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# Teach National Security

By Adele Simmons



Gerald Thomas

AMHERST, Mass. — On June 12, half a million people marched in New York City in support of a nuclear freeze. These days, thousands of college students who marched are returning to campuses and continuing their efforts to end the arms race. Their return is a challenge: Only a few colleges have the faculty, courses and programs to support learning about issues of this kind. But their return is an opportunity, too: The study of national security can be an especially apt vehicle for liberal education.

National security will be the subject of intense discussion in dormitories and coffee houses, but this is not enough. The subject should be brought into the academic curriculum through full-fledged courses.

Some argue that an emotional commitment to one side of an issue interferes with learning about it. I recognize that it may. But it may promote learning, too.

When undergraduates explore a subject of passionate interest, they move beyond the quest for grades and the confines of reading lists. One student I know whose central interest was in verification problems associated with the strategic arms limitation treaties found himself delving more deeply into physics than a political science major might otherwise do.

Many students are questioning Government and corporate involvement in weapons production and sales. We are all better off if such students are informed and understand all sides of the debate.

One of our goals as educators is to enable students to identify and test their own basic assumptions and those of experts and leaders, and to develop their own conclusions about complicated problems. The study of underlying assumptions is inevitably a part of the study of national security, an area in which different conclusions are regularly drawn from the same "facts." The Pentagon uses them to support its case that we must invest in weapons in order to survive. The Federation of American Scientists uses the same facts to argue for ending the nuclear arms race. What assumptions shape these conclusions? By learning to see and evaluate assumptions, students can develop responsible positions for themselves, and they can discover the elusiveness of an "objective" reading of the facts.

A mystique has grown up around the fields essential to an understanding of the subject of peace and war. Many experts say it is too complicated for others to understand. Some of us respond with relief, saying, "We leave it to you." In a democratic society, educators have a responsibility to prepare nonspecialists to exercise informed judgment about such questions. To meet this responsibility may be the most important job of liberal education today. That the subject is urgent and complicated means that educators must scramble to find ways to teach it — not that undergraduates cannot fathom it.

Few professors are trained in arms control or weapons systems, but at most colleges there are faculty members whose training equips them to acquire background sufficient to teach a new subject. For example, one professor of history spent this summer revising a seminar on "America since World War II" to focus nearly exclusively on nuclear weapons. The seminar is "based on the assumption that responsible citizens must think about nuclear war and weapons, in part because it is the most important public-policy issue in the world today, and in part because it provides a window (not of vulnerability but of understanding) into essential features of the modern American character."

I believe that most faculty members would be eager to apply their specialized skills in this way, especially if it meant collaborating with colleagues from other disciplines. A few colleges still discourage faculty members from trying new subjects and approaches, but most are finding that one excellent stimulus to a faculty member's development is the opportunity to use scholarly training to explore a new problem and to team-teach with scholars in other disciplines.

College presidents have usually balked at speaking out on public questions. While there are serious arguments against our taking political positions, we also recognize the danger of slavish conformity, of remaining silent about, say, significant violations of human rights.

We can provide leadership in building a saner world without compromising our institutions. By leadership I do not mean that every president must be a public advocate. Some college presidents understandably feel that they may chill debate on their campuses if they make public their own views on controversial issues. All of us, however, can work to provide an environment that encourages thorough examination of such urgent matters as national security and the arms race. If we move these issues nearer the top of our own curricular agenda, we help move them toward the top of the nation's agenda.

*Adele Simmons is president of Hampshire College.*

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WORKING PAPERS
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# AN INTERVIEW WITH MARY KALDOR

*Over the past two years a huge and influential new peace movement has emerged in Europe. Frightened and angered by the prospect that Europe could become the "theater" of a nuclear confrontation between the superpowers, Europeans, by the hundreds of thousands, took to the streets in 1981. Since then, Europeans have organized protests, conferences, sit-ins, camp-ins, and rock festivals that have made the European peace movement a leading force in the anti-nuclear debate.*

*As in the United States, one of the most interesting phenomena of the European nuclear disarmament movement has been the presence of women in key leadership positions in countries across the continent. Mary Kaldor, in Britain, is one of these women.*

