As a public service,

THE LAUCKS FOUNDATION

from time to time calls attention to published material that might contribute toward clarification or understanding of issues affecting world peace. The accompanying reprints constitute Reprint Mailing No. 60.

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May 17, 1984

(The following is an excerpt from "The Nuclear Mirror and the Will to Identity" by Hunter Brown, Cross Currents, Vol. XXXIII No. 3, pp. 348/349, Fall, 1983):

"...The will to survival is subservient to the will to identity; that is, the drive to avoid suffering and death, while very powerful, is not as powerful as the drive for meaning, worth and identity... ... If the disarmament movement is aimed basically at a gradual and insecure reduction of the means of war, motivated primarily by the will for survival, then even at its most successful it will leave us vulnerable to the very force by which we have been endangered all along... ... The very element in nuclear weapons which most repels and confuses—the apparent irrationality of their self-destructive use—is precisely the element which most clearly reveals the human characteristic responsible for their existence—that self-esteem which knowingly and deliberately seeks its own vindication, even at the most extraordinary cost to itself and to others."

23 December 1983, Volume 222, Number 4630
SCIENCE

A Run Worth Making

It has been said, perhaps too often and too loudly, that science is an objective process, one that is value-free. In our time, when science is being employed most conspicuously as an adjunct of politics and strategic national purposes, a vacuum of internal values tends to be invaded by prevailing external values. Not surprisingly, the eventual recognition of what is taking place produces a level of discomfort that expresses itself, within the strictures of science's methodologies, in concerted displays of scientific responsibility. The conscience of science comes, a step at a time, to life.

Despite admonitions from Rome that believing scientists have the duty to look themselves in the eye when they apply brainpower to weapons systems, scientists are justified in doing what is necessary to offset the unmistakable progress of an unpredictable adversary. But what must be added is that scientific responsibility has another dimension, and it is to look squarely at the consequences of violence in the application of scientific knowledge.

It has been a very good thing for the integrity of science, and a sign of courage, that some 40 scientists of high standing have gone public with their considered estimates of the global atmospheric effects and long-term biological consequences of nuclear war.* Whether such a weapons exchange would be small or vast in its scale, they believe, the effects on the biosphere would be lasting and literally deadly. In effect, life-support systems would be cut, and the diminished surviving populations would have little chance in a darkened and sunless environment.

Some four decades ago in the heat of war and its enforced secrecy, scientists prepared the nuclear weapons that were exploded without warning upon civilian populations. It says a good deal for the emergence of the scientific conscience that, in a difficult age of superpower hatreds and technological gusto, the present warning is timely, unvarnished, and stark. Nor is it the first of its kind. Health scientists have made clear the absurdity of assuming that there would be a medical care system after a major attack and have been stumping the country to put the message across.

There remains the question of who is listening and how deeply these warnings penetrate and adhere to the nation's thought. For a few days, the news of potential biological catastrophe is the stuff of media prominence, only to be quickly displaced by the next catastrophe. The society is exhausted and news-numbed. No special session of the U.N. General Assembly is called to digest and reflect on the appalling meanings of the scientists' findings. If alarms have shaken the American and Soviet tacticians ostensibly seeking a breakthrough in nuclear arms control negotiations, it is a well-kept secret. The drift continues, and the world is ablaze with "small" wars and threats of larger ones. What does this signal to concerned scientists? For all that is obvious about science as a universal force, as a trusted partner in the works of society and governments, can it be supposed that science cannot make a difference in the one matter that transcends all the others? This is not a conclusion that scientists will swallow.

