


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*from time to time calls attention to published  
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Eulah C. Laucks, President  
Post Office Box 5012  
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September 18, 1981

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"...When a world goes to pieces and inhumanity reigns supreme, man cannot go on living his private life as he was wont to do, and would like to do; he cannot, as the loving head of a family, keep the family living together peacefully, undisturbed by the surrounding world; nor can he continue to take pride in his profession or possessions, when either will deprive him of his humanity, if not also of his life. In such times, one must radically reevaluate all of what one has done, believed in, and stood for in order to know how to act. In short, one has to take a stand on the new reality — a firm stand, not one of retirement into an even more private world."

— Bruno Bettelheim  
(Surviving and Other Essays, p.257.  
Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1979).

## Qaddafi Interview

[Tease]

**ROBERT MacNEIL** [voice-over]: Tonight, live from Tripoli an interview with the leader of Libya, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi.

[Titles]

**MacNEIL:** Good evening. Last week the Reagan administration ordered all Libyan diplomats to leave the United States in five days, and last night they left. Officially the United States government charged Libya with "a general pattern of unacceptable conduct." Off the record, U.S. officials made a lengthy indictment of Libyan efforts to foment international terrorism by funding, training, and arming a wide variety of terrorist movements. The U.S. also condemned Libya's invasion and occupation of the neighboring country of Chad, and blamed the Libyan government for the murders of dissident Libyans living abroad. Privately, the United States government is also worried about the close relations between Libya and the Soviet Union, resulting in large-scale Soviet arms supplies to Libya. So far Libyan reaction to the diplomats' expulsion has been muted. One weapon in her grasp is oil: Libya is the third-largest supplier of U.S. oil imports, representing 4½ percent of U.S. consumption, or half a million barrels a day. Tonight we talk directly to the man in charge of Libya, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, speaking by satellite from his office outside Tripoli, the Libyan capital. Jim?

**JIM LEHRER:** Robin, Colonel Qaddafi holds no official title as Libyan's chief of state; he is known only as the leader of the Great First-of-September Revolution. That is the revolution of 1969, when he and a group of other young army officers overthrew the then-king of Libya, and established a new Libyan Arab republic. His rule of Libya, a nation of three million people that is 92 percent desert has brought him very mixed, starkly contrasting reviews. To his supporters he's a visionary, attempting to forge a united Arab front based on Islamic principles and his own so-called Green Book, a new international theory as an alternative to capitalism and communism. But to his detractors, he's a menace, a maniac, a supporter and exporter of terrorism, murder, and revolution. One point of information about our interviewing him tonight: in exchange for Colonel Qaddafi's agreeing to have it conducted in English without a translator, we agreed to submit our major questions in writing in advance. That was with the proviso, of course, that spontaneous follow-up questions be permitted. But here again, in order to eliminate the need for translation, we have agreed to try and keep them as simple and short as possible. Robin?

**MacNEIL:** Colonel Qaddafi, do you hear me?

**Col. MUAMMAR QADDAFI:** Yes, I hear you.

**MacNEIL:** What kind of relationship do you want now with the United States?

**Col. QADDAFI:** Anyhow I want a normal relationship with the United States, as any other relation with any other state in the world, particularly the relationship with any big power like Soviet Union or other big states in the world, just like you want.

**MacNEIL:** Do you consider your relations normal now with the United States?

**Col. QADDAFI:** No. Of course it is not normal.

**MacNEIL:** How do you expect your relations to change with the expulsion of your diplomats?

**Col. QADDAFI:** First of all, we have no diplomats. It is the popular bureau formed by the Libyan people. I don't find any people regards this bureau. I didn't appoint any one of them. They have chosen by the people in itself. They are not diplomats, and I think the masses that formed this people's bureau will form another one in America. We have thousands of citizens in the United States of America; I think they will form new one instead of this closed bureau. It is the responsibility of the masses because Libya's Jamahiriya, the authority is in the hand of the people itself.

