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

(Mrs.) Eulah C. Laucks,
President
Post Office Box 5012
Santa Barbara, CA., 93108

May 17, 1983

"Though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously, by licensing and prohibiting, to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?"

— John Milton

(Areopagitica)

SCIENCE

(Reprinted by permission from SCIENCE)
(American Association for the Advancement of Scienc
25 February 1983, Volume 219, Number 4587

Censorship, Soviet Style

Governmental power, when used to dictate what is permissible in scientific communication, tends to breed the climate of surveillance and intimidation that has long prevailed in closed societies accustomed to employing censorship to keep the natives in line. As the Soviet experience demonstrates, the habit evolves into an institution.

Sixty years after the founding of the Soviet state, and notwithstanding the eminence of Soviet scientists in the world community, the evidence is that distrust of brainpower remains as profound as in the era of the czars. Not even the brief window of détente, which found American and Soviet scientists mingling and promoting fellowship, changed the facts of life for Soviet intellectuals.

It is instructive to observe the impact of compulsive Soviet censorship on the English-language copies of *Science* that are imported under a long-standing purchase agreement with the AAAS. Systematic blackout is regularly imposed on editorials, letters to the editor, and news features. The effect, one suspects, is to alert Soviet scientists to the missing material and promote a lively underground market for it.

To safeguard the innocence of Soviet scientists during 1982, the censors ranged broadly over the alarming contents of *Science*. Struck from the issue of 23 April 1982, for example, was the entire letters department, in which appeared a protest against the revocation, on political grounds, of academic degrees in the Soviet Union. The censors likewise obliterated Donald Kennedy's editorial on "The government, secrecy, and university research," although it might have consoled Soviet readers to learn that their envied colleagues in the West have a few problems, too. Pressing on, the censors deleted a critical commentary on the MX missile. Of the five issues of *Science* in April, three had the news section amputated in whole. The following month, having rested, the censors were at it again, eliminating the news section for 21 May, which dealt with alternatives to the MX, the fortunes of Livermore National Laboratory in "the laser battle," the downfall of statistics at the hands of the Reagan Administration, and French attempts at reforming education. So it went throughout 1982, as indeed it had gone in every previous year.

To the extent that such mangling signals Soviet dissatisfaction with *Science*, the harm is small and our journal will survive it. The real import is of another kind, for it exposes the insecurity of a society that is unwilling and unable to trust its scientific community. It would not be surprising to find that the withholding of that trust by the Soviet government induces a response in kind and intensity, for the small affair concerning *Science* can only hint at the hostage state of scientists in the Soviet Union.

The Soviets' perennial defense of the censors' actions is that the expurgated materials in *Science* are of no interest to their scientists. It is a peculiar argument, considering what the authorities do *not* censor. We are asked to believe that Soviet scientists could not wait to get their hands on accounts of an audit of an American university's research grants, the Environmental Protection Agency's relaxation of hazardous waste rules, a letter about science and religion, and a news brief on federal security checks on peer reviewers of agricultural research. They were not to be interested, on the other hand, in reports on counterforce weapons or an accident at the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN).

It is tempting to deplore the lot of Soviet scientists while exulting in our better fortune. It would be wiser to reflect on the surpassing importance of trust in the contract between science and government in an open society, together with the obligation on both sides to respect it. On that foundation rests the whole of the American arrangement. The authors of the pending national security directive on protecting unclassified scientific information, now being drafted at the White House, should take note.

—WILLIAM D. CAREY

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THE GUARDIAN, March 20, 1983

Walter Reich

Andropov and Human Rights

FIVE MONTHS before a scheduled confrontation with the West, Soviet psychiatrists have quit the World Psychiatric Association. The resignation tells us something about the mind of Soviet psychiatry. It tells us even more about the mind of the Soviet leadership.

More than a decade ago, reports began to reach the West that the KGB was referring healthy dissidents to psychiatrists, who were diagnosing them as mentally ill and confining them in hospitals for the criminally insane. In 1977, the World Psychiatric Association voted to condemn the Soviets for psychiatric abuse; but the practices, critics charged, didn't stop. Last fall, the American Psychiatric Association proposed that the WPA suspend the Soviets from the organization, and Britain's Royal College of Psychiatrists proposed that it expel them. Both resolutions were set for a vote at the next meeting of the WPA, scheduled for July of this year.

Last month, the Soviets announced that they were quitting the world body. That they chose to quit now, though, is curious. In the weeks before the resignation, they repeatedly revealed their determination to stay. They paid the dues they owed in order to participate in the vote on their membership. And they submitted the case histories of hospitalized dissidents that had been requested by a WPA committee monitoring psychiatric abuse, even though they had denounced that committee as illegitimate and anti-Soviet.

So why did they suddenly resign? The most reasonable explanation is that the new Soviet leadership made them resign. Under Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviets were willing to yield on some Western demands in the interest of retaining memberships in international organizations. Under Yuri Andropov, such memberships apparently don't seem worth their cost.

Someone in the new bureaucracy — probably in the Central Committee, perhaps Andropov himself — must have discovered, late in January, the threat on the psychiatric front. The Western press was again making noises about Soviet psychiatric abuse. Western psychiatrists were again preparing to put the Soviet profession on trial.