Among the endless arguments centering on arms control agreements, no issue is more vexing than that of verifying compliance, especially as new weapons are promised to the arsenals of both sides. What the cluster of scientists concerned with biological effects have done very well is to nail down, as far as scientific method can do it, the probabilities of consequences of an exchange of nuclear weapons on the biosphere. Even allowing for the constraints imposed on scientific opinion in the Soviet Union, it is fair to assume that the same conclusions are held in that quarter. Here, then, is a new basis for dialogue and for an alternative run at restraint. It is a run worth making.—WILLIAM D. CAREY

*R. P. Turco *et al.* and P. R. Ehrlich *et al.*, this issue

27 January 1984, Vol. 223, No. 4634

LETTERS

Preventing Nuclear War

In his editorial "A run worth making" (23 Dec., p. 1281), William D. Carey suggests that the long-term global environmental and biological consequences of nuclear war provide a new basis for dialogue between Soviet scientists and scientists in this country. He is right. The key addresses of the Conference on the World after Nuclear War, Washington, D.C., 31 October and 1 November, were transmitted via satellite to Moscow. The Soviet scientific community was represented at the preparatory meeting for the conference in Cambridge, Massachusetts, 25 and 26 April 1983. Soviet scientists (V. Aleksandrov, G. Golitsyn, and N. Moiseev) were active participants in the conference. At the conclusion of the conference, a "Moscow link" was established enabling participants in Washington to carry on a real-time audio-visual exchange of views with their counterparts in Moscow. This exchange was witnessed by audiences in Washington and Moscow. The moderator of the Soviet panel was E. Velikhov, Vice President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. I performed that function in Washington.

To sum up 90 minutes of "live" conversations via satellite (restricted to scientific issues), there was unanimity that first-order effects are so large, and the implications so serious, that the scientific issues need to be "vigorously and critically examined," as urged by R. P. Turco *et al.* (23 Dec., p. 1290).

This examination is under way by the world scientific community in the Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment of the International Council of Scientific Unions. The chairman is Sir Frederick Warner of the University of Essex. The dialogue between the Soviet and U.S. scientists is thoughtful, lively, and constructive. It is enriched by the participation of scientists from other countries. This is appropriate, since one of the implications in the concern over the prospects of a nuclear winter is that the survival of individuals in noncombatant countries may be in jeopardy. The nongovernmental framework facilitates frank discussion.

Carey wisely uses the word "probabilities" to convey the limitations of the scientific method in specifying the consequences of an exchange of nuclear weapons on the biosphere. The full power of the scientific method cannot be brought to bear on this issue because of understandable constraints on validating calculations with experimental results. This places heavy responsibility on modeling the relevant physical processes.

I am persuaded that a substantial research effort will be required to confirm or modify the tentative conclusions published in the 23 December issue of *Science*. This research provides "a new basis for dialogue" that can "make a difference in the one matter that transcends all others," in Carey's words.

If cooperation in helping to prevent a nuclear holocaust achieves a modicum of success, perhaps the groundwork will have been laid for addressing in a positive fashion those global issues that must be resolved to achieve a more harmonious world.

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

Commonweal:

20 April 1984

Alternative to Armageddon?

JAMES TINDALL

THE YEAR IS 2010. Russian tanks swarm into a small country in Western Europe, spearheading an invasion by Warsaw Pact troops. But this invasion is unusual because no shots are fired. Instead, the Communist soldiers are greeted by shuttered windows and deserted streets. The nation being overrun phased out its military years ago and now relies on a carefully planned program of civilian non-violent resistance to deter its enemies. Immediately, clandestine government radio stations broadcast a call for a general strike to oppose the invaders. Factories close down, key machine parts are "lost," industrial experts go into exile, and normal channels of communication and transportation within the country are disrupted.

In an effort to get the country moving again, the Soviets round up government officials and tell them to end the strike or face execution. The few leaders that collaborate are socially ostracized. Meanwhile, an underground leadership begins to function and the economic shutdown continues unabated. Frustrated, the Soviets blunder by ordering troops to shoot at nonviolent demonstrators. As a result, the troops become restless, morale problems develop, and desertions begin to occur. Finally, realizing that the costs of continued occupation outweigh any possible benefits, the Soviets withdraw.

Farfetched? Perhaps. But Gene Sharp has reason to believe we could see a scenario like this within twenty-five years. Sharp is a professor of sociology and political science at Southeastern Massachusetts University and an Associate of Harvard's Center for International Affairs. He is also the major U.S. proponent of civilian-based defense — a system of national defense that utilizes nonviolent resistance.