*Kaldor, 36, comes from socialist roots. She is the daughter of the Labour Party economist Nicholas Kaldor, who was a leading architect of Labour's postwar program for Britain. She took her degree—in politics, philosophy, and economics—at Somerville College, Oxford. Soon after she went to work at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. A winner of the Ford Foundation's 1976 research competition on arms control and international security, she has written extensively for the (London)* Times, *the* New York Review of Books, *the* Spectator *and the* Guardian. *She currently teaches politics at the University of Sussex and is a fellow of the University of Sussex's Science Policy Research Unit and Institute for Development Studies.*

*Kaldor's first book,* The Disintegrating West, *is an analysis of how the decline of the nation state and the rise of multinationals have changed the face of international economics and politics. In* The Baroque Arsenal, *published last year in the United States, she takes on the extraordinary waste and irrationality of the military industrial establishment in both the United States and the Soviet Union.*

*Kaldor believes that the new peace movement has sprung up in response to the current world crisis of the nation state—a crisis that exists both in the East and the West. Peace activists, she feels, are not just motivated by fear of the horrific consequences of nuclear devastation, but also by their exclusion from politics and their hope that they can restructure the political universe. To her, the issue of nuclear arms is the issue of democracy—to prevent experts from unleashing World War III requires a democratic politics, just as workplace democracy would enhance conversion from military to civilian production. The effort to forge links with Eastern Europe suggests a new international system that democratically resolves conflict. Her belief in non-hierarchical structures of power bespeaks the influence of feminist ideas on her thinking.*

*She has just published a new book, edited with English arms expert Dan Smith,* Disarming Europe. *Kaldor, Smith, and historian E.P. Thompson are three of the original founders of European Nuclear Disarmament, one of Britain's leading peace organizations. She currently sits on its steering board. This interview was conducted by* Working Papers *associate editor Suzanne Gordon.*

**Working Papers:** *Your most recent book is entitled* The Baroque Arsenal. *In it you describe the terrible economic and political costs of the arms race. What do you mean by the term "baroque arsenal"?*

**Kaldor:** Most people usually assume that decisions about weapons are rational, that our policy makers assess the threats of the nation and then purchase the weapons the country needs. But when there isn't a war, decisions about who is threatening, and how you meet those threats are very subjective. Decisions are made by people in the know—by soldiers, by defense departments, by designers in the defense industry. But because of their experience, they have very traditional notions about appropriate weaponry. They tend to perfect the kinds of weapons used in World War II, in spite of the fact that there have been major technological changes since then.

Consequently, we've forced our thinking about nuclear weapons into a structure imposed on us by that war. We hear Brezhnev and Reagan talking about numbers all the time. Yet anyone with the minimum of common sense knows that it's absolutely irrelevant to talk about 7,000 nuclear weapons versus 5,000 or 9,000 versus 7,000 when you

know how much devastation one or two will do.

For the past thirty-five years we've been conditioned to view World War III as a hypothetical extension of World War II: to imagine that it's merely a bigger and better version of World War II.

**Working Papers:** *So people then believe that nuclear weapons are just bigger and better versions of the weapons we had in World War II?*

**Kaldor:** In Marx's *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon* he says that men's revolutions and experiences in the past weigh like a nightmare on the brains of the living. That's certainly true of the military, and the arms race. Policy makers are always refering back to the late 1930s and talking about the risks of appeasement. We equate the Soviet threat with the Nazi threat, and see ourselves on the side that's fighting for freedom and democracy. And we produce weapons that won World War II, because what won that war were the ship, the tank, and the aircraft. In World War II it was possible for the tank to roll over the plains of Europe without anyone being able to stop it.

We work on things like speed, range, protection, although many changes in technology make those particular things irrelevant. Just look at the Falklands crisis. It took one Exocet missile to knock out a Sheffield destroyer that cost us, at the time, £25 million. What sense does it make to have these gigantic surface ships when they are so incredibly vulnerable?

**Working Papers:** *So you're saying the technology of destruction makes these weapons obsolete?*

**Kaldor:** Right. And because their military effectiveness is limited, it doesn't make sense to concentrate all your resources into one big weapons system. Moreover, these weapons systems aren't just immensely destructive, they're also fantastically expensive. They require enormous numbers of spare parts, and parts are a tremendous problem in the military. Parts tend to break down often and require huge amounts of fuel to bring in new ones.

