ruling class. Expecting these forces to eliminate repression and corruption and to become democratically accountable through the distribution of power is expecting a form of self-amputation. No one undergoes such a procedure unless the alternative is worse.

Unfortunately, even as American illusions about the Salvadoran establishment are dissipated by better information, our knowledge of the guerrilla opposition remains hazy. It shares the philosophy of the Sandinistas; it does not enjoy the national unity that the Sandinistas rallied against Somoza. It has, however, offered openings for negotiating the institutionalized guarantees that might allow the insurgent forces to compete for power in the normal political ways.

Whether President Duarte gets this or that much American aid may not be as significant as whether the U.S. will devise a policy that frees itself from ultimate dependence on the Salvadoran military-oligarchical establishment. It will only be when the U.S. firmly concludes that we do not *have* to keep an anti-Communist government in power, no matter what, in El Salvador, that the genuine forces of democracy will have the leverage they need to pursue a livable future.

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BACKING DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT

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Andrew A. Reding

There is a dangerous notion widely held in this critical election year. It is that Ronald Reagan has at last scored a foreign policy victory by restoring justice, democracy, and self-determination to Grenada, thus striking a powerful blow for these principles throughout the Caribbean. The problem with this otherwise appealing vision is that it is built on illusion. Sadly, the only triumph to date has been that of deception.

To a nation longing for a foreign policy that would restore its self-respect after the shame of Vietnam, the intervention in Grenada seemed in many ways a triumph. It afforded us the occasion for a national flush of pride, as our government, for the first time in recent memory, appeared to act on behalf of an oppressed people. Seemingly rising above its past, the Reagan administration displayed an uncharacteristic concern for the welfare of a poor, black, Third World nation. The invasion by U.S. Marines was portrayed as a rescue mission—not only to evacuate U.S. nationals but more generously to free Grenadians from a military clique that had murdered their popular prime minister and from the control of foreign powers. Cuba and the Soviet Union, it was said, were behind the coup and had begun to transform the island into a military bastion for further aggression.

Professing a spirit of good neighborliness, we accepted the urgent requests of Grenada's governor-general and of other Caribbean authorities to intervene. With no designs on the island ourselves, all U.S. troops, the public was assured, would be withdrawn as soon as foreign forces and their domestic agents had been cleared out, perhaps in as little as a week. Those responsible for the Bloody Wednesday massacre of government ministers, labor leaders, and bystanders would be brought to justice; human rights, democracy, and self-determination would be restored. It is little wonder that a solid majority of the U.S. public applauded this scenario, as did most Grenadians, who were equally "well-informed" of its details thanks to the U.S. navy's "Spice Isle Radio" and the efforts of the U.S. army's First Psychological Operations Battalion.

Yet where do we stand half a year after all resistance came to an end? Hundreds of U.S. troops continue to patrol the island in jeeps and helicopters, and Green Berets train state and regional security forces. The country's former dictator, Eric Gairy, whose reign of terror precipitated the Grenadian Revolution, has returned to reorganize his political base; meanwhile, those held responsible for the killings of last October face possible execution on charges of murder and terrorism.

The provisional government installed by the invasion is in no small measure guided from behind the barbed wire of the newly established U.S. Embassy. It is perpetuating the very practices for which our government condemned its socialist predecessor: holding prisoners without charges and inhibiting the political and press freedoms of the opposition. The airport that the Reagan administration had consistently denounced as a potential Cuban and Soviet military base and as in *no way* necessary for Grenada's economy is now to be completed, ostensibly for that very purpose. And in the ultimate of ironies, Admiral Wesley MacDonald, commander in chief of the Atlantic fleet, has proposed that the United States establish a permanent military base on the island.[1] Far from delivering on the promises of last October, the U.S. government is well on its way toward earning the accusations it levelled against its adversaries.

Worse yet, it has since become known that many of these accusations were false. The Cubans were in no way involved in the coup against Prime Minister Maurice Bishop; in fact, they condemned it in no uncertain terms several days before the invasion, angrily turning down the new military government's request for aid. Moreover, no Cuban or Soviet military base was ever found on the island, nor was any supposed Cuban army of occupation. In place of the alleged 1,200 or so Cuban troops, only about a hundred "combatants" were found, most of whom were indeed airport construction workers.[2] All that was left for "show and tell" were a few warehouses containing small arms, many of them antiquated, which turned out to belong to the Grenadian militia. Castro's claims were confirmed; those of our own government were exposed as fabrications.