"Who," someone in the *apparat* may have asked, "is countering this onslaught? Psychiatrists? We're letting psychiatrists run our foreign affairs? We're letting them release internal Soviet documents for Western inspection? Find out who's responsible and order them to resign from this World Psychiatric Association before any more damage is done."

Actually, from a Soviet perspective, this strategy makes sense — but it makes sense only if a shift in Soviet human rights policy has taken place.

The new Soviet leadership seems to have decided that, as hard a line as Brezhnev took on human rights during his last years, it wasn't hard enough: "If the West wants to talk about arms control or trade, we'll talk. But we won't talk about human rights if we can help it. That kind of talk puts us on the defensive. It's orchestrated only to shame us. The United States doesn't really care about the way we treat our dissidents, but finds the subject a convenient way of flogging us before the world. Well, we won't let them do that anymore. If they complain, we'll just walk away. Let them talk to an empty room."

In the main, we in the United States view our concern for human rights in other countries as an affair of the heart. We feel a duty to protect victims of political oppression, especially in countries that claim a role in world affairs and offer themselves as models of human civilization. We see such protection as a noble national calling. And we tell ourselves that it's for this reason that we expend so much of our diplomatic capital with the Soviets in complaints about their treatment of dissidents — capital that could be devoted to goals of more direct and vital benefit to our own people, particularly arms control.

But this is only a partial explanation. True, we want to humanize the Soviets so they will treat their citizens decently. Probably even more, we want to humanize them because, somehow, it's important to us that they have the same concept of human worth that we have.

Our efforts at humanization are carried out not in competition with our efforts at arms control but, in large measure, and without our realizing it, because of them. It's necessary for us to believe that the country with which we've reached an agreement on nuclear weapons is a country we can, to a reasonable degree, trust. And it's hard to develop such trust if we believe that that country doesn't subscribe to human values similar to our own.

After all, we may wonder, if the Soviet leaders don't care about individual human beings, might they not some day calculate that it would be worth losing half of their people in order to obliterate all of ours? And shouldn't we, therefore, close our ears to their seductive arms control proposals? Shouldn't we protect ourselves by maintaining a nuclear arsenal so powerful that they couldn't possibly survive a nuclear war, even if they launched a first strike?

This line of thought helps keep us in our ever-rising spiral of nuclear self-defense. And many of us will find it hard to achieve the trust we need to confidently break that spiral unless we see some evidence that the value the Soviets put on human life isn't as low as we think it is.

Of course, there are other impediments to arms control negotiations, and we don't *have* to trust the Soviets in order to attain a modicum of understanding with them. But truly successful negotiations on arms reduction, and a stable structure of understanding on political and military issues, won't come, I think, until we can develop at least a measure of such trust.

So Andropov's position on human rights, signaled by the Soviet resignation from the World Psychiatric Association, is as frightening as it is important. It represents a hardening that's likely to increase our distrust of the Soviets in precisely the sphere of competition that could destroy us both.

The way we respond to that message is also important. It's important to convince the Soviets that a hardening of their human rights policies will dim the chances for our common survival. It's important to explain to them why we care so much about their treatment of dissidents and would-be emigres. Their human rights practices, we should tell them, aren't just convenient targets for our intercontinental brickbats. We criticize those practices because we do care about a Scharansky, a Sakharov, a dissident who ends up in a psychiatric hospital, or a complaining psychiatrist who ends up in the Gulag. We care about those people because we see that the Soviets don't, and that makes us worry, in turn, that they may not care about people at all.

We shouldn't stop talking to the Soviets about the problem of psychiatric abuse — or about any violations of human rights — just because they've pulled themselves out of reach. We should raise those issues in the forums that are still available to us, such as the Helsinki talks. We should do so not to pummel the Soviets but to engage them — so that they can understand our concerns, and perhaps even, some day, join us in them.

The writer is a psychiatrist and a fellow at the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies.

Vol. 127 No. 25 Week ending December 19, 1982

(Reprinted by permission - The Manchester Guardian Weekly)

From the Common to the Hill

IT is curious how little faith the leaders of our oldest democracies betray in the workings of democracy itself. Freedom, they may proclaim with one speech, is an unextinguishable torch in the heart of mankind. When the Poles rebel, that torch burns brightly. But consider the obverse reaction when thirty thousand ring Greenham Common; when NATO bases in Germany endure moments of siege; when political movements protesting against pell-mell escalation of the arms race gain influence in Europe or (most significantly) in America. Then the torch is rapidly forgotten. The people who campaign or vote are dupes of Marxist manipulation. Mr Ronald Reagan reads damning excerpts from a recent Reader's Digest. The existence of dissent in democracy is portrayed as the cancer at its heart, rather than the reason for sustaining it. Of course the Soviet Union does not permit anti-nuclear demonstrations of any weight. Of course the ladies of the Common would have faced sore heads and Siberia had they so demonstrated outside Moscow. But that is not Western weakness. That is Western strength. And the bedrock of our defences over the coming decades will emerge not from what a tiny caucus of experts feel must be done, but from what the voters of the West insist upon. This is a real, continuing debate. Answers cannot, in the end, be imposed. They have to evolve; and, if weakness lies in their evolution, then there is no way we can exorcise such weakness without destroying the freedom that provides both the definition and the rationale of our society.