Sharp testified before the U.S. Catholic bishops for their pastoral letter on war and peace. That letter received a great deal of publicity because of its criticism of U.S. nuclear strategy. But the bishops also suggest ways in which Christians can help develop policies that lead away from nuclear confrontation. Writing about nonviolent national defense, the bishops state that "practical reason as well as spiritual faith demands that it be given serious consideration as an alternative course of action." And they declare that nonviolent principles "are thoroughly compatible with — and to some extent derived from — Christian teachings and must be part of any Christian theology of peace." Yet while both Sharp and the bishops advocate more study of nonmilitary defense, they appear to approach nonviolence from fundamentally different perspectives.

Sharp's ideas are most clearly developed in his three-volume monumental work *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, available from Porter Sargent Publishers.

Each volume explores a different aspect of nonviolent strategy. In part one, *Power and Struggle*, ($2.95, 144 pp.), Sharp cites numerous historical examples of attempts to use nonviolent sanctions. Often these struggles were undertaken without planning, preparation, or any real knowledge of the dynamics of nonviolent action. Usually nonviolence was used as a last resort, when all else had failed. Yet surprisingly, in many of the examples Sharp describes, the resisters were completely or partially successful.

Gandhi's campaign for Indian independence is the best known illustration of nonviolent struggle. But Sharp points out that nonviolent sanctions had been used extensively (although perhaps less skillfully) long before Gandhi. Major aspects of the Russian Revolutions in 1905 and 1917 involved nonviolent resistance, and the American colonists made effective use of economic boycotts, tax refusal, and political non-cooperation. More recent examples include U.S. civil-rights campaigns and Solidarity's struggle in Poland. I will recount two illustrations here: the defeat of a coup d'état in 1920 and an unsuccessful attempt at national defense in 1968. In both cases the resistance was completely spontaneous.

The coup occurred in Germany on March 12, 1920, when Wolfgang Kapp and his right-wing troops marched into Berlin to oust the struggling new government of the Weimar Repub-

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lic. President Ebert fled without a fight but proclaimed that he was still head of the legal government. Resistance to the Kappists took a number of forms. Thousands of workers in Berlin went on strike. Officers of the *Reichsbank* refused to disburse money to Kapp because he could not obtain an authorized signature. Kapp had trouble finding a typist — or a typewriter — to prepare his manifesto, and it was delivered too late for the Sunday papers. Many qualified government officials refused to participate in the new regime, forcing Kapp to appoint inexperienced men to his cabinet. Finally, responding to mounting resistance, Kapp resigned on March 17. His defeated troops marched out of Berlin the next day.

Sharp concedes that the coup was amateurish and poorly planned. And, as in most instances of spontaneous resistance, there was a certain amount of violence, especially in outlying towns. Yet Sharp maintains it was the widespread refusal of the bureaucracy and population to cooperate with his illegal government that ultimately crushed Kapp's *Putsch*.

Since most countries have militaries they feel compelled to use when invaded, it is perhaps not surprising that there are very few examples of nonviolent national defense. But when half a million Warsaw Pact troops stormed into Czechoslovakia in 1968 to replace the Dubcek regime with a puppet government, Czech officials ordered soldiers to remain in their barracks. Czech leaders who weren't kidnapped by the Soviets issued statements denying that the Warsaw troops had been invited in. A pirate radio network (which had been set up in case of a NATO invasion) coordinated the resistance by organizing a clandestine congress, calling for short general strikes and urging the people to remain nonviolent. Soviet troops found themselves clashing with unarmed civilians determined to defend their homeland. As a result, Sharp reports, troops had to be rotated out of Czechoslovakia in a few days because of morale problems. Adding to Soviet demoralization was the fact that very few Czech government leaders and police collaborated with the invaders.

