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from time to time calls attention to published material that might contribute toward clarification or understanding of issues affecting world peace. The accompanying reprints constitute Mailing No. 55.

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Post Office Box 5012
Santa Barbara, CA. 93108

December 15, 1983

An instruction comes from India, in Science for Villages of February 1983, concerning the disturbance of nature's balances by today's technology. The writer, Devendra Kumar, points out the danger inherent in speeding up processes beyond natural tolerances. In comparing conditions at the time the earth was young, when vegetation grew at a great rate, absorbing the carbon dioxide from the air and storing it as carbon in plants (where later it became coal and oil) with conditions now when the burning of fossil fuel in larger and larger quantities is bringing more and more carbon dioxide into the air, he warns that there is danger that the unabsorbed carbon dioxide will cause the earth to heat up to self-destructive levels. He says:

"The bullock cart with its slow motion is not bothered by the high quantum of friction between its axle and the wheels since, at six kilometers an hour, this friction is within the limits of tolerance and does not produce any heat. But if the same cart were made to run at ten times its normal speed, its axle and wheels would burn themselves out. The friction inherent in a system has therefore to be kept in inverse proportion to its speed. Hence, if technology runs faster and faster, without at the same time bringing down the frictional levels of the environment in which it acts, tensions develop beyond the level of tolerance, creating chaos and crisis."

—Quoted from MANAS of September 7, 1983

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The Publishers

MANAS PUBLISHING COMPANY
P.O. Box 32112, El Sereno Station, Los Angeles, Calif. 90032

[Reprinted with permission of WETA, Mr. Drew Moseley]

THIRTEEN

May 17, 1983
Transcript #1992

WNET/Thirteen: 356 West 58th Street, New York, N.Y. 10019
Transcripts: MacNeil-Lehrer Report, Box 345, New York, N.Y. 10101
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THE MACNEIL-LEHRER REPORT

Geneva Talks

In New York

ROBERT MacNEIL ..... Executive Editor
DIMITRI SIMES ..... Carnegie Endowment
ROBERT DEAN ..... State Department

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Reporter ..... JUNE CROSS

Funding for this program has been provided by this station and other Public Television Stations and by grants from Exxon Corporation and American Telephone & Telegraph Company and the Bell System Companies.

A co-production of WNET and WETA Show #8229

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Geneva Talks

[Tease]

ROBERT MacNEIL *[voice-over]*: U.S. and Soviet negotiators resume the Geneva talks on European nuclear weapons. How wide is the gap between them?

[Titles]

MacNEIL: Good evening. After a seven-week recess and plenty of public rhetoric, the United States and the Soviet Union sat down in Geneva today to resume their effort to limit nuclear weapons in Europe. There were smiles and handshakes between the two negotiators — Paul Nitze for the United States, and Uli Kvitsinsky for the Soviets — which belied the tough things they've been saying in the last few days: Nitze, that the Soviets were seeking to impose unacceptable conditions; Vitsinski that the United States was blocking progress by trying to impose unilateral disarmament on Moscow. The talks have been going on for 18 months with little progress, but now the negotiators have two new wrinkles to discuss. Initially, the United States demanded that Moscow remove all its medium-range missiles aimed at Western Europe. In return, the United States would not deploy the 572 new missiles planned for later this year in NATO countries. That was called the zero-zero approach. The President has modified that, calling for an interim solution, with both sides reducing to an equal number of missiles. The new Soviet wrinkle is an offer to count warheads, not missiles, a move President Reagan initially called encouraging. Tonight we explore the positions of the two sides and the distance between them. Two men well versed in the intricacies of arms control will represent the two sides. For the American position we have Robert Dean, deputy assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. We have asked Soviet expert Dimitri Simes to represent the Soviet side, realizing it's not his own personal point of view. Mr. Simes is now with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Starting with you, Mr. Dean, on the American position, with reference to this funny map we have here with all the symbols representing the various kinds of weaponry, what, as Washington sees it, is the position right now and what does the United States want?

ROBERT DEAN: Robin, in 1977 the Soviet Union began to deploy the nuclear mobile SS-20 missile. This is a three-warhead system, and now they deploy a warhead total of over 1,050. In 1979 the NATO alliance, as a consequence of this unprovoked Soviet effort, undertook a decision to deploy 572 American nuclear cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe as a counter-deployment. Failing—

MacNEIL: That?