The simplest, most vital current example of this broad theme may be witnessed today not in Europe at all, but in the bunkers around Capitol Hill. It is almost two years since Ronald Reagan gained power. He won, then, on a multiplicity of issues: on his ability to string words together imposingly; on economic panaceas without pain; on abortion, lower taxes, law and order. Defence spending was one issue amongst many others. Mr Reagan and these around him believed that America had let its defences rust and decay, and that only a massive increase in expenditure across the board could repair such neglect. Within a year — in part because of the Strangelove rhetoric that accompanied renewal — a nuclear freeze movement had grown inside the States, embracing Congressmen of both the Republican and Democratic parties. For a few months, in the spring of 1982, the freeze became a dominant issue. Then, amid gathering recession, it slipped into a secondary role: still gathering votes, but afterthoughts compared to those driven by unemployment and slump.



Now, slowly in mid-winter, one may feel the freeze and the recession melding together as one central issue. America faces more record deficits, more interest rate agony, more budget cuts and more political anxiety. Mr Reagan (as he blithely told Time Magazine last week) sees defence spending as something quite apart from budgetary calculation. You tot up the defence bill separately and then implant it in the budget. After the MX defeat, he is unlikely to be so sanguine. MX is only the beginning now of a prolonged struggle with Congress which will — and must — find billions lopped away. Caspar Weinberger may propose. Congress disposes; and Congress — brick by brick and missile by missile — is no longer prepared (in American terms) to let the fat cats of the Pentagon merely run up whatever tab they desire.

There will be some uncomfortable moments through the months of struggle. What Tass reported about the House vote received much play back in America (just as the Mail and the Express deliriously found a Russian camera crew at Greenham Common). But the debate in America — because pitched at a higher plane — is probably proof from simplistic smears. The charge against Mr Reagan is not that America does not need strong defences, but that he has hopelessly botched his case and hopelessly fractured consensus: in short, that he has blundered politically. Mr Reagan and Mr Weinberger, on inheriting control, did not choose their weapons well. They pressed on with every costly project on the board. They assumed (or perhaps made no linkage to the fact) that such an array of weaponry could only be funded by a buoyant economy. They felt safe in their rhetoric about the "no-good bums" of the East. And now they are beginning to bang their heads against a ceiling of public tolerance — expressed in the departing Congress, to be expressed still more clearly by the incoming one. American administrations (for better or worse) are elected for four-year terms. There is a reckoning at the end of those four years. It was delusion for Mr Reagan, taking power, to talk of first repairing America's defences as an alleged means to disarmament. The lead time for such repairs can be a decade. There is no time — in a functioning democracy — for such a strategy to work unless (a) it is uncontroversial, and (b) can be afforded. Mr Reagan himself made the strategy controversial. It patently cannot be afforded.

What now flows? The worst (and likeliest) scenario is a period of bitter attrition, with the White House reluctant to shift its stance and Congress hacking piecemeal at whatever target — MX, the Pershing II, the B1 bomber — presents the chance of a coalition. But there is (as many more thoughtful voices on Capitol Hill are pointing out) a better way. The Geneva START talks — entered into by this Administration in response to European clamour — are one mechanism for curbing the arms race. American (not Russian, American) leaks from those talks portend substantial concessions from the new Moscow leadership; concessions swiftly brushed aside in Washington. That line, held to rigorously (and reportedly over the head of Paul Nitze, Mr Reagan's chosen negotiator), could be miserably self-defeating. If the Cruise and Pershings are ever to be deployed in Europe, then it is common ground here that America must have genuinely sought to bargain first. But this, increasingly, is more than a European perception. It is the perception in the Senate and House of Representatives too, one affecting not merely the new strategic weapons but the entire gamut of Pentagon spending. Mr Reagan, a democrat and a politician, is in the eternal, inescapable and blessed bind of all democratic politicians. He can't carry his people with him. He would be well advised to think again.

Is Reagan's 'Vision' of Missile Defense Possible?

"Let me share with you a vision of the future which offers hope," President Reagan proclaimed in a nationally televised speech March 23: "After careful consultation with my advisers, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I believe there is a way [to] counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive." The President suggested that if "we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies," then the security of the free world would depend no longer upon the threat of instant U.S. nuclear retaliation to deter a Soviet attack.

Reagan acknowledged "this is a formidable technical task, one that may not be accomplished before the end of this century. Yet current technology has attained a level of sophistication where it is reasonable for us to begin this effort." With this introduction, Reagan unveiled his plans for initiating a "comprehensive and intensive effort" to define the long-term research-and-development needs of an ambitious program aimed at "eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles." Specifically, he said: "I call upon the scientific community who gave us nuclear weapons to turn their great talents to the cause of world peace: to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons obsolete."

While the President didn't elaborate on what he had in mind, administration officials let it be known Reagan was referring to such exotic and futuristic concepts as lasers and "directed-beam" weapons — such as might be based in space.

With a few notable exceptions—among them Nobel laureate Edward Teller and George Keyworth, the President's science adviser — responses from the science community have thus far been lukewarm.

"Absurd," is how Jeremy Stone characterizes the President's plan. According to Stone, who directs the Federation of American Scientists, a nonprofit lobby representing 5,000 scientists and engineers (and which counts 47 Nobel laureates among its sponsors): "The President and secretary of defense are talking about this [defense from Soviet ballistic missiles] as if it were a challenge to scientists to put a man on the moon," says Stone. "But it's not like that. It's like trying to put a man on the moon while the Russians are trying to shoot the man down. If that had been the problem, we never would have succeeded in putting a man on the moon."