Startled by this strange form of warfare, the Soviets agreed to a compromise that left the Dubcek regime in power. Eventually, they were able to install their puppet government after anti-Russian rioting provided an excuse for more oppression. But it took the Soviets eight months to achieve their goals in the face of spontaneous civilian resistance, versus the two or three days it would have taken them to overpower the Czech military. If the civilian defense had been carefully preplanned, Sharp believes, the Czechs might have held off complete Soviet control for much longer — perhaps indefinitely.

In part two, *The Methods of Nonviolent Action* ($4.95, 368 pp.), Sharp discusses 198 different kinds of actions used during nonviolent campaigns. Some of these are clever (in 1968 the Czechs removed street signs to confuse invading troops), some are bizarre (protest disrobings), most are commonplace (protest marches and strikes). Some are practices by single persons (speak-ins, fasting), others by entire nations (boycotts, embargoes). Sharp admits his list is far from exhaustive.

Part three, *The Dynamics of Nonviolent Action* ($5.95, 480 pp.), illustrates why Sharp has been called the Clausewitz of nonviolent warfare. Taking an almost military approach to the study of strategy and tactics, he talks about the importance of timing, the choice of weapons, geographical and physical elements. Sharp develops at length a concept of power which is as simple as it is profound: People are the source of all power. When the citizenry withdraws its cooperation, the government crumbles.

THE IDEA that power comes out of the barrel of a gun is a myth, says Sharp. Rather than viewing tyrants as monolithic pillars of granite that need to be destroyed with explosive force, we should see them as pathetically fragile figureheads that can be toppled by simply undercutting their base of support. All governments, and especially oppressive ones, have inherent weaknesses that naturally contribute to their ineffectiveness and limit their control and longevity. Often these weaknesses are related to dissension within the ranks of the ruler's agents and a reluctance to carry out orders. When a government is faced with massive popular nonviolent opposition, those cracks in the bureaucracy tend to widen. An effective resistance would concentrate its strongest weapons against the ruler's most vulnerable points.

When governments go on the offensive, using violent measures, they often experience difficulty in suppressing nonviolent resistance. They experience what Sharp calls "political jujitsu." The violence rebounds against the aggressor by strengthening the resolve of the resisting group, alienating previously neutral parties, and increasing sympathy and support for the victims. Morale problems can develop among troops and police who have the distasteful job of shooting or beating nonviolent resisters.

In *Dynamics* Sharp also discusses the three ways a nonviolent campaign can be successful. The first is conversion. Gandhians and many religious groups insist that converting the opponent to their point of view — winning their hearts and minds — is the only true victory. The second, accommodation, occurs when the opponent doesn't agree with the resisters, but decides it is too costly to continue to fight. (Accommodation is probably the most common path to victory.) The third is coercion, achieved through nonviolence: against his will, the opponent is forced to concede because his power base has been dissolved. Thus, even when a nonviolent campaign is unable to change the adversary's way of thinking, it can influence his actions.



The Politics of Nonviolent Action does not explore in depth the possibility of using nonviolent sanctions for national defense. Recently Sharp spoke at Whittier College as part of a Quaker-sponsored seminar about national security. He called for the development of a functional substitute for war: a way to exercise power that is less destructive to society and human values. He rejected disarmament, world government, socialism, even pacifism, declaring "none of these are adequate today to address our problems in these extreme forms which they have taken." We should not expect mass conversions to pacifism or an outbreak of universal altruism, he said. With nonviolent struggle, however, there is no need to wait for participants to adopt a new set of moral values. People can (and do) use nonviolence to gain political goals without espousing a "turn the other cheek" philosophy in their everyday lives. Building on our natural abilities to be stubborn, obnoxious, and incompetent, he said, we can develop nonviolent strategies for national defense.

Sharp admitted that adoption of civilian defense by the United States, if it ever happens, is a long way off. Americans would first need to accept a narrower definition of national security. Many of the questions from the audience demonstrated the gulf between the public's perception of U.S. security needs and the capabilities of civilian-based defense (CBD). Some examples:

Q: *Without a military, how could the U.S. project its power globally in order to preserve its supply of resources?*

A: It could not. Preparations for CBD would have to include developing a high degree of self-sufficiency through stockpiling and other means.