Sec. DEAN: Like that *[adjusting map]*. Failing an arms control agreement which would stabilize the balance from the outset, and the negotiations began in November of 1981, we have sought an agreement with the Soviet Union based on balance and equality of U.S. and Soviet warheads. As you pointed out, it was our position from the outset to attempt to eliminate the entire class of missiles as a means of enhancing the security of both sides. The Soviets refused to negotiate on the basis of that proposal, and the President now, as a demonstration of flexibility, has said to the Soviets in effect that we are willing to accept a number above zero but at the lowest possible level.

MacNEIL: I see. Now, these missiles are not in here yet, but will go in in December?

Sec. DEAN: Deployments will begin in December.

MacNEIL: —will begin in December if there is no agreement.

Sec. DEAN: That's correct.

MacNEIL: All right. Mr. Simes, what is the present situation as you believe Moscow sees it, and what do they want?

DIMITRI SIMES: Uli Kvitsinsky, chief Soviet delegate, yesterday stated in Geneva that there were no positive changes in the American position, and both Yuri Andropov and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko already have denounced Mr. Reagan's interim proposal.

The Soviets have three principal objections. First, they think that the Americans want to do two things simultaneously — to put some U.S. missiles in Europe while asking the Soviets to dismantle some of their missiles. The Americans would be building; the Soviets would be dismantling. That action, they're saying, is unacceptable. Second complaint, the Soviets think that the Americans do not want to count French and British forces. "Who is going to be a potential target of these missiles?" the Soviets ask, "The Falkland Islands or the Soviet Union?" The answer, they say, is obvious. And thirdly, Mr. Reagan is talking about global equality which means that all Soviet missiles should be counted, not only those in Europe; not only those to the east of the Urals, but which have sufficient range to hit targets in Western Europe, but also those in the Far East, to the east of— by Lake Baical, close to Novosibirsk, which do not cover sufficient range to reach West European targets. Mr. Gromyko said that's totally unacceptable, doesn't make any sense. These missiles have nothing to do with European theater; this whole issue does not belong to negotiations.

MacNEIL: Right. Now, we're going to get into each of these areas specifically in a moment, but, Mr. Dean, in summary form, what does Washington think is wrong with the position the Soviets are taking?

Sec. DEAN: Our position is that security is to be found in a stable balance of comparable forces on both sides. The Soviets claim that a balance exists. I would point out that they claimed that in 1979, and they have claimed it through the years as we've been negotiating with them, although the warhead force has increased dramatically over that period. Our position then is that to stabilize the balance the Soviets will have to draw down forces, and in the event of a non-zero arms control agreement, the NATO alliance will have to deploy some forces.

MacNEIL: And what is wrong with the— well, I think you've just outlined what is wrong from Moscow's point of view with the American position — the three things you mentioned, that it does not include the British-French missiles; that it does not— that it does include the ones behind the Ural Mountains; and, even more negatively, it includes the ones in the Far East. Well, let's go into these in a bit more detail. Mr. Dean, why is it an unacceptable condition, as Paul Nitze told reporters today, for the Soviet Union to want to count the French nuclear force and the British nuclear force? Why is that unacceptable?

Sec. DEAN: Well, I think we have to go back to the question of balance. As I said, the Soviets claim that a balance exists of 1,000 systems at present on either side of comparable capability. In that reckoning they include the British and French systems — 162 missiles and approximately 90 aircraft. The fact of the matter is — and these figures are vouchsafed by the International Institute for Strategic Studies — that by any objective reckoning of aircraft— medium-ranged nuclear aircraft and missiles, the Soviets have approximately a three— a 3.5 to one advantage. That's the first reason. A balance does not exist. The second reason is that these are the sovereign independent forces of two nations on whose part we cannot negotiate. Thirdly, for the United States to accept the principle of equality as based upon the forces of third-party systems, would be to establish a situation in future under which, if British and French systems were to go up, American systems would have to come down. No American government will ever accede to that. I would point out also—

MacNEIL: You mean the American government is going to insist that there be equality between Soviet forces and American forces only?

Sec. DEAN: That's right. That's right. I would point out also that in SALT I and SALT II the Soviets pressed for inclusion of British and French forces, and later dropped that requirement and did accept the principle of U.S.-Soviet parity. And that is, of course, what we expect in this negotiation.

MacNEIL: Why does Moscow insist on including these sovereign British and French forces?

