As a public service,

THE LAUCKS FOUNDATION

from time to time calls attention to published material that might contribute toward clarification or understanding of issues affecting world peace. The accompanying reprints constitute Reprint Mailing No. 58.

(Mrs.) Eulah C. Laucks, President
Post Office Box 5012
Santa Barbara, CA. 93108

March 20, 1984

(Reprinted by permission of the author)

HELL IS NOW TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE

by

Wes Jackson*

These last ten years of the nuclear age should convince even the die-hard atheist that the essence of the 2,000 year old Christian message has not been altered. Christians have always been directed to love their enemies, to pray for those who despitefully use them, to love their neighbors as they love themselves, to work in behalf of the Prince of Peace. If we don't, the warning goes, there will be hell to pay, a heat death, no less.

These old commandments are hard to follow and even the Christian world has done a poor job of it. In modern times, we have even come to believe that it doesn't matter, for when we die, it's simply curtains for us. Since our bodies first gave us meaning when we came into the world, why shouldn't that meaning disappear with death? Since we return to nothingness, there is no penalty. Many moderns throughout Christendom came to regard the Christian code of conduct as something like an annuity. The benefit terminated at death.

Suddenly, in the last two and a half percent of the Christian era, that's the last half of this century, things changed. Suddenly, it has become painfully clear that all the requirements of the ancient program must be more rigorously followed than ever before if humankind is to survive. It is almost as though God has said, "I threatened them with heat death if they didn't follow the instructions in the old program, and it hasn't worked. Because they have not loved their enemies and their neighbors, they must now risk the threat of the 'second death', extinction. Since they don't care about themselves, we'll see if they care enough about the species, or for that matter all life on earth, to behave themselves."

As David Ehrenfeld has suggested, it is as though the Creator has designed a trap so elegant that none will escape; not the president, not the generals, not the Rockefellers, not the ordinary businessman or factory worker, nor the farmer or even the Quakers. Either we get with the specifics of the ancient program, beginning here at home, or the "second death", the heat death from the ancient fires of the universe, is inevitable. We are required to love our enemies, not stockpile weapons against them or point missiles at them from land or sea or air or satellite. We were not asked to comply 2,000 years ago. We were told.

*Director, THE LAND INSTITUTE
Route 3, Salina, Ks. 67401

(*Continued*)

Jonathan Schell, who first used the expression "second death" in his book entitled Fate of the Earth, makes an air-tight argument for disarmament, beginning with the nuclear weapons. The careful thinkers on this subject eventually conclude that in the nuclear age, we must remove all weapons if we are to avoid another arms escalation. The energy to do so can only come from loving our enemies and our neighbors. We must love our enemies both at home and abroad. We must love our neighbors. The threat which backs these Christian commandments is absolute. Of course, it is difficult to back away from the threats of the Soviet Union, but 10,000 years of existence under the worst imaginable authority—say a Hitler or Stalin-type—or any other political or social absurdity we might be forced to cope with doesn't compare with extinction, or even life in a nuclear wasteland. Human will is powerful and its devices sufficiently complicated to break any political stranglehold, but not on a densely radiated earth.

It won't be easy for me to love my enemies or even all my neighbors. I have been angry with most politicians, mad at the generals—the world's leading terrorists—for twenty years now, angry with my colleagues in the universities where potentialities rot and few seem to care. Greed and envy are unbecoming in their own right. What is one to do when it becomes unequivocally clear that it is these two forces which are primarily responsible for reducing options for the unborn, forces more responsible than meeting basic human needs on a too crowded globe? And yet, we are required to love those so possessed. We're in for a long pull.

I have wanted to underscore what the economist Paul Hawken says: that the economy which everyone says isn't working, is working—to the advantage of the rich and to the disadvantage of the rest. Because billions of petrodollars no longer circulate in the U.S. economy, because we have become resource-poor relative to our level of consumption, "the economy" now sends signals we choose to misinterpret. What is happening now in "the economy" is a small penalty for the past and a faint foreshadow for the future. I have not loved those countrymen and neighbors responsible.

I confess that because I have not loved my enemies and all my countrymen and all my neighbors, I have increased the likelihood of a new eternal hell on earth due to nuclear weapons. I believe this in my heart of hearts now, for as a biologist, I do believe that everything is connected to everything else, that Garrett Hardin is right; we can never do only one thing. Without knowing the probability, I believe that every act either increases the chances of nuclear war and the likelihood of extinction or it decreases it. An elegant trap has been set and the ancient program abides.