Although these unsettling facts have not become widely known in the United States, such is not the case abroad. There, the administration's failure to consult with its allies, its violation of the United Nations and Organization of American States (OAS) Charters, and its transparent deceptions have taken a steep toll. Apart from the views of a few small Caribbean islands, Israel, and El Salvador, the global consensus is that the United States has lowered itself to the moral level of the Soviet Union by duplicating the logic of the Brezhnev Doctrine and the invasion of Afghanistan. However well Reagan's piece of theater may be playing in Peoria, it is a disaster almost everywhere else.

Worst of all, there has been no serious Congressional investigation of, or deliberation over, our current policy toward Grenada. The administration has done its best to keep that issue from arising. It has used its emergency

[1] "Strategically 'Ideal' U.S. Base in Grenada Favored by Admiral," *Baltimore Sun*, November 27, 1983, p. 1.

[2] This is what our 6,000 invading troops had to contend with. They and 2,600 others involved were decorated for their valor.

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powers to reallocate funds to U.S. operations in Grenada instead of seeking Congressional authorization, and Congress has willingly cooperated. It has taken no initiative to challenge the administration's policy toward Grenada. Nor has the issue been raised in the presidential campaign, apart from occasional references by Jesse Jackson and George McGovern, who has since dropped out of the race. Conventional wisdom has it that the intervention in Grenada is a *fait accompli*, that such a small island can be but a trifling concern anyway, and that above all else public opinion, which seems to support the president's action, is not to be contended with.

Yet there are serious reasons to look again at what the Grenada invasion actually accomplished and what our responsibilities there should be. There is the considerable damage being done to our hemispheric and global standing. There is the dangerous set of precedents being established for our Caribbean and Central American policy as the administration escalates its military activity against Nicaragua. There are the associated precedents now eroding our domestic political process, such as the restrictions placed on the press in trying to cover the invasion and the failure of Congress to exercise its constitutional check on the war powers of the Executive Branch. And there is the often overlooked fact that by installing and maintaining a new government on the island the United States is now responsible for the state of human rights, justice, and democracy in Grenada.

How can we fulfill these responsibilities in a manner consistent with Grenada's sovereignty? How can we honor our international treaty obligations without compromising Grenada's security? And how can we, within the bounds of fiscal responsibility, go beyond fighting the symptoms of social ferment in the Caribbean and Central America to treating its causes? These are questions that Congress and the public should be debating with respect to our continuing involvement in Grenada. The following agenda proposes a strategy for correcting the damage caused by the invasion—to Grenada, to our domestic political process, and to our international prestige—and for allowing Grenada to achieve self-reliance and self-determination on its own terms.

1. *Reaffirm the Good Neighbor Policy by Withdrawing U.S. Forces and Accept the Commonwealth Offer to Ensure Peace.*

Proclaimed by Franklin Roosevelt in his first inaugural address, the Good Neighbor Policy renewed the commitment of the United States to the principle of self-determination and renounced any U.S. right to intervene in this hemisphere. This principle has been ratified no fewer than three times: in the Montevideo Treaty (1934), the Buenos Aires protocol on nonintervention (1937), and the OAS Charter (1948).

Under Article VI of the Constitution, ratified treaties are the supreme law of our land. Yet they continue to be violated by the presence of several hundred U.S. military personnel in Grenada, including 300 military police who patrol the island to maintain "order" and Green Berets who are training the so-called Caribbean forces on the island. The Reagan administration has tried to avoid drawing attention to this continuing occupation by terming these troops "noncombat," thus suggesting that all "combat" troops have been withdrawn. In this way, it has evaded the strictures of the War Powers Act. The complete withdrawal of U.S. forces in conformity with civil, constitutional, and international law should be an urgent priority.

