

As a public service,

THE LAUCKS FOUNDATION

from time to time calls attention to published material that might contribute toward clarification or understanding of issues affecting world peace. The accompanying reprints constitute Reprint Mailing No. 57.

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The following two excerpts are words of Thomas Merton, quoted from p. 14 and p. 15 of Letters From Tom, by W. H. Ferry. (A selection of letters from Father Thomas Merton, Monk of Gethsemani, to W.H. Ferry, 1961-1968. Fort Hill Press, Scarsdale, N.Y. 1983.):

"I do feel that there is a lot of point in sending around copies of things in a small circle of interested people. This to me is a significant activity, all the more meaningful because it lacks that mass, anonymous, stupefied quality that everything else has."

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"What is needed is really not shrewdness or craft, but what the politicians don't have: depth, humanity and a certain totality of self forgetfulness and compassion, not just for individuals but for man as a whole: a deeper kind of dedication."

From: TARGET SEATTLE (1983)  
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# THERE'S A DEFINITE DIFFERENCE IN DIPLOMACY STYLES

By Edward Rowny


There are things that are so different in our makeup and that of the Soviets that the things that would lead you to believe that you can and should deal reasonably and fairly and openly with the Soviets just don't work out that way. We don't share the same fundamental objectives as the Soviets. We don't have a common heritage. I don't mean by that that they want a nuclear war. They don't. What I mean is that they look at problems differently. Their objectives are different.

Go back to the beginning. We have much in our heritage that springs from Greek rationalism. We believe that problems are there and problems can be tackled and solved. The typical Russian, the Soviet you deal with, does not have that in his makeup — "It's there, it's been there, perhaps it'll improve but there's not much we can do about it" — they don't have that abiding interest that problems can be solved.

The Soviets don't regard law as something to embody agreements and then to live by. The law is a tool, the law is an instrument and it's not to be used as an overarching concept for justice, for example. They don't have our heritage of chivalry. The church: even though the Eastern church is part of their philosophy, part of their background, the church was, until religion was put aside in the Soviet Union, it was always an instrument of the Soviet Union. It was there to be a part of the hierarchy.

And it doesn't take long, after you've been negotiating and talking and mingling to find that you spring from entirely different backgrounds, that you have entirely different ways of looking at problems.

Early in the game I found out how extremely secretive the Soviets are. They are very secretive people, play everything very close to the chest. I tried to practice some of my Russian, so I went out to a gaggle of Russian lad-



ies and I said to one in Russian, "How many children do you have?" Oh, she drew back, went back over and talked to the KGB agent — "Can I tell him how many children I have?" I really didn't care, you know, how many children she had, I was just trying to be polite, but it showed me how differently they approached the problem.

I lived in the same apartment house with one of my counterparts — and let me say here that the Soviets as you've read like to be more equal than others, so I had two counterparts. Every other delegate had one, they had to have one more member of the delegation. I had two counterparts, two lieutenant generals opposite me — but one of those lived on the floor beneath me. I would come back from work and he would be coming back from work, and I would say, "Come on, let's have a drink," and he would say, "Nyet, nyet, very busy." Never, never did I get him to take that stairway. "Well, I'll come down and see you." "No, I'm too busy," he would say. One time he saw me leaving in the

morning and he said, "Oh, you're going to Brussels today." I said, "Yes." "Hah!" he said. "My agents were correct." I said, "You know, there's nothing secretive about this — I'm going to Brussels." "Oh, you know," he said, "we don't tell our whereabouts, what we're doing." Of course they don't. They operate differently.

They're very very patient. They just repeat over and over again, and they sit there forever and talk the thing again and again. I was trying to explain to President Reagan a couple of months ago about the difference between the Soviet way of negotiation and our own. The best figure of speech I can use, the best example I can use is that they play chess. They think of every move and they're slow and they're deliberate. We want instant answers. We like to play electronic games, we like to put the quarter in the machine: Pac-Man is our ideal. We've got to see the lights go up and we have to see results.

It makes it difficult under these circumstances to negotiate on an even basis with the Soviets. Repetition: they repeat and repeat so often that you'd think that they had started Madison Avenue. You find yourself unconsciously accepting because we are conditioned to advertising and they know it. And you begin to believe the things that they say simply because of the repetition.

They have a different idea of compromise. As you know "kompromiz po-russkiy" (compromise, Russian-style) is a derived word. They don't have that in their lexicon, and I found that out rather early in the game. I went to one of my counterparts and said, "Look, this is not such a difficult problem we're tackling today. There are perhaps six elements, and I think that we could give you A, B and C if you give us D, E and F." He didn't say no, so the next day I got permission

**"The Soviets play chess. They think of every move, and they're slow and deliberate. We want instant answers. Pac-Man is our ideal. We've got to see the lights go up, and we have to see results."**

— Edward Rowny

from the ambassador to take the floor and I said "Now, we'll give you A," and I spelled it out, and then B, and then C, at which point the Soviet delegation got up to leave. I said, "Now wait a minute! I haven't finished." "Oh yes you have," said the other chairman. "You've told us what you're ready to give up and we agree and we accept and we don't see any reason for going any further."

