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Excerpts from "The Myth of Peace Through Strength" by Bernard P. Kiernan, published in The Virginia Quarterly Review, Volume 57, Number 2, Spring 1981:

"The faith in peace through strength simply will not withstand rational scrutiny. Our strength has clearly not deterred the Soviet challenge to our hegemony; it has, instead, greatly stimulated that challenge and provoked a ruinous nuclear arms race. And the readiness with which President Reagan appears willing to lay the burden of that race wholly on Soviet intransigence totally overlooks the role our own enormous nuclear power, our clearly perceived and loudly proclaimed 'strategic superiority' have played in the past in provoking the alarming nuclear arms build up. Our willingness to accept for so long the risks of nuclear escalation, in the search for military superiority, is now bearing the bitter fruit of a greatly increased danger of mutual nuclear annihilation, a precarious impasse created by the illusion that we could achieve absolute security only through absolute military power."

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"Our policies of 'strength' have had no more success in building peace and stability in the Third World than in our relations with the Soviet Union. The projection of our power in the Third World, that demonstration of 'toughness' and 'strength' so dear to conservatives like President Reagan, far from commanding any respect, have, to the contrary, produced that fanatical hostility of which the Iranian crisis has been such a striking example."

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"Nothing in the history of the revolution in the Third World since 1945 gives support for the notion that our policies of strength have gained us anything there, except the hostility of its peoples."

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Excerpt from "Make Nonproliferation a Condition of International Lending" by Leonard S. Spector, published in The Wall Street Journal, July 14, 1983. (Mr. Spector, formerly chief counsel of the Senate Energy and Nuclear Proliferation Subcommittee, is a senior fellow at the Roosevelt Center for American Policy Studies in Washington, D.C.):

"Last month in New Delhi, Secretary of State Shultz missed an extraordinary opportunity to use economic leverage in the cause of non-proliferation. India is seeking U.S. support for a $2 billion Asian Development Bank loan. At the same time, in a major setback for U.S. non-proliferation efforts, Prime Minister Gandhi has apparently revived India's long-dormant nuclear-weapon development program—possibly by preparing to set off a second test after nine years of restraint. This is why exports of spare reactor parts from the U.S. for India's Tarapur reactors are prohibited under U.S. law. Mr. Shultz might readily have suggested that U.S. backing for India's pending ADB loans would be more likely if Mrs. Gandhi curtailed India's nuclear-weapon development. Instead, he effectively turned his back on the issue by announcing President Reagan would waive or amend current law, if necessary, to allow export of the spare parts."

WILLIAM J. LANOUETTE

Reagan's non-policy

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

August/September 1982

"There isn't a Reagan non-proliferation policy," quipped Paul Leventhal, president of the Nuclear Control Institute. "It's a Reagan proliferation non-policy."

His remark was made only half in jest, since both opponents and proponents of this Administration's approach to nuclear proliferation are having trouble figuring out what's going on.

Indeed, Leventhal's cynicism is matched by views within the highest levels of the State Department bureaucracy. "In non-proliferation matters," one senior advisor said, "there is much more consistency than there is change. I don't think the senior political appointees around here would like to admit it, but essentially they're still following the Carter Administration's example."

This view was underscored by Frederick McGoldrick, director of the department's Office of Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Export Policy when, at a public briefing, he said that Reagan Administration policies simply reflect "where we were heading" at the end of Carter's term.[1]

In deciding where a policy is going, it's essential to know where it's been, and for several reasons U.S. efforts to curb nuclear proliferation have not made that process clear.

One part of the confusion comes from the mixed signals still echoing from the Carter years, when bold declarations about non-proliferation were often undermined by bolder deeds—such as the fight with Congress to export nuclear fuel for India's Tarapur reactor.

Another part of the confusion comes from the structure of the U.S. government itself. Policies to control nuclear proliferation are based on a combination of statutory authority (for example, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978), interpretations of that authority by the executive branch, and initiatives by the President and his top aides.

Furthermore, non-proliferation efforts of the last few years have focused on the search for a technical "quick-fix"—something that would avoid the tougher questions of political will and military security. But this approach holds little appeal for the Reagan policymakers. To them proliferation "is primarily a political and military issue rather than a technical one."[2]

Still, political and military issues aren't easy to unravel either, even

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By introducing a commercial imperative, the Reagan Administration has shifted the ground rules for nuclear exports far beyond the case-by-case approach of the Carter years.

when an administration is candid and articulate about its actions. The Reagan Administration's dealings with Pakistan offer a good example. Economic and military aid is being given in the hope that this will make the country's leaders feel more secure, thus diminishing the desire to develop their own nuclear weapons. But similar aid to India only destabilizes the region, leaving both adversaries insecure.