Mr. SIMES: Well, first of all, the Soviets obviously do not accept the balance as it is presented by the London Institute of Strategic Studies. They have their own calculations, and they suggest that there is parity. Secondly, they think it is wrong in principle to count Soviet missiles, which after all are targeted on Europe rather than the United States, and American missiles, which can hit Soviet targets. And they immediately remind the Americans how the United States reacted in 1962 when Soviet missiles were deployed in Cuba. As far as French and British systems are concerned, the Soviets are saying, first of all, these two countries are sovereign, but they are NATO members. Britain is a part of the NATO military structure. France is outside the structure, but under President Francois Mitterrand, is increasingly integrated in the NATO alliance. More importantly, as Bob just said, the French and the British are planning to proceed with a fairly major modernization, and the Soviets are saying, "Come on. You want us to make a commitment that we would not do anything in response to this modernization?"

MacNEIL: The modernization would involve increasing the number of warheads in the British and French forces.

Mr. SIMES: Tenfold.

MacNEIL: Tenfold? And the Soviets are saying what you just—

Mr. SIMES: The Soviets are saying that that is unacceptable, that these are missiles which are going to be used against the Soviet Union, and that they represent a problem and they have to be countered.

MacNEIL: What is the American answer to that?

Sec. DEAN: Well, this is a question. One can look at it two ways, either as a question of principle from the Soviet point of view, in which they insist on incorporating all third-party systems, and which in effect says that the Soviet forces have to be the equal of all of their potential nuclear adversaries; that is to say, greater than any one of them. And, as I pointed out, the United States simply cannot accept that in principle. Or we have to get down to a serious discussion of numbers and calculate a genuine authentic balance of comparable systems. Equality. Which is all the United States and the alliance is seeking in this negotiation.

MacNEIL: What would happen if the United States were to go to Britain and France and say, "Look, the only way we're going to get an agreement on these missiles, on these systems in Europe, is to include your systems. Now, let's work out a way in which we can include your systems." What would happen? Why would that not be possible?

Sec. DEAN: Both the British and French governments have pointed out that in the framework of an INF force draw-down—

MacNEIL: That's the intermediate nuclear—

Sec. DEAN: These are the systems they're talking about—

MacNEIL: The ones we're talking about here.

Sec. DEAN: —and within the framework of a START reduction — that is a reduction of strategic nuclear systems, on Soviet and American systems — they would reduce their forces accordingly. Now, the issue of the 162 British and French systems is really a red herring in these negotiations introduced by the Soviets—

MacNEIL: You think the Soviets have introduced it just to make difficulties and to make agreement difficult or impossible? Is that it? They're trying to block agreement with this issue?

Sec. DEAN: Well, I don't want to say they're trying to block agreement, but I'm saying that the effect of making this a pivotal issue in the negotiations in the end will be to block agreement.

MacNEIL: Is this just a tactical obstacle, or is this something the Soviets, you believe, sincerely believe is necessary to their security?

Mr. SIMES: I think the Soviets take it quite seriously, but I am sure that Bob is quite correct. There is an element of propaganda; there is an element of public posturing. After all, you are not just dealing with negotiations focusing on military numbers. We are talking about manifestation of NATO unity, and the Soviets of course want to decouple the United States from Western Europe. And this particular issue is very advantageous to them.

MacNEIL: Let's move on to the United States' insistence that the Soviet intermediate-range missiles here behind the Ural Mountains, as Mr. Simes pointed out, can reach Western Europe, but also the Soviet intermediate missiles that are in the Far East and can't reach Western Europe. Why is the United States insisting that those be included?

Sec. DEAN: Well, as your replicas correctly point out here, these are mobile systems. They

are designed to be transportable and to be moved around. And in fact they do move around. They move within many kilometers of their main operating bases on a training basis. The fact is that the Soviets have deployed these systems, many of them, along the Trans-Siberian rail line, and that in the event they move them behind the Ural Mountains, they could simply, in a matter of days, bring them up, transport them to within range of NATO. So it really makes no sense to limit them other than on a global basis.

MacNEIL: Is that the only reason, or is there some— is there some concern for American allies in South Korea and in Japan as well? Has that anything to do with these talks?

Sec. DEAN: Well, the President has said that we cannot accept a situation in which we purchase European security for Japanese insecurity. And we will not accept a situation in which the Soviet threat is transported from the West to the East against our Asian friends and allies.

MacNEIL: Now, how does Moscow view this?

Mr. SIMES: Well, Moscow says the following. First of all, it takes about a year to build sites for SS-20 missiles. You do not invest that much money just to move them somewhere else.

MacNEIL: You mean you can't just run them down the Trans-Siberian Railroad and start firing them immediately?