We took a boat ride with the Soviets. A nice day on Lake Geneva, and all the Soviets sat on one side and all the Americans on the other. How were we going to get these people together? Well, I whipped out my harmonica and began to play, and I knew some of the songs, the Russian marching songs. Pretty soon they began to dance and jig. I had a good-looking secretary and my counterpart had an eye for good-looking girls, and they danced around. And afterwards Minister Semyenov, the head of the delegation, took off his little sailor cap and went around and took up a collection. He got some dollars and French francs and rubles and Swiss francs, and he came around to me and said, "All right, General, 50-50." I said, "Fine." He took all the money and he put it in his pocket. I said, "Where's the 50-50?" He said, "Oh, you had the 50 percent of the pleasure of playing and having the applause for your harmonica play-

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***"The Soviets are basically secretive, basically repetitive, basically patient, basically uncompromising. They do study us much more than we study them."***

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— Edward Rowny

ing, I'll have the 50 percent of the pleasure of spending the money."

Well, these are just a few little examples, they are perhaps overdrawn, extreme. The Soviets are much easier with us now after long periods of time. But still they're basically secretive, basically repetitive, basically patient, basically uncompromising. They do study us much more than we study them.

Don't be taken in by simplistic reasons or pie-in-the-sky formulas of how you're going to get an agreement. Two examples which we hear a lot of talk about today: one is the freeze.

Now the freeze has a lot of appeal. My mother called me in Geneva and said, "This is great! I didn't bring up my son to be a war-monger. Don't we have enough? Let's freeze!" I said, "Mom, if we agree to freeze while these imbalances exist there's no incentive for the Soviets to negotiate." They simply won't come to the table. It wasn't until the president announced in response to NATO's request that we put ground launched Cruise missiles and Pershing IIs into Europe to balance the large growth of SS-20s, that the Soviets agreed to come to the negotiating table. I want to negotiate on reductions, I want to spend all my time and energy moving right to the heart of the problem. Stopping to negotiate a freeze in these conditions is going to be diverting in time, we're going to have to spend months or perhaps years to negotiate the verifiability of a freeze, and I'm not even sure the Soviets will join me at the table once they find that they have frozen things at their present situation.

Another policy is the "no first use." Again, it has a lot of appeal until you think it through. But the Soviets have this tremendous conventional asymmetry in Europe. We should have a no first use of *any* weapons. Now that's our policy. Because even if you began in a conventional way, this could escalate to some nuclear threshold, or some nuclear use, and if you didn't have the nuclear weapons there'd be no incentive for the Soviets to stop and not move forward in a conventional way. ■

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EDWARD ROWNY is the chief U.S. arms-control negotiator at the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in Geneva, Switzerland.

The following segment was excerpted  
from the MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour  
aired December 8, 1983.  
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## The MacNeil/Lehrer NEWS HOUR

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**MacNEIL:** Two weeks after they walked out of the Euromissile talks, the Soviets today terminated their talks with the U.S. on long-range strategic missiles, but Washington did not consider this another walkout. The START, or strategic arms reduction talks, have been going on for 17 months in Geneva, and were due to recess today anyway for a holiday break. But the two sides met for only 35 minutes at the Soviet Embassy, and a Soviet delegate read a statement saying his side needed to re-examine all the issues in light of the deployment of new American missiles in Europe. For that reason Victor Karpov, the Soviet negotiator, said they were not setting a date for resumption. But the U.S. negotiator, Edward Rowny, did not see the Soviet move as an abandonment of the talks.

**Amb. EDWARD ROWNY, U.S. START negotiator:** The United States, for its part, is fully prepared to continue the regular pattern of the START negotiations. We have proposed to resume Round 6 in early February, and we hope that the USSR will soon agree on a date for resuming these negotiations which are in the interest of both our

nations and of the entire world.

**MacNEIL:** President Reagan was asked about the breakoff of the START talks as he left the White House to fly to Indianapolis to make a speech. The President appeared to be putting an optimistic face on the situation, saying he didn't believe the Soviets were walking out for good.

**Pres. RONALD REAGAN:** They're pretty careful about their choice of words, and all they said in this one was that they were not prepared at this time to set a date for when they would come back. This was a regular adjournment that was scheduled to take place, and the Soviet Union, in departing, simply said that they were not prepared at this time to set a date for resumption of meetings. But I thought also that it might be a pretty good time to state our own position on this and why we are going to continue attempting these negotiations. It was just 30 years ago today, on December 8th, 1953, that President Dwight Eisenhower made a speech on this very subject of nuclear weapons, and in that speech he said, "To the making of these fateful decisions, the United States pledges before you its determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma, to devote its entire heart, mind, to find a way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life." And this administration endorses this view completely, and this is what we are dedicated to.

**LEHRER:** There have been two sets of nuclear arms talks going on in Geneva, of course, and it's the other one, on medium-range missiles in Europe, that has caused the most rhetorical fireworks. They're called the INF talks, for intermediate nuclear forces, and they've been underway for two years, the point of the exercise being agreement on some balance of nuclear weapons arrayed in Europe by the U.S. and NATO on one side, the Soviets on the other. The U.S. negotiator, Paul Nitze and the Soviet negotiator, Yuli Kvitsinsky have spent hours talking, both formally across tables and informally on walks through Swiss woods and parks. But there was no breakthrough, and two weeks ago, when the new U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles began arriving in Western Europe, there was a breakoff. Kvitsinsky took a walk, and Soviet officials in Moscow and elsewhere says he isn't coming back until the new U.S. missiles are removed. Ambassador Nitze went from Geneva and why. He's now back in the United States to do the same, and he's with us tonight. Mr. Ambassador, welcome.