Take the 1977 Arab-Israeli war. It took a ton of jet fuel from Israel for every ton of supplies brought in. If the Israelis' jet fuel supply had been bombed, which could easily have happened, the whole operation would have been ruined.

**Working Papers:** *In your book you explain that baroque weapons systems are born of the marriage between technical dynamism and conservatism. You say this inhibits progress. Yet, to an American, this seems a contradiction in terms. We believe technical dynamism defines progress.*

**Kaldor:** The idea of baroque weaponry contradicts that kind of thinking. Of course the idea that you could actually be wasting your time making something that is completely useless doesn't occur to policy makers. We believe science and technology, by its very nature, is efficient. We assume that even if science is directed toward bad ends, it at least accomplishes them efficiently.

That's why the analogy with art is so useful. People understand that baroque art is art that has become more and more elaborate and less and less functional. Finally, it becomes rococo and becomes ridiculous.

**Working Papers:** *And our military hardware is getting rococo?*

**Kaldor:** Yes, in fact, "Rococo Arsenal" might have been a better title, but it would have sounded silly. MX is certainly rococo. So this concept demystifies technology because it helps people see that these weapons which seem like great miracles of science are actually decadent and not at all useful.

**Working Papers:** *But you also add that this decadence is a result of our not being able to use nuclear weapons. The military has created a system that precludes what psychologists call reality testing. And it seems that the more these weapons aren't used, the more convoluted and unusual they become.*

**Kaldor:** That's right. People can decide to buy Toyotas or Datsuns instead of American cars when American cars become baroque. But that doesn't happen with weapons systems. Everybody buys American. And precisely because these weapons are built for an imaginary war, which never takes place, it's possible for the soldiers and designers to go as far as they like with their designs. They tell the President of the United States or the people that if we don't get these weapons we will be defeated in this imaginary war. There's no way to test that.

PHOTO BY ARTHUR W. WANG

**Working Papers:** *But wasn't Vietnam a test? It was, after all, a real war where real weapons were used.*
**Kaldor:** Yes, but if anything Vietnam proved my point. It proved that modern technology wasn't appropriate to win wars; that to win you have to understand the politics of a war. All the problems one might have predicted happened in Vietnam. The war caused horrific devastation, without any real military gains. It required huge amounts of supplies and spare parts and support personnel. Yet there were always shortages. It involved a total breakdown in the authority structure of the armed forces—which had been built around these weapons systems and a belief in technology.

What is really interesting is that no one has learned these lessons. People are always saying Vietnam is different, it doesn't apply because what we're talking about is an imaginary war that takes place in Europe, through a confrontation of superpowers. In Vietnam, they say, we were fighting a very unsophisticated opponent. Yet, if we were fighting a real war I think the tactics used in Vietnam would be used there too. They would be the only way to combat this incredible technology.

**Working Papers:** *Yet despite all this, the interlock between industry and the military keeps pushing us toward baroqueness?*
**Kaldor:** I make two points in my book. On the one hand, we have these very conservative institutions—the military establishment and the defense industry. All are built around the weapons we used in World War II. At the same time, the military contractors operate according to the principles of private enterprise. They have to compete in order to survive. This does not, however, produce price competition but rather intense technological competition, because if you have a single customer it makes sense to make things more expensive.

**Working Papers:** *It also makes sense to make things more complex.*
**Kaldor:** Right; the teams that design these things get bigger and bigger and nobody has responsibility for anything except a small part. In the past, all the great aircraft designers were men with vision who would follow the project through and make the necessary adjustments in design. Today, these things are designed by huge teams who do it all by computer and mathematics. In this system, mistakes get multiplied because workers' interest lies in covering up their mistakes. In a big hierarchical organization, they're not particularly interested in the success of the whole enterprise.

**Working Papers:** *Does the Soviet Union operate in this way?*
**Kaldor:** Not only does their military operate in this way, but the whole Soviet system operates this way. I was just recently reading Rudolph Bahro's book *The Alternative in Eastern Europe*. Bahro is an East German who now lives in West Germany and he argues that in the Eastern bloc all anyone is concerned about is covering up their mistakes. Nobody is really interested in producing something that's useful because they're all so low in the hierarchy that they're only worried about their careers.