But we need to go further than that. The administration, by using emergency powers that permit it to reallocate funds without Congressional approval in cases affecting our national security, is spending millions of dollars to recruit, arm, and train a Grenadian police force.[3] Such an "independent" armed force will be more of a menace than a safeguard to the public: it is precisely what twice brought Grenada to grief, once under dictator Gairy's "green beasts" and Mongoose Gang, more recently under the so-called People's Revolutionary Army. Why, then, does the administration want to establish yet another such force? Is it more interested in the security of a "friendly" government than in the security of the Grenadian people?

In forming what in reality is a state security force, Washington is shamelessly pursuing policies that earlier helped form Somoza's National Guard in Nicaragua. Conceding that Maurice Bishop's revolutionary government enjoyed not only "legitimacy" but "grass-roots support," Brigadier General Jack Farris, commander of the U.S. forces in Grenada, has said it is U.S. policy to prevent any similar popular resurgence. To this end, the United States has brought sophisticated computers to the island to build an extensive police intelligence system to monitor suspected leftists.[4] Additional millions are being spent to develop what could be called a regional rapid deployment force, consisting of the combined state security forces of several Eastern Caribbean islands and designed to further shield their governments from revolution.[5] These programs endanger both human rights and national self-determination and compound our violation of international law. They should be terminated at once.

A withdrawal of U.S. forces and a cutoff of U.S. military aid to Grenada need in no way endanger peace and stability on the island. For the British Commonwealth, of which Grenada is a member, has formally offered to send a peacekeeping force to the island. This offer should be accepted. It would facilitate the removal of U.S. forces and those of other belligerents on the island as well. The present "Caribbean peacekeeping force" patrolling Grenada alongside U.S. military police is nothing of the sort. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) voted against military intervention: the armed forces masquerading under the "Caribbean" banner are in reality those of right-wing governments in the region (primarily Jamaica and Barbados) that were hostile to the Grenadian Revolution from the outset. The presence of these forces in Grenada is as much a violation of international law as that of U.S. forces; they, too, should be withdrawn.

[3] "30 Million More to Go to Grenada," *Washington Post*, November 24, 1983, p. 1; "33 Million in U.S. Aid to Grenada," *Chicago Tribune*, November 25, 1983, p. 5.

[4] "U.S. Commander Hopes to Build Up Grenada's Police," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, November 7, 1983, p. 14.

[5] "U.S. Teaching Defense in the Caribbean," *New York Times*, February 19, 1984, p. 3; "Caribbean Aid," *Washington Post*, December 17, 1983, p. 1.

Unlike the United States and hostile Caribbean governments, the British Commonwealth can provide a truly neutral—and hence truly peacekeeping—force for Grenada. It was in no way involved in the invasion, and the bulk of its members are nonaligned. Significantly, it includes among its members Trinidad, the Caribbean country with the closest cultural, trade, and familial ties to Grenada. It is also Grenada's closest neighbor, and while it refused to recognize the new military government in Grenada, it likewise denounced the U.S. invasion. Trinidad could therefore play an invaluable role in assisting Grenada's recovery from political trauma.

Although the OAS should be formally approached for its advice and consent, it should be recognized from the start that the Commonwealth is better suited to oversee Grenada's transition. The OAS is made up primarily of Latin American countries. These countries differ in language, culture, and political and legal traditions from the English-speaking nations of the Caribbean. As the Cubans learned in Grenada, these barriers are difficult to overcome. In spite of their considerable gifts—doctors, dentists, fishing boats, a cement-block plant, and even the airport Grenadians had for so long dreamed of—Cubans were never fully accepted by most Grenadians. The Commonwealth, however, already shares a common language and a common set of political and legal norms with Grenada that make it the appropriate steward for Grenada's transition to self-determination.

2. *Enlist the Assistance of the Commonwealth in Overseeing the Application of Justice and the Drafting of a Constitution.*

If Grenada is to make its transition to self-determination successfully, it must arrive at an application of justice that places the rights of Grenadians above the supposed prerogatives of governments, both past and present. Only by bringing *all* who were involved in criminal violations of human rights to trial can Grenada transcend its troubled past. This requires that those responsible for the police murders and torture under the Gairy dictatorship be indicted and tried by the same standards as those now being held in connection with the Bloody Wednesday massacre carried out by the Revolutionary Military Council. The provisional council currently in charge of the country is poorly positioned to oversee this process: it is acting under the authority of a governor-general who owes his appointment to the former dictator and who is acting more as a U.S. satrap than as a Commonwealth official.