"Peace is indivisible."
— *Maxim Litvinov (1933)*

"Peace is indivisible."
— *Ronald Reagan (1983)*

(Reprinted by permission of the author)

THE GAME THEORY OF ARMS CONTROL

by

Jordan Bishop*

(Aired December 15, 1983 on Commentary, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Radio)

It is interesting to look at the question of arms control in terms of game theory, and it may help to gain an image of the obstacles. The Scottish philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre put it this way: "The problem with game theory is that your move of the Queen Bishop's pawn may be answered with a low lob across the net."

I would submit that this is the case with the international arms limitation game. For Mister Reagan and the Americans the game is poker. Right now there are three separate contests under way: the START talks, the Geneva talks on intermediate ballistic missiles, and the nearly-forgotten negotiations on the balanced reduction of conventional forces. In each the game is five-card stud: each player sees nine cards and is ignorant of the tenth. Neither is supposed to know anything about the forty-two cards remaining in the deck. It is an image that comes readily to the cartoonist's mind: the smoke-filled room, the cowboy atmosphere, the forty-four ready at hand. It is as American as apple pie.

The Russian game is chess. Unlike poker, it is a perfect-information game: both players see all the pieces on the board. The image is one of sober, studied calculation, frightening in its intensity as the official stopwatch ticks off the seconds allotted for the next move. The advantage of full information is countered by the extreme complexity of the game. And it may well be this complexity that makes negotiations with the Soviets so difficult. For example, an American or a Canadian can see Mister Reagan's "zero option" for what it was: a bluff that was never called. For the chess player, it can only be seen as a gambit, a trap for the unwary.

It should be noted that in chess the stalemate is very much a part of the game. The great Capablanca once said: I always have a stalemate at hand... A stalemate has no place at all in poker.

What does Mister Trudeau's initiative do to the game? His proposal for a five-power conference will, for the poker player, result in an increase in information, but the odds remain the same. For the chess player, it may change nothing. One of the problems has been that the Soviets are unable to ignore the French and British nuclear weapons. Mister Trudeau's proposal, in that it includes all the pieces, may irritate the Americans—as indeed it has—while adding nothing to further understanding on the part of the Soviets, who knew all along that those pieces were in the game. On the other hand, if it would break down the Americans' divide-and-conquer approach, the Soviets might be more willing to play.

In terms of the great international numbers game, independent observers tend to see it as a stalemate. The Russians can live with that—it is part of their game—but the Americans cling to poker, in which there is no stalemate, only victory or defeat, the whole pot or nothing at all. And one may seriously doubt whether Mister Trudeas's initiative, if it were adopted, would succeed in changing this.—This is Jordan Bishop, in Sydney, for Commentary.

*195 St. Peter's Road, Sydney, Cape Breton
Canada B1P 4P9

The following segment was excerpted from the MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour aired December 1, 1983. (Reproduced by permission of Mr. Drew Moseley, Rights and Clearances, MacNeil/Lehrer/Gannett Productions)

December 1, 1983
Transcript #2134

WNET/Thirteen: 356 West 58th Street, New York, N.Y. 10019
Transcripts: MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour, Box 345, New York, N.Y. 10101
Press contact: Roz Boyle (212) 560-3016

The MacNeil/Lehrer NEWS HOUR

... ...

MacNEIL: In Geneva, the United States and the Soviet Union held another meeting today on strategic arms reduction. It was the longest in the current series, lasting 3½ hours, and they agreed to meet again on Tuesday. This was the second START meeting since the Soviets walked out of the separate talks on limiting medium-range missiles in Europe. The breakdown of those talks last week added to an atmosphere of hostility and danger developing between the superpowers since the shooting down of the Korean airliner and aggravated by the recent absence of President Andropov. In that atmosphere there is growing anxiety that Moscow and Washington could find themselves in a nuclear war by accident because communication between them is faulty. That view was put forward last week by two members of the Senate Armed Services Committee — Republican John Warner of Virginia and Democrat Sam Nunn of Georgia. They suggested risk-control centers in each capital to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war. Senator Nunn is with us this evening. Senator, how great is the danger of ourselves and the Russians finding ourselves in nuclear war accidentally?

Sen. SAM NUNN: Robin, I believe the danger is increasing every year. The risk, if you measure it in one given period of time, may not be so great, but if you accumulate the risk over a 10- or 20-year period, I think we have to be very concerned. If you consider that by 1990, 20 to 25 nations in the world will have the capacity or the potential of developing nuclear weapons and then you have the overlay of the terrorist groups around the world and the instability and unpredictability of a good many of the Third World countries and their leaders, then I think we have a mutual interest with the Soviet Union to begin to address this problem.