**MacNEIL:** So you don't consider the men who have been expelled by the United States as diplomats?

**Col. QADDAFI:** No, we have no diplomats in the world at all after the authority of the people since 1977 when the authority of the people took place in that time. We have no government, no ministries, no ministry of foreign affairs, no minister of other affairs. Here in Tripoli also there is popular committee which is responsible for the foreign affairs, and it is a link between the people — the Libyan people ¼ and the other states and peoples in the world. It is not official department.

**LEHRER:** Colonel, what kind of retaliation can the United States expect for the expulsion?

**Col. QADDAFI:** I don't expect now anything because it is not a serious step. We lost nothing, and it is only— it is— it is not a reasonable step from United States of America against a state like my country, and there is no justification to expel this popular bureau from your country because it is to link good relationship between Libyan people and the American people. And the government of America has no right to close this popular bureau. I think it is against the interests of United America— United States of America itself, not against my country. I am not nervous; I am very quiet, very calm now. But I am sorry to see big power like America behave this childish behavior like this, and I decry your childish, this childish behavior like this. It is not suitable for big power like America to do this.

**LEHRER:** So you do not intend, then, to use oil as a weapon of retaliation?

**Col. QADDAFI:** It is another— oil is power, and it is a weapon in our hands, so we have the full right to use this when it is necessary.

**LEHRER:** But it's not necessary now in your opinion?

**Col. QADDAFI:** It is due to the Libyan people itself through the basic popular congresses; they may discuss this matter and decide what is suitable and what is right.

**LEHRER:** Robin?

**MacNEIL:** Colonel Qaddafi, there are some 2,000 Americans living in Libya. Can you assure their safety and freedom, or should they now leave your country?

**Col. QADDAFI:** No, they are our guests, and they are people who are helping us, and we are cooperating with them for mutual interests between Libya and America, and nothing will happen to them until the situation deteriorates. I hope it will not be so. Now, I think nothing will be towards this people who are here now. We are not like American. We are wise. We have responsibilities towards others, and toward world— we are a nation of civilization, not like America. We behave very, very calm and rightful, and I think nothing will happen.

**MacNEIL:** You say "until the situation deteriorates." What did you mean by that? "Deteriorates" in what way?

**Col. QADDAFI:** It is in the side of America. The United States of America deteriorates itself in the situation by any new childish manners — childish behavior like what is happening now because this stunt closing our popular in America, it is without any justification, and it is unreasonable action, and according to this America might do some stunts like this which is not responsible action.

**MacNEIL:** Are you expecting some further action by the United States against you? I'll repeat that question. Are you expecting some further by the United States against you?

**Col. QADDAFI:** No one can expect what the United States of America can do because the policy of America is not a reasonable policy. It is out of any international responsibility, and I think if there— America has no right to do anything against my country because we do what is right, what is justice, is our right to do.

**LEHRER:** Colonel, you are anti-communist. How do you explain your close relationship, then, with the Soviet Union?

**Col. QADDAFI [laughing]:** It is not necessary if I am anti-communist that my relation will be bad with the Soviet Union. My relations are very good with Soviet Union. Soviet Union is our friend, and I am not communist, not capitalist. I am socialist — Jemeheri — progressive. I don't see any contradiction between my good relationship with Soviet Union and because I am not a communist.

**LEHRER:** You share— I was going to ask you if you shared the Soviet Union's basic political goals in the world.

**Col. QADDAFI:** Pardon? Would you repeat, please, this question?

**LEHRER:** Sure. Do you share the Soviet Union's basic political goals in the world?

**Col. QADDAFI:** What?

**LEHRER:** Let me ask it another way. The Soviet— are you and the Soviet Union— do you and the Soviet Union agree in political terms as to what the future of the world should hold?

**Col. QADDAFI:** Oh, I see. I understand you now. No. Sometimes we agree about some international matters, and sometimes we disagree because Soviet Union is Soviet Union. Libya is Libya. Every one of us has his own interests, and has his own strategy in the world, and his different policy and social system and political system which is different also. But he is our friend besides all this.