Q: *How could we defend our allies with CBD?*

A: We could not. They would have to learn to take care of their own defenses.

Q: *If a country adopts CBD, won't it be vulnerable to nuclear attack?*

A: Perhaps, but there is no defense against nuclear weapons, and it is the nations with large offensive militaries that are most likely to be targeted. Nations with CBD would threaten no one.

AFTER THE LECTURE, I met with Sharp for an interview. "Do you think we will see the end of war in our lifetime?" I asked. "Maybe not in mine," he replied. But he said he felt there will definitely be some exciting developments in the next few years. Sharp hypothesized that the smaller Western European countries will take the lead in adopting CBD. A nation would first develop a limited CBD capacity alongside their military. Then, as citizens become more comfortable and proficient with CBD, the military could slowly be phased out. This process is called transarmament. Sharp told me that the Netherlands has already approved funding to study certain aspects of what they call "social defense," while the Swedish cabinet has authorized a commission to prepare a plan for incorporating nonviolent resistance into Sweden's defense program. Sharp predicts that Sweden will adopt a limited civilian defense plan within two or three years, and there could be several cases of full transarmament in the next twenty to thirty years.

How would a nation prepare for CBD? One goal of preparation would be to prevent the mass bewilderment, uncertainty, and passivity that often occurs during an invasion. Citizens would be trained in nonviolent tactics and to function without a centralized leadership. A corps of defense workers could be established to coordinate different aspects of the resistance. Stockpiling of food, fuel, and other essentials might be encouraged, and contingency plans drawn up to relocate some of the population to rural areas where control would be more difficult. Mutual nonviolent defense treaties could be implemented between nations to help out with international boycotts and embargoes. Some experts have even suggested nonviolent "war games" to carry out local or nationwide practice drills.

Of course, not all societies are ready for transarmament. Before converting to CBD, a nation with highly centralized industries would probably need to disperse its production facilities, making it more difficult for adversaries to gain control of the economic infrastructure. The best candidates for transarmament are countries with healthy, harmonious societies. But even the most stable nations would find it beneficial to improve the quality of life for all segments of the population in order to insure a unified civilian resistance. A country adopting CBD would in effect eliminate the traditional conflict between guns and butter. Imagine a future world in which a defense build-up consists of improving social welfare programs for minorities!

While interest in Europe is high (a number of smaller political parties are advocating CBD research as part of their platforms), civilian defense is practically unheard of in the United States. Nevertheless, recent developments indicate that awareness is on the rise. Last summer Harvard's Center for International Affairs established the Program on Nonviolent Sanctions in Conflict and Defense to do research and policy studies. Dr. Sharp heads the project, which is the first of it kind in the world. In Omaha, a new organization called the Association for Transarmament Studies facilitates research, discussion, and public eduction about CBD in the U.S.

Throughout the Whittier College lecture and interview Sharp appeared to take great pains to present an amoral image. For example, when I asked if he thought violence was ever justified, he replied, "I really don't deal with the question of justification . . . it's not one that interests me." I was curious why he did not like being referred to as a pacifist. Pacifism is a personal moral position, he said, and does nothing to offer a practical alternative to war. He described himself as a researcher and writer who has come upon an important idea which is beginning to generate a lot of interest.

Yet years ago Sharp also spent nine months in jail as a conscientious objector, and he is personally opposed to war and violence. It seems he is concerned that being characterized as a "peacenik" will hurt his credibility with more mainstream groups, or lead to the impression that nonviolent resistance is

for pacifists only. Sharp sincerely believes that CBD can stand on its own as a practical, effective alternative to war. As he put it, we may be able to give up military weapons for the same reason we gave up bows and arrows — not because they are wicked and immoral — but because we have discovered a better weapons system.