MacNEIL: Most people are worried enough about nuclear war by calculation, as in the recent movie, "The Day After," where it's an act of policy to deter aggression or respond to aggression. Give us a quick scenario of the kind of thing that could lead to nuclear war by accident in your view.

Sen. NUNN: Well, I had the Strategic Air Command, at my request, take a look at this about a year and a half, two years ago take a look at this, and they did a very in-depth classified report that gives a great number of hypothetical scenarios. Let's just take one. Let's assume an F-4 aircraft, a fighter aircraft plane, with false U.S. markings on the wings takes off from the Middle East, flies in low over the Soviet Union, finds an outlying Soviet city and drops one nuclear weapon, decimating that city. How would the Soviets respond? Would they believe this was the beginning of a nuclear war? Would they retaliate against one American city? I don't think we've thought through that question. Another example? Let's assume a merchant ship pulls up in the San Francisco harbor with a nuclear weapon on board put there by terrorists. Twelve hours later that weapon goes off and one of our great cities in this country is obliterated. How would we respond? Would we immediately demand retaliation against the other superpower? We'd better start thinking about this and thinking about it seriously.

MacNEIL: Now, what is wrong with the procedures presently in place to take care of that?

Sen. NUNN: Well, you have the hotline, but the hotline is for a crisis that has already occurred or is about to occur, and it is for high leadership communications. We have no pre-planning with the hotline. There is no scenario laid out in advance as to how we may react. And what we're trying to do here in the risk-reduction centers is to have an on-going kind of communication that would involve pre-planning, that would involve communication between the military leaders of both sides, and that would be able to get out in front of a problem rather than react after the problem had already occurred.

MacNEIL: Your proposal made these risk-reduction centers independent of the two governments. How independent? Who would man them and what would the relationship be to the governments?

Sen. NUNN: We really don't mean them to be indpendent. We mean that they would be in two separate cities, probably Moscow and Washington, although you could have one city and one center at some point in the future. They would have to be linked with the top officials in government. So we would mean by our proposal that they would be an integral part of the governments of both countries.

MacNEIL: I see. And there would be Americans in the Moscow one and Russians in the Washington one?

Sen. NUNN: We would hope that would evolve. You may have to have liaison forces to begin with without having a large number of people, but eventually I would hope we would have centers that would have Soviets and Americans in both cities so that we could have an on-going kind of activity, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.

MacNEIL: Thank you. Jim?

LEHRER: How the Soviets view the problem of an accidental war now as seen by Arkady Shevchenko, the highest-ranking Soviet official ever to defect to the United States. He was the undersecretary general of the United Nations for five years before defecting in 1978. Earlier, he had been a personal adviser to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. He joined the Soviet foreign service in 1956. How do you think the Soviets will react to the Nunn proposal as just laid out?

ARKADY SHEVCHENKO: I would say that most likely the Soviet Union in general will react at least positively in the sense that they will accept to study this proposal because the Soviet Union was concerned for all these years, and I would say it was a permanent concern of the Soviet government about the accidental war.

LEHRER: So if a Soviet official were asked the same question that Robin asked Senator Nunn a moment ago — what is the risk? — you think that the honest Soviet official would answer it the same way?

Mr. SHEVCHENKO: Yes. They would answer basically the same way, and they will answer in a way that there is a grave risk, and this risk is growing. There is no question about that, and I think that both Soviet political leadership and Soviet military are of the same opinion about this matter.

LEHRER: And are they concerned about the same kinds of scenarios that the Senator laid out?

Mr. SHEVCHENKO: Oh, I would say it could be many other scenarios. There is no question. This is just an example. But that would be of their worry of more or less of similar situations. No question about that.

LEHRER: Based on your experience, and you were involved in the 1973 Middle East crisis and several others as a Soviet diplomat. What are the internal mechanisms in the Soviet Union now, say, to— let's take Senator Nunn's example, a plane with false U.S. markings drops a bomb on a Soviet city. What are the procedures, as you understand them, for the Soviet Union to find out whether or not that was for real or what?