**LEHRER:** Is the— we have read the figure here in the United States that you have purchased \$12 billion in arms from the Soviet Union. Is that correct, sir?

**Col. QADDAFI:** I don't know exactly the number [if] it is true or not but anyhow we buy weapons from Soviet Union, and from other countries like Britain, Italy, and France and China and other countries.

**LEHRER:** It has been suggested that many of those arms that you have bought have been placed there as a kind of staging area for the Soviet Union: Is that true?

**Col. QADDAFI [chuckling]:** No, of course it is not true. We have weapons only for defense for ourselves, and these weapons are not enough now for sufficient defense. We need more weapons that defend our country, and we will not allow Soviet Union to store any weapons for here — for it — in my country. We refuse such things.

**MacNEIL:** Military commentators say that you already have far more arms and tanks and planes than your army of 40,000 men could possibly ever use.

**Col. QADDAFI [laughter]:** We have armed people. We are going now to get rid of the regular army. The regular army will disappear in this Jemekeri society — Jemekeria — the state of masses. The state of masses will have no regular army, no government. Now there is no government and the regular army will disappear; therefore, we need weapons for the people. The armed people. Every citizen must have weapon, not in his house but in the store, and in time of defense for his—

**MacNEIL:** Defense— defense from what, Colonel Qaddafi?

**Col. QADDAFI:** Against whom, you mean?

**MacNEIL:** Against whom, yes.

**Col. QADDAFI:** Against any enemies who might attack my country; attack my people. My people must be armed and be ready to face any aggression.

**MacNEIL:** How do you answer charges that Libya is involved in promoting and supporting and training international terrorists?

**Col. QADDAFI:** This accusation [is] without any justification, also. No evidence that we support or promote terrorism. We are against terrorism absolutely, and we issued law — very severe law — against any terrorist action. Therefore, we are absolutely against terrorism, but now we must clarify the meaning of terrorism. What is that, terrorism? We consider the manufacturing of nuclear weapons is terrorist action, and establishing foreign military bases in the land of others it is also terrorism. And in make peoples suffering from [hunger] — to keep food from them — it is also terrorism. And hijacking airplanes and seize honest people to be victims from this action is also terrorism, but it is also very small— very small one in the comparison of the big action of terrorism which America is doing now by treating others by its fleets and by its bases, by [starving] peoples — keeping wheat not to sell and to give to her poor people, and so on.

**MacNEIL:** It is frequently reported that— let me list some of the places you are said to have given assistance to — some of the so-called terrorists — and ask if it's true. Did you not train and later give sanctuary to the terrorists who attacked the Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics?

**Col. QADDAFI:** No. We haven't any relation with this accident, and we heard about it in the media as you heard it.

**MacNEIL:** But you deny that?

**Col. QADDAFI:** No. We have no intention or no decision to do such bad things which is considered as terrorism. But we support the struggle of the peoples for their freedom, their independence like the people-of Palestine — support its struggle for it is justice cause— support the just cause—

**MacNEIL:** Do you— excuse me. Do you give support to the Irish Republican Army?

**Col. QADDAFI:** No. No support. No material support. But spiritual one. We consider it is justice cause because Ireland is Ireland and Britain is Britain. The existence of Britain in this place is colonization, and our evidence is the struggle which is going now severely in this area, and this— and this— r of the Irish army who are dying now of hunger in the jail for this cause. they have cause; they have justice cause. They want to be independent.

**MacNEIL:** Did you send support to the Italian Red Brigades?

**Col. QADDAFI:** No. We are against the Red Brigades, and we consider them a terrorist group, in fact.

**MacNEIL:** To the guerrillas in El Salvador?

**Col. QADDAFI:** No, it is far from us, and we support the people of Salvador. We hope these people will succeed to restore its stability and dignity and freedom. We support the people, but no relationship between us and these people. It is far from us and we have nothing to do with it.