There have been a few public statements from this Administration. But its principal directive on non-proliferation has been classified and remains secret.[3] A State Department spokesman said on June 9 that the President had decided the United States would offer to work out "predictable programmatic arrangements" for reprocessing and for plutonium use for civil power and research abroad. This is to be achieved through new or amended bilateral agreements.

Predictably this Administration's laissez-faire approach has prompted a legalistic response from Congress. Perceptions on Capitol Hill that the United States is easing its safeguards restrictions invited resolutions, amendments, and laws to tighten nuclear trade.

In addition to the secret policy reported on June 9, other evidence of this Administration's intentions have appeared in scattered public statements:

- On July 16, 1981 the Administration issued guidelines for its non-proliferation policy, which emphasized that it is "essential to our non-proliferation goals" to become a reliable supplier of nuclear materials and technology and urged "expeditious action on export requests and approval requests."[4]
- On September 4, 1981 James L. Malone, the State Department's Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, told the Uranium Institute in London that the Administration intends "to reestablish the United States as a reliable and very competitive participant in international nuclear commerce." Nuclear exports, he said, would be guided by a "policy of the possible and practical."[5]
- On December 1, 1981 Malone told the Atomic Industrial Forum's annual conference that the Administration intends to "enhance the international competitiveness of U.S. nuclear exports by all appropriate means" as a way to increase "leverage" with clients but also to insure the economic health of the U.S. nuclear industry.[6]
- Malone told the American Nuclear Society's Executive Briefing in Washington on January 27, 1982 that nuclear export policy decisions "must be based on the given facts of the world situation, rather than on a set of preconceived rules."[7]
- On March 22, 1982 Richard T. Kennedy, Under Secretary of State for Management, delivered an address on "Nuclear Common Sense," stressing the Reagan Administration's intention not to inhibit civil reprocessing and breeder reactor development in countries that are technically advanced and pose little proliferation risk.[8]

From these public statements, a new policy of economic laissez-faire is already clear. Privately as well, there are signs of a new approach. The State Department is now amending the "trigger list" of sensitive nuclear technology that was agreed upon by the London Suppliers' Group. This is being done through bilateral negotiations, a senior advisor said, because some of the Group's members do not want to appear to be discriminating against developing countries.

How the United States treats developing countries under its new push to expand nuclear exports is still unclear. Members of EURATOM and Japan are likely to gain U.S. help for reprocessing and plutonium recycle. But will this assistance also be granted to developing states with aggressive nuclear programs, such as Taiwan and South Korea?

By introducing a commercial imperative, the Reagan Administration has shifted the ground rules for nuclear exports far beyond the case-by-case approach of the Carter years. The shift has also prompted Congress to focus anew on non-proliferation policy. Hearings this summer before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee may finally force this Administration to spell out what its non-proliferation policy is—and isn't.

In fact, the policy may not be such a great secret after all. For the Reagan Administration's public statements and private actions already make it clear how moral and political issues are being settled: by the laws of supply and demand.

1. Briefing on Reagan Administration reprocessing and plutonium use policy, June 25, 1982, as reported in the "Minutes of the Working Group on Nuclear Explosives Control Policy."
2. John M. Marcum, assistant director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, speaking on "International Nuclear Cooperation" on March 9, 1982, to the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum's 15th annual conference in Tokyo.
3. The Washington Post, June 9, 1982, p. 1; *Science* (June 25, 1982), pp. 1388-89.
4. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* (July 20, 1981), pp. 768-770.
5. Joseph F. Pilat and Warren H. Donnelly, "Nuclear Export Policy of the Reagan Administration: A Summary Analysis and Four Case Studies," Report No. 82-70 S (April 1982), pp. CRS-1-2 and 3 (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress).
6. Pilat and Donnelly, pp. CRS-I-4 and 5.
7. Pilat and Donnelly, p. 5.
8. The address to an Atomic Industrial Forum meeting in New York is reprinted in *U.S. Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs Current Policy* No. 382.

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STRIKING UP FOR A NEW WORLD

Otis L. Graham, Jr.

Frank K. Kelly. *Court of Reason: Robert Hutchins and the Fund for the Republic*. New York: The Free Press, 1981. xii + 722 pp. Notes and index. $19.95.

In American politics every action produces some reaction, even if not "equal and opposite" as in physics. The rancid anticommunism focused in the 1950s by Joe McCarthy drew major energies from groups alarmed by the New Deal (and modernism in general) and eager to take their revenge after the war. In its turn, McCarthyism and the broader postwar reaction put liberals through a sustained trauma, sowing another counterthrust. They were able to push the national political pendulum back, starting with the ADA, working through Stevenson to the fulfillments under Kennedy and Johnson. This political counterattack on postwar "conservatism" had its intellectual counterpart. A large part of that effort bubbled up around Robert M. Hutchins, where this book commences.