What's different about the Soviet system, therefore, is its lack of technological dynamism. It has the same conservatism, the same institutions that are hangovers from World War II. In fact, there it's even worse. That's why the Soviet Union has so many tanks.

**Working Papers:** *Because they believe that tanks win wars?*
**Kaldor:** Right. And they believe in numbers because the plan operates on the basis of numbers. That means producing a lot of numbers even if they're wrong numbers. If you're told to produce 6,000 left shoes, you produce them even if there are no right shoes to go with them. The point is, technological dynamism is lacking in the Soviet Union. It gets its technological dynamism from the United States.

**Working Papers:** *How does that affect the prospects for disarmament? Are you saying that if the West didn't set the technological pace, then the Eastern bloc would not continue to propel forward in the arms race?*
**Kaldor:** Yes, and that's precisely why a freeze could be very successful. If the West adopted a unilateral freeze and stopped making weapons systems the Soviet Union would go on making weapons but it wouldn't make new systems. But of course to change fundamentally the political system in both East and West is far more problematical.

**Working Papers:** *What would you suggest?*
**Kaldor:** It seems to me that, in the West, when we press for disarmament, we've also got to press to change our institutions, and we have to press for conversion from the arms industry. I would probably have to link that to very different kinds of economic policies. For instance, drawing up a conversion bill for Britain a bit like McGovern did in the United States. In a more radical version ordinary shop stewards and workers could go to a Defense Industry Conversion Committee and propose alternative products. That would be a very major step in mobilizing opinion for disarmament. It could change the defense industry and unwind some of this technological dynamism.

**Working Papers:** *What would be a Soviet counterpart of such a process?*
**Kaldor:** This is what's worrying. Can one envisage a Russian counterpart? Going back to what's hap-

pening in the West, we've seen that baroque weapons have caused a crisis on a number of different levels. President Reagan has introduced this huge peacetime military budget, yet it's still not enough to finance all the weapon systems that are on order. In the West people are beginning to realize on a broader scale that if the money didn't go into the defense industry it might be solving forms of unemployment. People are beginning to protest all this. Now the question is, are there similar protests in the Soviet Union and how can those protests be expressed and how do they operate through the party system?

If you'd asked me this question a year or two ago, I'd have just been very depressed about it. There's no question that Soviet authorities recognize that military spending is an incredible burden that is traded off against the standard of living. There's no question that they are having fantastic problems with economic growth. They can't generate the technology they need. They've become more dependent on direct imports of Western civil-

*One Exocet missile knocked out a £25 million destroyer. What's the sense in gigantic ships that are so vulnerable?*

ian technology, and now they are incredibly indebted. They're paying off their debts through commercial sales of armaments, which makes them more interventionist in the Third World. Added to which are the economic problems of Eastern Europe. Unfortunately this hasn't only produced protest but greater oppression. The danger is that it could lead to far greater repression and far greater adventurism.

**Working Papers:** *Are there any positive signs of progress emerging?*

**Kaldor:** On the one hand, what's been encouraging recently is that people are beginning to react in Eastern Europe the way they are in Western Europe. In fact, the effect of the Helsinki accords—the agreement in 1975 for greater cooperation within Europe to guarantee human rights and so on—has been to bring Eastern and Western Europe much closer together. It's enabled East Europeans to find out more about what's going on in Western Europe. There's some evidence of protest. One can't call them movements or campaigns, like here, but there is activity in East Germany, and in the Soviet Union itself, and to a lesser extent in Hungary. There's activity originated by churches and writers in East Germany. Although it's harder to tell what's happening in the Soviet Union, there have now been two official pamphlets attacking pacifist tendencies among youth. And people who recently visited the Soviet Union say that the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament peace symbol is all over everywhere. And we just got a report from Hungary that the students at Budapest University had passed a resolution implicitly challenging the military strategy of the Soviet bloc.

The concern is what will happen to this? The East German movement is already being repressed. Will this kind of protest filter through to the parties and really bring some kind of internal change, and not just an official Soviet line supporting arms control? I'm sure they are genuinely interested in another SALT or a freeze, but will this lead to changes that would enable them really to shift out of the military sector? That would require internal changes in the Soviet system. But what's been happening in the last year gives one much greater hope than would ever have been thought possible.