**PAUL NITZE:** It's good to be here.

**LEHRER:** Do you agree with what Ambassador Rowny and the President said about the significance of today's action in Geneva on the START talks — nothing to get that worked up about?

**Amb. NITZE:** I do agree with exactly what they said, and that was, the Soviets put is as merely not setting a date for resumption, which implies that one can later set a date for resumption.

**LEHRER:** All right, let's talk about the talks you've been involved in, the INF talks. How would you characterize the progress that you all had made there up to the time that the Soviets did in fact walk out?

**Amb. NITZE:** When we entered the last round of these negotiations three months ago, there were four basic issues. The first was, what would happen to this SS-20, the main missile system in this class, that the Soviets had been deploying in recent years. And what would happen on our side to the Pershing II missiles and the ground-launched cruise missiles, which NATO had decided back in '79 should be deployed as a counter to the Soviets' deployments in the event it was not possible to arrive at a mutually satisfactory agreement limiting both the weapons on both sides. Now, that was the central issue that we thought existed between the two sides. The Soviet position was that they should have a large number of SS-20s, should maintain a large number of SS-20s in Europe and have no constraints on their deployments in what they call the Asian portion of the USSR. They further maintained that there should be no U.S. deployments of any kind. In other words, in Europe, that there should be approximately 140 SS-20s on their side and none for the U.S.

**LEHRER:** No Pershing IIs, no cruise?

**Amb. NITZE:** No Pershing IIs and no cruise, and further than that, that there should be radical constraints on nuclear-capable aircraft in Europe, of which they have 6,300 and NATO has 800. All our planes are dual-capable, and therefore, to radically constrain them would have undermined the conventional defenses, or the contribution that the U.S. can make to the conventional defense of Europe, as a byproduct of this kind of an agreement.

**LEHRER:** All right. So that's where you started in this last round. Now, where did you end two weeks ago?

**Amb. NITZE:** Well, let me begin with the last part of it first, and that is the radical controls on aircraft. Up to the last month, last three months, the U.S. position has remained constant, that we thought it was wrong to try to control these dual-capable aircraft in this kind of a negotiation, and that we just complicate the thing, and it wasn't necessary. These negotiations had arisen because they had deployed the SS-20s, and NATO had decided it must, in the absence an agreement, to counter those. Yet, in order to progress on this, the President, on September 22nd, said that we would consider— we would be willing to have controls on specific types of longer-range aircraft, nuclear-capable aircraft, provided the Soviets would agree to that. So that this was a concession made by the President in order to advance the negotiations. On October 27th, Mr. Andropov came forward with a somewhat similar proposal, not quite the same with respect to aircraft, so that by the end of this round it had looked as though the question of aircraft would no longer be a bar to an agreement. With respect to the next to last, the third issue, with respect to geographic constraints, the scope of the negotiations, where the Soviets claimed they should be limited to Europe and we thought they should cover all systems with given capability.

**LEHRER:** Including the ones in the Asian section?

**Amb. NITZE:** Including the ones in the Asian section. There, on September 27th, President Reagan offered a way forward to working out a negotiable compromise on that issue, that we would be prepared to work out with the Soviet side a specific limit on the number of systems that we would deploy in Europe within a global total, which in effect resulted in separate totals in Europe and separate totals in the Far East. On October 27th, Mr. Andropov came forward also with a move designed to make this issue negotiable, and that was that they would halt further deployments in the Asian portion of the Soviet Union when a treaty dealing with European systems entered into the force, and at least this was a move on their side to make that issue negotiable. We never got as close to a solution on that issue as we did on the aircraft issue, and it was my view that had the negotiations continued we would have been able to work out that third issue. Now that left the second issue, which was the Soviet justification for a one-sided result on the first issue. In other words—

**LEHRER:** SS-20s versus the Pershing IIs and cruise?

**Amb. NITZE:** Yes. In other words, in order to have a justification for their demand for around 140 SS-20s in Europe and an equal number, roughly, in the Far East, they claimed they needed compensation for British and French SLBM systems, which are identical with our SLBMs, our submarine-based missiles, and the Russian submarine-based missiles. They really are exactly identical in their characteristics with these Soviet and U.S. systems, which are the subject of START negotiations. They shouldn't be in these discussions about intermediate-range systems, or, as the Russians call them, medium-range systems, at all. They're not medium-range or intermediate-range systems. But this was the— this was a rationale for an unequal outcome in the field of the SS-20s versus the Pershing IIs and GLCM. But on October 26th, Ambassador Kvitsinsky came to me at a dinner party at our house, at our apartment, and he said, "Why don't you look into the idea of equal reductions on both sides?" and I said, "Well, we've been over this once before, and you told me there was nothing in this that was of interest to your people in Moscow." He said, "But this is a little different. This would result in a reduction on our side to 120 rather than the 140," which Mr. Andropov was proposing on the same day. And it would also eliminate, at least for the time being, the problem of compensation for the British and French because the rationale, the justification, would be equal reductions on both sides, and not compensation for the British and French. And that would be a great advance. So it looked as though this second issue of compensation for British and French forces would— could be eliminated and a different rationale substituted. And that left only the issue of what balance should there be between

Soviet deployments of SS-20s on the Soviet side, and our Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles on the U.S. side. And it was just as we'd gotten the negotiations to a point where we'd reduced the difference between us to one single issue, basically, not that we weren't wholly agreed on the other issues, and we were close enough to agreement so that you could see that one could weave through those if one could lick the central issue.