The liberal intellectual base in the Fifties fell far short of that total grip upon the universities, foundations, and media that the Dan Smoots of the world assumed. William F. Buckley's *God and Man at Yale* notwithstanding, the academic community was in those days not overwhelmingly liberal, and was not in any event well mobilized to write policy-oriented tracts or otherwise perpetuate the New Deal revolution. Brookings was a smaller and more cautious place than now, not accustomed to breeding undersecretaries for liberal administrations and hatching up new programs to improve the welfare state. The infrastructure of foundations and think tanks was thinner, existing institutions were less socially engaged, hesitant about controversy. Into this near vacuum, with the spiritual descendants of the New Deal somewhat alienated from even Stevensonian (certainly from Trumanish) leadership in their party and largely without institutional bases, Robert Maynard Hutchins launched the Fund for the Republic, and then the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. They had a long and interesting run.

Hutchins came to this venture from a Yale Law School Deanship and an innovative presidency at the University of Chicago. The Fund was established in 1954, the Center in 1959. His Center, located in the Montecito suburb of Santa Barbara, California, made waves and made news. Historians must decide if it made a difference. Thomas Reeves wrote *Freedom and the Foundations* (1969) on the Fund years, and now Frank Kelly writes the first Center history, *Court of Reason.*[1] I was another Hutchins associate at the Center, toward the end of the story, and thus bring to this review overlapping perspectives, historian and participant.

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Bob Hutchins had a way of provoking emotion that then flowed to extremes, ironic for a courtly man who deprecated himself with a disarming wit, and wished to stir up only reflection, not emotion. Like Hutchins himself, whom most people either revered or (especially if they had not met him) reviled, his Center tended to evoke sharply divergent reactions. Either it was a beacon for citizens of humane, "concerned" orientation, extending the reform agenda while fighting for basic liberties; or, it was a twenty-year fund-raising show, a preposterous piece of "Liberal Rippoffery," where eggheads tired of eastern winters wrote harmless tracts and lolled in the sun; or, it was a Communist commune.

Kelly's book, though I think not by design, leads us through the first but comes to rest upon the second of these conclusions. It offers a detailed and honest accounting of the Center's origins, personnel, and main programmatic outlines, from the 1959 purchase of the estate in Montecito through Hutchins's 1977 death to the end of the Center in 1979. The files were moved to the UC campus at Santa Barbara, along with the three or four remaining staff members, the lot sequestered in a barracks at the noisy edge of the campus. A sign went up, proclaiming The Hutchins Center, and *The Center Magazine*, thinned out, appeared infrequently* But the Center was no more.

The impression left is one of twenty years of endless fundraising as a raison d'etre, of internal conflict as a way of life, of lawsuits and reorganizations and "events," such as the Pacem in Terris conferences, aimed chiefly to spread publicity and raise funds. Kelly dutifully lists the conferences and publications which carried on the intellectual work of the Center, but there is no sense of how the Center's ideas intersected with contemporary thinking. Kelly frequently asserts the influence of Center activities, but does not demonstrate it. News releases and pamphlets and *The Center Magazine* were the output. Their engagement with the larger national discussion and consciousness would be difficult but important to trace, but this is not attempted. As a result, *Court of Reason* will seem to most readers largely a story of institutional troubles.

This was hardly Kelly's intention, for he falls among those who revered Hutchins, while knowing well his weaknesses. He wrote the book from the documents available, mostly Center files, and from memory. It is thus only

*The author wishes to correct this statement, which is in error. The Center Magazine, although it did shrink in size, did not appear "infrequently" after 1979, but maintained its six-issue-a-year schedule from its new base with the successor institution, THE ROBERT MAYNARD HUTCHINS CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, based at UCSB.

part of the story, inside the walls rather than outside, and mostly about money, structure, and power rather than the Dialogue, reflecting Kelly's experience. With that, it is accurate, candid, and not easy to put down. The Center operation by 1968 seemed flourishing enough, with nearly 50,000 "members" receiving *The Center Magazine*, with publications and tapes, twenty-five Fellows and assorted young research assistants, daily meetings, splashy conferences. The great white building, "El Parthenon" Hutchins called it, bustled with energy, articulate and assertive people, books and magazines, luncheons on the sun-splashed patio overlooking the Pacific.

