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The De-linking of Peace and Development.
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Professor Yoshikazu Sakamoto. Your invitation to open this series of keynote speeches on the occasion of the foundation of the Asian Peace Research Association both honours and frightens me. I thank you for such trust, but also beg your forbearance for my ignorance of things Japanese.

You have invited me to speak on a subject which eludes the modern use of certain English terms. Violence now lurks in many key words of the English language. John Kennedy could wage war on poverty; pacifists now plan strategies (literally, war plans) for peace. In this language, currently shaped for aggression, I must talk to you about the recovery of a true sense of peace, and bearing in mind always that I know nothing about your vernacular tongue. Therefore, each word I speak today will remind me of the difficulty of putting peace into words. To me, it seems that each people's peace is as distinct as each people's poetry. Hence, the translation fo peace is a task as arduous as the translation of poetry.

Peace has a different meaning for each epoch and for each culture area. This is a point on which Professor Takeshi Ishida has written. And, as he reminds us, within each culture area peace means something different at the center and on the margins. At the center, the emphasis is on "peace keeping"; on the margin, people hope to be "left in peace". During three so-called Development Decades, the latter meaning, people's peace, has lost out. This is my main thesis: under the cover of "development", a worldwide war has been waged against people's peace. In developed areas today, not much is left of the people's peace. I believe that limits to economic development, originating at the grassroots, are the principal condition for people to recover their peace.

Culture has always given meaning to peace. Each ethnos - people, community, culture - has been mirrored, symbolically expressed and reinforced by its own ethos - myth, law, goddess, ideal - of peace. Peace is as vernacular as speech. In the examples chosen by Professor Ishida, this correspondence between ethnos and ethos appears with great clarity. Take the Jews; look at the Jewish patriarch when he raises his arms in blessing over his family and flock. He invokes shalom, which we translate as peace. He sees shalom as grace, flowing from heaven, "like oil dripping through the beard of Aaron the forefather". For the Semitic father, peace is the blessing of justice which the one true God pours over the twelve tribes of recently settled shepherds. To the Jew the angel announces "shalom",

not the Roman pax. Roman peace means something utterly different. When the Roman governor raises the ensign of his legion to ram it into the soil of Palestine, he does not look towards heaven. He faces a far-off city; he imposes its law and its order. There is nothing in common between shalom and this pax romana, though both exist in the same place and time.

In our time, both have faded. Shalom has retired into a privatized realm of religion, and pax has invaded the world as "peace", paix, pace. Through two thousand years of use by governing elites, pax has become a polemical catchall. The word was exploited by Constantine to turn the cross into ideology. Charlemagne utilized it to justify the genocide of the Saxons. Pax was the term employed by Innocent III to subject the sword to the cross. In modern times, leaders manipulate it to put the party in control of the army. Spoken by both St. Francis and Clemenceau, pax has now lost the boundaries of its meaning. It has become a sectarian and proselytizing term, wether used by the establishment or by dissidents, wether its legitimacy is claimed by the East or the West.

The idea of pax has a colorful history, in spite of the fact that little research has been done on it. Historians have been more occupied filling library shelves with treatises on war and its techniques. Huo'ping and Shanti seem to have meanings today which are not unlike those of the past. But between them there is a gulf; they are not comparable at all. Huo'ping of the Chinese means smooth, tranquil harmony within the hierarchy of the heavens, while Shanti of the Indians refers primarily to intimate, personal, cosmic, non-hierarchic awakening. In short, there is no "identity" in peace.

In its concrete sense, peace places the "I" into the corresponding "we". But in each language area, this correspondence is different. Peace fixes the meaning of the first person plural. By defining the form of the exclusive "we" (the kami of the Malay languages), peace is the base on which the inclusive "we" (kita) can arise. This distinction between kami and kita of the Malay languages comes naturally to most speakers around the Pacific. It is a grammatical difference utterly foreign to Europe, and completely lacking in western pax. Modern Europe's undiferrentiated "we" is semantically aggressive. Therefore, Asian research cannot be too wary of pax, which has no respect for kita, the Adat. Here in the Far East it should be easier than in the West to base peace research on what ought perhaps to be its fundamental axiom: war tends to make cultures alike whereas peace is that condition under which each culture flowers in its own incomparable way. From this it follows that peace cannot be exported; it is inevitably corrupted by transfer; its attempted export always means war. When peace research neglects this ethnological truism, it turns into a technology of peace keeping: either degraded into some kind of moral rearmament, or perverted into the negative polemology - war science - of the high brass and their computer games.