A more difficult and ongoing debate within the peace movement concerns how to relate to East European dissidents, who are very definitely struggling for human rights but who represent a very small minority. Do you relate to government officials, many of whom are quite good on the question of disarmament—for instance the Rumanians—but who are terrible on the human rights questions? Will relating to these official people totally discredit you in terms of getting wider support?

That's what's interesting about East Germany. There the churches have become an umbrella for an independent peace movement. So the peace movement in East Germany is neither dissident nor official. The emergence of other organizations in Eastern Europe also represents a forum where we can debate these issues without having to be pushed into the position of being either dissident or official.

**Working Papers:** *What is so fascinating is the link between the nuclear issue and issues of power and democracy. Here we have weapons which are really dysfunctional—economically, politically, and militarily. So why do they build them? It seems to me one could argue that their real function is to serve as symbols of power. They have to be bigger, better, and more complex because the power interests they serve are bigger, better, and more complex—as well as more destructive. So naturally the nuclear debate and its corollary, conversion, get right to the heart of the debate about power. The anti-nuclear movement is really saying, "You guys aren't going to decide what we think, what we do, and what we make anymore; we're going to begin to have a voice in that."*

**Kaldor:** Absolutely; I agree. Human rights, feminism, workplace democracy, they all come together

on this. In fact, we think feminism is in a way one of the major links we have with Eastern Europe. We can reach out through women's organizations because they are relatively independent and feminism has been expressed quite widely in Eastern Europe. For example, Christa Wolf in East Germany has spoken out very strongly against the arms race. Her main point is that we are caught in the arms race within male hierarchial power structures.

**Working Papers:** *It seems very important in America to convince people that there is sentiment in Russia and the Soviet bloc for disarmament, because if disarmament is perceived as a unilateral act, then you get entangled in a vicious circle where people insist we can't trust the Russians, so we can't de-escalate the arms race.*

**Kaldor:** Well here is a real divergence between European and American opinion. We feel that regardless of how the Russians react, we don't want to have nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons can't defend Europe. They only can destroy Europe. So we adopt a completely different line from the American movement. We don't say the Russians will respond. We don't claim that the Russians will necessarily respond. Of course we want to have a defense policy against the Russians, but we think that nuclear weapons are a disastrous defense policy. And we want to get rid of them. We also think that for important political reasons, it's essential to get similar movements going in Eastern Europe, because in the end, the only way you will get rid of the risk of war and the risk of nuclear weapons is through political change. This means political change in the Eastern bloc as well as in the West, and it means change by people rather than by governments.

**Working Papers:** *But how do you respond to somebody who says you're completely naive, because if the Soviets have nuclear weapons then we in America have to have nuclear weapons. Otherwise they can blackmail America and the rest of the West. We have to look strong so they won't attack.*

**Kaldor:** Deterrence is a suicide threat. The threat of retaliation even at the cost of wiping out your own country can never be credible so you always try to find ways to escape the suicide threat and make nuclear weapons usable. There's no meaning in a policy of minimum deterrence for a small country like Britain or France. It's a pure suicide threat for us.

**Working Papers:** *Well, what are the options, if you want to avoid situations like this. Do you stay in NATO, or get out of NATO? And what kind of defense do you build?*

**Kaldor:** As an off-shore non-aligned island of Europe, we're not going to escape any nuclear war. We may improve our chances of escaping a nuclear war through trying to shift NATO strategy rather than by opting out. That's why I'd support conditional membership in NATO—conditional on ending the use of nuclear weapons that is.

Even if we ring ourselves with precision guided munitions somebody can always come and bomb us to pieces. So all we can achieve with a defense policy is to use these policies to put constraints on the enemy. Either we say, in military terms, that we will cause a very high rate of attrition on any attacker or we give a political message: we're a country with a defensive policy and you will have the onus of international opinon against you if you attack us. It will be very difficult for you to attack us and invade us because our people will be very resistant. I'm not a pacifist by nature, but I think that modern warfare has brought us to a situation where war is becoming impossible. Our aim should be to build a defense policy that will really lead to a kind of withering away of defense.