**LEHRER:** It has also been charged, Colonel, that your government has sent killer squads to assassinate Libyans living abroad of whom 11 have been killed. Is that true?

**Col. QADDAFI:** First of all, we have no government. There are some few people — Libyan people — who are royal — royal ones — and they got big quantities of money and got out. This money belong to the Libyan people, and they did some crimes against their country, and they support now the foreign intelligence against the security of Libya, and therefore the revolution committees they hold a court — revolutionary court — made decision, and decided to punish some of them. They will be — they will be judged to death or sentenced to death, or something like this. They are very few people. It is according to the judge of this — the judgment of this revolutionary court.

**LEHRER:** Do you support that effort?

**Col. QADDAFI:** Excuse me. Is that clear? Is the answer is clear?

**LEHRER:** Yes. I was just wondering if you personally supported that. I noticed that you said some time ago that you ordered Libyan exiles to return home or they would be executed. I assume that you support this effort to execute these people, then.

**Col. QADDAFI:** No, I didn't say like this. I told them they must come back to be safety. To be safety, yes? Otherwise, I can't protect them abroad. Therefore, the revolutionary committees may be after them, and they may even attempt — therefore, I declare that if you come back to your country you'll be safety — safe — or safety I grant to you. But outside, no one can protect you. That I declared.

**LEHRER:** The FBI here in the United States, Colonel, says that your government was behind the attempted assassination of a man here in our state of Colorado — a Libyan exile. Is that true? It was an attempted assassination. The man lived.

**Col. QADDAFI:** I don't think it is true, and I didn't hear about this accident. But I can assure that no one will be killed outside without justice and revolutionary trial.

**MacNEIL:** Colonel Qaddafi, many countries in Africa and Europe are worried that your armed military intervention in the neighboring country of Chad means that you plan to annex Chad, and maybe the Niger and other countries, in your enlarged Libyan pan-Islamic republic. What are your aims in Africa?

**Col. QADDAFI:** We have no plan towards this area. We want stability, independence, progression for all this continent, and for all these countries particularly in Africa. It is our continent, and we have no other intention towards this area.

**MacNEIL:** Why did you say when your troops went into Chad that Chad was part of Libya's needed living space?

**Col. QADDAFI:** No, it is not true. I said, the security of Chad is — it touches the security of Libya, of course. But we sent our troops to Chad in accordance with mutual defense, yes, agreement of defense between us and the national government of Chad, and according to the request of this government to help it for stability and for peace, yes. And my troops put an end in for a civil war which continued about 20 years, and now this civil war end. It ended. And now Chad is living in peace and security, and now is turning to build itself

after this war.

**MacNEIL:** I'm sorry to interrupt you, but Colonel Qaddafi, our time for this interview is up. Thank you very much for joining us from Tripoli, Libya this evening. And thank you, Jim. Good night.

**LEHRER:** Good night, Robin.

**MacNEIL:** That's all for tonight. We will be back tomorrow night. I'm Robert MacNeil. Good night.

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
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## AFTER THE ISRAELI STRIKE

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**I**S THE WORLD a more or less dangerous place after the Israeli air strike on Iraq's nuclear reactor? Is the security of Israel itself strengthened or diminished? The *New York Times* did not mince words in its opinion: "Israel's sneak attack . . . was an act of inexcusable and short-sighted aggression." The *New Republic* was no less certain: "Faced with this threat, Israel had little choice but to take its defense into its own hands." We've had more time than most editorialists to ponder the questions above. It hasn't helped much. The more we know, and the more we know what we don't know, the knottier the issues become. They should be disentangled, nonetheless, because in large measure those questions remain open ones: the answers depend on where the world and Israel, in particular, go from here.