Mr. SHEVCHENKO: In fact there is no good procedure. That's why I think the whole proposal is for to improve the whole communications and understanding by both sides of what might happen. And that is, I think, that is exactly the reason that I consider that this proposal is extremely important, because there is— there is a lack of established standard procedure — how to deal with the situation. And in fact, as I see how the present hotline will work, I don't think that the Soviet leadership, at least what I know about them in the past, they would not immediately launch a nuclear attack against the United States if it would be— the plane which they detect—

LEHRER: They would not?

Mr. SHEVCHENKO: —immediately, I mean, will not. They will try to do something, at least to see whether it was one plane, or what is what? It would be a big difference whether they're launching one missile or several, which could be detected by the Soviet Union. But I would say that a lot has to be done because there is a lot of things which are not being done now.

LEHRER: But what about, here again, just using one of the Senator's scenarios, the airplane dropping a bomb on a Soviet city, and then there's communication, and the Soviets say, "Was it yours?" and the United States says, "No, it wasn't." Now, are they going to believe that? And can a mechanism be put in place, which I think is what the Senator is suggesting, that is already there so there would be no question that when the word said, "No, it wasn't ours, it would be believed?"

Mr. SHEVCHENKO: I don't think that really we can have a system which will work. I mean, it would be 100% guaranteed that one side would really trust or believe fully the intentions of the other. There always been marginal, certain risk. You cannot totally absolutely eliminate all risk. But at least the present system can be improved, because in the present system if something like that would happen and at least there is a little time now, at least there is 40 minutes or 50 minutes time, and during this—

LEHRER: Forty or 50 minutes between—

Mr. SHEVCHENKO: Between, let's say, *[unintelligible]* launching from the American territory of the missiles, which could be detected by the Soviet Union, and they could, within this period of time, even to ask— even to use the hotline. And I think it's good, at least, that there are now negotiations to improve, to make this hotline which existed more efficient in the sense that to transmit facsimiles, not only the whole page immediately— because now it's rather slow. And there are negotiations underway to improve it. But this idea of having these lines and the teams in both capitals, it's one step further to supplement the existing arrangements.

LEHRER: Thank you. Robin?

MacNEIL: Now an American view from a former official with inside knowledge of crisis management here. William Hyland was a CIA analyst for 15 years, then worked with the National Security Council and the State Department under Presidents Nixon and Ford. During the Middle East crisis of 1973, Mr. Hyland traveled to Moscow with Henry Kissinger. He is now with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and about to become editor of *Foreign Affairs* magazine. Mr. Hyland, do you see a growing danger of accidental war?

WILLIAM HYLAND: I think there is a danger, and it will grow in time because there is a multiplication of the number of nuclear powers, the number of nuclear weapons. Compared with the Cuban missile crisis, there are just thousands times more weapons. And so statistics, in a sense, are running against us because there is a danger, it seems to me, of an accident at some point. Senator Nunn was giving an example of a possible use of a terrorist, perhaps, or someone faking an incident to blame it on the United States. But there are just simple accidents where a nuclear weapon can be lost and could even detonate in the wrong place and the wrong time and cause a crisis.

MacNEIL: In the movie, do you remember, "Dr. Strangelove," when a wild man decides from the Strategic Air Command to bomb the Soviet Union himself, the American president in that movie gets on the phone directly with the Soviet chairman to tell him the United States doesn't mean it. What is the mechanism now between the two countries, at least from this side, to know what is serious and what is meant and what the intentions are?

Mr. HYLAND: Well, the purpose of the hotline, which was established, I think, under President Kennedy, is for that very purpose — a very serious, direct message from the President of the United States to the leader in the Soviet Union.

MacNEIL: It's just a teleprinter, physically, isn't it?

Mr. HYLAND: It's actually a teleprinter. It's not a telephone, and it prints— we don't even know for certain where it prints out in the Kremlin. It is intended for this very purpose — something very serious, very immediate and urgent. But in addition there are, of course, normal diplomatic channels, and in a crisis there are ways of communicating through embassies, through the Soviet Embassy here and so forth. But in fact you are really reduced to that one line, that hotline, if you want to go quickly and call attention in the Soviet Union to the message.

MacNEIL: What do you think of Senator Nunn and Senator Warner's proposal?

Mr. HYLAND: Well, I support it. I think it's a good idea, and if you think about it, it's really rather amazing that in all these years we have relied on a mechanism set up only 20 years ago, one line, so to speak, to the Soviet Union, that we have nothing more formal, more involved, that would build some confidence. If you take the Korean airliner, for example, if you had come kind of a confidence center, it's possible that the Soviets could have gotten on the line, so to speak, and say, "We have an aircraft intruding. We don't know what's happening, but we're going to have to shoot at it. Can you tell us if it's an American plane?" etc. If you can build that kind of confidence over a few years of exchanging information, maybe not a lot, but having some mechanism for communication, I think it'd be a great step forward.