**LEHRER:** And you think if they hadn't left you could have made it?

**Amb. NITZE:** If they'd been willing to stay on and continued to negotiate I think that the chances were very real that we could have moved toward a mutually acceptable agreement. At that point they walked out.

**LEHRER:** Robin?

**MacNEIL:** So that the breakup of the talks really had nothing to do with progress or lack of progress you were making — it was the decision in Moscow, based on the deployment of the first missiles in Europe?

**Amb. NITZE:** The Soviet position basically was that they would not— they did not wish to sanction, as they called it — bless — any U.S. deployments in Europe. And the reason for that, as Kvitsinsky explained it to me, was that their friends and associates in Europe had been demanding that there be no U.S. deployments in Europe, and for them to enter into an agreement, which would have permitted even the deployment of a single U.S. missile, would be to bless that deployment and to undercut their friends and associates in Western Europe.

**MacNEIL:** Now, Mr. Ambassador, the Western governments, particularly the United States, have expressed many times confidence that the Soviets will come back. The Soviets said last week at the press conference, the press conference of three top officials, that that was wishful thinking, that it was fantasy to think so. What is the feeling in your own gut about whether they're going to come back to these talks?

**Amb. NITZE:** Well, if you look back at what has happened over the last year, it was last fall, more than a year ago, that they began to say that in the absence of an agreement which would provide for no U.S. deployments in Europe and which would provide for large Soviet deployments, then they would break off the talks. They would break off the talks as soon as delivery of U.S. missiles was sanctioned by the NATO governments and actually took place. So that they've been making this threat that they would walk out of the talks if the NATO parliaments supported deployment and the U.S. government went forward with deployment. Having made those threats over a period of a year, they were really— would have been in an embarrassing position if they hadn't done something. You can't be in the business of bringing pressure, which the Soviet government often does, on countries by threatening to take this action or that action unless the other nations follow their will— you know, you can't be in that business and then back away from this sort of a thing as though nothing had happened. At least you can't do it often.

**MacNEIL:** Well, you're saying that the Soviets have done what they said they would do. Now, are they going to continue doing that and not return to the talks until the U.S. removes the missiles or agrees to reverse the situation?

**Amb. NITZE:** It's very hard to predict exactly what the Soviets will do. In 1979, when the NATO countries together took the decision to ask the United States to deploy these weapon systems in Europe. At that time, Mr. Brezhnev said that, "If the NATO countries make this decision, why then we will not agree to any negotiations. We refuse to negotiate if you've made that decision." Well, within six months they said, "Well, we've rethought the problem, and we will negotiate." So that it is possible for the Soviet Union, and they often do reconsider, after the factual situation has changed, and do what they've said they wouldn't do. But they're not apt to do it right away. I really think it would take some time before they will come back.

**MacNEIL:** You've just toured the European countries after the breakdown of the talks. Do you think the Soviets have yet given up their campaign to undermine — their campaign with European public opinion — to undermine the NATO decision? Do you think they've given up that attempt yet?

**Amb. NITZE:** Certainly not. The whole basis of their decision to walk out— I think they

made the decision to walk out in the absence of an agreement which would be zero for us and a large number for them. I think they made that decision some 16 months ago. Their behavior in the entire period since that time has been consistent with their having made such a decision and then having— then devoting themselves to putting the blame on the United States, or trying to put the blame on the United States for the failure of the talks.

**MacNEIL:** The NATO foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels today considered and rejected a slow-down in the deployment of the missiles, stretching it out further, slowing down. They rejected that. Do you think that that rejection, when it sinks in, is what's going to bring the Soviets back to the table ultimately? Do you have confidence in that?

**Amb. NITZE:** Well, I was pleasantly surprised when I went around to see the various NATO governments after the breakdown of the talks, or the Soviets' unilateral withdrawal from the talks. As to the unanimity of opinion that the deployment schedule should continue unchanged, I think they feel that it would be a mistake under these circumstances to change the deployment schedule at this time.

**MacNEIL:** And even among those NATO countries whose parliaments have not yet finally ratified the deployment? I'm thinking of the Dutch and the Danes, I believe, who have not yet finally come to the decision to go the next step?

**Amb. NITZE:** No, I think the Danes are not amongst the countries on whose territory any of these missiles were ever planned for deployment.

**MacNEIL:** I'm sorry, that's my mistake.

**Amb. NITZE:** And they have been quite uniform in their opinion since then that they would not want to see any— they don't want to see NATO deployments at all. They've had this position for a long period of time.