Liberal instincts run rather automatically against the settlement of disputes between nations by military action. That's the way it ought to be. But instincts can only be the starting point for thinking a problem through. Three facts about the Israeli-Iraq conflict seem indisputable. First, Iraq is a nation essentially at war with Israel. It has never signed an armistice with Israel after any of the Mideast wars. It even avoids referring to *Israel* in its official statements, substituting phrases like "the Zionist entity" to indicate Israel's illegitimacy. And while, contrary to Mr. Begin's declaration, Iraq has never specifically threatened the use of nuclear weapons against Israel, its leaders have spoken with anticipation of the destruction of Tel Aviv.

Second, the war aims of the two nations are not symmetrical. No one supposes Israel to have designs on Iraqi territory. Iraq, on the other hand, clearly challenges Israel's very existence as a nation. Third, the Iraqi nuclear effort was directed toward obtaining the capacity for nuclear weapons. True, it may *also* have been pursuing the legitimate right of any state to develop nuclear technology for energy reasons, however superfluous that energy source may appear in such an oil-rich land, or simply to expand a prestigious or potentially useful scientific infrastructure. And to date, it may have abided by international safeguards against diverting nuclear materials for weapons use. But to examine the overall pattern of Iraq's procurement of nuclear technology and fuel and not to conclude that a weapons capacity was a major consideration demands an almost willful naiveté.

Given these realities, why was Israel's strike any less justified than the raid Iran made on the same nuclear facility last September? Indeed, considering that Israel is far more vulnerable to nuclear attack than the extensive territory of Iran and that Iraq's quarrel with Iran is far more limited in scope, isn't the Israeli raid far *more* justified? It would be going too far to compare the Israeli act to the Berrigan brothers' assault on potential first-strike weapons at the King of Prussia General Electric plant: for one thing, the Israeli raid did kill one individual; for another, it was far more efficient. But in contrast, say, to Israeli air strikes in Lebanon, this was

as nearly an anti-military example of military action as a pacifist could imagine — aimed not at people but at death-dealing property, a kind of neutron bomb in reverse.

Such thoughts as these may counter a natural and healthy suspicion of a preemptive attack like Israel's — but, still, there is more to be said, and on both sides of the debate. Critics of Israel complained, for example, that it had not exhausted all the diplomatic possibilities before taking this dangerous step. Israeli diplomatic efforts stretch well back in the last decade, however. It tried to talk the French and Italians out of supplying Iraq with the threatening technology. To no avail. Of course, further diplomatic attempts were possible. Further diplomatic attempts are always possible. The problem is that pursuing them may permit a critical moment to pass, after which military action, should diplomacy fail, is no longer possible.

And here we come to several of the unknowns in this episode. There has been considerable debate over whether the Iraqis had already embarked on the process of manufacturing weapons, or could do so in the near future; over whether Baghdad could have a bomb in hand by the end of this year, or in two years, or in ten years. But the crucial deadline, according to the Israelis, was not posed by the actual production of weapons but by the fact that the Iraqi nuclear facility was about to go "on-stream," after which point its destruction would have spread radiation over the surrounding populated area. Was this date—given as either the beginning of July or the beginning of September—accurate? Or was it established with an eye to the Israeli elections on June 30? Furthermore, is it true that once operational, the reactor could not have been destroyed without subjecting Baghdad to massive radiation, a claim that, according to Anthony Lewis, has been questioned by a study prepared by the research service of the Library of Congress? Israel's assertions about timing and the later danger of radioactive fallout are central to its case. So far, they have been only peripherally challenged. *Newsweek*, for example, refers to "nuclear scientists" who say that "the danger zone would probably not have extended much beyond 1,000 feet even if the Osirak reactor had been in operation." These points demand further clarification.