Here again, we can turn to the Commonwealth for assistance. Grenada has never, at least since independence, had an impartial, effective legal system of its own. The country does not need another state security force: it needs a judicial system capable of protecting the lives and liberties of its people. The Commonwealth, grounded in British jurisprudential norms and widely experienced in adapting these to Third World needs, is ideally qualified for this task.

Unlike the provisional council, it has the resources, authority, and impartiality needed to conduct fair trials. It would be able to bring experienced legal talent to Grenada to ensure the rights of the accused while forcefully advancing the rights of the people. It could arrange to have former Prime Minister Eric Gairy, together with his associates in the terror of the 1970s, arrested and tried. It would be competent to provide Bernard Coard, Hudson Austin, and their associates, believed responsible for the terror of last October, with fair trials. And it would be bound by the right of *habeas corpus* to release all those now being held without evidence of criminal wrongdoing.

Finally, by overseeing fair and searching public trials, the Commonwealth could ensure that they aim not for vengeance but for public revelation. The most effective way to prevent the reenactment of these crimes is not to repeat them against the perpetrators but to expose them to public scrutiny. Thus trials, if broadcast to the nation and conducted with scrupulous fairness, could make an invaluable contribution to the political awareness of Grenadians, much as the Watergate inquiries and impeachment proceedings did in the United States. They would not only enable Grenadians to understand more fully how their country was abused by antidemocratic extremists on both the right and the left, but they would demonstrate a system of justice in operation. Most important, fair public trials would further inform Grenadians about their rights and the need to safeguard them against encroachment. If this should prove discomfiting to the present government or to the political extremes, so much the better for Grenada.

The Commonwealth should also be asked to oversee the process of developing a popularly approved constitution for Grenada—a process in which all domestic groups and parties should be encouraged to participate. Grenada has never had a popularly approved constitution. The only constitution it ever had was imposed on it by the Gairy dictatorship when the island gained independence in 1974. Far from obtaining a popular mandate, Gairy encountered the resistance of a majority of Grenadians who opposed independence under his rule. They not only participated in mass demonstrations against independence, but for several months kept the country at a standstill by means of a general strike. By launching a counter campaign of terror, including murder, torture, and looting by his police and secret police, Gairy was barely able to force the country into independence. Such were the inauspicious origins of the constitution that the governor-general and the Reagan administration intend to restore to Grenada.

The right to self-determination requires that Grenadians be given the opportunity to construct their own constitution—one that can obtain the "consent of the governed" and that will, in their judgment, adequately safeguard their rights. Here again, the Commonwealth can be most helpful: It can provide a framework for political pluralism in a country that has never known it. It can ensure that freedom of speech and of assembly are guaranteed to all Grenadians, along with uncensored access to radio, television, and newspapers. The free exchange of ideas should neither be limited by censorship nor determined by one's financial resources, as was the case under the Gairy regime. The present government, like its predecessors, is not secure enough to open up the political process in this manner. The Commonwealth, in contrast, would be able to relax political controls in

Grenada without jeopardizing the public order. For the first time since independence, national affairs could thus be opened up to all parties and viewpoints, preparing the way for the formation of a legitimate constitution.

In the absence of a full-fledged national dialogue, any talk of holding elections in Grenada is premature. If elections are to play a meaningful role in democratizing Grenada, they must be preceded by a searching public inquiry into the abuses and usurpations of past governments, and they must occur within a constitutional framework fashioned by Grenadians to suit their own needs and conditions. Why, then, are we rejecting the advice of Grenadians not to rush them into elections? Because Grenada is being run as a U.S. territory, its government installed by the invasion. Elections are needed to confer the appearance of legitimacy on this arrangement. The Commonwealth would have no such needs: it could enable Grenadians themselves to lay the groundwork for self-determining elections when they decide they are ready.