Ballistic-missile defense does not involve merely pitting scientists against nature, Stone contends. "This is a problem of scientists against scientists. And in this contest, their scientists are as good as ours. Furthermore, we are giving them the easy task," he says. Through its defense posture, the United States assumes the Soviets will strike first at U.S. cities, he posits, while "we take the difficult task of trying to protect, against all methods, having those cities destroyed." But, he says, "It's easier to destroy than to protect."

Arthur Schawlow, a Nobel Prize winner and co-inventor of the laser, agrees: "It's much easier for the attackers." Military planners have considered placing laser weapons in space to avoid the problem of beam absorption by the atmosphere. However, the Stanford University scientist contends, "A laser battle station out in space would be a sitting duck." The first thing the enemy will target, he says, is its opponent's laser space stations. What's more, he points out, space-based lasers would only have an unobstructed path to the missile they are targeting for the few minutes missiles are outside the atmosphere. And simple smoke screens or vapor clouds accompanying missiles could foil lasers during these vulnerable periods. Alternatively, he suggests, missiles could be equipped with multiple mirrors to deflect laser beams directed at them.

Richard Garwin, a defense-technology analyst at IBM's Thomas J. Watson Research Center in Yorktown Heights, N.Y., also believes the ballistic-missile defense schemes Reagan seems to be envisioning "won't work. I've worked on these things for many years," he told SCIENCE NEWS. "And if [the system] is to be based in space, satellites which carry it will be accompanied by Soviet space mines which will be exploded at the first outbreak of war." In contrast, land-based laser systems would be plagued by the fact that "it's technically unfeasible to get up to high enough altitude to be over the bulge of the earth—one-quarter way round the earth — to strike [missiles] while they are still in their boost phase." If you don't hit them then, you've got multiple, independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) — each with its own warhead—to hit. As a result, Garwin says, "We're just better off sticking with what the President says has successfully prevented war for 30 years—namely deterrence by the threat of retaliation."

But at a press conference this past Tuesday, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger scoffed at the technical naysayers. Developing a secure ballistic-missile defense, he said, is one problem "I'm confident American ingenuity can solve."

—J. Raloff

Excerpt from "Lasers for Missile Defense" (The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May, 1983):

"The idea that lasers in space could defeat a nuclear attack is fatally flawed. It is unlikely that any system of lasers, no matter how comprehensive, could destroy missiles with sufficient reliability to be regarded as the main component of a defense against nuclear attack. And even if it could, missiles are not the only means of delivering nuclear weapons. Moreover, putting in orbit a system of lasers big enough to begin to protect civilian targets from missile attack would require tremendous effort, most likely larger than any military project yet undertaken. Finally, the deployment of even a small laser system—despite its effectiveness as a defense—would create profound instabilities in the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union."

— Daniel Kaplan
(scientist with
Battelle Pacific Northwest
Laboratories, Washington, DC)

THE GUARDIAN, March 20, 1983

(Reprinted by permission from The Manchester Guardian)

Reagan slams godless communism

PRESIDENT REAGAN last week maintained his uncompromising stance on arms control with a ferocious denunciation of the Soviet Union. He told a conference of fundamentalist Christians in Orlando, Florida, that, "Simple-minded appeasement or wishful thinking about our adversaries is folly." The issue was not simply the arms race, but the struggle between right and wrong.

"I urge you to beware of the temptation of pride, the temptation blithely to declare yourselves above it all and to label both sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a gigantic misunderstanding . . . I ask you to resist the attempts of those who would have you withhold your support for this Administration's efforts to keep America strong and free while we negotiate real and verifiable reductions in the world's nuclear arsenals."

The Kremlin, he said, must be made to understand that the United States "will never compromise our principles and standards. Let us pray for those who live in that totalitarian darkness, pray they will discover the joy of knowing God. But, until they do, let us be aware that while they preach the supremacy of the state, declare its omnipotence over individual man and predict its eventual domination of all people of the earth, they are the focus of evil in the modern world".

Mr Reagan maintained his invective the following day, accusing Soviet leaders of "using their military power to extend their influence and enforce their will in every corner of the globe".

Mr Reagan's prepared remarks were part of the administration's public relations offensive to convince the American public and Congress that it would be unsafe to substantially cut the president's $274-billion military budget.

"If the American people are asked to support our defense program, they must get the straight facts about this threat," Mr. Reagan said.

Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger joined in the campaign by alleging at a Pentagon press conference that the Soviet Union was bent on "world domination".

A 107-page booklet entitled "Soviet Military Power" was released for publication at the start of that press conference. In it the Defense Intelligence Agency gives what it says are details about the Soviet nuclear and conventional forces. The report, however, makes no startling disclosures.

It says the Russians are flight-testing a new generation of ground, sea, and air launched cruise missiles. Other developments included test flights of the new Blackjack strategic bomber, equivalent to the American B-1 but said to be larger than the US aircraft; deployment of a new phased array radar and interceptors to strengthen the anti-ballistic missile defences round Moscow; appearance of the new PT-80 main battle tank; and test firings of the 25,000-ton Typhoon class submarine's 550-mile range missile with multiple independently targeted (MIRVed) warheads.

A senior official involved with the booklet, in briefing reporters on the agency's findings, said his own opinion after reading the secret information was that Soviet forces "don't have an edge" over U.S. strategic forces. "Strategically we are better," he said.