MacNEIL: Thank you. Jim?

LEHRER: Senator Nunn, everybody seems— everybody who has spoken about your proposal says it's a great idea and why— what's happening to it? I mean, why isn't it being implemented as we speak?

Sen. NUNN: Well, President Reagan has made what I would call a first step in that direction by proposing the link between the military of the United States and the Soviet Union. We have a long way to go from that to the concept we're talking about, but I think that at least the first step has been made, and they are indeed negotiating that.

LEHRER: What are they negotiating?

Sen. NUNN: They're talking about a military link, a communication link between the Pentagon and the Soviet military.

LEHRER: To discuss what kinds of things?

Sen. NUNN: To discuss perhaps what Bill just mentioned — perhaps a case like the 007. I think one think is very important here. Once the United States and the Soviet Union form this kind of communication mechanism, even if we have a very slow evolution of exchange, and even if confidence is built very gradually, I think it will immediately, from the time we announce that formation, it will serve as a deterrent. I think terrorist groups or Third World

countries that might have that in mind will think a long time before they'd go against both superpowers when they're working together and when we do have some interchange of intelligence. One of the big things here is to get out in front of the problem and make sure it doesn't happen. If, for instance, there was a missing nuclear weapon or if the KGB or the CIA found out that a terrorist group was planning this kind of situation, getting the other side to cooperate in advance and notifying them in advance so everyone could be alert — those are the kind of things that I think we need to watch.

LEHRER: Is that the kind of thing, Mr. Shevchenko, that the Soviet Union would agree to, that if the KGB, for instance, picked up an intelligence— a piece of intelligence information that terrorist group "X" was about to do something, they would notify the United States? Is that possible?

Mr. SHEVCHENKO: It's possible. It's possible, because in case of such a grave situation, when they see the possible risk of nuclear war, the Soviet government will be pretty responsible. May I just remind you a case when both Soviet and American government acted even in case when it was detected that South Africa was about to produce nuclear weapons. It was a joint action.

LEHRER: There was a communique. They worked together on that.

Mr. SHEVCHENKO: They had been working together.

Mr. HYLAND: They sent us a message.

LEHRER: The Soviets did?

Mr. SHEVCHENKO: Yes.

Mr. HYLAND: The Soviets sent the United States a message saying they believed that South Africa was developing the mechanism for a nuclear test in a certain part of South Africa and asked if the United States had any information and would become involved. And in fact the United States did act on that, and both sides more or less joined to say that it would be against it.

LEHRER: Senator, what about the basic security problems that we hear about? I mean, if we take your proposal to its final conclusion, where you would have Soviet folk sitting here in Washington and U.S. people sitting in Moscow, how would you get around that problem? Wouldn't both nations be reluctant to share that kind of information?

Sen. NUNN: That's the big thing. That's the reason it's got to be evolutionary. The intelligence-sharing would have to start very gradually. But I would submit that the risk involved in sharing some intelligence, limited, to begin with, is much less than the risk of continuing to do nothing. You have to measure risk in this case, and I think the riskiest course of all is continue to have the superpowers using megaphone diplomacy and very little communication.

LEHRER: Mr. Hyland, based on your long CIA experience, would that trouble you as a professional?

Mr. HYLAND: I suspect that you will find in the American government that there will be reservations, that the Soviets would use it to gather information and so forth, but I think this is an issue that transcends those bureaucratic concerns because the risk of nuclear war is such a monumental problem that I think you would have to accept some marginal risk of intelligence gathering on the side. And I have a feeling that if you started down this road—

LEHRER: I mean, you'd assume they'd spy too?

Mr. HYLAND: Well, of course, and I'm not so sure that we would— in fact, I hope we would take advantage of any openings. But I think that it might evolve into something more important. And I think it might even help with the actual arms control problem if you had some kind of mechanism where there was an exchange of information, a little bit of confidence growing. It might add to the general sense of confidence between the two sides.

LEHRER: Senator Nunn, when you and Senator Warner announced the new phase of this a few days ago, you made a strong point of the fact that it's not necessary to trust the Russians to make this thing work. What do you mean?

Sen. NUNN: Well, I mean that you don't have to assume that mutual trust is present. If mutual trust was present then we probably wouldn't need any such mechanism. But you do have to assume that the Soviets are not madmen, and you have to assume that they will act in their own interest, and those are the only two assumptions I think are necessary to make a beginning here.