But Hutchins was strangely morose, disappointed at the Center's direction. A gift of $5 million, along with perhaps an intimation of his own mortality, nudged him to a reorganization which stunned and divided the Center community, and made damaging headlines. Kelly, despite a resourceful effort, cannot quite clarify what Hutchins's ideal of his Center really was, or just how the 1968 Center disappointed him. Clearly the Dialogue table was too large, with twenty-five people shuffling papers and too many of them making speeches without pursuing the line of thought. In the spring of 1969, in a slightly bizarre performance reflecting a strong determination to start again but a strangely infirm hand of leadership, Hutchins dismissed much of the "academic staff." There followed much ensuing intrigue, eventual lawsuits, expensive settlements, and bad publicity. Four years later, with the new Center not much closer to his dreams and his own health and age requiring a change in leadership, Hutchins sent the Board on a search for a successor. It was another episode in which he declined to offer strong guidance, and a flawed search came up with the luckless Malcolm Moos. Came more intrigue, with Harvey Wheeler as well as alcohol confusing Moos, and with Harry Ashmore, whom Kelly astutely describes as an "articulate, clever and ambitious man" (p. 178) undercutting Moos's short presidency. Hutchins came back out of retirement and reconstituted the Center—again.

Kelly carries the story beyond 1975, when, with the decaying old mansion showing signs of skimpy maintenance, Hutchins launched a leaner program, using a small core of nontenured Associates and a stream of visitors from outside, with a brief and ill-fated Chicago branch. It was not an opulent time, but with the divisive personalities gone and a strong sense of community evident, Hutchins often mused that he had found the key at last. But time ran out quickly. He died in May, 1977. Maurice Mitchell came from the University of Denver to prove once again that Hutchins, with all his faults, was virtually impossible to follow, and the Center was sold and boarded up in 1979, its files shipped over to UCSB. I took down the bell that Hutchins had used to summon Fellows to the 11:00 a.m. meetings, and, with Harry Ashmore, Rex Tugwell, Elizabeth Borgesse, Don MacDonald, and Bill Gorman, and the

others who were left, presented it to Vesta Hutchins at dinner one evening in the autumn of 1979. Unless she has found a use for it, the bell is stilled.

Hutchins would have winced at *Court of Reason*'s stress on money and bickering, not because it was unflattering, but because this was the side of the enterprise that he most disliked. Pale and gaunt in his last years, he became paler when we had to talk of money or lawsuits, but was animated when he discovered a *Yale Law Review* article by a local philosopher, or when dissecting the inconsistencies in his friend Justice Douglas's thinking on the constitutional issue in zoning. Kelly's history of the Center is dominated by administrative troubles, the smallness of Great Minds. But this hardly mirrors Hutchins's mind, which begrudged such matters and was restless always to get back to reading, talking, writing.

Were the wrangles, indeed the failure to set aside an endowment and find a viable successor, i.e. to put the institution on a permanent basis, mainly Hutchins's fault? Here we uncover the problem of leadership and Hutchins's own ambivalence about it. A firm hand by Hutchins might have disciplined the Dialogue, as well as the Fellows and Board, but repeatedly he would withdraw to a permissive, watchful stance. He appeared to have a reasonably clear idea of what the Center should be, but he would not dictate its form or functioning (nor would he run matters by daily plebiscite, either; hardly a "monarch," as Kelly says, he was felt to be always in charge). At times he came near to confessing to me that the administrative floundering had been his fault (it was not his manner to talk of himself, and this precluded bragging, but also autobiographical rambling, confession, and other useful expressions of the exposed ego). Kelly lays all the internal troubles at Hutchins's door, always implicitly and sometimes explicitly, and knowing Bob's clarity of mind and regretting his reticence I tended in those days to side with Kelly. But we read in William Barrett's history of the *Partisan Review* group, a story replete with internal squabbles among a band of intellectuals, that "Nobody seems to have devised a way of building an intellectual and literary circle without adding immeasurably to the usual stock of nastiness, bitchery, and backbiting that are the lot of human nature. Perhaps that is the price humanity has to pay for the centers that generate ideas." [2]

Perhaps. Hutchins's Center, according to Kelly, spent $42 million, and he is certainly right to say that "it was virtually impossible to measure the success or failure of the Center" (p. 648). Could the money have been better used, to produce more and better books and conversations and less high living in Montecito and Malta and Geneva? This seems an unpromising inquiry in one sense. I have no sympathy with the argument that if Hutchins had not rescued Detroit, New York, and Beverly Hills money from its owners, then somehow it would have gone to finer purposes. The Ford Foundation would

have frittered its portion away on studies by professors of sociology, and the wealthy who left their checks with Hutchins would otherwise have bought yachts and fine art. There was perhaps a moment in the mid-1960s when an endowment base could have been saved, but Hutchins allowed personnel and programmatic expansion in all directions. Probably an opportunity was missed just at that point, not only to insure long-term viability but to discipline the sprawling program toward coherence. In this sense, he wasted money, but the charge of high living misses the nub of things. True enough, Hutchins lived in a fine house in the nearby hills and drove a silver Jaguar. Kelly notes this several times. But ease did not distract him from work—he really was "a Puritan in Babylon" to the end—and the Center was not distractingly plush for anyone. The building occupied a stunning setting, but the staff was reasonably frugal; the large swimming pool off the patio was never filled, the sherry was mediocre.