Mr. SIMES: Their transporters are about 52 tons each. It is not that easy. I think it was correct to say that they can be moved. But if you are talking about moving not five of them, it would not make great deal of difference militarily. If you are talking about moving all 108 of them or 50 of them, that would be detected immediately by—

MacNEIL: By U.S. satellite.

Mr. SIMES: By the United States and it would be essentially an early warning to the West that the Soviets are planning an attack. So from the Soviet point of view this argument about mobility is just not very serious.

MacNEIL: What's the U.S. answer to that? Wouldn't mobility of any size be so obvious to U.S. intelligence that it would be, as Mr. Simes says, an early warning?

Sec. DEAN: Well, I don't know how early it would be, but I think that would be a case of closing the door after— the barn door after the horse had disappeared. The fact is that NATO cannot jeopardize its security by signing on to an agreement which provides for the future mobility of these systems westward.

MacNEIL: So what is the United States asking the Soviets to do about those missiles?

Sec. DEAN: We are asking now for the reduction of these systems on a global basis, and the question of what— of how the systems in the East are handled is— will be a subject for negotiation.

MacNEIL: In other words, if the Soviets agreed to reduce the number, they couldn't just reduce the number here; they would have to take the whole total and reduce the whole total?

Sec. DEAN: That's exactly right.

MacNEIL: That's what you're saying.

Sec. DEAN: And as Foreign Minister Gromyko pointed out at the beginning of April, what the Soviets have in mind in any reductions plan is not to dismantle and destroy these systems, which is what our position is, but rather to transport them to the east.

MacNEIL: Where the Soviets would argue they're not a threat to Western Europe.

Mr. SIMES: Well, the Soviets of course say that the military balance in this region is rather threatening as far as they're concerned. They would say here are missiles which look like, on this map in fact they're maybe right, Chinese missiles.

MacNEIL: Chinese missiles.

Mr. SIMES: They would not mention them publicly because they're trying to have rapprochement with the Chinese, but they obviously have them in mind. They are talking about American nuclear-capable aircraft on Okinawa, in Japan, and of course American nuclear weapons in South Korea. And they want to count American aircraft carriers. So they are saying that they have a separate threat in the Far East and they are entitled to have weapons to meet this threat.

Sec. DEAN: May I point out—

MacNEIL: Sure.

Sec. DEAN: —in response to that that it's important to reckon these systems once again in terms of comparable capabilities. The Soviets claim that the 1,000-1,000 balance consists on our side of the F-4 aircraft, which has a range of 750 kilometers, yet on their side they do not include the Fencer aircraft, which as a range of double that.

MacNEIL: Going to come to aircraft in a second. I just wanted to, on the question of the missiles behind the Ural Mountains and the French and British nuclear systems— first, on the French and British nuclear systems. If you can't get agreement on that, if the Soviets continue to be adamant about including them, does that mean no agreement in Geneva? Is that a compromisable or negotiable issue?

Sec. DEAN: Well, I wouldn't want to prejudge the issue of how the negotiations will turn over the next six months or beyond on the basis of that one issue. Obviously this has to be solved as a package arrangement.

MacNEIL: Does that mean there could possibly be a tradeoff between this insistence and this insistence?

Sec. DEAN: Insistence meaning?

MacNEIL: That the American insistence on including all this, the Soviet insistence on including these?

Sec. DEAN: No, I think we cannot accept the principle of including third country systems, for the reasons I gave earlier.

MacNEIL: Do you regard the Soviet insistence on these as non-negotiable or a negotiable thing? If they want—

Mr. SIMES: Not wanting to give you my totally subjective guess, which I cannot document, and I suspect that even Mr. Kvitsinsky does not know the answer. But my guess is that the Soviets would accept some deal which would include French and British systems, but not necessarily explicitly, but rather implicitly. And essentially a deal like that was already offered by the Soviets, by Mr. Nitze, several months ago. French and British systems, of course, were not mentioned.

MacNEIL: That was during the famous walk in the woods in Geneva.

Mr. SIMES: That's right. But the Soviets would have some advantage in warhead numbers which in fact would offer them compensation. So the American concern not to have a formal linkage between French and British systems and American systems, this concern would be addressed, yet the Soviets would get some advantage as a result of this imbalance.

MacNEIL: Let's come to aircraft for a moment. The Soviets are calling for a substantial reduction of American aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons in these INF negotiations. Is that correct?