**MacNEIL:** But the Dutch have not yet confirmed deployment, is that not true?

**Amb. NITZE:** That is true. I think the— well, they have a complicated political situation and they have not yet confirmed it.

**MacNEIL:** But is it your hunch, on the knowledge you've gained of dealing with the Russians, is it your hunch that it is the determination of NATO to go ahead with deployment and no pause that is going to bring the Russians back to the table?

**Amb. NITZE:** Well, there's another factor, obviously, and that is, what is the state of public opinion in all these countries, because after all, the NATO governments are all democratic governments, they are responsive to public opinion in their countries. I think the extraordinary thing is that even though many, if not most, NATO people would prefer not to have nuclear weapons on their territory, which is similar to the view of most Americans — they would prefer not to have nuclear weapons. Still, the NATO people elect governments that they have confidence will look out for their security in a serious way. So that even though many of the Germans would prefer not to have NATO have nuclear weapons on their territory, still they elect the Kohl government which they knew was committed to support of this NATO decision.

**MacNEIL:** You say—

**Amb. NITZE:** The same is true in Italy. After all, Mr. Craxi has taken as strong a position here, and Mr. Craxi is a Socialist, a new leader of the government in Italy, when he's taken as firm a position as any of the other governments.

**MacNEIL:** Well, Mr. Ambassador, you say European public opinion is another factor to consider. Can NATO governments and the United States relax and not worry that Western European public opinion may erode as the months go by and these talks don't resume and more missiles come in?

**Amb. NITZE:** No one can ever relax in this business. One must always take seriously what is going on and do the intelligent thing from time to time, the things that will in fact strengthen the alliance and will make deterrence adequately solid, which will preserve both the security of the countries involved in the alliance and at the same time will avoid a nuclear war as best we possibly can.

**MacNEIL:** So are you recommending that the United States now just sit tight and make no different gesture, no further modification of position in public or anything? What— is that what you're recommending? That we just let the work of the deployment of the missiles have its effect on the Kremlin?

**Amb. NITZE:** That's not correct. I think we ought to examine all the options that are available. What I am saying is I think it would be unwise to make concessions to the Soviet Union which spring from their unilaterally having torpedoed these negotiations which were making progress. After all, we sat still there and negotiated for two years while they were deploying SS-20s at the rate of one a week. Now, here we begin small counterdeployments to those SS-20s which have reached larger numbers. And the moment we deploy the first one, before they've become even operational, the Soviets torpedo the negotiations and walk out. Now, that— you can't reward them for that by unilateral concessions, at least we shouldn't.

**MacNEIL:** Your walk in the woods and then later in the park with Mr. Kvitsinsky have become quite celebrated. As you sit here this evening are you confident that you're going to be taking another stroll with Mr. Kvitsinsky some time in the next year or so?

**Amb. NITZE:** I'm not confident about anything in the future, but the important thing is, what is it one tries to do? I think we should try to get the negotiations going again, but on a sound basis and not on the basis of unilateral concessions on the part of the West.

**MacNEIL:** Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for joining us. Jim?

*The following is quoted from "REFLECTIONS (NUCLEAR WEAPONS—PART II)", by Freeman Dyson.*

*(The New Yorker, February 13, 1984, p. 78)*

"There are many ways in which one may try to discourage nuclear proliferation. One way is to negotiate non-proliferation treaties. Another way is to establish nuclear-free zones. Another way is to place embargoes on the export of nuclear apparatus to countries that are unwilling to submit their nuclear activities to international inspection. Another way is to organize political opposition to commercial nuclear power stations. Another way is to demolish, by air attack or sabotage, facilities that are believed to be incipient nuclear-weapons projects. All these ways have been tried, and all have been partly successful. But all have the disadvantage of treating symptoms rather than the underlying disease. The only way to cure the underlying disease is to extinguish the desire for nuclear weapons. To extinguish the desire, it is necessary to convince political leaders that the possession of nuclear weapons brings trouble and danger rather than strength and safety."

## SUNDAY FORUM GUEST WRITER

## Why not a Year of Bible?

By Rev. Tony Perrino

Last fall, when the Santa Barbara City Council considered a resolution proclaiming 1983 "The Year of the Bible," I had the dubious distinction of being the only clergyperson to speak against the motion.

I spoke against the resolution, first, and most obviously, because such an action by a governmental body — violates the principle of separation of Church and State.

As Norman Cousins pointed out in a book entitled "In God We Trust," many people came to this land to escape the oppressive atmosphere of European nations — where Church and State were identified: where there was an "established religion" and persecution of those who did not adhere to it.

Then "the Founding Fathers" observed a paradox: these same people promptly "established" their faiths in the various colonies, and practiced similar oppression against those who did not conform to it.

And so, when the U.S. Constitution was written, it specifically stated that "Congress shall make no law regarding the establishment of religion . . ." thereby erecting what Thomas Jefferson described as "a wall of separation between Church and State."

**Jefferson's summary**

Jefferson summarized the concern of our nation's founders when he wrote: "There is sufficient historical evidence to prove that the partnership of Church and State has always led, and perforce must lead, to tyranny and oppression!"

Now, of course, the City Council (and other advocates of "The Year of the Bible" resolution) argued that it does not violate the "establishment clause." But I would point out that the Supreme Court (the *Everson* case in 1947) has interpreted that First Amendment statement to mean that:

"Neither a State or the Federal government can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another . . ."