Hutchins himself often took a critical view of the Center story based on other concerns. He was disappointed in the "Dialogue," that centerpiece of its process, that "sustained conversation" among gifted generalists which he hoped would break through the disciplinary and terminological barriers so rigid within universities. But it had never worked consistently as he hoped. Fellows could be made to sit together daily, breaking off their work on individual projects. But they rarely became a collegial body cutting steadily away to the core of issues.

Hutchins ran these meetings in a conventional way, calling upon those who happened to raise their hand, and the argument often meandered. At first I was shocked to find that the Dialogue was merely a large meeting. No new methods were apparent. It resembled our own faculty meetings and academic conferences, but for the green table in that dramatic room looking out on the Carpinteria Valley. I had assumed that by the mid-1970s the Center would have refined the arts of small group discourse, but Bob insisted that they had learned no new tricks. He kept waiting for the green table to produce a more Socratic process that two reorganizations had not yielded.

He was further disappointed that the Community of Scholars had broken down so persistently into squabbling egoists and silent sufferers. He thought the Center "not a very good Center" though "the best we had," and fretted also that its survival was so threatened as he reached his 70s. Sensing that it would not survive him, he yet poured out ebbing energies right to the end in order to give it lasting form. He mused with me many times that perhaps his main error had been to grant "tenure," that he should have worked with a constantly revolving band of thinkers and only a very small core group, as we were forced to do after 1975. He might well have written a history of the Center as critical in its concluding notes as that of Kelly, but one touching

upon the faltering Dialogue process in the rear room, not the money and personnel worries in the front office.

He and Kelly would still, in my estimation, be a bit too much on the negative side. For twenty years the Center exerted an elusive but impressive influence within American politics and thought. A strong case could be made that the Center's influence was not matched over those years by any other institutional social critic—not merely because of its unique design as half publishing house and half conference center, but measured also by its flourishing national membership, network of discussion groups, the ability to pull the national media to its repeated Pacem in Terris meetings where Kennedys and Kissingers would agree to speak.

To what was its influence attributable? Hutchins had wanted to inquire in two directions not well scanned in the 1950s—toward the foundations of democracy, lest they erode while we became rich, and toward the future, which in America was nobody's business. Who possesses the standard by which to measure the Center's engagement with either? By my own lights, the attention to the presidency, the media, public education, First Amendment freedoms, the arms race, the idea of equality were sound choices, quite apart from the illumination which was produced. Hutchins had also wanted the place to be "an early warning" system, raising and exploring issues long before grant-oriented academics or event-chasing journalists would take them up. Here again a positive appraisal seems warranted, as I look back over files of *The Center Magazine* and published reports. There was the early Robert Scheer critique of the Vietnam engagement, the sustained study of planning, pioneering attention to exclusionary zoning and illegal immigration, and the literal founding of the movement which led to the Law of the Seas negotiations. Along with this, of course, went much that was superficial (the work on The American Character), trendy (the rights of prison inmates), better done elsewhere (problems of the U.S. health care system), embarrassingly wrong (cybernation-automation in the late 1960s), even incomprehensible (some, though not all, of the discussions of The Great Books, an old Chicago-based passion that went with Hutchins wherever he was). The twenty-year enterprise deserves and requires a keen intellectual historian, master of the panorama of postwar ideas.

While the goals of the Center had a tendency to sound as if they had traveled too far on the direct mail circuit, I conclude that Bob Hutchins and his Center had their twenty-year run not because he was tall and well-connected and brilliant—though he was all of that—but because he understood what was bothering the well-intentioned educated American. His Center was to be a place removed from life's pressures and deadlines, where thinkers talked together in English instead of the jargon of specialists, made a common effort

to get back to "first principles," to get underneath the quotidian to the timeless. There was the intimation of consensus at the end of Dialogue, but in any event the promise of a place where minds could be both fundamental and audacious, respectful of first principles and irreverent toward power and orthodoxy. Considering the sort of society that was America after World War II, no wonder that the "Center Idea" touched many souls, inspired loyalty and a sense of hope. Dan Smoot, Barry Goldwater, and later Jerry Falwell would rise to deal with the anxieties of those of a reactionary temper. Hutchins found his clientele on the other end, among those concerned that affluence had smothered the basics, that technology threatened religion and morals, that constitutional rights would be junked in the Cold War hysteria, that the vision of racial equality would falter, that knowledge and expertise had bullied the citizen and fragmented the larger view of the Common Good. He pledged to conduct a reasoned response to all of these worries, and his agenda was a reflection of the deeper concerns of the postwar intelligentsia.