*Deterrence is a pure suicide threat for a small country like Britain or France.*

Any kind of military arrangement leads to hierarchical structures, to decisions made in secret. Of course you need some defense, but in Britain, for example, it could be a force of small submarines and patrol boats that would defend the coastline of Britain. All we have now are these huge aircraft carriers and destroyers and frigates that are supposed to attack Soviet submarines but are in fact very vulnerable to Soviet submarines. For months the whole of our forces protecting the Atlantic were down in the South Atlantic. We've been told that we needed these things to protect us from the Soviet Union. Well, the question is why didn't the Soviet Union take this opportunity to put military pressure on us?

**Working Papers:** *So all this talk about building a protective force and flexible response is simply a way to justify having a huge navy?*

**Kaldor:** Flexible response is a wonderful justification for weapons because the argument is we ought to have elephants if that's what the Russians have. It justifies every element at every level.

**Working Papers:** The Baroque Arsenal *concludes that the arms race has created a crisis in the military: it now fosters production of inaccurate information, frustrates idealistic young officers, lowers the credibility of leadership, stifles creativity and innovation, and rewards trivia. In*

*reading that I thought not only of the crisis of the military, but of the crisis of modern industrial capitalism.*

**Kaldor:** What we really have to understand is that it's a crisis of the state. We have developed a huge state, and state structures, over the last hundred to two hundred years, and people who believe in capitalism argue that we've got to get rid of the state and go back to pure capitalism. Those of us who are very concerned about the ways capitalism produces inequality and crisis don't think that's the right answer. And the right answer, it seems to me, must be the transformation of the nature of the state. The same applies to the Soviet Union.

**Working Papers:** *Do you believe the disarmament movement does more than address the arms race? Do you believe it will draw attention to the crisis of the modern state and seek ways of resolving that crisis?*

**Kaldor:** Well, yes I do. The disarmament movement is a coalition of a lot of people who are in different ways dissatisfied with modern society. And nuclear weapons, if you like, epitomize the worst that our society can offer. And so you've got all these people—feminists, socialists, ecologists, Christians—coming together to oppose the arms race. They're doing more than opposing the arms race. They're saying we want a more humane society. The big question that all of us in the peace movement have to ask ourselves is can this protest be translated into political action? Can we succeed in transforming political, social, economic institutions?

So I don't think that one could get rid of nuclear weapons without changing politics. But the question for us is how explicit do we make this aim. Do we, as we've been doing in END*, emphasize the human rights aspect? Because if we're talking about changing politics in both East and West, and for grassroots people in Eastern Europe, human rights is a much more obvious struggle than against nuclear weapons.

**Working Papers:** *The European disarmament movement seems to have sprung out of nowhere two years ago. Could you tell us a little bit about its origins.*

**Kaldor:** Just like the emergence of the freeze campaign in the United States, certain immediate events caused its tremendous growth. One of these was the 1979 NATO decision to deploy Cruise and Pershing missiles based in Europe. In Britain it was also the decision to buy the Trident submarine from the United States. Margaret Thatcher's election also added fuel. Then there was the circulation of a civil defense document, *Protect and Survive*, which gave people some sense that the government was discussing nuclear war as if it was thinkable.

The 1979 NATO decision was the crucial factor. But there have been decisions about new weapons systems before, and people didn't get so upset about it. People got upset about this because now an American administration was really talking about fighting a limited nuclear war—a nuclear war in Europe. That brought it home very vividly.

Another crucial element was the fact that Europe was emerging from the shadows of World War II. People felt that Europe was no longer dependent on the United States in any economic or political or real social sense. They felt that a whole range of political options over the last twenty or thirty years had been denied them, and one of the reasons for this was the nature of the military structure and the artificial division of Europe.

**Working Papers:** *Can you explain the difference between the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) and European Nuclear Disarmament (END)?*

**Kaldor:** Yes. CND was set up in the late 1950s to fight for a nuclear-free Britain and for unilateral nuclear disarmament in Britain. It was very popular at the end of the 1950s and in the early 1960s. It lost members in the 1960s and 1970s but the organizational structure remained intact. When this new peace movement began, grassroots groups began affiliating with CND. So that CND is once again a mass movement in Britain.

END started two years ago when we issued an appeal for a nuclear-free Europe. We made it clear in that appeal that the responsibility for the arms race rested with both the United States and the Soviet Union and that we thought the disarmament issue ought to be linked to human rights. We did this for two reasons. First, we thought that CND had been very insular. It was part of, if you like, this old statist idea. It was "stop the world, we'd like to get off" and we can do what we like with our own country. But we who formed END thought the world had changed. Although we always fought for CND and the aims of the nuclear-free Britain, we think that movements cannot succeed unless they cooperate internationally. And we think we can't have a nuclear-free world unless we do it all together.