Peace remains unreal, merely an abstraction, unless it stands for an ethno-anthropological reality. But it would remain equally unreal if we did not attend to its historical dimension. Until quite recently war could not totally destroy peace, could not penetrate all levels of peace, because the continuation of war was based on the survival of the subsistence cultures which fed it. Traditional warfare depended on the continuation of people's peace. Too many historians have neglected this fact; they make history appear as a table of wars. This is clearly true of classical historians, who tend to report on the the rise and fall of the powerful. Unfortunately, it is equally true of many of the newer historians who want to act as reporters from the camps of those who never made it, who want to tell the tales of the vanquished, to evoke the images of those who have disappeared. Too often these new historians are more interested in the violence rather than the peace of the poor. They primarily chronicle resistance, mutinies, insurgencies, riots of slaves, peasants, minorities, marginals; in more recent times, the class struggles of proletarians and the discrimination battles of women.

In comparison with the historians of power, the new historians of popular culture have a difficult task. Historians of elite cultures, of wars waged by armies, write about the centers of cultural areas. For their documentation they have monuments, decrees engraved in stone, commercial correspondence, the autobiography of kings and the firm trails made by marching armies. Historians from the losing camp have no evidence of this kind. They report on subjects which often have been erased from the face of the earth, on people whose remains have been stamped out by their enemies, or blown away by the wind. The historians of peasantry and nomads, of village culture and home life, of women and infants, have few traces to examine. They must reconstruct the past from hunches, must be attentive to hints which they find in proverbs, riddles and songs. Often the only verbatim records left behind by the poor, especially woman, are the responses made by witches and rogues under torture, statements recorded by the courts. Modern anthropological history, the history of popular cultures, l'histoire des mentalités, has had to develop techniques to make these odd remnants intelligible.

This new history often tends to focus on war. It portrays the weak principally in their confrontations with those against whom they must defend themselves. It recounts stories of resistance and only by implication reports on the peace of the past. Conflict makes opponents comparable; it introduces simplicity into the past; it fosters the illusion that what has gone before can be related in XX° century uniquack. Thus war, which makes cultures alike, is all too often used by historians as the framework or skeleton of their narratives. Today there is a desperate need for the history of peace, a history infinitely more diverse than the story of war.

What is now designated peace research very often lacks historical perspective. The subject of this research is "peace", purged of its cultural and historical components. Paradoxically, peace was turned into an academic subject just when it had been reduced to a balance between sovereign, economic powers acting under the assumption of scarcity. Thus study is restricted to research on the least violent truce between competitors locked into a zero sum game. Like searchlights, the concepts of this research focus on scarcities. And they permit the discovery of unequal distributions of scarcity. But in the process of such research, the peaceful enjoyment of that which is not scarce, people's peace, is left in a zone of deep shadow.

The assumption of scarcity is fundamental to economics, and formal economics is the study of values under this assumption. But scarcity, and therefore all which can be meaningfully analyzed by formal economics, has been of marginal importance in the lives of most people through most of history. The spread of scarcity into all aspects of life can be chronicled; it occurred in European civilisation since the Middle Ages. Under the expanding assumption of scarcity, peace acquired a new meaning, a meaning without precedent anywhere in Europe. Peace came to mean pax economica. Pax economica is a balance between formally "economic" powers.

The history of this new reality deserves our attention. And the process through which pax economica monopolized the meaning of peace is especially important. This is the first meaning of peace to achieve worldwide acceptance. And such a monopoly ought to be deeply worrisome. Therefore, I want to contrast pax economica with its opposite and complement, popular peace.

Since the establishment of the United Nations, peace has been progressively linked with development. Previously this linkage had been unthinkable. The novelty of it can hardly be understood by people under forty. The curious situation is more easily intelligible for those who were, like myself, adults on January 10, 1949, the day President Truman announced the Point Four Programme. On that day most of us met the term "development" for the first time in its present meaning. Until then we had used development to refer to species, to real estate and to moves in chess. But since then it can refer to people, to countries and to economic strategies. And in less than a generation we were flooded with conflicting development theories. By now, however, most of them are merely curiosities for collectors. You may remember, with some embarrassment, how generous people were urged to make sacrifices for a succession of programmes aimed at "raising per capita income", "catching up with the advanced countries", "overcoming dependencies". And you now wonder at the many things once deemed worthy of export: "achievement orientation", "atoms for peace", "jobs", "windmills" and, currently, "alternative life styles" and professionally supervised "self-help". Each of these theoretical incursions came in waves. One brought the self-styles pragmatists who emphasized enterprise, the other would-be politicians who relied on "conscientizing" people into foreign ideology. Both camps agreed on growth. Both advocated rising production and increased dependence on consumption. And each camp with its sect of experts, each assembly of saviors, always linked its own scheme for development to peace. Concrete peace, by thus being linked to development, became a partisan goal. And the pursuit of peace through development became the overarching unexaminable axiom. Anyone who opposed economic growth, not this kind or that, but economic growth as such, could be denounced as an enemy of peace. Even Gandhi was cast into the role of the fool, the romantic or the psychopath. And worse, his teachings were perverted into so-called non-violent strategies for development. His peace too was linked to growth. Khadi was redefined as a "commodity", and non-violence as an economic weapon. The assumption of the economist, that values are not worth protecting unless they are scarce, has turned pax economica into a threat to people's peace.