It was a powerful idea, and gathered Niebuhr and de Jouvenel, Adler and Huxley, Douglas and Doxiades and Myrdal, $42 million and 100,000 members, and a penumbra I observed in the parlous 1970s as the energies ebbed. On any given work day would come idealistic college kids ready to work in the library, brilliant young graduates who had gone from Center internships to careers in public interest law, a steady stream of nuts and dreamers who wanted to get into Hutchins's office for just an hour to tell him of a new weed which would end the energy crisis or kill cancer, or of some new plan for harmony among the nations. And over lunch or coffee came stories from the veterans of left-liberalism's postwar campaigns—of Wallace in '48, of Selma and Ole Miss and Birmingham, of UN meetings on hunger or women's subordination, of battles with Joe McCarthy.

By these paths came my own conviction that the story of the Center should not be an institutional one primarily, but be cast as both a shaper and reflector of Cold War liberalism and radical neighborhoods to the Left. Its major concerns were always the threat of Armageddon and the hope of peace, race hatred and the vision of racial justice, mindless affluence and the restoration of transcendent national purpose. These drew other causes to the agenda, and not all of them were well chosen. But the Center was indeed in the center of the postwar Left, and the talk it produced will provide a crucial documentation of the history of the American Left when its postwar chapter is written.

Frank Kelly ranks the performance favorably, though he gives us a book which to some extent undercuts that conclusion. If the Center be judged on its intellectual contribution, I side with Kelly, yet wish that he had written a somewhat different book. Of course the Center displayed from time to time all the liberal foibles: the preference for polite and educated blacks, for

women who were not angry, for fuzzy idealism when the content of issues was especially complex, for avoiding the study of capitalism's economic workings. It agreed to panhandle the Beverly Hills rich, it sheltered Joy of Sex Comfort from British taxes, it housed a few harmless frauds and raconteurs, it dared to domicile in lotus-land, far from the urban crisis. By all means let us have a critical portrait, but primarily from the green table where issues were (or were not) engaged, not primarily from the files of the treasurer and the press agent. If we ever get the full story of those two decades of talk around Bob Hutchins's table, it will pass at least this test: you will wish you had been there.

To my mind, the Center of Bob Hutchins deserves what I think Frank Kelly attempted to give it, a warm portrait, and a sad tone at its closing. As I took down the bell that afternoon in 1979, I wondered who in the 1980s would try again to make a place where we can get our bearings? Who will strike out again along Hutchins's path, which was to the end Utopian, captured in these words of Whitman he liked to quote: "Solitary, singing in the West, I strike up for a new world."

Otis L. Graham, Jr., Department of History, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, was Program Director of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions from 1975 to 1979.

1. It is a good title. Hutchins was seen as headed for the Supreme Court in the late 1930s, and its work was never far from his mind. "I want to write one more law review article," he said to me three months before his death, as he shifted some work to my desk. The Center could be seen as a court with original jurisdiction, sorting out the claims of justice and constitutional rights. It would probably have worked much better if he had limited the number of Fellows to nine.
2. William Barrett, *The Truants: Adventures among the Intellectuals* (1982), pp. 229–30.

Church/world watch

Mobilizing opinion, curbing technology

J. Bryan Hehir

BY THE TIME this column appears, the May 2-3 meeting of the Catholic bishops will have taken place, and the bishops will have acted, one way or another on the pastoral letter. Yet even as so much of our attention is given, quite rightly, to the letter, it is still very important to resist isolation of intramural Catholic debate from the wider public concern about the nuclear arms race. The pastoral letter has been guided by the spirit of Vatican II's "Constitution on the Church in the World"; this document calls us to be attentive to the church's relationship to the world and to what the church can learn from the world. The pastoral letter seeks to contribute to the wider debate and to learn from it. Two aspects of that wider debate provide lessons to be learned.

First, the relationship of public opinion and public policy. In his 1982 World Day of Peace message John Paul II identified the role of public opinion as crucial for arms control and as an arena particularly open to the church: "Rulers must be supported and enlightened by a public opinion which encourages them or, where necessary, expresses disapproval."

While this statement finds much support, the more difficult question has always been one of determining precisely the potential of public opinion to influence foreign policy decisions. The interplay between policy-making and public attitudes in a large democracy is complex enough in itself but analysts going back to Walter Lippmann have seen special problems when public opinion tries to influence foreign policy. Nonetheless, a broad consensus exists today that President Reagan's successive proposals on arms control—from the "zero option" of November 1981 through the START proposals of May 1982 to the recent "interim proposal" for the Geneva negotiations on intermediate-range weapons—have all been generated partially in response to strong public calls for a serious U.S. arms-control policy.