His conclusion caused laughter among reporters and consternation among Pentagon officials.

Later a "supplementary" statement was released that, like the first one, was issued on a "background" basis, which means that it is not for attribution. In the second statement, the senior official said: "I meant the United States has an edge in the largest sense — society compared to society."

He added he agreed with Mr. Weinberger's statement that "the Soviets have acquired a margin of nuclear superiority in most important categories".

The Soviet government news agency Tass sharply assailed President Reagan's Florida speech as "provocative" and said it demonstrated that his administration "can think only in terms of confrontation and bellicose, lunatic anticommunism". It called his speech a fit "of anti-Soviet bellicose hysteria" grounded in "Reagan's pathological hatred for socialism and communism". Tass said the president was ignorant of the subject matter he was talking about because "in the whole of his lifetime (he) has never opened a book (of) the classics of Marxism-Leninism".

Tass also denounced the Pentagon report on Soviet military strength as a mixture of "lies and distortions" designed to "frighten and confuse" the American people and generate public support for the administration's plan to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union.

Specifically, Tass said, the booklet claimed the United States had 241 B-52 strategic bombers despite the fact that the SALT II treaty puts the number at 574.

The commentary said the booklet contained contradictory facts. On one hand, Tass said, it assumed that all Soviet missiles had multiple warheads while pointing out, on another page, that this was not the case.

COMMENT *Incomprehension*

THERE is, as yet, no definitive evidence: but the days since Helmut Kohl's triumphant election have been thoroughly queasy ones for European governments worrying about Cruise deployment. What, one may wonder, is the problem? The Bonn electoral hurdle is past: but the American rhetorical hurdle grows by the hour. George Bush learnt a good deal on his panicky tour of Europe; in particular he learnt that the zero option must soon be superseded by a practical and genuine US offer in Geneva. The bones of such an offer exist. Yet now, apparently convinced that Kohl's victory solves all problems, Washington is rowing back to zero and the President is rowing back in public to his ancient cue card saws about "the totalitarian darkness" of an "aggressive, evil Soviet empire". There could be no greater or more foolish miscalculation. The essential Cruise deployment problem has always been the Reagan problem. Does he really want to negotiate? Does he truly seek a stable relationship with Moscow? As the adjectives rain down, Mrs Thatcher and her friends in Bonn, Paris and Rome must see the spectre of the uncomprehending old President once more plucking potential humiliation from the jaws of victory.

Commonweal



TIME TO ACCEPT THE CHALLENGE

WAR, thought St. Augustine, might sometimes be required to combat flagrant wrongdoing. But that did not make either a justifiable war or the human injustices that might or might not necessitate it any easier to contemplate. "Let everyone, then, who thinks with pain on all these great evils, so horrible, so ruthless," wrote Augustine in *The City of God*, acknowledge this misery for what it is. "And if anyone either endures or thinks of them without mental pain, this is a more miserable plight still," he warned. Such a person has simply "lost human feeling."

Fifteen hundred years after Augustine the mental pain involved in thinking about war is all the greater. There is, of course, the terrible, truly unimaginable destructive power of tens of thousands of nuclear warheads. And there are the brain-racking paradoxes of deterrence that seem to turn so many of our commonsense notions, including our moral ones, upside-down. The Catholic bishops who have now produced the third draft of the pastoral letter on war and peace in a nuclear era have obviously not spared themselves any mental pain. For almost two years now they have been concentrating their minds on the horrible potential of nuclear weapons, the intricacies of deterrence theory, the developing moral teaching of the church, the demands of God's word. They have had to accommodate different views within their own committee; they have tried to respond to the suggestions voiced last November by fellow bishops; they have been subject to appeals and arguments mounted by organized Catholic groups to the left and right, by the U.S. government, by European hierarchies, and by the Vatican. The document they have forged is not perfect; it can be improved by amendment. But even as it stands, *The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response* is a wise and challenging guide for the church's peacemaking effort, and a serious contribution to the national search for a way back from the brink of nuclear catastrophe. *The Challenge of Peace* deserves to be accepted overwhelmingly by the American bishops.

This third and, we hope, final draft of the pastoral letter has already been the subject of many judgments. A good many of them, unfortunately, show little evidence of the "mental pain" that marks the bishops' own hard-wrought effort. One group of observers, for example, seem interested mainly in whether the pastoral is "for" or "against" the Reagan administration. The administration itself detonated this line of thought by ostentatiously and inaccurately hailing the latest draft as an endorsement of its own nuclear arms policies. Politics is politics, and except for the tactical shrewdness of this move, it should have surprised no one. What was surprising, however, was the reaction of a number of peace activists who seemed to put their usual skepticism toward the administration aside and dutifully take these claims at face value. They were pushed in that direction, of course, by the substitution of the word "curb" for the word "halt" in a passage that had been taken,

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(Continued) →

justifiably, as an endorsement of the nuclear freeze movement — the new terminology being promptly seized upon, with considerably less justification, by anti-freeze leaders as a repudiation of the freeze resolution now before Congress. While the bishops may repair this impression through the amending process and while Cardinal Bernardin and Archbishop Roach were right in correcting the administration's attempt to co-opt the pastoral, there is a larger point: the issues the letter addresses stretch back several administrations and will not go away tomorrow (or in November, 1984). Even the transforming of deterrence by nuclear "war-fighting" doctrines did not start with the Reagan administration. A pastoral letter need not be written "for the ages," especially one dealing with the question of whether there will be any "ages" at all. Still, it should be read and evaluated in a time frame larger than one session of Congress.