LEHRER: Are those realistic assumptions, Mr. Shevchenko?

Mr. SHEVCHENKO: I think so. Perhaps they are predatory, but they are not mad. Definitely. And I think it's quite true that the Soviet leadership would take it very seriously and even, I would say, that in case of certain situation, they will trust a certain— there will be some trust in even by the Soviet Union. And I would like to add that the Soviet government and Soviet Union was even more worried than the United States about all these problems, and I would say that the recently United States somehow lost a little bit drive for preventing the nuclear proliferation. Soviet never stopped to do that. So—

LEHRER: I hear you. Gentlemen, thank you very much, and good luck, Senator Nunn.

Sen. NUNN: Thank you.

LEHRER: Robin?

Journal of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS)

(Reprinted by permission of the author)

Volume 37, No. 2

February 1984

PEACE AND THE PECKING ORDER

In a post-war period, the Soviet Government has not, with a few exceptions, been looking for trouble with the West. There were, of course, two efforts to take Berlin, an effort to put missiles in Cuba, and the gratuitous explosion of a 50-megaton bomb.

But, for the most part, the Soviet approach to foreign policy has been to try to calm the West down, not to rile it up unnecessarily while, of course, pursuing Soviet foreign policy aims that may have irritating collateral effects.

Most Americans have the opposite impression. For most of the last third of a century, their attention has been drawn to Soviet statements and Soviet procurement of weapons by American hawks eager to cry alarm. Of course, viewed through that lens, the Soviet Union has been engaging in one deliberate, unnecessary, provocation after another with the presumed goal of intimidation.

In fact, it is the special political alchemy of the American hawk to turn Soviet weakness into strength that is swaggering.

If the Soviet Union builds big, vulnerable, and slow-reacting missiles, it is not a failure to have the solid-fuel technology to which the West has already passed, but a conscious desire to intimidate us with size.

If the Soviet Union has an ineffective missile defense around Moscow, our extremists give it the benefit of every possible technological doubt—the better to inspire us to leap-frog it into something much better—and they predict political challenges. And yesterday's example in ABM is, really, today's example in antisatellite weapons.

If the Soviet Union is cautious, extremely cautious, about saying it can win, or even survive, a nuclear war, the caution is interpreted as a suppression of real Soviet feelings, and as an incitement to read ever more closely between the lines of Soviet military doctrine. In short, even Soviet caution is, really, transmuted into devilishly clever aspects of a diabolic peace offensive. Few Americans pause to thank their lucky stars that our adversary is so cautious and so unsure of herself that she denounces claims that *she* is ahead in the arms race as provocations and lies!

Detente in the Soviet Interest

No doubt the long and consistent Soviet interest in detente has a major component of realpolitik. The Soviet Union is the weaker power and it wants, and needs, decades of respite from struggle, the better to catch up. As things now appear, it is, indeed, falling behind and not catching up at all. (Twenty years ago, in the late Herman Kahn's "On Thermonuclear War", it was projected that the Soviet Union would have 75% of the U.S. GNP by 1970 and be rising in relative terms; this is yet another of the defense alarums that never came to pass. The Soviet GNP is still 50% of ours.)

In short, one doesn't have to love the tortoise to say that it has a healthy respect for the ability of the hare to bolt ahead. So the tortoise does not usually call the rabbit names. And the rabbit has forgotten, for the most part, that such impudence could actually occur!

But it may now be coming. The Soviet Union is obviously looking for some dramatic way to "get even" for the deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles. Preferably, they would like something which they could offer to withdraw if the West would withdraw the missiles in Europe. And, best of all, it would be something that would drive home to the West the sense of vulnerability which the Soviet Government feels when faced with the Western intermediate range missiles.

This is why Valentin M. Falin and Lieutenant General Viktor P. Starodubov told the Washington Post's Don Oberdorfer that they were convinced that the U.S. would "begin serious talks" once it feels "the weight of the weapons countermeasures" recently ordered by the Politburo. (Washington Post, January 23, pg. A18)

A few months ago, when Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John W. Vessey was asked what response he expected to materialize on the Soviet side, he said:



1960 Graph shows Soviets GNP increasing rapidly.

Continued

"Look for the bizarre."

My guess is that they will put intermediate range missiles on surface ships and station them off the East Coast. Americans would not like this visible reminder of the speed with which their capitol could be destroyed, even though it can be done by submarines today. And the Russians would find it easier to keep these missiles on station than to mount them on submarines. (There are, however, recent reports of increased stationing of submarines).