Grenadians are not yet at that point. Elections in their country gave rise to Gairy's dictatorship. As prime minister, Gairy transformed a nominal parliamentary democracy into a brutal dictatorship: he organized a secret police, rigged elections, seized opponent's properties, squandered public funds, and imprisoned, tortured, and murdered political adversaries. Deeply influenced by this traumatic experience, thousands of Grenadians have signed a petition asking that elections not be held for at least another five years, lest the previous dictator use them to regain power.

Maurice Bishop is doubly a hero to his people: both because he led the revolution that ousted Gairy and because he was martyred while resisting the Marxist ideologues who tried to usurp his rule. His revolutionary government, although it maintained tight control over the media and continued to hold political prisoners, ended political murder and torture. In spite of its Marxist orientation, it did not expropriate large landholdings, choosing instead to lease "idle lands for idle hands." And it applied its revenues and foreign aid receipts to grass-roots economic development projects designed to provide for the basic needs of all Grenadians.

Any serious effort to promote democracy in Grenada must come to terms with this reality. It must acknowledge the error of our government's prolonged—and ultimately successful—efforts to undo what Bishop and his popular movement had achieved. Fearing Grenada would provide an example to neighboring islands, the U.S. government was never able to accept its revolution. Spurning all of Bishop's efforts to normalize relations, it turned down requests for economic assistance, pressured foreign countries and regional and international lending institutions to deny economic aid and credit, and engaged in military exercises to rehearse for an invasion.

The effect of these menacing measures was not difficult to foresee. For Grenada, under siege by the military and economic might of the world's most powerful country, defense became an overriding concern. The military acquired a prominent role within the inner councils of the New Jewel Movement, the party of the revolution—so prominent, in fact, that it was able to engineer the removal of the overwhelmingly popular Bishop in favor of Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard. When the people freed Bishop from house arrest, military units machine-gunned the crowds and executed not only Bishop but three other government ministers and two labor leaders as well. From a Machiavellian point of view, U.S. statesmanship was brilliant: to so tighten the vise on one's adversaries as to drive them to militarize an all-too-peaceful revolution, then invade as "liberators." Such behavior, however, is no tribute to our sense of morality and proclaimed commitment to self-determination.

The tragedy is that until the army takeover, Grenada was—under Bishop's leadership—evolving its own democratic institutions. Only months before the events of last October, Bishop appointed a five-person panel, chaired by a respected Trinidadian lawyer, to begin to develop a constitution. He also injected new life into the African tradition of the *maroon*, according to which communities gather to carry out local construction projects of their own choice and design. To facilitate these efforts, Bishop's government instituted a very popular program to distribute construction materials and to provide technical assistance to any community group that requested them, giving rise to major infrastructural improvements in many of the historically most neglected parts of the country.

This same democratic impulse carried over into the formation of participatory governmental units—the parish and zonal councils—that were established in communities throughout the country. These engaged in everything from cooperative guidance of local affairs to interrogations of government officials and discussions on the national budget. They worked well, perhaps too well from the standpoint of the doctrinaire Marxists who overthrew and then murdered Bishop. For Grenadians showed a far greater interest in democracy than they did in Marxist ideology. With Bishop now elevated to the status of a martyr, and with his "democratic centralist" foes thoroughly discredited, Grenadians may well wish to pursue their experiment in community-based democracy. But this will require that we first give up the notion that *we* have perfected democracy, and that all we need to do to spread its blessing abroad is to move in and hold elections.

3. *Provide Broad-Based Development Assistance to Foster Self-Reliance.*

Since the October 25 invasion, U.S. economic and military assistance to Grenada has totalled over $30 million. In April, President Reagan asked Congress to more than double that amount by approving an additional $40 million in aid to revitalize Grenada's economy, to rebuild the mental hospital that was destroyed by American navy planes during the invasion, and to complete the airport at Point Salines.[6] Helpful as these measures may seem, they will do little to encourage Grenada's economic self-reliance. U.S. economic assistance to the island is based on a faulty trickle-down theory that favors foreign investors and large local businesses over small-scale development projects. It draws little on local resources, undervalues Grenada's need for processing facilities, and cannot ensure that the eco-

[6] "40 Million Asked in Aid to Grenada," *New York Times*, April 15, 1984, p. 11.

nomic benefits of development will be equitably distributed. But unless our economic aid package is tailored to encourage import-substitution, to increase Grenada's export earnings, and to see that the benefits of these policies reach those who need them most, it will only reinforce Grenada's dependence at our growing expense.