A second line of criticism is equally superficial. The pastoral letter, it is said, is not "prophetic." The word is meant to indicate something of style, something of substance. In style a properly "prophetic" statement would be short, laced with ringing phrases, issuing assertions without elaboration, launching condemnations without qualification. (One journalistic pseudo-Isaiah, complaining that the draft pastoral lacked a single memorable phrase, offered his own alternative, filled with memorable phrases like, "As Christians, therefore, we have decided to alter completely our priorities. . . .") Undoubtedly, the pastoral would have profited from some editorial blue-penciling. It is too long, too slowed by quotations, too burdened with passages "traded off" among committee members of differing viewpoints. (Isaiah and Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Amos, Nahum, Habakkuk, and Zechariah might sound different if they had been required to prophesy as a committee.) But this raises questions about the church that we cannot explore here: Is the teaching role of our bishops to be exercised in the inspired manner of Isaiah? Are there not other more appropriate and equally authentic models by which today's church formulates its doctrine? Not that the advocates of "prophetic" statements have such matters in mind. They are thinking of public impact. And they are forgetting that religious statements, filled with ringing phrases and sweeping condemnations, have been rolling forth from various church bodies for years — to the maximum emotional satisfaction of their authors and with minimum impression on the public. It is precisely because *The Challenge of Peace* is a long, nuanced document that cannot be dismissed by expert opinion, on the one hand, and that holds out the potential of forging a new consensus in the nation's largest religious denomination, on the other, that it has been debated on the front pages of the daily papers instead of relegated to the church news.

But the complaint that the pastoral is insufficiently "prophetic" has a substantive dimension as well. In many cases, the pastoral's critics simply believe that the nuclear deterrent is immoral, period. They favor unilateral nuclear disarmament, and they evaluate the successive drafts of the pastoral largely by the one criterion of whether it moves toward or away from their own conviction. The problem is not that this position is held. The pastoral itself admits the force of the argument against the deterrent; its own moral acceptance of deterrence is "strictly conditioned"; and one would have to admit that even this acceptance rests more on a resort to papal citation than on any well developed moral defense. Nonetheless, the bishops' position strikes us as *earned*, based on a grappling with all the facts. All too often, the critics' position does not. Indeed, some of the outstanding critics have never spelled out their case in full. At one point, they call for unqualified Catholic opposition to the nuclear deterrent on the basis of the Gospel and moral law. At another point, they call for it because it will preserve the world from nuclear holocaust. But the second argument does not follow, at least not automatically, from the first. Pronouncing a Catholic anathema on nuclear weapons will not make them go away, not even America's, let alone the Soviet Union's. It could, in fact, increase the likelihood of their use. Thomas J. Reese, writing in *America* and worried that the latest draft does not stress that deterrence puts us "in a damnably sinful situation," nonetheless admits, "Unilateral disarmament could just as likely increase the possibility of nuclear war as lessen it."

Does our faith require us to refuse all complicity with these weapons even if that not only weakens our defense of political values that do matter but also actually brings the holocaust nearer? Reese says "no," while the conservative theologian Germain Grisez, in his criticism of the pastoral, effectively says "yes." But too many of the "prophetic" critics of the bishops have not, at least not publicly, faced the question at all.

For the time being, deterrence remains the worst method of staving off nuclear disaster except for all the others. Deterrence, however, means different things to different people. For a few friends of the Reagan administration deterrence is a dream of restoring the military edge which made Moscow blink at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. Others would not go that far, but do see deterrence as a crumbling barrier threatened by Soviet advances and Western peaceniks and badly in need of vast technical refurbishment. Others, like the *New York Times* or the *New Republic*, feel that deterrence needs to be defended against the extravagances of our own strategists and technicians no less than against Soviet designs; but they remain suspicious of popular efforts to influence the delicate adjustments of politicians and arms controllers. Finally there are those who see deterrence itself as generating its own instability and therefore the proper object of constant citizen vigilance as well as elite reform, indeed a system of "peace of a sort" that must be put under steady and deliberate moral pressure in the determination that no escape from its dangers will pass unexplored. The bishops' pastoral falls in this last category.

The bishops have tried to say a decisive and definitive "no" to nuclear war, but without saying a definitive "no" to deterrence. Some say that is a contradiction. We say that there is no way to say a definitive "no" to deterrence without at least risking a "yes" to nuclear war. Politically and morally, the bishops' position is the best that can be done.

The following is an excerpt from the article in MANAS, "A Long Way To Go", FEBRUARY 23, 1983 VOLUME XXXVI, No. 8 :-

ALL men desire peace," said Thomas à Kempis some five hundred years ago, adding that "few men desire those things that make for peace." This seems to cover practically everything that can be said about putting an end to war. Yet it has had little effect on behavior, the reason, no doubt, being the obscurity of the connection between moral causes and political effects. It might reduce that obscurity to turn his saying around: "Few men desire war, but (nearly) all men desire those things that make for war." This doesn't change the meaning of what à Kempis said, but it makes specific criticism easier. That is, it seems easier to trace the bad effects of bad causes than it is to trace good causes to good results. Consider medicine. There are countless fairly precise definitions of diseases, which are blamed on germs, heredity, and poor personal habits, but health remains a mystery. Health is "holistic" and described mostly by slogans, while bodily ills have particular symptoms which can be noted and often tracked to particular causes. As the British physician, G.T. Wrench, has put it: "We make no studies of the healthy—only the sick."