Sec. DEAN: That's correct, but the Soviets approach this issue by establishing 1,000-kilometer floor for the aircraft they include. So it is not dual-capable aircraft.

MacNEIL: A 600-mile range, roughly speaking.

Sec. DEAN: That's right.

MacNEIL: And what is wrong with that?

Sec. DEAN: Well, it's not all dual-capable aircraft, as I point out. It's aircraft capable only of a certain range. Now, in that category, they include the American F-4, which comes nowhere near 1,000 kilometers. They include the A-6s and A-7s, which are based on American aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean. We have said that following the successful resolution of the

missile issue— following a successful resolution of the missile issue we will consider aircraft.

MacNEIL: You will consider aircraft. Now, what is the Soviet position on the aircraft? Why are they arguing it?

Mr. SIMES: Well, the Soviets of course says that American count is not very fair. They would remind the Americans that initially the Reagan administration wanted to count obsolete Soviet MiG-17s, but the Soviets want to say, "Well, we are kind of generous—

MacNEIL: I don't follow you. The Reagan administration wanted to count what?

Mr. SIMES: Obsolete Soviet MiG-17. It is fairly old Soviet aircraft.

MacNEIL: I see.

Mr. SIMES: And also the Soviets are saying there are American Phantom force based in the United States, but there are bases ready for them in Germany, and if mobile missiles can be counted, the Soviets are saying this dual-based aircraft—

MacNEIL: In other words, if the Soviets could run these SS-20s back to attack Europe, the Americans could bring over the Phantoms and base them in Germany?

Mr. SIMES: Yes, but the Soviets are saying they are not insisting on this kind of arithmetics. But most importantly, I have to say, this from my point of view is the most negotiable part of the Soviet position.

MacNEIL: The aircraft?

Mr. SIMES: The aircraft.

MacNEIL: What about from the American position on this?

Sec. DEAN: Well, the Soviet insistence on counting aircraft is a bit puzzling inasmuch as the balance is heavily skewed in their favor — approximately a three-to-one balance in their favor in aircraft of over 1,000 kilometers range. So we're a bit led to believe, I think, that once again at this point in the negotiations it's something of a red herring.

MacNEIL: Let's use the last few minutes to talk about what likelihood there is of reaching agreement. First of all, it's clear that Washington is under a good deal of political pressure to reach some agreement, is it not, because there are a lot of people in Western Europe who, although the NATO countries agreed in 1979 to bring in the Pershing missiles this December, would like to see them not put in there now in terms of the antinuclear movement and so on. How much pressure does Washington feel to reach some kind of agreement before it's necessary to deploy those?

Sec. DEAN: Well, the Soviet calculus thus far appears to be that they can bank on sufficient public pressure mounting in Europe so as to make these deployments impossible or politically very difficult. And it would be less than candid not to acknowledge that such public pressure doesn't exist. But make no mistake about it, Robin. The NATO governments stand shoulder to shoulder on this issue, and deployments will go forward, failing achievement of an equitable arms control agreement. We think that is eminently achieveable.

MacNEIL: Is there any pressure— comparable pressure on Moscow to reach any agreement?

Mr. SIMES: Well, there is obviously pressure. First of all, they would be quite concerned if NATO manages to proceed with deployment without major polarization in West European countries and without tension between the United States and NATO allies.

MacNEIL: In other words, if they ended up with these missiles here and it hadn't divided the NATO allies, they'd be in a net worse position?

Mr. SIMES: Absolutely. No question. And 572 missiles in Europe would represent a strategic problem for them. But I also think that one should not have any illusions about the 11th-hour Soviet proposal. Last-minute concessions simply because they would be frightened of American deployment. Three reasons for that. First, the deployment would take a long time, so there is no need for the Soviets to respond immediately. Secondly, I suspect that the last thing Mr. Andropov would want to do is to be perceived as surrendering under pressure. That would be very difficult for him as a new leader trying to consolidate his position inside the Soviet Union.

And reason number three, they would want to give West European peace movements and American freezeniks some time to mount their position. So the Soviets, instead of saying, "Well, Reagan achieved a major political victory, the Soviets are making concessions under pressure," instead, I think they will pretend that they are not interested in the situation—

MacNEIL: In other words, let the United States deploy the first two or three missiles in December, and then let the opposition to that build up in the West?

Mr. SIMES: Absolutely.