A country that does not provide for its own basic needs is at risk of compromising its sovereignty. This is particularly troubling for Third World countries like Grenada. Lacking the capital and the technical expertise to produce finished products, they must sell unprocessed foods and raw materials to obtain foreign exchange. Because almost all economic value in a finished product is added on in the processing stages, Third World countries obtain very little from their exports and pay dearly for imports. To make up the shortfall, they go into debt; and because they cannot hope to pay off the principal, they end up paying ever more in interest as they mortgage themselves to lender countries.

As we are belatedly realizing, this arrangement does not bode well for the lenders in the long run. But it is already disastrous for the borrowers. In order to obtain further credit, they must carry out austerity measures specified by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank that cut back social programs, further squeezing their already impoverished populations. The result is a simultaneous undermining of the country's right to self-determination and of its people's right to the fulfillment of basic needs.

Our aid policy toward Grenada should acknowledge these realities. It should make the funding of import-substitution projects to provide for basic human needs (especially food, housing, and energy) out of indigenous resources a high priority. For this, we will need to go beyond conventional economic analysis, which overlooks the often considerable local resources that are capable of fulfilling local needs.

Grenada, like most of the island nations surrounding it, has rich volcanic soil and abundant rainfall; it is fringed by coral seas teeming with life. Yet it relies on imported foods to supply 70 percent of its protein and 85 percent of its overall food consumption. Unable to afford such foods, many Grenadians suffer from protein deficiency even though their abundant terrestrial and marine resources could amply meet their needs.

In pre-Columbian times, the cultures of the Caribbean region thrived on high-protein, high-nutrition crops such as beans and amaranth, a plant worshipped by the Aztecs for its life-giving powers. The Spanish systematically burned these sacred fields, severing the spiritual and nutritional lifeline of native cultures. Amaranth greens, we now know, are as nutritious in vitamins and minerals as spinach, and the protein quality of amaranth grains is comparable to that of soybeans. Just as high-protein crops were essential to the achievements of the pre-colonial past, they can play an important role in vitalizing a post-colonial future.[7]

The sea is another source of nutritional bounty. Grenada is nestled among vast swirls of coral reef. The large southern island gives way to the smaller Grenadines receding to the north. Beyond these, Grenada's exclusive economic zone extends 200 miles out to sea, from every isle and islet in the chain. These waters are home to kingfish and flying fish, grouper and snapper, shark, dorado, the Caribbean spiny lobster, and that Grenadian delicacy, lambi (conch). Just as there is no good reason for Grenadians to have to purchase Kellogg's Corn Flakes and bleached flour from the United States when they have "idle hands and idle lands" at home, so is it senseless for them to import salted fish from Canada when they have their own fresh fish offshore. A shift to local resources would lower prices while improving nutrition, and a fisheries development program could put many unemployed Grenadians to work.

The key to success lies in the optimal use of local resources. This means favoring the widespread, decentralized application of appropriate technologies over showcase modernization. Instead of importing capital- and energy-intensive techniques that employ few, that strain the environment, and that generate further demand for expensive imported goods, our aid policy should emphasize labor-intensive, environmentally benign approaches to development.

These principles could usefully be applied to the housing and construction sectors of Grenada's economy. The island and its northern dependencies are part volcanic and part limestone. Pozzolanic cement, formed from the chemical reaction between finely divided volcanic ash and slaked lime, is particularly durable and well-adapted to a wet tropical environment like that of Grenada. Why import Portland cement if a superior one may be at hand? Grenada's lush forests of mahogany, pine, mahoe, and gommier could also supply a greater share of the country's demand for wood—*if* better milling equipment were available. And the bamboo that grows in dense thickets lining the rivers could be used in place of steel reinforcing bars in concrete, as is being done with notable success in Texas and New Guinea.[8]

For its energy needs, Grenada depends entirely on imported oil not only to fuel transportation but also to generate electricity. If oil seems expensive to us, imagine the staggering burden it imposes on an impoverished Third World country with no known fossil fuel reserves. Yet here, too, there are domestic resources adequate to meet Grenada's needs. Prevailing easterly winds push moist Atlantic air over Grenada's mountainous spine, bringing steady rains to higher elevations which then rush down the steep slopes in small but powerful streams. According to feasibility studies conducted by European hydrologists, small hydroelectric generators placed on three of these streams could meet all of Grenada's electricity needs for the foreseeable future.