The linkage of peace to development has made it difficult to challenge the latter. Let me suggest that such a challenge should now be the main task of peace research. And the fact that development means different things to different people is no obstacle. It means one thing to TNC executives, another to ministers of the Warsaw pact, and something other again to the architects of the New International Economic Order. But the convergence of all parties on the need for development has given the notion a new status. This agreement has made of development the condition for the pursuit of the XIX° century ideals of equality and democracy, with the proviso that these be restricted within the assumptions of scarcity. Under the disputes around the issue of "who gets what" the unavoidable costs inherent in all development have been buried. But during

the seventies one part of these costs has come to light. Some obvious "truths" suddenly became controversial. Under the ecology label, the limits of resources, of tolerable poison and stress, became political issues. But the violent aggression against the environment's utilization value has so far not been sufficiently disinterred. To expose the violence against subsistence which is implicit in all further growth, and which is veiled by pax economica, seems to me a prime task of redical peace research.

In both theory and practice all development means the transformation of subsistence-oriented cultures and their integration into an economic system. Development always entails the expansion of a formally economic sphere at the cost of subsistence-oriented activities. It means the progressive "disembedding" of a sphere in which exchange takes place under the assumption of a zero sum game. And this expansion proceeds at the cost of all other traditional forms of exchange. Thus development always implies the propagation of scarcity - dependence on goods and services perceived as scarce. Development necesarily creates a milieu from which the conditions for subsistence activities have been eliminated in the process of making the milieu over into a resource for the production and circulation of commodities. Development thus inevitably means the imposition of pax economica at the cost of every form of popular peace.

To illustrate the opposition between people's peace and pax economica, let me turn to the European Middle Ages. In so doing, I emphatically do not advocate a return to the past. I look at the past only to illustrate the dynamic opposition between two complementary forms of peace, both formally recognized. I explore the past rather than some social science theory to avoid utopian thinking and a planning mentality. The past is not, like plans and ideas, something which might possibly come about. It is not something which ought to be. The past has been. It allows me to stand on fact when I look at the present. I turn toward the European Middle Ages because it was near their end that a violent pax economica assumed its shape. And the replacement of people's peace by its engineered counterfeit, pax economica, is one of Europe's exports

In the XII° century, pax did not mean the absence of war between lords. The pax that Church or Emperor wanted to guarantee was not primarily the absence of armed encounters between knights. Pax, or peace, meant to protect the poor and their means of subsistence from the violence of war. Peace protected the peasant and the monk. This was the meaning of Gottesfrieden, of Landfrieden. It protected specific times and places. No matter how bloody the conflict among lords, peace protected the oxen and grain on the stem. It safeguarded the emergency granary, the seed and the time of harvest. Generally speaking, the "peace of the land" shielded the utilization values of the common environment from violent interference. It ensured acces to water and pasture, to woods and livestock, for those who had nothing else from which to draw their subsistence. The "peace of the land" was thus distinct from the truce between warring parties. This primarily subsistence-oriented significance of peace was lost with the Renaissance.

With the rise of the nation-state, an entirely new world began to emerge. This world ushered in a new kind of peace and a new kind of violence. Both its peace and its violence are equally distant from all the forms of peace and violence which had previously existed. Whereas peace had formerly meant the protection of that minimal subsistence on which the wars among lords had to be fed, henceforth subsistence itself became the victim of an aggression, supposedly peaceful. Subsistence became the prey of expanding markets in services and goods. This new kind of peace entailed the pursuit of a utopia. Popular peace had protected precarious but real communities from total extinction. But the new peace was built around an abstraction. The new peace is cut to the measure of homo economicus, universal man, made by nature to live on the consumption of commodities produced elsewhere by others. While the pax populi had protected vernacular autonomy, the environment in which this could thrive and the variety of patterns for its reproduction, the new pax economica protected production. It ensures aggression against popular culture, the commons and women.

First, pax economica cloaks the assumption that people have become incapable of providing for themselves. It empowers a new elite to make all people's survival dependent on their access to education, health care, police protection, apartments and supermarkets. In ways previously unknown, it exalts the producer and degrades the consumer. Pax economica labels the subsistent as "unproductive", the autonomous as "asocial", the traditional as "underdeveloped". It appels violence against all local customs which do not fit a zero sum game.

Secondly, pax economica promotes violence against the environment. The new peace garantees impunity - the environment may be used as a resource to be mined for the production of commodities, and a space reserved for their circulation. It does not just permit, but encourages the destruction of the commons. People's peace had protected the commons. It guarded the poor man's access to pastures and wood; it safeguarded the use of the road and the river by people; it reserved to widows and beggars exceptional rights for utilizing the environment. Pax economica defines the environment as a scarce resource which it reserves for optimal use in the production of goods and the provision of professional care. Historically, this is what development has meant: starting from the enclosure of the lord's sheep and reaching to the enclosure of the streets for the use of cars and to the restriction of desirable jobs to those with more than twelve years of schooling. Development has always signified a violent exclusion of those who wanted to survive without dependence on consumption from the environment's utilization values. Pax economica bespeaks war against the commons.