There is no doubt in my mind that the "Year of the Bible" resolution, innocuous as it may sound, contributes toward an "establishment" of Christianity as the officially recognized re-

Mr. Perrino is minister of the Unitarian Church of Santa Barbara. The Sunday Forum welcomes a response to this provocative article.

ligion of our nation. The Bible (which was tacitly endorsed by the Council's action) does, after all, say among other things, that only those who believe in Jesus Christ as Lord — will be saved! And, as James Madison once warned, ". . . the same authority which can 'establish' Christianity . . . may establish a particular sect of Christianity in exclusion of all other sects."

The resolution passed by the City Council seeks justification with the statement, "Whereas most of the religious organizations in the United States are part of the Year of the Bible movement . . ."

Well; I would remind our City "elders" that the greatness of democracy does not lie in its rule by the majority — but its respect for the minority. Religious freedom is what they should be striving to strengthen — rather than pandering to popular opinion.

**Reading intelligently**

The second reason I am opposed to the resolution which urges citizens "to re-examine (the Bible's) timeless message" — is that it is impossible for the average person to read the Bible intelligently and profitably — without a great deal of background knowledge; and — to read it any other way — is downright dangerous! (as the Holy Wars of history have demonstrated.)

To begin with the 66 books of the Bible are not printed in chronological order, and you can't begin to understand their "messages" unless you know the historical context of the writing.

Perhaps the best illustration of that fact is the story of Cain and Abel, which is contained in the Book of Genesis but which was actually written centuries later, after the Israelites conquered, and settled in, the land of Canaan. In the story Cain's "sacrifice" of grain was not pleasing to God, but Abel's "offering" of a lamb was. So Cain, in a fit of jealousy, killed his brother.

Now, the "message" intended by the

writer was that when the Israelites were a nomadic, sheepherding people (represented by the lamb), they were faithful to their God. But, when they settled in Canaan and became an agrarian (and relatively secure) culture, they abandoned Jahweh — who was displeased with their faithlessness. Cain's sacrifice of grain simply symbolized that betrayal. But how could you begin to understand that without knowing the historical context?

Furthermore, as the Biblical scholar Rolland Wolfe suggests, the Bible does not contain one "timeless message" but "is a book of many religions." Wolfe lists nine of them! — beginning with the primitive polytheism of the earliest narratives — in which their god is depicted as a jealous, vengeful deity — who would, for example, send wild bears to devour some children who had made fun of his prophet, Elisha. (They had called him a "bald-head"! ) This Jahweh was clearly a savage deity — interminably urging his "chosen people" to acts of genocide!

**A benign faith**

Then came the patriarchal religion of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, a relatively benign faith, followed by the religion of Moses — which borrowed heavily from Egyptian writings (specifically, the famous Ten Commandments were a distillation of the 42 commandments contained in the Egyptian "Book of the Dead"). The fact that they (including "Thou Shalt Not Kill") were meant to be a tribal code of ethics, rather than universal law, is reflected in Moses' fury when Midianite children were spared in battle: "Kill every male among the little ones," he roared!

The Bibles' fourth religion, according to Wolfe, was the ethical faith of the 8th century prophets, beginning with Amos (and it contains some of the noblest utterances in human literature).

In 620 BC, ritualistic Judaism was originated by Jeremiah, and then came the humanistic wisdom religion of the last three centuries of the pre-Christian period (which includes the "Book of Esther" and "Song of Songs", and is

so secular that God is not even mentioned!)

The seventh religion of the Bible is that of Jesus, which is wholly non-ritualistic, emphasizing ethical and spiritual concerns. But that was followed by the religion of Paul — which deified Jesus, substituted dogmatic belief for ethical concern, and became the foundation of modern-day "Christianity." (Emphasizing Paul's teachings about Jesus.)

The final religion of the Bible is the bizarre faith of The Book of Revelation which transforms Jesus into a militaristic hero and conqueror of the world, with his tongue elongated into a two-edged sword with which to cut off the heads of his enemies!

All of which is simply to point out that there is no one "timeless message" to be found in the Bible — but a plethora of religious beliefs: some of which are lofty and edifying — while others are savagely brutal and conducive only to depravity!

Anyone who undertakes to read "The Good Book" should be made aware of that fact — and encouraged to do what Thomas Jefferson did: cut out, and paste together the nobler expressions of religious feeling. But I don't think that's what the proponents of "The Year of the Bible" had in mind.

The third reason for my opposing the resolution springs from its praising the role of the Bible "in shaping the values of our community." I would suggest that some of the values, contributed to our culture by the Bible, are not so praiseworthy:

The most obvious, perhaps, is its condoning of slavery, which for many years in America was used by those "religious" people who would exploit their fellow human beings for profit.

But more subtly pervasive, I think is the patriarchal character of Biblical writings (with its hierarchical, authoritarian mind set). It is blatantly exhibited in passages which would subordi-

nate women from the Genesis command that "thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee . . ." to Paul's declaration that women should be subject to their husbands in all things. Centuries of denial of woman's legal, economic, and human rights have followed from that Biblical attitude "shaping our values."