MacNEIL: It's become quite current for people described as U.S. officials and U.S. observers, the last few days, to put some faith in this 11th-hour Soviet capitulation to avoid the deployment of even the first Pershing missiles in December. Is that what Washington believes, that Russia will so much want to avoid that that it will, come October, November, finally negotiate seriously?

Sec. DEAN: Well, I think that's a defensible hypothesis, although I think the Soviets will come to see, well before December, that the deployments will move forward unless they become more flexible in the negotiations. So they needn't wait until December or following it—

MacNEIL: Well, what about Mr. Simes' hypothesis that the Soviet leaders will say to themselves, "We could do more damage to NATO by letting the United States deploy a few missiles" because they will come in gradually, won't they — they don't— the 572 don't get all deployed at once — and have the political opposition build up? What about that hypothesis?

Sec. DEAN: Well, I think the Soviets are miscalculating if they think that there would be a groundswell of public opinion in Europe that takes place following those deployments.

MacNEIL: Mr. Dean was optimistic a moment ago that some agreement is possible. Are you?

Mr. SIMES: No. I think the chances are that there will be no agreement this year before the deployment starts. The Soviets would not want to give Mr. Reagan any political victory at this point. But I agree with Mr. Dean that in principle the agreement is possible, and in 1984, 1985, after deployment starts, a deal can be cut.

MacNEIL: Right. We have to stop it there. I'd like to thank you very much indeed, Dr. Simes and Secretary Dean, for joining us this evening. That's all for tonight. We will be back tomorrow night. I'm Robert MacNeil. Good night.

Transcript produced by Journal Graphics, Inc., New York, N.Y.

San Francisco Chronicle
Wed., January 6 1982

How to Tell If Moscow Really Wants Arms Control

By Laurence W. Beilenson and S. T. Cohen

A public offer from President Reagan to the Soviet Union proposing unlimited inspections of all nuclear weapons installations, known or suspected, of each side by the other would be the first sensible approach to arms control negotiations in the nuclear age.

The offer and its reception would allow each side to see the true face of the other. If accepted, the proposal would be the most important non-military step toward preventing a nuclear war since negotiations on the strategic arms limitations treaties (SALT) started. If rejected by the Soviet Union, this refusal might forge a national consensus for the United States to go on a SALT-free diet.

From the so-called Baruch plan advanced by the United States after World War II to the present, suspicion by each side about the good faith of the other has prevented effective nuclear arms control. The distrust has been fully warranted and still is.

Look at the prospect of war as a Russian commissar would. V. I. Lenin, the mentor of the Communist world, predicted that the struggle between the Communist and capitalist camps would be protracted, and in the course of the long contest, the bourgeois nations would strive to prevent a Communist triumph by war against the U.S.S.R. Frightful armed clashes were inevitable, he declared.

England and France attacked the fledgling Soviet Union in 1918-20. Hitler's 1941 attack was the next such war. A good Leninist believes that a coalition of capitalist nations, led by the United States, will wage another war against the Russians whenever it sees the opportunity of success.

Glance at the history of bourgeois diplomacy and treaties as a Russian commissar would. No student of the history of diplomacy can truthfully deny that its hallmarks have been chicanery and deceit. When, in 1913, Joseph Stalin likened honesty in bourgeois diplomacy to "dry water" or "wooden iron," he was not exaggerating; the record bore him out.

The history of treaties, the fruit of diplomacy, has been just as wretched. All nations, including the United States, have habitually broken their political treaties. The United States began early. John Jay, in the course of double-crossing France and breaking our Revolutionary-War treaty with it, said he would not "give a farthing for any parchment security whatever. They had never signified anything since the world began, when any prince or state, of either side, found it convenient to break through them."

And in the 20th century the bourgeois nations, including the United States, have emulated Jay. In short, by the test of history a Russian commissar who trusted the pious protestations of the West would be an utter fool.

Now survey the situation as a realistic Western statesman. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in their 1848 "Communist Manifesto" "disdained" to conceal their aims, as has every Communist leader since, from Lenin through Leonid Brezhnev. They have declared their intention to place Communist parties in control of all governments.

Their primary tool has been, and is, internal subversion aided by external subversion from Communist bases already captured, but in the end, following Lenin, they believe the contest will be determined by war between the two ideological sides. They exalt violence as the only way to win, aided by deceit, which if to advance communism, is a positive virtue. The end justifies the means; whatever aids communism is right.

And what about Soviet diplomacy and treaties? In its short history the Soviet Union has followed or exceeded its bourgeois precursors in deceit and topped them as a treaty-breaker. From the record, any Western statesman who would trust the Russians deserves to be returned to private life by his countrymen.