Of course, the ships would be vulnerable to attack—but so are the Pershing and cruise. Both the U.S. and the Soviet deployments would be "first-strike" deployments of the "use them first or lose them quickly" kind.

Falin, a prominent commentator for the Government newspaper Izvestia, predicted the deployment as being "perhaps the next year or the year after", but Vadim Zagladin, of the Central Committee said it would probably be well before this year is out.

Meanwhile, on the same day, Yuri Andropov gives an interview saying:

"...before it is too late, the United States and NATO should display readiness to return to the situation that had existed before the commencement of the deployment of the Pershing 2's and cruise missiles. We are raising this question before the United States and its NATO allies because we want to avoid yet another spiral of the arms race, this time on a new, still more dangerous level that leads to a growth of tension and instability in Europe."

Despite the Soviet record of caution and unwillingness to provoke us, this statement should not, I think, be taken lightly.

Of course, America has persuaded itself that the deployment of the SS-20 was an aggressive act designed to destabilize the European theater and to produce a politically intimidating lead in intermediate range missiles of 600 to zero. But all informed observers know that the Soviet Union had that "lead" for 20 years and that the SS-20 was simply the third and latest Soviet attempt to modernize that long-overdue-for-modernization missile force of SS-4's and SS-5's.

Predictably, once the West moved to emplace the cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe for a number of unilateral reasons, our own agit-prop went into action, giving one million and one reasons why it was a response to Soviet (SS-20) actions. (This first article of a series being run currently in Science Magazine by Jeffrey Smith on this subject was splendid and relevant.) In that atmosphere most of the public will see any new Soviet response as a gratuitous "topping" action rather than as a retaliation.

Thus we are at the beginning of a political escalation of military deployments. And most explosive of all the ingredients of this escalation is a latent double standard arising from past Soviet caution. We have come to assume that the Soviets will blink first in an eye-ball-to-eye-ball crisis.

The West considers the Cuban missile crisis to be the model for confrontations—one in which Soviet adventurism is followed by Soviet capitulationism, as the Chinese put it at the time. But the Soviet Union may no longer be willing to capitulate so easily. It may be weak economically, culturally, politically and in virtually all other ways, but it has, after all, built strategic forces comparable to our own in the last two decades. It may think that it has a right to have its ships proceed unimpeded on the high seas or whatever.

If war comes from this, therefore, it will not be over the issue of cruise and Pershing missiles directly, or about the Soviet response. It will have to do with what might be called escalation dominance in the realm of politics. Or, put another way, with a game of political chicken in which the players' interest in the outcome has long transcended the initial stakes and become a question of future escalation dominance.

U.S. and Soviet relations oscillate within a fairly narrow range. When they get too bad, the fear of war drives them closer, and when they get too warm, various defense mechanisms on both sides see the relaxation of tension as threatening—either to political control (on the Soviet side) or to loss of vigilance (on the Western side)—and one or both sides move to close it off.

We are now near the height (one hopes) of the backswing. On the upswing to a more normal part of the range, we can expect to achieve a new measure of arms control. But it obviously will require another Administration and so we must wait, nervously, for one to five years. Meanwhile one must hope that no crisis triggers an effort to change the international pecking order.□

—Jeremy J. Stone
(Director, FAS)

The following responds to the article "Andropov's Plan for Fortress Russia" from The Manchester Guardian Weekly of June 26, 1983, reproduced in Laucks Foundation Reprint Mailing No. 56 of January 24, 1984, before Andropov's death:

ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO
19TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

2332 RAYBURN BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
202-225-3601

CONFERENCE SECRETARY

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SUBCOMMITTEE
WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS
RANKING MINORITY MEMBER

COMMITTEE ON
INTERIOR AND INSULAR
AFFAIRS
SUBCOMMITTEES:
INSULAR AFFAIRS
RANKING MINORITY MEMBER
PUBLIC LANDS AND NATIONAL PARKS

January 27, 1984

Mrs. Eulah Laucks
President, Laucks Foundation
P.O. Box 5012
Santa Barbara, Ca 93108

Dear Mrs. Laucks:

Thank you for sending me a copy of your latest Laucks Foundation Report. I appreciate hearing the views presented in the Report.

I particularly find the Manchester Guardian Weekly article by Jonathan Steele interesting. The article, "Andropov's Plan for Fortress Russia," would lead one to believe that policies under Soviet leader Andropov support concentrating on domestic affairs at the expense of foreign military involvement and commitments. I find such an insinuation contrary to the facts.