Thirdly, the new peace promotes a new kind of war between the sexes. The transition from the traditional battle for dominance to this new all-out war between men and women is probably the least analyzed of economic growth's side effects. This war, too, is a necessary outcome of the so-called growth of productive forces, a process implying an increasingly complete monopoly of wage labor over all other forms of work. And this too, is aggression. The monopoly of wage-related work entails aggression against a feature common to all subsistence-oriented societies. Though these societies be as different from each other as those of Japan, France and Fiji, one central characteristic is common to all of them: all tasks relevant to subsistence are assigned in a gender-specific way, to either men or women. The set of specific tasks which are necessary and culturally defined, vary from society to society. But each society distributes the various possible tasks to either men or women, and does so according to its own unique pattern. In no two cultures is the distribution of tasks within a society the same. In each culture, "growing up" means to grow into the activities characteristic there, and only there, of either man or woman. To be a man or a woman in pre-industrial societies is not a secondary trait added on to genderless humans. It is the most fundamental characteristic in every single action. To grow up does not mean to be "educated", but to grow into life by acting as a woman or as a man. Dynamic peace between men and women consists precisely in this division of concrete tasks. And this does not signify equality; it establishes limits to mutual oppression. Even in this intimate domain, people's peace limits both war and the extent of domination. Wage labor destroys this pattern.

Industrial work, productive work, is conceived as neutral and often experienced as such. It is defined as genderless work. And this is true whether it is paid or unpaid, whether its rhythm is determined by production or by consumption. But even though work is conceived as genderless, access to this activity is radically biased. Men have primary access to the paid tasks which are viewed as desirable and women are assigned those left over. Originally, women were the ones forced into unpaid shadow work, although men are now increasingly given these tasks, too. As a consequence of this neutralization of work, development inevitably promotes a new kind of war between the sexes, a competition between theoretical equals of whom half are handicapped by their sex. Now we see a competition for wage labor, which has become scarce, and a struggle to avoid shadow work, which is neither paid nor capable of contributing to subsistence.

Pax economica protects a zero sum game, and ensures its undisturbed progress. All are coerced to become players and to accept the rules of homo economicus. Those who refuse to fit the ruling model are either banished as enemies of the peace or educated until they conform. By the rules of the zero sum game, both the environment and human work are scarce stakes; as one gains the other loses. Peace is now reduced to two meanings: the myth that, at least in economics, two and two will one day make five, or a truce and deadlock. Development is the name given to the expansion of this game, to the incorporation of more players and of their resources. Therefore, the monopoly of pax economica must be deadly; and there must be some peace other than the one linked to development. One can concede that pax economica is not without some positive value - bicycle have been invented and their components must circulate in markets different from those in which pepper was formerly traded. And peace among economic powers is at least as important as peace between the warlords of ancient times. But the monopoly of this elite peace must be questioned. To formulate this challenge seems to me the most fundamental task of peace research today.

Of several minds: *John Garvey*

LIMITS OF ALLEGIANCE

LOYALTY TO DEEPER LOYALTIES *Commonweal: 31 July 1981:*

ONE NIGHT when I was in college I found myself sitting with a number of European students at dinner. The name of Willy Brandt came up, and a German graduate student reacted strongly. "Brandt! That swine! He ran off to Sweden when he should have stayed to defend his country." "You mean fight for Hitler?" someone asked. "Of course," the German student answered. He had straight blond hair and small round wire-rimmed glasses, just like the Nazis in the movies. I mentioned this to a friend, this uncritical and immediate defense of a form of patriotism which murdered millions, and my friend admitted that because of the way he had been brought up he would probably have allowed himself to be drafted into the Nazi army, and in all likelihood he would have obeyed any order given to him. He wasn't comfortable about this; he hoped that he would have had the courage to resist if he were ordered to do something that was obviously evil, but he was not at all sure what that was in a wartime situation, and he was not at all sure that he would ever feel free to make the choice to disobey.

I remembered these things as I watched a news special about America's defense, and heard soldiers talking about the tactical use of nuclear weapons. No doubt all of these men would obey orders, whatever the orders were, just as previous soldiers were willing to bomb Dresden and Hiroshima. There is more to this than the question of obeying orders, of course. The men who bombed Dresden and Hiroshima did what they did not only because they were ordered to do so, but because they were absolutely convinced of the need to defeat Hitler and the Axis powers. The question which became especially clear with Hiroshima, however, is this: is *anything* permitted to defeat an enemy? Are there no limits at all to what governments may do in the name of self-defense?