With such a legacy of justified mistrust, how did arms control ever get off the ground? Up to Richard Nixon, every proposal for extensive arms control foundered on the demand by the United States for on-site inspections to verify compliance. Nixon offered the Congress and the American people the lure of a scientific marvel: national technical means of verification (scientific surveillance), which would make on-site inspections unnecessary.

Aided by the aura of detente and skillful advocacy by Henry Kissinger, SALT I was executed and ratified. With Kissinger still at the helm as secretary of state, Gerald Ford carried on at Vladivostok. Then Jimmy Carter, a man devoted to peace and to treaties as its instrument, signed SALT II and submitted it to the the Senate.

There SALT II faced certain defeat. Although the opponents pointed out the deficiencies of national technical means of verification, probably

they made more converts by their argument that the specific terms of the treaty were unfair to the United States. Outraged by the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, Jimmy Carter suspended consideration of SALT II. The treaties, however, are still before the Senate.

During the presidential campaign Ronald Reagan attacked SALT II, whereupon Carter depicted him as a warmonger. Realizing that many Americans associated treaties with peace and their absence with war — even though mistakenly — Reagan felt obliged to promise the resumption of arms negotiations. He will keep his promise and proceed in good faith. The question is: To what end?

According to the proponents of arms control, there are three purposes of SALT: peace, stopping the arms race, and saving money. From our own experience, none of these objectives has been accomplished. True, there has been no nuclear war between the Soviet Union and the United States, but neither was there a nuclear war before SALT.

Detente and SALT, according to Kissinger, were to induce Soviet restraint; this, he now concedes, has not happened. Neither talks nor treaties have stopped the Soviet nuclear buildup, which has proceeded steadily during all the SALT years. True, we didn't race; we ran in place. Although we spent less money when we were running in place than we would have if we had raced, the expense of pursuit will be higher than would have been the expense of keeping up.

Why then continue? Let no doughty cold warrior underestimate the sentiment in favor of peace in the United States and among our allies. And why not? Who wants to be killed? This has led to our SALT diet: Strong support for arms control by treaty.

From the beginning the advocates of arms control have occupied the high ground of peace. From this pinnacle, the most influential newspapers and network commentators have favored arms control. None of them probably believes that there will be total nuclear disarmament or that nuclear weapons will disappear from the Earth; but, they maintain, that is no reason not to attempt the control of nuclear arms.

Granted that there is a vast gulf between the Soviet Union and the United States and that their political competition will continue, nonetheless, they say, if the nuclear arms race continues to spiral, each side will achieve the power to destroy the other, which creates a mutual interest in preventing such a catastrophe. Let's try by more SALT.

Few of the proponents of SALT would place any faith in Soviet promises. They must therefore rely on the United States' ability to detect any Soviet violation, or at least any violation that would be harmful to the United States.

Has SALT I been broken? There is not the slightest doubt that Soviet camouflage has been a breach of the provision prohibiting interference with the other side's verification by national technical means of verification. Whether there have been other breaches is a matter of argument because nobody knows.

The difficulty goes deeper. We have drafted the treaties according to our ability to count rather than our need to know. We can count launchers which we can see with our eyes in the skies, so the treaties are based on launchers rather than missiles. But in order not to fall behind, what each side needs to know is the total nuclear strength of the other. This is impossible to discover through national technical means of verification.

Certainly as a minimum the United States needs to know how many missiles the Soviet Union has. But no arms-control advocate can truthfully say that we can count missiles. Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, an advocate of SALT, admits that the Soviets have a refire capability and may have missiles to refire, but he argued, the refire process is so slow that the launchers would be destroyed before they could be refired.

Brown's contention misses the point. First, there is no law of nature which says that the Soviets are compelled to fire their missiles from silos. They can be fired from the canister in which they are kept. Second, Soviet ICBMs, by the thousands, can be concealed in warehouses and underground, and we have no way of knowing. They, too, could be moved into the open and launched.

If we cannot count missiles, we cannot count warheads, and they also can be attached to the missiles underground. For cruise missiles, national technical means of verification, cannot ascertain their number, their range, or whether they are nuclear or conventional. We can't check quality.

Without inspection, SALT hinders peace. The best deterrent for each side is a large number of mobile ICBMs, widely dispersed. Everybody agrees that mobile missiles cannot be adequately detected by national technical means of verification. The answer of the arms controllers is not to have mobile missiles because they interfere with SALT, the same argument made against cruise missiles. All of which leads to this pertinent question: Do we want deterrence and peace or do we want SALT? Arms control treaties have no virtue except as a means to an end.