A more specific indication of the effect of public opinion on policy is visible in the defense posture statement presented to the Congress by Secretary Weinberger on February 1, 1983. This annual review of U.S. strategic and foreign policy is always a benchmark for assessing an administration's strategic intentions. Mr. Weinberger uses much of the nuclear section of his testimony to address three issues, all of them raised by groups in the public-opinion sector of society. First, as both the *Wall Street Journal* and *Washington Post* noted, he addressed the opposition of the bishops' second draft to any strategic policy which targets civilians directly. Second, Mr. Weinberger seeks to deflect the proposal of Messrs. Bundy, Kennan, McNamara, and Smith that NATO adopt a no-first-use pledge. Third, he seeks to counter the advocates of a nuclear freeze. My point in mentioning these examples is not to debate any of the proposals or the secretary's response to them, but to highlight the need he felt to address them in his major presentation to the Congress.

A second element in the public debate which ought to concern us was developed in the recent essay in *Time* by Henry Kissinger. (Much the same point is suggested by the report of the Snowcroft Commission, which was established by President Reagan to find a home for the MX but ended up making a thorough reassessment of U.S. strategic arms policy.) The thesis of Kissinger's intricate and important article is that the key challenge to arms control today is a conceptual one. In explaining why a new conceptual approach is needed, Kissinger touches on a favorite topic of John Paul II. The pope has consistently couched his discussion of the nuclear question in the broader terms of the relationship between technology and ethics. While positively supporting the role of science, John Paul II has repeatedly raised concern about how to establish moral limits for technological development.

Kissinger's concern is the way technology has outrun both strategy, policy and ideas for arms control. The principal arms-control problem today is the disparity between numbers of warheads and launchers, a disparity produced by the decision both the U.S. and the Soviets took in the 1970s to deploy "MIRVed" missiles, i.e., to fit each missile with more than one warhead. Thus both sides may possess a roughly equal number of launchers (missiles) but the side that fires first suddenly translates its equal number of launchers into, say, three times or even ten times as many "bullets"—warheads—as the adversary has targets—the still unlaunched missiles. Since the likelihood of eliminating the opposing missiles is obviously much increased by this kind of ratio, in a crisis there would be a strong incentive to strike first. Moreover, the arms-control paradox is that reducing the numbers of launchers without significant reductions in warheads (à la SALT II) could reinforce this instability by increasing the ratio of warheads over targets that would be enjoyed by the power that struck first.

Kissinger's proposal amounts to a call to repeal the MIRV decision of the 1970s, preferably on a bilateral basis but unilaterally if necessary. Specifically, he calls for the U.S. to move in the 1990s toward a mobile land-based system of single warhead missiles. The full scope of the Kissinger proposal and the Snowcroft Commission report requires more comment in a later column.

The one point to be made here is that the Kissinger essay highlights the dangerous turn the arms race took when it moved toward MIRVing. Kissinger was associated with that move, but now sees its consequences as so detrimental that he urges quite drastic remedial steps. The lesson of MIRV is that concern for reversing the arms race must be not only vigorous and broad-based but specific and selective. Some decisions are systemically hazardous for arms control; these need to be given priority in our concern to control the technological dynamic of the nuclear race. The MIRV decision escaped adequate analysis in the public sector. We can't afford other slips in the future.

J. BRYAN HEHIR

CHILDREN ...and Ourselves

APPROPRIATE MOCKERIES

WHILE there may be values in computers and the art of programming of which we are ignorant, a letter on this subject from a man in Quebec (in the *Manchester Guardian Weekly,* March 27) seemed worth repeating. He said:

> "What's an American?" goes a somewhat esoteric riddle. Answer: "Someone who uses a $10,000 machine to split infinitives."
>
> Maybe it's a silly comment; but the story about computer literacy in the *Washington Post* section (Jan. 30) reminded me of an old friend whose own tale, alas, is true. Old Friend has given up the Anglican priesthood to take a course in computer education. Over a coffee one day, he tells me about the wonderful software he is creating: it takes half an hour to describe and uses mathematical logical concepts I can't quite grasp. What does it do? It allows first-graders to sit in front of a terminal and draw triangles. When I ask him why he can't achieve the same educational goal with a box of pipe cleaners, there is a long silence. At last the explanation stumbles out: "It's not what they do with it that counts: what's important is that they should get used to using the machine."
>
> So Johnny, with the blessing of every educational institution in North America, suddenly has a billion more games to play. Perhaps one Johnny in a thousand will have some purpose that will make it all worthwhile. The other 999 will be inert consumers of more or less trivial software sold by a small class of electronic impresarios.
>
> What we should be teaching Johnny, of course, is first of all to know when he has something worth saying or making; then to use the most direct and effective means to say or make it. If we don't, the computer will extend our wits in the same way that the automobile extended our horses.