The second thing was that CND had a pro-Soviet image. It was often thought of as being fellow-travelerish. There were a lot of communists that have kept it going in the interim period. So we felt there was a role for a separate organization. But we didn't want to compete with CND so we didn't set ourselves up as a membership organization. We depend on donations from supporters and the money we make from publications and other things. We operate to promote the European idea in Britain and between other groups—politicians, trade unionists, churches, and so on.

However, in the last few years CND has totally changed. It has largely adopted the END platform

*European Nuclear Disarmament.

and CND is now very involved in things we do in Europe. The old style communists have also been voted out.

So now there's not so much difference between us. The main difference is that we (END) tend to be at the more intellectual end of the peace movement. And obviously we don't have as much grassroots campaigning. We have more of an educative role, and we do all this cooperation with Europe. So we have to decide, do we now become a part of CND or do we just continue in some other way.

**Working Papers:** *How do both CND and END relate to the freeze movement in America?*
**Kaldor:** Well, I think we should support it because it's terribly important for us to work with the American peace movement. And I think it ought to be a unilateral freeze. People should be saying, "Let's freeze now and then we'll negotiate about reductions or whatever else is on the agenda." But I think it's fantastically important, whether it's a unilateral or bilateral freeze, that we work together.

**Working Papers:** *What about the narrow and deliberate single issue quality of the freeze movement? For example, the decision not to include a proposal that money saved from the arms race be spent on civilian purposes, because that would lose support. How do you feel about that?*
**Kaldor:** You need a single issue that everyone agrees with, but there's absolutely no reason why some of the people shouldn't be saying, "Let's divert resources from the arms race to the economy." You build a large constituency around that. It may become the major constituency, but you don't have to feel that you've got to get everybody to support it. I think the nuclear issue—nuclear-free Britain and nuclear-free Europe—is what unites us all. In the Labour Party I'm working hard on alternative defense policies, for instance. Or with the trade unions who are working very hard on conversion.

**Working Papers:** *You have written about the break down of the "Atlanticist" consensus. What does that mean?*
**Kaldor:** After World War II, a generation of pro-American leaders—"Atlanticists" dominated the governments of Western Europe. Atlanticism was not just associated with the NATO alliance and containment of the Russians, but also with a domestic philosophy of managed capitalism. This was true whether these governments were nominally conservative or social democratic.

Today, Atlanticism, which held NATO together, is being challenged from both sides. The consensus is breaking down. On the one side, the Atlanticists themselves feel that the Americans are no longer serving their interests. America's tax policies, her trade policies, and of course her nuclear strategy, are in the American self-interest, not the European interest. On the other side, the nuclear disarmament movement is part of a resurgent left, which is offering new options that were precluded by the Atlanticist consensus.

**Working Papers:** *Does the peace movement also represent a rebirth of European nationalism?*
**Kaldor:** It certainly represents a sense of European identity. Atlanticism was not only an attempt to bury the old nationalism that had nation states like France and Germany fighting each other or an attempt to contain the Russians. It was also the conservatives' attempt to control socialism. Don't forget that socialist ideas were very popular throughout Europe immediately after the war. Socialism influenced not just the left, but Christian Democrats too.

The division of Europe was justified, of course, in terms of the dangers of the re-emergence of European nationalism on both sides, but it also prevented the spread of domestic forms of socialism. The Russians purported to be afraid that a united Germany might invade them again. In fact, the Russians would have accepted a neutral Europe. But the tightening hold of NATO, beginning in 1949, and the close relationship between Germany and the United States, made that impossible on the Eastern side as well. Both sides were tightening their grip because they didn't dare risk an independent neutral Europe.

**Working Papers:** *If Atlanticism was a sophisticated attempt to fight socialism, do you believe the peace movement's challenge to Atlanticism represents a resurgence of socialism?*
**Kaldor:** In a way it is, but it is not expressed as socialism because over the last ten to twenty years socialism has become discredited. I am a socialist myself. But in Eastern Europe socialism has tended to statism, and very often to the nation-statism of the Soviet system. Based on the organized working class, it's a hierarchical structure where the state fights against capitalism.