For other critics of Israel's action, the question of Iraq's nuclear ambitions is irrelevant: they are willing to take it for granted. So, too, they do not simply regret the recourse to arms before further diplomatic initiatives were at least explored. Instead, they reject the notion of a preemptive strike against nuclear facilities altogether. In their eyes, it sets a precedent in international relations that is more dangerous than living with a nuclear adversary. The U.S., they argue, was wise to resist the temptation of a strike against the budding nuclear capabilities of Russia and China. Had the precedent been otherwise established, Pakistan might have struck at India, as India today might strike at Pakistan. Black Africa could do the same against South Africa. Argentina and Chile might face each other's sudden attacks. Israel could be a target for a fistful of Arab nations—and vice versa. Yet each preemptive action, though it set the world on the edge of crisis, offers only

temporary respite. Permanent nuclear security would require repeated preemption, and against an enemy increasingly humiliated, determined, and secretive.

The problem with this criticism is that it asks Israel, or any other nation confronted with a development like Iraq's, to sacrifice its immediate security interests for the overall stability of the international system. True, the individual state may benefit from that overall stability, but enough to outweigh the burden of dealing with a threatening nuclear neighbor? If the world's nations have a general stake in forestalling preemptive strikes, then it would seem that the responsibility for preventing proliferation ought to rest with the nations as a whole, and especially with those which weigh most in the international system. This, of course, has been recognized in principle, and sloughed off miserably in practice.

It is here that the real significance of the Israeli raid may eventually depend on what the world does next. For in breaking the inhibition against preemptive strikes of this sort, Israel also forced the nations to recognize that Emperor Nonproliferation has no clothes. The 1968 nonproliferation treaty, with its more than one hundred signatories, the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency to patrol nuclear energy facilities, and the brave but uneven attempts of the Carter administration to enforce some discipline on Western trade in nuclear technology deserve respect; but they all have fallen short of the mark. In the end, the search for profit by Western firms, each nation's fear of losing out to competing economies, and the desire to maintain diplomatic leverage with nations threatening to seek their technology or fuel elsewhere, have poked wide holes in the anti-proliferation safeguards. Nonproliferation should be a high priority item for collective action by the U.S. and European nations. That means a reversal of the administration's attitude, which so far has subordinated concern with the spread of nuclear weapons to its unwillingness to cross any nation on our side of the East-West conflict and to its apparent belief that in this realm as in all others the free pursuit of self-interest is a reliable mechanism that, in any case, cannot be usefully regulated.

If the Israeli raid shocks the West out of its dithering complacency about nuclear nonproliferation, the world will be safer for it. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the psychological effect of the raid on Israel's own security and the chances for peace in the Middle East. Here is where the profoundest objections to the action lie. Once again, Israel has bought time. But time for what? By further embarrassing Egypt's Sadat, Mr. Begin has only made it all the more likely that once the return of the Sinai is completed a year from now, Egypt will see no reason not to close ranks with the other Arab nations. By demonstrating the violability of Saudi air space, the Israelis may have assured the sale of U.S. AWACS to Riyadh and, in any case, hardened that nation's resolve to strengthen its armed forces. By insisting on the right to aggressively define their security needs over a wider and wider zone, the Israelis have only lent real weight to their neighbors' fears. Israel's intentions may be (largely) defensive; but nations cannot put permanent trust in intentions, there must also be

some balance of military capacities.

Finally, if the raid on Iraq cements the election victory of Menachim Begin, a leader who yields little to the fiercest of his Middle East adversaries in the unreliability and irresponsibility of his declarations, whose long-range attitude toward the central issue of Palestinian autonomy appears unyielding, and whose supporters have been as riddled with corruption and anti-democratic impulses as were Mr. Nixon's, then whatever was gained in the air near Baghdad will be lost at the ballot boxes in Israel. Paradoxically, a Begin victory may turn a salutary shock for the rest of the world into a self-inflicted defeat for Israel.