While it may be that Soviet President Andropov wishes to implement bold plans of action for reviving the stagnant Soviet economy (no one really knows if this is his goal), there has been no hint that such efforts are at the expense of the present Soviet policy of aggressive interference in the internal affairs of sovereign nations. There has been virtually no movement by the Soviets towards withdrawing the overextended Red Army from Afghanistan. In addition, under Andropov, the Soviets have dramatically increased the deployment of nuclear weapons from western Russia to Czechoslovakia and East Germany and most recently off the East Coast of the United States.

Under Andropov there has been an impressive if unsuccessful attempt to drive a wedge between the U.S. and our NATO Allies, particularly the Federal Republic of Germany. As you know, leaders from both the Social Democrat and Christian Democrat parties officially blamed the Soviet Union for "meddling" in the F.R.G.'s elections. Numerous examples of Soviet "diplomats" being expelled for espionage from several independent nations across the globe also exist. Is this evidence of President Andropov's "Fortress Russia" policy?

Again, thank you for contacting me.

Sincerely,

ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO
Member of Congress

RJL:caw

SCIENCE

24 February 1984, Volume 223, Number 4638

Mutual Deterrence or Nuclear Suicide

The phrase "nuclear winter" has already become a part of our language, but the completely new strategic implications of the nuclear winter scenarios* have not yet received any great public attention or discussion. The prospect of a nuclear winter has been greeted as just one more chapter (a final chapter?) in the story of Armageddon that has been told to us so often in the past 40 years. We believe the story, but it no longer moves us. So what's new about nuclear winter?

What is new is that the nuclear winter scenario replaces the prospect of mutual destruction through the failure of mutual deterrence by the prospect of assured self-destruction through nuclear attack. If the analysis of the climatic effects of a nuclear strike is correct, then no nation can make a major nuclear attack even against an unarmed opponent without committing suicide—without itself receiving punishment as severe as that imposed on its intended victim. Nuclear weapons, by their guarantee of suicide, become their own deterrent.

The plausibility of the current doctrine, that mutual deterrence by arming to the teeth is a preventive for nuclear war, has been steadily eroding the payload of each power increases, so do the demands of its opponent redundancy of its nuclear force, in order that ability to reply to an at may be ensured. As warning times decrease to the vanishing point, not only does reprisal against the aggressor become less certain, but Strangelove mentalities become fascinated again with the possibilities of a "surgical" preemptive strike. And, of course, the opportunities for all kinds of unintended triggerings of nuclear exchanges multiply. Mutual deterrence is increasingly viewed as a bankrupt policy, which we cling to for lack of an alternative.

If nuclear weapons are suicidal, guaranteed to cripple or destroy the user even without a response from the targeted victim, then the futility of mutual deterrence is complete. A second strike is no more appetizing than a first, and a preemptive strike loses any gambling appeal that it might have had. Both powers have supplied themselves with mountains of suicidal weapons for which there is now no discernible use, either for deterrence or aggression.

But in these questions of human survival, we must not be precipitous. Neither the scientific basis for the nuclear winter nor its strategic implications have been examined in the depth that they require. It is too early to draw firm conclusions about what strategy should govern the deployment of a presumptively suicidal weapon. A plausible inference is that such a weapon is worse than none, either for attack or deterrence, and that the way is now open for nuclear disarmament, even unilateral partial disarmament. But that conclusion may be simplistic. It would be rash to proceed on it without a more thorough analysis of the nuclear winter than has yet been made and a careful study of alternative strategies.

The terms of the nuclear standoff have been changed—fundamentally changed. Awakened to that fact, we must proceed at once to an examination the scientific reality of the nuclear winter and of the implications of this reality for our policies of arming for suicide and our fears that a suicidal weapon might be used by an aggressor against us.—HERBERT A. SIMON, *Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh 15213*

*R. P. Turco, O. B. Toon, T. P. Ackerman, J. B. Pollock, C. Sagan, *Science* 222, 1283 (1983); P. R. Ehrlich *et al.*, *ibid.*, p. 1293.

LAUCKS FOUNDATION, INC.
POST OFFICE BOX 5012
SANTA BARBARA, CA., 93108

GOLETA, CA
MAR 16
PM
1984



FIRST CLASS MAIL

MARY LAUCKS
3815 42nd AVE. N.E.
SEATTLE, WA. 98105