There is a reason for this. Sickness attracts attention; health, when you have it, enables you not to have to think about it. Of course, exceptional individuals—perhaps philosophical individuals—give instinctive or intuitive attention to the laws of health (whatever they are) and so are more free from disease. Their counsels, however, when they are willing to make them, are so general that professional doctors ignore them. "That isn't scientific," the conventionally trained physician says. "It isn't based on experiment," he says, and he is right; it is based on good life and good health, for which there are no definitions, only splendid generalizations.

In a good society, a society of people who are philosophically inclined, the generalizations would be enough. The people would see the point and conduct their lives in ways that make for health—and peace. For us they are not enough. A sick society is used to being given particulars, having things spelt out for getting rid of particular evils, obtaining particular goods. Most books supposed to be on health are actually about diseases, as the index will show. Still, there are a few fine books on health by doctors who sought out healthy people, noted how they lived (as well as where), and most of all what they ate. The consensus of such authors has been that the Hunzas of India (now Pakistan), who number about six thousand and live in a sunny valley seven miles long, between cliffs as high as 15,000 feet, are the healthiest people in the world. The noted nutritionist, Robert McCarrison, told his colleagues in medicine that the Hunzas have practically no diseases because of what they eat and the way they raise their food. J.I. Rodale (founder of *Organic Gardening*) wrote *The Healthy Hunzas* to celebrate their achievement. So, in the area of health, we do have people whom we could study, and books like *The Wheel of Health* (Schocken) by Dr. G.T. Wrench, on the sources of the Hunzas' long life and health bring home to us what we need to know. Unfortunately, not very many people read them.

But what has this to do with peace? Years ago, one of the American visitors to the Hunza Valley asked their ruler, known as the *Mir*, why they were left alone by their more powerful neighbors. He smiled and said, "We are a society of *just enough*." Explaining, he said that while the Hunzas had great health, they had little wealth. No one had sufficient reason to want to conquer them for spoils. There weren't any. It is the rich countries that provoke wars, from fear of being poorer or wanting to be richer. All things being equal, then, if you want to live at peace, become or stay poor. But no one wants to be poor! Well, as Thomas à Kempis warned, few men desire those things that make for peace. There must, people say, be another way. Why can't we be peaceful *and* prosperous?

Perhaps we can, but it's necessary to add another rule—no peace without justice. We, of course, *believe* in justice. But to get peace by *doing* justice is, as all the prosperous nations agree, too expensive. And they insist that there must be another way, which comes down to having more bombs.

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WHAT DO THEY WANT?

WHY GREAT POWERS DO WHAT THEY DO

Commonweal:
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A FEW YEARS AGO I asked a student of political and military affairs what was the source of Russian interest in Angola. It seemed such a remote, useless, God-forsaken spot. It was a ridiculous distance from the Soviet Union, it had no natural wealth to recommend it, the climate was unappealing, South Africa was large, close and hostile. Why would the Russians risk something which mattered — détente with the United States — for an expensive adventure bound to make enemies and strain their relations with friends? (For that matter, I had always found it hard to comprehend Portugal's willingness to beggar itself for nothing more than the illusion of empire.) My friend was a bit puzzled himself. The best answer he could find was arcane in the extreme; the development of over-the-horizon radar, he said, would allow Soviet clients to keep track of shipping traffic around the Cape of Good Hope.

But there was no puzzlement in Washington. A base in Angola would threaten Namibia (one of the world's leading diamond producers) and the Congo (an important source of uranium and other minerals). It would provide a sanctuary for black rebels fighting the white regime of South Africa, thus giving Moscow a voice in the fate of an important part of the globe. It offered further proof of the utility of Cuban proxies. And so on and so forth. These explanations all made sense of a geo-political sort — they are the common stuff of debate in world capitals — but still left the central mystery intact. Why should the Soviet Union care about events so far away, promising benefits so marginal, involving peoples whose vernacular tongues are unknown to all but a handful of Russians. There is something nutty in ambition of this kind. Foreign offices think it quite a matter of course but people of the nations they represent — Russia in this instance, the United States in others — simply don't care. Can it really be that the lives of ordinary people are not just affected but actually determined by *everything* that happens *anywhere*?

If the death of détente can be blamed on something anyone *did*, then it was probably the fault of Russian adventures in Ethiopia, Yemen, and Angola. The "strategic" location of Ethiopia and Yemen, close to the Persian Gulf, naturally concerned policy-makers in Washington, since Europe and Japan are both heavily dependent on Arab oil. But the genuine alarm of American officials was probably the result of Russian success as much as anything else. Sending Cuban troops was a bold act. In the wake of Vietnam the United States was unable to respond in kind. This made officials feel helpless and impotent. Doubtless their "success" made Russian officials feel good — strong, daring, and effective. But it's hard to see that these endeavors made sense, even from Moscow's point of view, in the long run. They finished off the spirit of détente, which doomed SALT, which prompted a vast American military buildup, which meant the Soviet Union would have to respond in kind. The cost to Russia of this melancholy chain of events is bound to be billions of dollars, hardship at home, a renewed fear of war. And for what?