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Also from COMMONWEAL:

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## Of several minds: *Abigail McCarthy*

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### 'THE DARK SIDE OF ISLAM'

IT IS ONLY ONE SIDE OF A BINDING FAITH

**C**OLUMNIST JOSEPH KRAFT created something of an uproar here when he wrote recently that the alleged assassin who attempted to take the life of Pope John Paul II represented the "dark side of Islam." Both Washington papers were inundated with letters defending Muslim culture and demanding to know whether Kraft would also say that the young man who shot President Reagan represented the dark side of Christianity. In part the response was probably the typical American reaction to anything which seems to criticize another's reli-

gion. As Kraft himself put it, "censorious scrutiny of other people's religion is a kind of bad form."

The sheer weight and volume of the response was evidence that Islam has become very much part and parcel of our world without our knowing very much about it. Here in Washington, for example, the Islamic Center is one of the local landmarks. During late spring and summer each year there is a veritable flowering of fund-raising church festivals up and down Massachusetts Avenue, which in its more fashionable reaches is called

Embassy Row. The Church of the Annunciation (Catholic) has a spring carnival, the Washington Cathedral (Episcopal) holds its annual Flower Mart, the Greek Orthodox Cathedral has a three-day food fair, and at the Center, commonly called the mosque, the Muslim Women's Association has its annual bazaar.

Were it not for the great variety of costumes worn by the people at work and in attendance it would be just like any other church sale. The visitor approaches through a marble courtyard where conducted pilgrimages and summer schools are advertised (although here the pilgrimages are to Mecca), and finds booths under a striped tent where food, plants, clothes, and white elephants are being sold. The sellers, however, are a dramatic reminder of the variety of the Islamic world. The president of the association (a Saudi) is chic and Parisian; the

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women in the Egyptian and Turkish booths are indistinguishable from matrons in other Mediterranean countries like Italy or Spain, but there are also sari-clad Pakistanis and women in the more filmy robes of Indonesia. Flitting here and there are women in white trousers and tunics with faces half-veiled. Perhaps most interesting of all are the women in long blue robes and towel-like white headaddresses, who, when asked what country they represent, answer in accents unmistakably American, "We're from right here in D.C."

Muslims, once rare on the American scene, are gaining converts here—and not only among the black followers of Malcolm X and Mohammed Ali. When the Libyan delegation was asked by the State Department to leave this country, one of the most dolorous guests at the farewell party was reported to be a printer from Cedar Rapids, Iowa. He said the Libyans would be sorely missed because they had been so helpful to those propagating the Islamic creed. The religion of Islam is no longer too exotic to make inroads in the Americas; it is the fastest growing religion in Africa, and spreading in Asia. Each year its number of converts is far greater than the number becoming Christians. Add to the multi-

plying converts the population of the Muslim countries which has doubled in the last thirty years—grown from 350,000,000 to more than 750,000,000—and it becomes clear that the Islamic world is a world to reckon with.

It is that, because to say that there are probably one billion Muslim believers in the world today is not like saying that there might be that many Christians. There are no specifically Christian states but there *are* forty nations in the Conference of Islamic states. Basic to Islamic thought is the concept of *umma*, a community of believers. The current Muslim revival in the world with all its revolutionary force draws on the religious resource of Islam. Says Yakim Moubarac in the Spring, 1980, issue of *Cross Currents*, "... religion has never been an isolated sector of life in this (the Muslim) world, but has provided a traditional foundation for law, civil society, and the state."

The religious character of Islam, Moubarac goes on to say, offers more than a vision: *it offers the lived experience of a genuine unity*. It binds together very different people in one faith. Rich and poor gather for collective prayer on Fridays in the same mosque. (Racially,

the mosque in Washington is the most integrated place of worship in the city.)

Yakim Moubarac, a Catholic priest, hopes for a spiritual rapprochement between a renewed Islam and a Christianity strengthened to oppose the world of consumerism and of the exploitation of people and material resources. The reconciling of Muslims and Christians on the basis of justice for the poor could challenge the divided world "in which we are afraid to live." This seems also to have been the dream of John Paul II as he reached out to Islam during his visits to Turkey and Pakistan. It is a great dream.