Much more could also be done to harness the power of the Caribbean trade winds. Stone windmill towers, their sails long gone, testify to the liveliness of these winds. So do many current aspects of Grenadian life, such as the brightly painted sailing vessels that dock alongside the Carenage in St. George's and form the mainstay of inter-island trade, and much of the country's architecture, which is freely perforated to welcome the cooling

[7] John Cole, *Amaranth: From the Past to the Future*, (Emmaus, PA: Rodale Press, 1979). Outstanding work has also been done with soybean cultivation and processing by PLENTY International in Haiti, Dominica, and Guatemala.

[8] Pliny Fisk, *Natural Cements and Fibers in the Third World Building Industry: A Key Toward Developing Stable Economies in South Texas and the Eastern Caribbean* (Austin, TX: Center for Maximum Potential Building Systems, 1983).

breezes. These indigenous design principles, which efficiently tap the locally prevailing forces of nature, should be allowed to inform the development of Grenada's fisheries and construction industries, minimizing the island's dependence on diesel engines, air conditioners, and fossil fuels. Similarly, biogas digestors, adapted to Grenada's conditions with French technical assistance under Bishop, could be made more widely available to the agricultural sector. These low-capital devices harness the catalytic forces of nature to turn animal and plant waste into organic fertilizer and methane cooking fuel. They provide a superior alternative to imported inorganic fertilizer while substituting for imported propane and butane.

In addition to encouraging import substitution by making extensive use of Grenada's local resources, a well-planned U.S. aid policy should fund projects that boost Grenada's export earnings by improving the island's transportation infrastructure and by introducing the equipment needed to process raw materials into intermediate or finished products. The need for improved transportation is acute. Forty percent of Grenada's banana crop, a primary source of foreign exchange, is lost to export sales owing to bruising on the island's pothole-ridden roads. Many other fruits that abound on the island, such as mangoes and avocadoes, also cannot be exported because the country lacks the requisite air-freight capabilities to transport such perishable but higher-priced produce.

Just as getting goods out of Grenada is a problem, so is getting tourists in. Without a jetport to receive the flights of major airlines serving the Caribbean, Grenada cannot hope to compete with its many neighbors that already have the requisite 9,000-foot runways. The one sound element of the Reagan administration's economic aid program for Grenada is its decision to repave Grenada's roads (further mangled by U.S. tanks) and, at the insistence of the Grenadian Chamber of Commerce, to complete the Point Salines International Airport. Care, however, should be taken to prevent the airport from being used as a U.S. military installation.

Grenada's export earnings also would be enhanced by projects that would enable it to process its raw agricultural produce into intermediate or finished goods. Bishop's government took a major step in this direction: it established a processing plant at True Blue that converts Grenadian fruits, vegetables, and spices into jams, jellies, juices, chutneys, hot sauces, and relishes that are then canned and bottled for domestic consumption, for supplying the tourist sector, and for export. This trailblazing example could profitably be repeated elsewhere in the economy.

A case in point is the cocoa crop, which accounts for 40 percent of Grenada's agricultural export earnings. It could yield Grenada far more if it were processed into cocoa powder and cocoa butter, and several times more if it were processed into chocolate. Should Grenada's cocoa crop be too small for such processing to be done efficiently, cooperative arrangements with neighboring islands could be established for mutual advantage. Export-enhancement projects of this sort, operating in conjunction with the import-substitution projects discussed above, could greatly improve Grenada's balance-of-payments standing, and hence the vitality of its economy and all that hinges on it.