Another example of this sophisticated way of making fun appears in the Foreword of the Winter *et cetera,* by Jay Rosen, one of the editors. He begins:

> Any comedian working today knows that the language of news, advertising, and prime-time television is hilarious when repeated on stage. No exaggeration or comic twist is required; the laughs come instantly at the moment the language is recognized. Just mentioning a popular show or a heavily promoted product is often enough to amuse an audience. People laugh because they are relieved to be free of their individual responses to an absurd demand television makes on everyone. The demand is always the same: to treat the impossible claim as plausible, the ridiculous pretense as serious, the obvious ploy as subtle—in short, to perceive the completely motivated world of television as unmotivated, natural, innocent. No one can respond to television in this way, and yet the demand is continuously, absurdly made.
>
> Television intends to say what cannot be reasonably said. It announces this intention by denying it so feebly that only a kind of brute power remains: the power to ignore all proportion in language, to speak in excess, to always claim more meaning for things than things deserve.

We all know what Mr. Rosen means: The intense, hardly controlled excitement in the voice of the man or woman reading the commercial—as though the fate of the world (read consumer) depended upon the swirling importance of what is said. Why do we put up with it? Why don't we boycott manufacturers and advertisers who systematically insult the intelligence of the watcher or hearer? Why don't we recreate the world in which, if somebody has something to sell or a service to perform, he hangs an unostentatious symbol over the door of his dwelling, knowing that that is all he needs to do? Today, not to belabor the point, a great deal of unnatural effort is required just to live a natural life. Isn't that enough to show that we must be doing a great many things wrong?

In evidence of the degree to which we have submitted to the marketing psychology, we draw on some remarks by Steve Baer (proprietor of Zomeworks) in *CoEvolution Quarterly* (Spring). Baer is introduced as "a sharp analyzer of the people-technology dance." He says:

> It is often important to give customers a card. They need to remember you, your name, the company you work for and what you do. There is something else here that is important: Don't have a handwritten card. The card should be printed, not on a typewriter or by hand lettering but by a printing press. The person to whom you give the card does not want your autograph. Besides needing the information on the card, he will be reassured by a glimpse of the machines behind you. Of course you yourself are there, but the introduction should be blessed by the other part of a proper team; you want an introduction by a robot. Don't imagine that your customer is prejudiced against people or against what you can do with your hand or a pen. He is merely investigating to be sure you are part of a bigger team of men and machines.

We offer Baer's somewhat sardonic insight to show that the best "research" may often be simple *thinking.* He goes on:

> What accounts for this widespread need for evidence of teamwork between men and machines? Past success. Men and machines working together produce. Men have grown rich and powerful because of their partnership with machines. If people were at first suspicious of men when they introduced machines, it is no longer so. We are now suspicious if anyone tries something alone. This is taken to extremes: Without a dose of a machine's electricity, plain human speech is suspect. Obliging hosts, not wishing to offend, provide microphones for speakers at tiny gatherings. This is only good manners, even though there are only 20 people at the Kiwanis Club meeting.

Baer tells about a trade show where he showed a sample of a Zomework heat exchanger—a good one, but unconventionally made; it looked like a potter's hand work more than the product of giant metal rollers or stamping presses.

> A passerby looked at it and as he left, he remarked, "It looks handmade." After this comment there was little to say. The price and the performance could not redeem such bad manners. . . .
>
> The man who didn't want a handmade heat exchanger was simply being chivalrous to machinery. The handmade product, or the product that appears to be handmade, when offered to a mass market is offensive because it speaks of its maker's selfish refusal to become married to the many machines waiting to help. Promoters of such techniques are spotted as production perverts, homofabricators instead of heterofabricators, and the lumpy metal that looked as if it had been shaped by hand yet sits on the same aisle with the

(Continued) →

products of mills, lathes, and screw machines is simply, regardless of price of performance, an embarrassment.

A brief passage by Michael Blee, an English architect, in *The Man-Made Object* (Braziller, 1966), provides a concluding comment:

> For the primitive his wooden bowl is valued, fingered, felt and known; a true man-made extension, his spoon a prehensile projection of his own anatomy. Each of his few possessions has a similar intense reality, each is necessary and life-enhancing. It is surely experientially relevant to ask to what extent such identity can be offered by or demanded of the trivia of materialistic society, the paper plate, the plastic spoon. If identity depends wholly on scarcity, slowness, familiarization, frequent contact, then the contemporary urban environment denies all possibility of such experience.

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