THE CONCEPT of CBD is very new. Sharp does not advocate transarmament for any nation at this point. What is needed, he says, is hard-headed research by both governmental and non-governmental institutions to determine its feasibility, and develop and refine strategy and tactics to increase effectiveness. "The nonviolent technique," Sharp writes, is "an underdeveloped political technique, probably at the stage comparable to violent group conflict several thousand years ago."

On the need for more research into nonviolent resistance, Sharp and the U.S. bishops are in complete agreement. In their letter the bishops write: "Nonviolent means of resistance to evil deserve much more study and consideration than they have thus far received." But Sharp and the bishops would seem to disagree on a key point. The bishops state that the objective of nonviolent resistance is "to seek the good of the other. Blunting the aggression of an adversary or oppressor would not be enough. The goal is winning the other over, making the adversary a friend." Sharp, the pragmatist, would counter that the only goal of nonviolent action must be victory. Converting the opponent is all well and good if it should occur, but there are times when this may be impossible, and we must not rule out the more common forms of victory: accommodation and coercion.

This is an important point because if the only objective is "making the adversary a friend," then certain tactics could not be used for fear of alienating the opponent, thus limiting the effectiveness of CBD. And, to play a significant part in a Christian theology of peace, CBD must not only help reduce the level of violence in the world, it must also prove an effective method of struggle against oppression and injustice. Until then, even most moral and well-intentioned Christians will not feel comfortable in renouncing violent forms of struggle.

In the past, Christians faced with evil and injustice have often had to choose between two distasteful alternatives: submit, or resist with force of arms. But if a system of nonviolent sanctions can be developed that is as effective as violence, perhaps there is a way out of this dilemma. As the bishops state, "We believe work to develop nonviolent means of fending off aggression and resolving conflict best reflects the call of Jesus both to love and to justice." And later they write, "Nonviolent resistance offers a common ground of agreement for those individuals who choose the option of Christian pacifism even to the point of accepting the need to die rather than kill and those who choose the option of lethal force allowed by the theology of just war."

The Catholic bishops are not the only religious body to recognize the potential importance of civilian defense. The United Methodist church has adopted a resolution calling for more study on CBD, and there is interest among some evangelicals. What is needed is for Christians who are concerned about the increasing violence of modern warfare to encourage research into nonviolent methods of resistance. Gene Sharp believes the possibility now exists to deliberately contribute to a new stage in human history, leading perhaps to the "transformation of politics and the justifiable restoration of hope."

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House of Representatives

ARMS RACE IN SPACE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California (Mr. BROWN) is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Speaker, I have requested this time to discuss an issue of deep concern to me—the developing weapons race in space. One year ago, on March 23, 1983, the President shocked Americans when he delivered his "Star Wars" speech calling for a massive new defense program aimed at developing weapons in space. Even after a year, the strategic and budgetary implications of this decision have not yet been fully explored. In an effort to begin to examine these issues I have requested this special order on the arms race in space and I am pleased that my colleagues with similar concerns are joining me in this effort.

The threshold events in the course charted by the President are represented by the commitment of the Department of Defense to proceed with testing and procurement of antisatellite weapons (ASAT's), and by the increased emphasis placed on research on space-based ballistic-missile defense systems embodied in the President's strategic defense initiative. ASAT's, by destroying satellites in oribit, threaten the national technical means by which we verify compliance with arms control agreements, monitor military activities world-wide, and conduct vital communications functions. Deployment of space-based ballistic-missile defense systems would violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, perhaps the most effective and vital treaty in existence.

Mr. Speaker, the United States has a 20-year commitment to the peaceful uses of space. The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty prohibit nuclear weapons testing and explosions in space. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits the placement in orbit around the Earth of any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction. The 1972 ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing or deployment of ABM systems which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. The ABM Treaty also instructs the United States and the U.S.S.R. not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other country; ASAT's are explicity designed to do just this. These treaties have all contributed to preserving space for peaceful purposes.

I should make explicitly clear that there are two distinct and different kinds of military activity in space. The first includes intelligence collection by remote sensing, weather satellites, communications satellites, and other so-called force-extending activities. The second I call the weaponization of space, in which ABM systems, space mines, antisatellite weapons, and other offensive military devices are deployed in space.