Even more subtle is the fact that all the concomitant manifestations of patriarchal thinking have determined the basic character of our culture. It is useful, I think, to consider this in the context of the "Yin/Yang" concept of Taoism. It suggests that there must be a balance between the "masculine" and "feminine" characteristics if wholeness and health are to prevail. (In individuals, as well as society.)

Some of the "masculine" traits obviously emphasized in our society are being: competitive, rational, analytical and aggressive. Is there any question that these are the capacities most valued by and rewarded in our culture? Ancient Chinese wisdom says: none of them is intrinsically bad; but by isolating them from their counter-balancing opposites (investing them with moral virtue and exaggerated power) — we have created an unhealthy society.

#### What is needed:

We are, as the City Council resolution states, "facing great challenges which can best be met through a strengthening of our spiritual resources," but what is needed to accomplish that aim — is not a re-emphasis of the biblical, patriarchal values — but an appreciation of their opposites: a capacity for cooperation — rather than competition, intuition as well as rationality, synthesizing as well as analyzing, and sensitive responsiveness to curb the over-aggressiveness which threatens to turn our planet into a wasteland.

In psychiatric circles there is a test of imbecility — which places the subject before a tub being filled with water. The person is asked to stop it

from overflowing. If he begins to bail out the water instead of turning off the faucet, he's judged sub-normal in intelligence.

Well, when I look about me — at the world scene — where our natural resources are being destroyed and nations are behaving like football fans: shouting that their "team" is "number one," I think of those who advocate further cultivation of such "machismo" values — aren't very bright (or, at least, haven't thought the matter through).

What our society (indeed our world) most urgently needs right now is the corrective which would be afforded by a feminization of its consciousness. And I don't think that will be achieved by declaring "A Year of the Bible"!

These — are my reasons for speaking against the City Council resolution.

# "Food Vulnerability Briefing" or Why I'd Rather Be a Chicken

By Dave Lehman

The Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA, has added a corollary to Deputy Undersecretary of Defense T.K. Jones' famous statement that all we need to survive a nuclear attack is enough shovels. FEMA now tells us that the U.S. agricultural system will be able to feed the survivors of a full-scale nuclear attack, if only there are enough tin cans to go around. This is just one of the astounding revelations contained in a 1982 FEMA White House "Food Vulnerability Briefing" for Cabinet members and the National Security Council recently released to the press by SANE board member, Rep. Tom Harkin (D-IA).

For the purpose of its report, FEMA estimates the effects of a massive nuclear attack, totalling 6000 megatons and 1200 warheads, on U.S. agriculture. The bad news is that only 46% of the U.S. population would survive the attack. The good news is that survival rates among sheep, chickens, and steers would be significantly higher, leading to a better livestock-to-population balance than pre-attack. Similarly, crops are expected to fare relatively well, depending on the time of year of the attack. An attack on June 1st would have a worse effect than an attack in August. "Attacks during the non-growing season," according to FEMA, "would not be expected to affect future yields directly."

Almost 80% of the rural population would survive a 6000 megaton nuclear attack, FEMA estimates, so no farm labor shortage should be expected, although FEMA admits there is a risk of radiation exposure. The report continues that "the dependence on 'guest workers' for fruit and vegetable harvesting is not expected to be an additional problem following a nuclear attack. These workers should survive at least as well as the U.S. rural population, and the Department of Labor sees no reason why they would not continue to participate in U.S. harvests." There would, of course, also be new "urban migrants" to help harvest crops.

The ability of the agricultural system to feed the surviving population would actually increase over time, the FEMA report notes, because, "the numbers of survivors during the first sixty days following an attack drops over time. Thus, those who are doomed to die will be consumers for [only] part of that time."

FEMA admits that the ability of U.S. agriculture to feed the survivors will only be possible as long as there is no emergency population relocation, which is the current cornerstone of FEMA efforts. "Ironically, the relatively favorable balance between population and livestock and poultry survival rates expected under current Civil Defense capabilities could disappear under an effective crisis relocation effort."

The bright picture FEMA paints is somewhat clouded by its findings on food processing and distribution following a massive nuclear attack. FEMA warns that U.S. agriculture can expect short-term shortages of fertilizer, diesel fuel, and energy for irrigation. Worse yet, food containers would be in short supply. FEMA warns, "Frankly, the post nuclear attack picture is not so bright in food processing. The margin of safety in the ratio of potentially surviving processing capabilities to surviving population is razor thin when compared to that of agriculture production. In addition, the

availability of containers could be a serious problem for surviving food processors." Hopefully, food containers could be somewhat modified and simplified, but, "potential labor casualties [in the food processing industry] could be a significant problem."

January in June?