Socialism in its original and true meaning represented real democracy. Socialists believe people should control what they produce; that use should be directly related to production; that the state should wither away along with capitalism. The peace movement is imbued with these ideas. So many of the people involved, whether they're ecologists or feminists, would not call themselves socialists because socialism tends to be discredited.

**Working Papers:** *While the peace movement is building, the Americans and the Russians are continuing their own official arms control negotiations?*
**Kaldor:** We're tremendously skeptical about all these talks and we think they're a mechanism for lulling the public into feeling that politicians are doing something about it and we don't have to wor-

ry. We think that they're all based on the assumption that there is such a thing as a balance in the nuclear age and that it is possible to balance numbers against each other. But you can always find a category where you're imbalanced. That's why we're constantly stressing nuclear-free zones rather than limits on numbers.

As for Geneva, we should argue "Fine, if you want to have Geneva talks go ahead and have Geneva talks, but we shan't be satisfied until we achieve a nuclear-free Europe. If you want to achieve it through multi-level negotiations, that's great. We don't care how you achieve it, we just want it." Our aim should not be to reject the talks but to steer the talks and force them to be serious. The goal should be to stop the deployment of Cruise whatever happens.

**Working Papers:** *So far we have talked a great deal about strategy and politics. What about economic pressures. How should the peace movement address the economic crisis?*
**Kaldor:** This is crucial, and over the next few years there is going to be greatly increased unemployment. There are going to be major economic problems in Eastern Europe as well as in the West.

*Our aim should be to steer the Geneva talks, to force them to be serious . . . to stop deployment of Cruise whatever happens.*

**Working Papers:** *In Great Britain the labor movement is playing a big role in the peace movement. One of our big problems, of course, in America is that the official labor movement is so reactionary in regard to the peace issue. Do you see that as an important thing for activists in the American peace movement?*
**Kaldor:** It seems clear that the peace movement has been very important in bringing about changes in those institutions. If you take the labor movement, pressing for conversion is really pressing for a change in trade union policy. We're saying that trade unions should do more than negotiate wages and conditions. They should negotiate about what is produced. That's a very radical shift in trade union policy. In general, we've found that we get grassroots support from the trade unionists on this but not support from the trade union hierarchy. The trade union hierarchy supports CND but they've shied away from campaigns about alternative plants.

**Working Papers:** *There is a great deal of talk in the United States about the issue of a no-first-use strategy for NATO. What do you think about this?*
**Kaldor:** It's also coming from the liberal establishment in my country. As you probably know, NATO's flexible response stategy is based on the first use of nuclear weapons. And essentially if we decide to have a no-first-use strategy it does mean that we will greatly reduce the levels of nuclear weapons in Europe. And it also means that there will be considerable opposition to tactical nuclear weapons. That there will be a very strong case made for removing battlefield nuclear weapons—that's artillery, mines, and all that kind of stuff, short range missiles, aircraft—from Europe. And that would be a step forward and it might be good for us to make a big scene about battlefield nuclear weapons so that those people who start talking about first-use-strategy are obliged to do something about it. We should call their tune.

If we drew people's attention to the link between the military structure of the world and the economic structure of the world, this could be very important, both in building support, particularly among trade unionists, and in offering political alternatives.

This is also a wonderful link with Eastern Europe because the idea of democratic planning is involved. It goes beyond economic systems in both West and East; it's the link with Solidarity.

Now having said that, there's a real question of diluting our efforts. It seems to me that it is very important that the nuclear issue remain the central issue, because that's what unites all those groups that have come together in the movement. I mean, I was saying before that I think nuclear weapons have very much to do with political power. Very, very different kinds of groups have come together in the peace movement, which is what makes it a mass movement. That is the one thing that holds them together. And as soon as we start diluting it with some of those other issues, we are in danger of breaking up this broad coalition.

On the other hand, we have to have these themes because they do explicitly link up with particular groups. And it seems to me there's no reason why we shouldn't explore subsidiary themes, and we explicitly *should* try to explore them as a way of changing the different kinds of institutions that are involved in the movement. But what we should come together on and continue to press as our central theme is nuclear weapons. ■

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* *Peace on Earth* *

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