The military forces of both the United States and the Soviet Union have long depended on space for communications, early warning, intelligence, weather, navigation, reconnaissance and arms treaty verification. These systems lend security and efficiency to our military operations. They have contributed significantly to maintaining peace by denying the element of surprise or advantage in a first strike. In a properly balanced overall space program, I can continue to support such military uses of space. In fact, I have supported for many years the concept of an international peace-keeping satellite system that would be used to monitor worldwide military activity, including arms build-up, troop movements, and all other aggressive military actions.

Space is clearly vital to our national security. But putting antisatellite weapons or other weapons in space is not necessarily going to enhance our national security. The emerging competition in space weapons, for example, threatens the delicate intelligence apparatus I described earlier, and is destined to increase the likelihood of a nuclear exchange between the super-

powers. Ironically, the United States depends more heavily on space than the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union has twice indicated a desire to resume negotiations on banning antisatellite weapons, but the U.S. position was made clear recently in a statement by Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, before the Senate Armed Services Committee that the United States has no intention of resuming these negotiations. It is a mystery to me why we cannot even approach the Soviet Union to determine if they are serious about their proposal. I can only assume that the administration's intent is to proceed with the ASAT weapon, and has no interest in arms control in space.

"Star Wars," the President's proposal to render nuclear weapons obsolete, may have intuitive appeal; the thought of an orbiting security blanket of lasers and particle beam weapons intercepting incoming missiles is comforting. However, a careful analysis reveals that the exotic space weapons of ballistic-missile defense are vulnerable, unpredictable, and fantastically expensive. Senator GOLDWATER, not noted for dovish sentiments, was quoted recently—Washington Post, March 9, 1984—as saying that the strategic defense initiative sought by Reagan could prove to be "the biggest project this country has ever been asked to fund." He went on to say "We're facing a threat far more destructive than anything the Soviets might throw at us—the deficit."

Earlier examination of ballistic-missile defense (BMD) led to the conclusion that it would actually prompt a buildup of weapons on the other side. After building its own BMD to counter the U.S. system, for example, the Soviets would be expected to methodically set about building up their stockpile of nuclear weapons to blast through any shield Pentagon dreamers devise. Instead of 100 missiles aimed at any given U.S. city, for example, there could be 200, or 300. Or perhaps they might adopt an even simpler strategy of sending a few dozen decoy missiles over with every real one.

These facts were discussed during plans for the development of an antiballistic missile (ABM) system in the 1960's and led the United States and the Soviet Union to ratify the Anti-Ballistic-Missile Treaty in 1972. The text of the treaty states that effective measures to limit antiballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the arms race in strategic offensive arms, and that each party therefore agrees not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country. Negotiated and ratified under the Nixon administration, the ABM Treaty has provided the framework for the control of nuclear weapons ever since. President Reagan's "Star Wars" proposal is an irresponsible and dangerous threat to this treaty.

For these reasons, I plan to introduce a House joint resolution next week which calls on the United States to maintain its commitment to the ABM Treaty and to refrain from activities which could undermine the treaty. Ambassador Gerard Smith, the negotiator for the ABM Treaty said in a speech recently that the "tilt toward a defensive strategy is inconsistent with arms control and would destabilize the strategic balance." The President's initiation of a 5-year, $25 billion research program on ballistic-missile defense, with projected total costs of at least $500 billion, and possibly as much as a trillion or more, could lead to a reversal of the U.S. strategy relying on survivable retaliatory forces to deter aggression.

"Star Wars" would fundamentally challenge the concept of avoidance of nuclear war by threat of retaliation. I see no credible or compelling reasons to feel confident with changing this strategy. I do not like the fact that we live in a world in which we survive by fear of retaliation. But it certainly has advantages over a world in which fear of a first strike is foremost in our minds.