Photo by Ray Pinkson

Carl Sagan

The FEMA report stands in stark contrast to a recent study released by five leading scientists on the atmospheric and climatic effects of a nuclear war. The study, known as the TTAPS Report after its authors, R.P. Turco, O.B. Toon, T.P. Ackerman, J.B. Pollack and Carl Sagan, makes the FEMA report appear not only ludicrous, but certifiably insane. The TTAPS Report warns that even a "small" nuclear war could trigger a "nuclear winter," an epoch of cold and darkness and intense radiation that would put into question the survival of the human species. The scientists based their projections on the atmospheric and climatic effects of a 5000-megaton war, using recent findings about the earth's thin layer of atmosphere. (Keep in mind that the FEMA report presupposed a 6000 megaton attack on the U.S. alone.) The scientists found that the great clouds of smoke and dust generated by such a war would reduce the amount of sunlight penetrating the earth's atmosphere to a fraction. The heavy toxic overcast would last for months, perhaps longer, making photosynthesis, and thereby all plant growth, impossible. Land temperatures would drop to 13 degrees below zero. Carl Sagan predicts that "because the temperatures would drop so catastrophically, virtually all crops and farm animals, at least in the Northern Hemisphere, would be destroyed, as would most varieties of uncultivated or undomesticated food supplies. Most human survivors would starve." Compare this to FEMA's projection that 82% of all wheat and 83% of all corn could be harvested in the U.S. following a nuclear attack. Or that 57% of all beef cattle would be available for consumption.

FEMA chides the "choruses of Cassandras" that predict "doom and gloom" for U.S. agriculture. But Sagan warns that there is a dangerous tendency to underestimate the results of nuclear explosions among scientists and policy makers. The climatic effects of nuclear war have only recently been considered. "What else have we overlooked?" Sagan asks.

Rep. Harkin called the FEMA briefing for the Presidential Cabinet "disgraceful," and added that, "with information like this, it is no wonder that there are those in our government who believe that we can win a nuclear war."

Dave Lehman is a SANE staff member in the Publications Department.

Ellen Goodman

## A New Act in the Nuclear Follies

YES indeed, ladies and gentlemen, just when the script was getting stale, we are offered a new act in the National Nuclear Follies. A hearty welcome, please, for "FEMA and The Farmers".

When last heard from, you may recall, FEMA (the Federal Emergency Management Agency) was hoofing it up on center stage with plans for evacuating our cities. In case of nuclear war, their theme song was: Pack up your troubles in your old family buggy and drive, drive, drive. Each urban dweller was assigned a rural destination, and a welcome wagon.

Alas, their act played second banana to the hit charade of T. K. Jones and His Magic Shovels. The undersecretary of defense made it into the Nuclear Follies' big time with his upbeat view on survival: "Dig a hole, cover it with a few doors and then throw three feet of dirt on top." It was Jones who told us that we'd all make it if there were enough shovels to go around.

Well, fans, FEMA is back. They've taken on the farmers and they're talking food. They have assessed the post-nuke food situation and are here to tell us that the survivors are all gonna make it if there are enough cans to go around.

FEMA produced its new script as a briefing paper for the Cabinet last year. It was going to be a private showing, but Rep. Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) put it into our national repertoire. Once again, the theme is upbeat: A large-scale nuclear war wouldn't devastate American agriculture.

For one thing, they assure us that livestock might fare better than people in the aftermath. Sure, the crops would suffer, but the amount of damage is hard to predict since young crops suffer more from radiation than more mature crops. With any luck the nuclear war would take place in August rather than June. Summer stock time, as you know.

But FEMA's basic scenario is that, "The land and the work force would be available under even the greatest calamity — nuclear attack . . . Sufficient production seems assured to meet survivor needs."

In part, the planners are counting on the availability of migrant labor. There would be plenty of urban migrants hanging around to help with the harvest, they say. No more help problems, no more illegals. Everyone will pitch in with the picking.

They are also counting on diminished appetites. The pressure to feed the survivors will disappear pretty

quickly, along with the survivors. Following an attack which would eliminate half the population, FEMA notes, "those who are doomed to die will be consumers for (only) part of that time." No problem.

But back to the cans. The authors do admit there will be a problem with food processing, and distribution: "Frankly the post-nuclear attack picture is not so bright in processing." What we seem to be missing is a plan for more containers.

Now I don't know about the rest of the civil defense audience out there, but I have a feeling that these people could have cribbed their script from "The Day After". The best scene in the film was the wonderful meeting between the bureaucrat and the farmers.

The bureaucrat, speaking from instructions probably produced by FEMA fantasists, tells the farmers to go out into the fields and scrape up the fallout and the contaminated top soil. This is a little like skimming a ten-mile oil slick off the ocean with a teaspoon. Only this time, we're talking dead dirt.

Frankly, I hate to pan such a sincere troupe. Lord knows, they win points for imagination. More to the

point, FEMA and the farmers were just doing their job of post-nuke planning. In an era when we name a nuclear missile "The Peacekeeper" and talk freely about first-strike scenarios, FEMA is just a doo-wop chorus for a headliner like Edward Teller.

But I keep remembering the words of Robert Jay Lifton, the Yale professor of psychiatry who has written about the "logic of madness" in our nuclear thinking: "Civil defense is part of the fundamental illusions about a nuclear war: The illusion of surviving. The illusion of recovery. It's massive denial."

Lifton's point of view is that of a nuclear theater critic. "In itself (civil defense) seems like a natural and appropriate thing to do. But it increases the possibility of nuclear war by making it more acceptable. That's why it's immoral."

In fairness, the FEMA predictions may be accurate. If Carl Sagan's group of scientists is right, ten percent of the nuclear arsenal can create an ultimate Nuclear Winter. In that case, there would indeed be enough food for the number of people: none.

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