While it is important to continue pressing for disarmament and accord between nations, there is something even more important to be considered. The German student and my friend's response made me realize that the major question is not what an army may be permitted to do, or the limits to be placed on weaponry, but the problem of obedience itself. Should I be willing to serve? If given an order, should I assume that it ought to be obeyed?

This is an important educational matter — educational, because it has everything to do with what we teach our children about their obligation to society, to government, and to the church. If we teach a form of loyalty which assumes the decency of those in authority, if we allow our children to believe that a soldier should obey orders without question, or a citizen must pay taxes or obey the summons to join the army, we are laying the groundwork for more of the horror that has marked our century: total warfare, and the destruction of millions. It has been argued that there simply must be a more or less unchallenged chain of command for society to work at all; unless people obey those in authority there will be chaos. But we really must consider what obedience has brought us. The fact that he was obeying orders was Eichmann's chief defense.

We should not teach our children wholesale cynicism or an individualism which would do away with the idea of any obligation at all. There are loyalties deeper than the allegiance which is ordinarily asked by the state or the church, loyalties to what state and church are supposed to be about, but too often are not. It is not disloyal to wonder whether the institution — whatever it is — is being well served by those who are temporarily in charge, nor is it disloyal to judge an institution in the light of what it claims to be about. When America's support of dictatorships is allowed to go unchallenged in any serious way, something important about America has been allowed to die. The intention of an anti-Communist foreign policy is not what is wrong; it is clear to most people by now that Communism is a bad idea whose time may be passing. Poland is wonderful news. But it is a betrayal of American assumptions about liberty to support a Somoza in the name of anti-Communism, and the argument that the Sandinistas aren't very decent either is not a worthy response. America simply should not support the sort of people who send home other people's heads as a warning to behave.

To take a less serious, but still very serious, example from the church, it is necessary to judge the hard-heartedness of Catholic canon law in the light of the Gospel. It is not the intention of the regulations surrounding marriage and divorce which is in question; it is the pastoral effect of enforcing the laws we have, which are easier on mass murderers than on those who have remarried after divorce. Jesus's teaching on divorce is clear, and clearly opposed to divorce. But his teaching on justice to the poor is also clear; so is his teaching about laying up treasure for ourselves, and on loving our enemies. Soldiers and people with fat bank accounts are not kept from communion; they are admitted, and called on to repent, and be transformed.

Questioning those in authority, and where necessary resisting them, is not disloyal. It may be the result of deeper loyalties. In disobeying Creon, Antigone is obedient to something more profoundly important than the laws of the city. Thomas More, the loyal servant of the king, knew that his loyalty had limits. Wherever allegiance is equated with unquestioning obedience it has led people into trouble. There are exceptions: in fairy tales they have to do with orders which come from obviously magic sources. In religious history the unquestionable orders come from God, as when God asked Abraham to sacrifice Isaac. I don't think this can be extended to include the orders of generals or judges. The only unquestioning loyalty we are allowed is our obedience to God, and even here there are questions and struggles: Job is more admirable than Abraham, because he questions God. And although God's answer to Job seems a rebuke to the whole idea that God can be questioned, the strong implication is that an honest man must question even God. "I burn with anger against you," God says to Job's comforters, who offered pious answers to Job's anguished questions, "for not speaking truthfully about me as my servant Job has done."

As long as questioning those in authority is seen as a special vocation, the prophetic call of a chosen few, we are in danger. We have one good example in

our time of a community which resisted, not assuming that resistance was for extraordinary or heroic people. Denmark is arguably the only nation which comes out of World War II looking good. The English and Americans did little to stop the slaughter of the Jews; when occupied by the Nazis, France caved in. Denmark, occupied, resisted. When the Nazis threatened to enforce the law which required Jews to wear the yellow star, King Christian let it be known that if they did so he would wear the yellow star himself, and call on all Danes to join him. The Nazis gave up on that one. Then, in a massive act of resistance, the Danes managed to smuggle virtually every Danish Jew out of Denmark. An army looks like a weak thing next to that sort of spirit. The example of Denmark has not been praised or studied enough. It shows us that when resistance becomes a communal undertaking, a form of common sense, it can save the soul of a nation.

JOHN GARVEY

Of several minds: *Thomas Powers*

PRINCIPLES OF ABOLITION

EIGHT REASONS FOR GETTING RID OF THE BOMB

Commonweal: 31 July 1981:

IN 1945, even before the Trinity test proved an atomic bomb could be made to work, a sudden wave of concern or alarm swept the laboratories where the new weapon had been fashioned. Military authorities had done their best to keep everybody in the dark, to isolate Oak Ridge, the Met Lab in Chicago, and Los Alamos, and to treat all general discussion of the bomb as a violation of security. Scientists didn't like it, but for the most part went along. But early in 1945, when the magnitude and the imminence of the bomb became apparent, the scientists—in a single, spontaneous, almost convulsive awakening—suddenly grasped the thing whole: the bomb was big enough to wreck our civilization, there was no defense, any determined nation could build one, an arms race could result in stockpiles of thousands, something had to be done. Churchill and Truman were slow to understand the bomb was not simply bigger. For the Pentagon, then as later, a weapon was a weapon. It was the scientists alone, throughout 1945, who understood what had happened, and what must be done.