My point here is not to blame the world's current state of tension on the Russians — in the past we have done similar things which scared them — but to ask why great powers pursue their "interests" on such a vast scale. This is what seems to trouble and mystify ordinary citizens. Hatred is easy to understand as a cause of tension and war, and it is easy to understand how injury can lead to hatred. There is nothing mystifying about the Arab-Israeli wars. Over the last hundred years a million European Jews have migrated to Palestine and now live where Arabs used to live. It comes as no surprise that the Arabs feel a sense of injury. But the Jews came in flight, seeking a refuge. The millions who failed to escape were mostly murdered. The Russians can make no similar claim of the right of self-defense to explain their probings in Africa, Afghanistan, the Caribbean, Vietnam, and Cambodia, not to mention Eastern Europe. Russia has territory, people and resources in plenty. If it's power that Moscow is after, there is vast untapped potential for power at home. If the Russians could get as much out of the working day as the Dutch or the Japanese, who could stand against them? Indeed, the Russian economy is starved for the very funds and attention squandered on foreign adventures. In addition, the staggering cost of defense is importantly — perhaps even largely — the result of the fears which these adventures arouse abroad. It has been this way for two hundred years. The Russia inherited by the Bolsheviks was the result of long imperial expansion east towards China, south towards India, west and southwest into the Baltic and the Balkans. We can explain each acquisition till the cows come home; it is the whole which is troubling. What do the Russians want?

Doubtless the Russians could ask the same of us. When Russia was only landlocked misery surrounding the wooden cathedrals of Moscow, America was a couple of million people east of the Allegheny mountains. We got our size the same way the Russians got theirs — by taking it from weaker neighbors. But this only begs the question. What the Russians want — and what we want — is ultimately the source of the trouble between us, the thing which goes deeper than policy or even history and pushes us toward war. What they want and what we want undoes the initiatives of diplomats, it overrides the caution of allies, it poisons understanding, mocks the sentiments of peacemakers, arouses suspicion. It is what goes wrong when things go wrong. It is the elemental part of what makes us adversaries, the thing which makes us wake up at night, and keeps us busy at the frontiers.

The closest parallel to this elemental wanting I can think of — so close it may spring from the same source — is the appetite characteristic of business titans. Many examples can be found in Matthew Josephson's book, *The Robber Barons*, but none reveals the pattern more clearly than the recent attempt of the oil millionaire Nelson Bunker Hunt to manipulate the silver market. Hunt was never formally charged with trying to corner the market in silver futures, which is a crime, but most observers think that is, in effect, what he was up to. By steady purchases of bullion and futures Hunt and his partners drove the price of silver up from around $12 an ounce to $50, at which point the price collapsed. The puzzling thing about this episode is why

Hunt did it. If things had worked out differently he might have made a billion dollars, but what can a billion dollars buy which scores of millions cannot? A man can only eat and drink so much. A house can only be so big before you get lost in it. When yachts grow beyond a certain



size you might as well book passage on a ship. By all accounts Hunt had money enough, long before the silver adventure, to do anything a man might want to do, or acquire anything a man might want to acquire. A billion dollars is a nutty sort of goal, a source of trouble rather than gratification. And yet there are many men who would like a billion dollars, many who have ruined themselves in the attempt to get it, even a few who have succeeded. Ordinary people can hardly conceive of desire on such a scale.

It would be easier to understand if the men who struggle for such sums had in the back of their minds something they wanted to *do* with it. Most seem to have no such plan. Howard Hughes, towards the end of his life, bought a large chunk of Las Vegas. This is a truly unfathomable endeavor. What did he plan to *do* with Las Vegas? Apparently nothing. It was enough simply to own it. There is no evidence he even liked gambling. He seems to have had no interest in show girls. He was indifferent to stand-up comics and Frank Sinatra. Not even the climate, which is spectacular, seems to have attracted him. He secluded himself at the top of one of his hotels, sealed all the windows, worried excessively about germs, and drove the local citizens half crazy with trying to figure out what he was up to. So far as I know Hughes built nothing in Las Vegas. He merely owned it for awhile. Then he grew weary of the venture and departed. Doubtless he sold out at a profit. So what? He had long passed the point where more money could have any practical material effect on his life.

This elemental wanting is characteristic of big corporations as well. A few years ago fierce bidding wars for oil companies dominated the financial news. I remember reading that one of the contestants for the Marathon Oil Company — I think it was Mobil — had put together a line of credit of *seven billion dollars* for the deal. But U.S. Steel got Marathon instead. What did the loser do with the $7 billion? Nothing. That was money enough for a great venture. It could have bought the whole of the South Bronx. But the line of credit simply expired, unused. The lack of imagination inherent in such bidding wars is breathtaking. What difference does it make who owns Marathon? *Somebody* has to own it. The real challenge would be to create something new, but a kind of Gresham's Law seems to be at work here. The acquisitive spirits tend to overwhelm the creative spirits. They don't want to acquire great business empires *for* anything; they just want them.

Nations seem to be much the same. They don't want influence, territory, and power *for* anything. Simply having them is enough. The appetite which made a nation get big pushes it on to get bigger still. It is a blind, instinctive thing, overriding doubts and caution. The rulers of empires can't seem to help themselves. They didn't rise to power by minding the store. When they meet an obstacle the pressure builds until something gives. Then ordinary citizens pay the bill.

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