Intended or not, a U.S. ballistic-missile defense will be viewed by the Soviets as part of a first-strike system. A United States preemptive strike would reduce the number Soviet retaliatory missiles a BMD system would have to contend with, and thus would provide advantage to the United States by striking first. I do not believe that the United States has a first-strike policy, but we cannot be sure that the Soviets would not adopt such a policy when they get their own ballistic-missile defense, and we would certainly suspect them of having such intentions. The abrogation of the ABM Treaty for the pipe-dream of people defense is not worth the risk. Ironically, the promise of people protection by means of a BMD system would result in exposure of the American public to the unpredictable paranoia of the Soviet Union.

Weapons in space, including ballistic-missiles defense systems, will not protect the American people from nuclear war. Instead, they would destabilize the United States-Soviet strategic relationship. In peacetime, ballistic-missile defense would fuel the offensive arms race, and would yield no strategic value, at great cost. During times of crisis it will aggravate the pressures to engage in a preemptive first strike. And it perpetuates a myth that nuclear war can be waged, and won.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues in the upcoming debates on the Department of Defense authorization legislation, on the defense appropriations legislation for fiscal year 1985, and in the overall consideration of the budget in the coming years to seriously consider the strategic and budgetary impact of the arms race in space. It will lead us nowhere, except down a rathole.

Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

(The following is an excerpt from "Maze of Opposites", MANAS, Vol. XXXVII, No. 1, p. 1, January 4, 1984):

"We live in a world where only half-truths are convincing. This is not really remarkable since our world—probably any world, universe, or external environment—cannot possibly exhibit more than a part of itself to any single observer at any given time. Half-truths, in short, have the confirmation of experience, while whole truths, should we somehow come upon them, and be able to recognize them, might dissolve most or all of what we know. Accordingly, we live by half-truths, argue by using them, win with them, and, inevitably, are defeated by them. Yet the world of half-truths is the world of action. An intelligence absorbed in whole truths alone may feel no call to do anything. Men of action, therefore, quite naturally jeer at would-be philosophers, calling them armchair thinkers, ivory towerists, and use other epithets that will come to mind. Yet the glancing insight of a philosopher will sometimes give a man of action balance in choosing and working toward goals.

"A rather revealing half-truth coming from some philosopher or historian is that revolution always devours its own children. Is it true? It was certainly true for Robespierre. Did this occur to him on the way to the guillotine? It may have, since he was an exceptionally bright man. It was true, also, for Bukharin, and one wonders what he thought when he came to die at Stalin's hands. Michael Polanyi's attempt to put some half-truths together in The Tacit Dimension is of interest here:

> 'Marxism embodies the boundless moral aspirations of modern man in a theory which protects his ideas from skeptical doubt by denying the reality of moral motives in public life. The power of Marxism lies in uniting the two contradictory forces of the modern mind into a single political doctrine. Thus originated a world-embracing idea, in which moral doubt is frenzied by moral fury and moral fury is armed by scientific nihilism.
>
> 'Bukharin, explaining urbanely, in the spring of 1935, that scientific truth would no longer be pursued for its own sake under socialism, completed the wheel full circle. Embodied in a scientifically sanctioned political power, moral perfectionalism had no place left for truth. Bukharin confirmed this three years later when, facing death, he bore false witness against himself. For to tell the truth would have been to condemn the Revolution, which was unthinkable.'

"This sort of criticism of Communism, while the most valuable, since it explains by understanding the moral forces involved, is of no interest at the political level of the shaping of 'public opinion', because the politically useful is always at best a half-truth. Politics, which is the struggle for power, lives entirely by half-truths. Most politicians survive and win by denunciation of 'enemies', whether at home or abroad. Only in a society which has given up the search for scapegoats shall we be able to get rid of such politicians. That would be a society able to listen to and profit by the thought and criticism of such writers as Michael Polanyi, Simone Weil, and Hannah Arendt, and, let us add, Louise Halle. These are minds eternally suspicious of half-truths, and very careful not to lay claim to the whole of it while examining and dissecting the succession of illusions that have made so much of the history of mankind."

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