Robert Bacher, at Los Alamos, was one of them. He had been working on the bomb since 1943. In August, 1945, he personally checked out the core of a bomb intended for a third Japanese city, while a military team waited outside, motor running, to carry it to the airport for the first leg of its flight to the Pacific. At the last minute orders arrived not to send the core. Instead it remained at Los Alamos. The American stockpile of nuclear weapons may be said to have begun at that moment. In the following months Bacher was active with the Association of Los Alamos Scientists—known without irony as ALAS—in what came to be called the scientists' movement. It was clear to Bacher what had to be done: the world had ten years at the outside to find a way to control nuclear weapons, or some awful calamity would eventually follow. The ten years passed, nothing was achieved, the calamity is still pending. Now a professor emeritus at the California Institute of Technology and a veteran of many government commissions, Bacher hopes he was wrong, that the world's failure to reach agreement does not really mean disaster. But the hope is not robust. "It's a miracle we've got this far," he said recently. Perhaps it was a miracle. Perhaps we've been given time for a second effort. Who can say? One thing is clear: attempts to control nuclear weapons in the last thirty-six years have failed. There are thousands now, and thousands more on the way. Nothing stands in the way of the disaster Bacher and so many others foresaw but fear, and the hope that fear is enough. The scientists who were active in 1945, asked for a gambler's guess of our chances now, fall into two rough groups. Some think we may squeak through. Others think not. It seems to be a question of temperament. Whatever they think, naturally all are hopeful. Talking to these scientists, or to others in what is called the national security community, one hears a great deal about hope. It is hope naked, hope pure, hope unalloyed with anything hard enough to point to as an actual reason. At this point in our history, it seems clear, optimism must be blind. We have built thousands of nuclear warheads, and we hope they won't be used.

Is this the best we can do?

One should not be too quick to answer. It may very well be the best. The history of efforts to establish varying degrees of international control of nuclear weapons—beginning with the ambitious and clear-sighted Acheson-Lilienthal plan of 1946—is dense with the serious work of able men. William Foster, Gerard Smith, Paul Warnke, Henry Kissinger, and Cyrus Vance, as well as many others both in and out of government, in this country and elsewhere, have done their best to fashion useful and enduring agreements and to explain the importance of the undertaking. Arms control is not a subject which has been neglected in print or in fact. But the history of these efforts is a history of failure, for the most part, while the history of the arms-builders records one triumph after another, without break.

One might isolate any number of reasons for the failures of those who think there are too many weapons in the world, not too few. A major one is the tendency of any plan for controlling, limiting, or reducing arms to invert itself, to shift its focus from limiting weapons to an argument that X are enough. Thus arms negotiators and defense planners are in the same line of work; they attack the problem from opposite ends, but meet in the middle. In this perpetual debate at the official level all concede we need arms, including nuclear arms. Some say we need a great many, others say not so many. Naturally the president, who must decide, prefers to err on the side of safety. The result, since 1945, has been a slow, losing, rear-guard action by the arms limiters, and the building of a great many strategic weapons—not so many, perhaps, as the military would have liked, but more than enough to break the back of our civilization, when used.

This pattern is not reason for abandoning arms negotiations, but for something else—the building of a constituency which might take a different approach. The prospects for a new movement of this sort are dim at the moment. What might be the occasion for a spontaneous arousal on the necessary scale, short of a major war? This I cannot answer. But if such a movement came into being—a genuinely abolitionist movement, prepared to forego nuclear weapons en-

tirely, to work for *none*—on what basic principles might it build an argument? How might it justify—not only to the world's military and political leaders, but more importantly to itself—a claim that nuclear weapons are too dangerous and too wanton to possess in any number at all? It seems to me there are eight basic principles on which an abolitionist movement might found itself. All are in the nature of givens.

1. *It can happen*. Nuclear weapons do not make war impossible; they only ensure it will be terrible. The theory of deterrence is that war is an act of aggrandizement, and that nothing can prevent it but fear of the consequences. History suggests that war is something else—a characteristic and habitual form of human behavior, a thing men do—sometimes for one reason, sometimes for another. If we do not know the root causes of war how can we hope to prevent it—*forever*?

2. *All victims are equal*. How are we to choose between human beings, and say that the death of one somehow matters more than the death of another? War happens to both sides; it is the whole loss which diminishes mankind and is cause for sadness—not just the loss on our side. Very few of the dead had anything to do with starting it; war simply came and took their lives away. In the sort of war where millions die the balance of the millions is immaterial. All the millions were innocent. Any serious attempt to save them must attempt to save all of them. Attempts to save our side only are simply military measures under a different name.