The success of these projects will depend, however, on whether the capital earnings they generate are recycled back into the country to improve living conditions and to stimulate further development. Current U.S. aid policy, typified by the Caribbean Basin Initiative, favors a fundamentally different capital flow. Instead of concentrating on the welfare of the aid recipient, it concentrates on the balance sheets of U.S. businesses, the agents of development assistance. To entice these businesses abroad, it gives them two incentives: large tax deductions at home and tax concessions and relaxed foreign investment rules which it coaxes out of governments abroad. These enticements are not in the best interest of the host country. Large foreign companies that enter a Third World nation are typically able to command local capital resources. Perceived as a better risk, they can outbid local businesses (especially new ones) for bank loans at favorable rates. The profit they make on the use of local capital is then returned to their stockholders at home. The net result is a capital drain rather than a capital infusion.

U.S. aid policy should attempt to redirect the capital flow. Tourism is a case in point. U.S. policy, instead of encouraging businesses to capitalize on tax concessions and cheap labor for foreign hotel chains, should favor smaller, locally owned and operated hotels and guest houses. These would funnel income from tourism into the local economy instead of overseas. Unlike the chains, which import most of their food and fixtures, these home-grown establishments would expand markets for local foods, furniture, and building materials, thereby enabling Grenada to retain more of its foreign funds.

But merely stemming the flow of capital from the Grenadian economy will not ensure its equitable distribution at home. For that, U.S. economic assistance should be designed to help those most in need acquire independent means of support. Current U.S. policy, however, does just the opposite. It favors assisting established businesses on the trickle-down theory. The problem with this theory is that even when it works, it fails to distribute aid efficiently to those who need it most. It requires very large infusions of capital to achieve even modest results. At the same time, it gives more capital—more control over productive resources—to local elites, precisely those who need it least.

At less cost, we could adopt a trickle-up policy that would place capital directly into the hands of those who currently lack it. We could do this by funding small-scale projects that empower households, cooperatives, and communities instead of foreign corporations and domestic elites: projects that, with small seed infusions of outside capital and technical support, could mobilize local labor and resources to build a decentralized capital base in Grenada. That means favoring family and cooperative farms over industrialized plantations; composting and soil conservation techniques over imported inorganic fertilizers; multiple cropping and biological pest control over imported chemical pesticides; and farmers' markets over supermarkets. It means giving preferential assistance to family and cooperative businesses instead of to large firms, establishing revolving loan funds to supply low-interest or interest-free loans, and providing equipment and

training to tap underutilized local resources. By broadly distributing access to productive resources, U.S. development assistance can help to weave the conditions for democracy into the social and economic fabric of the country.

When Less is More

In the final analysis, a well-conceived aid program for Grenada requires development projects that are formulated through, and guided by, the communities affected. They should be advised by technical experts, but not governed by them. They should be allowed to develop as organic outgrowths of Grenadian culture.

The key to the success of this approach is that it releases local energies, ideas, insights, and resources to allow a society to develop itself with only a modest infusion of outside capital. Less can indeed be more when sensitive design substitutes for extravagance, particularly when we take into account the similar needs of nations throughout the Caribbean and much of Latin America. Not only does this approach sensitively address the needs of our neighbors while respecting their national and cultural integrity, it also recognizes the constraints imposed by $200-billion federal deficits.

Just as we can ill afford a development policy that relies upon massive amounts of aid, we cannot afford the cost to our international and hemispheric relations of maintaining a military presence in Grenada in violation of regional and international law. Apart from its inconsistency with our treaty obligations and our professed commitment to self-determination, it is beyond our financial means to police an increasingly restive hemisphere. The OAS and the Commonwealth are almost entirely composed of nations that are ordinarily well-disposed toward us. What sort of foreign policy chooses to alienate these countries in place of enlisting their friendly cooperation?

The Reagan administration, with its inability to engage in constructive diplomacy and its inflexible economic orthodoxy, is barely able to contain even the symptoms of instability in this hemisphere. Its growing reliance on guns and ever-expanding fiscal appropriations only contribute to that instability while undermining our domestic economy. There are alternatives to this approach—alternatives that address the causes of this instability and yet remain within our means. Are they beyond our imagination?

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