Of course, even on-site inspections can be fooled; for how can an inspector know whether he is on the right site? Cruise missiles and mobile missiles could easily escape detection.

If the Soviet Union and the United States truly want nuclear peace, each will be willing to have the other side know what the other has. The proposal that the president would make would be for unlimited continuous inspection of all nuclear installations, known or suspected, of the other without notice, day or night, by an army of legal Russian spies for our installations and an army of legal American spies for theirs.

The inspections would not be limited to declared nuclear installations because nuclear weapons may be concealed elsewhere. The offer would make acceptance by the Soviet Union a precondition of arms control negotiations. Each side would have to give a complete report to the other of all nuclear weapons. Then the legal spies would arrive and have

the access required. They would stay in the other country with replacements from time to time. Meanwhile, negotiations could proceed and be continuous, with treaties resulting from time to time, subject to cancellation on short notice.

The unlimited inspections would not cease with the treaty. They would be given subject to cancellation on our agreed period for notice. The inspections would be a greater service to peace than any treaty. A treaty can be broken in an instant. The inspections would provide confidence in the other side's intentions. Even such an arrangement possibly can be foiled if loopholes are allowed, and it is of the essence that the proposal not be hedged in any way: no limit on inspections and no notice required.

Objectors will say: This is just a ploy to kill arms control negotiations. The reason we settled for scientific surveillance was that the Russians wouldn't permit on-site inspections. They are hardly likely to permit an army of bourgeois spies.

The way to find out is to offer. If the offer is accepted, the chance of nuclear peace is enhanced. If the offer is rejected, we'll know that for the Soviet Union arms control is a game to gain an advantage and act accordingly.

The offer would unite the country. The American people have far more sense than their guardians give them credit for. If the president makes the offer and the Soviet Union rejects it, the president can forge a national consensus for peace through armed strength rather than through paper chains.

Nor is the offer certain to be rejected. It has far more chance than the linkage so often suggested. The rationale for the Soviet dictatorship rests on its necessity for promoting world revolution and world communism. That is its Leninist mission. To expect the Soviet Union to relinquish this role as the price of a SALT treaty is to expect shrimps to whistle.

Leninism, however, does not adopt war as the main tool. Lenin expected a major war with the capitalist camp, but during his reign he avoided war, and he counseled his successors to avoid wars that risked the Soviet base for subversion. Nuclear war would be such a war. Constantly, the Russians reiterate for the benefit of the West that they do not want nuclear war. Just talk, say some Americans; sensibly true, say others. Why not find out?

It will not be easy for President Reagan to persuade the military or some of his own followers. They will claim the Soviet Union will use the knowledge they obtain under the agreement against us after canceling the arrangement. But because of our open society, the Russians now know much more about our nuclear strength than we know about theirs.

But with nuclear war a very real possibility, most Americans would follow the president's lead. We have heard much about risks for peace that urge us to buy a pig in a poke. Why not an offer for peace which gives us what we truly require: full disclosure and inspection?

We certainly need not worry about how such a proposal would appeal to our allies, who are urging negotiations at any cost. And, the proposal would be a proper answer to the foreign and American demonstrators for peace. The proposal need not put conditions on the outcome of the talks and await the bargaining table. Meanwhile, let's take the Russians at their word, assume they want to avoid nuclear war, and make the offer in good faith, hoping for acceptance.

Laurence W. Beilenson, a scholar on foreign policy and defense and long an adviser to Ronald Reagan, is the author of "Survival and Peace in the Nuclear Age." S. T. Cohen, commonly known as the father of the neutron bomb, is co-author of "Checkmate on War."

"In 1907 the Hague Convention made an agreement that war should not impinge on unarmed civilians, and we find that of the numbers killed in World War I only 5 percent were civilians. In World War II we find that 48 percent were civilians. In the Korean War we find that 84 percent were civilians. In any third world war such a distinction between civilians and professionals will be utterly meaningless. Such a war would entail the indiscriminate mass destruction of life. Such a perception should deeply shock the ethical imagination, and yet we observe in our times the steady nightmarish increase and proliferation of nuclear weapons."

—Peter Abbs
(University of Sussex)

Quoted from "Teachers, Ethical Imagination, and World Disarmament" (TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD, Volume 84, Number 1, Fall 1982, p. 181.)


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

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