3. *Nothing can be gained or preserved commensurate with the loss*. War on a global scale cannot be said to be about anything. Nations have their differences, but it is impossible to conceive of one large enough or important enough to require the wrecking of the world. Such a war would simply happen. The issues involved at the outset would be overwhelmed by the war itself. Nothing the United States or the Soviet Union could do to each other in a non-military way could ever equal what they can do to each other in a military way. In the past it might have been said that war was about who wins. Now it is about what survives.

4. *Weapons threaten; they don't defend*. As a practical matter one can't protect oneself by threatening others. Threats elicit threats. There are distinctively defensive measures a nation might take, but building strategic weapons is not one of them. Thirty-five years of trying to guarantee our safety with strategic weapons has made us about as unsafe as any nation in history; it is the same for the Russians. This ability to injure each other has become the deepest source of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union; it is the bedrock of defense policy. But defense is a misnomer; what we buy, for the most part, are not things which defend, but things which threaten.

5. *There is no military solution*. Weapons have not made us safe; more weapons cannot be expected to do any better. Attempts to gain or hold an advantage in weapons have been the motor of the arms race, and have only increased our common danger. The fifteen thousand strategic warheads possessed by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. threaten our civilization. The twenty-five thousand we are expected to have by 1985 may threaten human life in this hemisphere. Eventually we may acquire weapons enough to threaten all human life on the planet. This is not something either of us wants to do, and it is not something either of us would risk if it weren't for the peculiar context of pride and will which forms the background of an arms race. It is the weapons which threaten us, not the political differences. The problem isn't too few weapons, but too many. We need to get rid them, not build more. But insofar as the military sees weapons (theirs) as a problem, it insists that weapons (ours) are the solution.

6. *There are no villains*. The problem is not rapacious monopoly capitalism or militant Communism. Such claims are only a convenience. The scale of the present arms race is unprecedented, but otherwise it's the common stuff of history. Our reason for it is the common one too. The strategic weapons possessed by both sides threaten the annihilation of the other; why are we doing such a terrible thing? The easiest answer—the one that leaves us out—is villainous intent on their part, some great ambition we must resist. Thus our own military efforts can be seen as the solution to a problem. There is a problem all right, but it isn't the iniquity of the other side; it is our characteristic response to the fact of sides. The students of war have got hundreds to study; their causes come in dozens of varieties. Clearly men are ready to go to war for this reason or that reason or no reason; the reasons are only a kind of veneer. They describe without truly explaining the war. There is a corollary to the no-villains principle; if the other side isn't the problem, then we aren't the problem either. It is our nature which explains our behavior. Understanding war is not a polemical but a spiritual exercise. To free ourselves of war we must understand and transform ourselves, no easy task.

7. *We can never forget how to build nuclear weapons*. The threat they pose is now a permanent part of the human situation. Even if complete abolition of nuclear weapons were achieved, no system of international inspection or control, however extensive, could prevent their renewed manufacture in the event of a big general war. Starting from scratch in August, 1942—with no certainty for the production of fissionable material—the United States built its first nuclear device in less than three years. Next time the job would go quicker. Thus the danger posed by nuclear weapons is inseparable from the danger posed by the war itself. The weapons reflect a dangerous part of our nature, not the only one by any means. We shall be struggling with it, one way or another, for as long as we are here to struggle.

8. *We do not have to submit*. The pattern since 1945 is clear; it is one of preparation for war. Our chances of altogether escaping this war are fragile, but the prospect of failure is no reason for submission. Why wait till war proves the point? The political and military establishments of the world do not really like living under the threat of annihilation any better than we do; they simply fail to see an alternative. Thus an attempt to free ourselves of war and the fear of war may be seen as a struggle toward the light—to see the danger as a common one, to grasp our own role in the process as well as our opponent's, to comprehend that the violence of modern war is out of scale with whatever it may be said to be about, and finally to understand there is no way to threaten others without endangering ourselves in return. A move in this direction, away from war, must be personal before it can be political. It is worth undertaking for its own sake, whatever the results. We need no one's permission to begin.

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MANAS

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About Establishments

WE have an acquisitive and increasingly self-destructive society and there are times when even its excellences seem like flowers of evil . . . and yet, there are other times when something comes through that should be singled out for praise and appreciation. We are thinking of the *New Yorker,* which we can't help but admire for its editorial quality, even though it exists by reason of all those insidiously clever ads. To get to the point, "Talk of the Town" for April 6 begins:

> There seems to be no end to the amount that the world can learn from the Poles. Through the actions of the Solidarity movement, they have refreshed the spirit of freedom everywhere. In them, liberty has flowed from its deepest and purest source: the direct will of millions of people to live and act together honorably and peacefully, unconstrained by the fear, suspicion, deception, secrecy, brutality, and general demoralization that pervades society under totalitarian rule—and, in this case, foreign-sponsored totalitarian rule at that. In opposing a Marxist state, they have given an unexpected confirmation of Marx's theory that the workers themselves could organize and take charge of their destinies. Even the withering away of the state—a Marxist theory never before confirmed anywhere—is occurring (or anyway has begun to occur) in Poland. Although they do not call themselves revolutionaries, what they have accomplished—a transformation of society at the molecular level, with an apparently irreversible change in the life and spirit of a whole people—goes far deeper than the accomplishments of most of the insurrections, guerrilla actions, and coups instigated by those who do call themselves revolutionaries. And by their restraint the members of Solidarity have added a hopeful new chapter to the story of non-violence, for this is the first time that this mode of action has been used to telling effect against a totalitarian adversary. Whereas many other rebellious movements of our era have pursued noble ends with inhuman, or even criminal, means, Solidarity's means and ends have been one. Its members have fought for tolerance by being tolerant; they have fought for the truth by telling the truth; and they have gained freedom by practicing freedom.

This is a level of comment that we'd like to see appear more often in the radical and pacifist press. Even if what is said can be picked at—as can practically everything in anything as complicated as mass action—a profile of moral significance and achievement emerged and became evident to the *New Yorker* writer, and he, like other staff members of that paper, was equal to putting it into appropriate words.

This calls for a few other words in appreciation of the Establishment, which has its good side as well as its indecent side, that usually gets the most attention. The Establishment is the creation of a comparatively small number of opinion-makers whose views prevail at a given moment of history. They have their notions of culture and human good along with prudent and bankerish attitudes about policy. They keep the universities going—such as they are—and, like a great many managers, have a fair stock of common sense. They preserve the conventions—good ones along with others not so good—and follow tradition until obliged by circumstances—pressures are more effective than reason—to submit to change. An establishment is the guardian of the status quo. A good establishment tends to be free from fears of revolution, willing to listen to if not to accept intelligent criticism, and is aware that some day it will have to change, even though it hopes to put change off for as long as possible. An establishment willing to tolerate fellows like Cicero or William O. Douglas is a pretty good one. (Cicero lasted quite a while before political enemies killed him, and the attempt to impeach Douglas failed.)

Another way of thinking about an establishment is comparing it to a tree—the firm stature, that is, of a tree. What holds a tree up is its dead wood. Without its strength the other functions of the tree—ecologically many—could not be performed. So you could say that even the part that is no longer growing has a function—it holds things together and gives support to the tender cambium layer where the growing takes place. So with society. If the daring and imaginative workers for change couldn't get any kind of job we'd soon have a totalitarian society.

The important thing for the health of an establishment is not to allow itself too much complacency. A conceited establishment rewards mediocrity and demands that originality be ignored if not suppressed. This almost always results from the elevation of bureaucratic minds to areas of decision. Armed with power, bureaucracy becomes routine tyranny. Years ago frightened establishment people used to talk about "creeping socialism." Their aim was bad. The prevailing defect—the inevitable vulnerability of every complex technological society—is in the monstrously large and growing organization required to minister to its multiplying needs and manage its increasingly unwieldy functions. So, "creeping bureaucracy" would be a better target for criticism. So far as we know, only the decentralists have a remedy, and the modern welfare, warfare state is not about to adopt it.

In such a period of history, there is a great deal of clutching at straws, while the voices of intelligent critics grow stronger and stronger. A decent establishment learns how to bend when it must. It may not bend enough—what group jealous of its power does?—but bending a little is better than putting its critics in jail, as happened, say, in Russia a generation ago, when the curious biological theories of Lysenko were adopted by the Communist leadership and bureaucracy, probably because they seemed to parallel Party doctrine, leading to the ostracism of the distinguished Mendelian geneticist, Nicoli Vavilov, who apparently died in a camp or a prison because Gregor Mendel

was a bourgeois foreigner. But here in America, the Department of Agriculture, after snubbing "organic" gardeners and farmers for many years, decided to look into what they were doing and saying, and made a favorable report.

This is no *carte blanche* apology for the Establishment, but an attempt at reminding ourselves that our country couldn't possibly have held together so well for so long without certain essential qualities in its most distinguished citizens. William O. Douglas' *The Court Years* is a good book to read about the kind of men we have had on the Supreme Court over many years, and there is a lot more evidence of this sort salted away in biographies. The indecent side of the Establishment is well known to us, and incidentally is much more noticeable because outrage is easier to recognize than the behavior of men who do what they think is right as a matter of course.

We can't conclude a discussion of this sort without referring once more to Arthur Morgan, who worked in and with the Establishment, yet was himself immeasurably ahead of its common opinions. His *Dams and Other Disasters* (Porter Sargent, 1971) shows how a man of integrity, imagination, and good will was able to work with the best forces in this country, while opposing with vigor (and some success) the stubborn bureaucratic stupidity of the Army Engineers.