And it is ironic in the face of it that the man who tried to kill the pope has been quoted as saying, "I shot at the pontiff because I considered him responsible for the Western reaction against Islam and the leader of the crusade that is being waged against my faith." Whether Mehmet Ali Agca is an Islamic fundamentalist fanatic or not is open to question, but there is no doubt that the fundamentalism he invokes is often laced with hatred and does have its dark side. But that does not negate the dream.

Moorhead Kennedy, the State Department economic counselor who was one of the hostages held by Iran, gave a lot of thought during his captivity to how unprepared Americans had been for the revolution in Iran and what the Ayatollah Khomeini was trying to say. "We were victims of a lack of sensitivity to the tremendous force that religion is in Third World countries, particularly in countries like Iran which have been forced into a modernization program for which they are not ready." In consequence Kennedy is leaving the State Department to become director of a peace institution at the Episcopal Cathedral of St. John the Divine in New York, where he and his colleagues will attempt to define the religious dimension of international affairs. The religious revolution within Islam will be one object of his study.

The dark side is only one side of Islam. As one of the pamphlets distributed at the bazaar explains, "Islam calls for a united world under one God. 'We (God) have made you nations and tribes so that you may know one another in friendship.'"

ABIGAIL McCARTHY



# Risk of Disaster Or a Certainty

By C. P. Snow

Scientists know certain things in a fashion more immediate and more certain than those who don't know what science is. Unless we are abnormally weak or abnormally wicked men, this knowledge is bound to shape our actions. Most of us are timid, but to an extent, knowledge gives us guts. Perhaps it can give us guts strong enough for the jobs in hand.

Let me take the most obvious example. All physical scientists know that it is astonishingly easy to make plutonium. We know this, not as a journalistic fact at second hand, but as a fact in our own experience. We can work out the number of scientific and engineering personnel it needs for a nation-state to equip itself with fission and fusion bombs. We know that for a dozen or more states, it would take perhaps only five years, perhaps less. Even the best informed of us always exaggerate these periods.

This we know with the certainty of — what shall I call it — engineering

truth. We also, most of us, are familiar with statistics and the nature of odds. We know, with the certainty of established truth, that if enough of these weapons are made by enough different states, some of them are going to blow up — through accident or folly or madness. But the numbers do not matter; what does matter is the nature of statistical fact.

All this we know. We know it in a more direct sense than any politician can know it, because it comes from our direct experience. It is part of our minds. Are we going to let it happen?

All this we know. It throws upon scientists a direct and formal responsibility. It is not enough to say scientists have a responsibility as citizens. They have a much greater one than that, and one different in kind. For scientists have a moral imperative to say what they know. It is going to make them unpopular in their own nation-states. It may do worse than make them unpopular. That doesn't matter. Or at least, it does matter to you and me, but it must

not count in the face of the risks.

For we genuinely know the risks. We are faced with an either/or and we haven't much time. The either is acceptance of a restriction of nuclear armaments. This is going to begin, just as a token, with an agreement on the stopping of nuclear tests. The United States is not going to get the 99.9 percent "security" that is has been asking for. This is unobtainable, though there are other bargains that the United States could probably obtain. I am not going to conceal from you that this course involves certain risks. They are quite obvious, and no honest man is going to blink at them. That is the either. The or is not a risk

but a certainty. It is this: There is no agreement on tests. The nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union not only continues but accelerates. Other countries join in. Within, at the most, six years, China and six other states have a stock of nuclear bombs. Within, at the most, 10 years, some of those bombs are going off. I am saying this as responsibly as I can. That is the certainty. On the one side, therefore, we have a finite risk. On the other side, we have a certainty of disaster. Between a wish and a certainty, a sane man does not hesitate.

It is the plain duty of scientists to explain the either/or. It is a duty which seems to me to live in the moral nature of the scientific activity itself.

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C. P. Snow, the English physicist, and writer, died in 1980. This article is excerpted from a speech, delivered in 1960 that will be published in the forthcoming book, "The Physicists."

André François

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