


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(Mrs.) Eulah C. Laucks, President
Post Office Box 5012
Santa Barbara, CA. 93150-5012

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The following are transcripts of two MacNEIL-LEHRER NEWS HOUR interviews by Robert MacNeil with George F. Kennan, December 21 and 23, 1988. (WNET, New York, N.Y.) (Reprinted from copies* made by "Strictly Business", P.O. Box 12361, Overland Park, KS. 66212).

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Wednesday, December 21, 1988

NEWS MAKER GUEST: George F. Kennan

MR. MAC NEIL: First tonight a different perspective on the momentous events in the Soviet Union. There is probably no American who watches the changes Mikhail Gorbachev is attempting with more interest than George F. Kennan. He was the man who 40 years argued that if the West followed a policy of containment of Soviet expansion, it would eventually produce changes in Moscow. George Kennan is a career diplomat and Soviet expert. He served in many diplomatic posts in Eastern Europe in the 30's and 40's. After World War II, he joined the national war college. There in 1946, he wrote what became one of the most influential papers ever produced in the foreign service. It was published a year later in Foreign Affairs Magazine under the signature X. Russia was evolving from war time ally to expansionist foe. In the X Article, Kennan argued that "The main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansionist tendencies.". That idea became the cornerstone of Western policy, although with more military emphasis than Kennan intended. Four decades later, many see the changes in the Soviet Union as the result of that policy. Eventually, Kennan resigned from the foreign service to write history for which he's won a Pulitzer Prize and a national book award. Now at 84, he is a Professor Emeritus at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. He rarely gives interviews and until now has commented very little on the Gorbachev revolution. Our interview is in two parts. Tonight, how he reads the events in Russia; tomorrow, what policies should replace containment.

MR. MAC NEIL: Professor Kennan, given the changes Gorbachev has made in Soviet policy, is this the historic turning point the West been working towards and hoping for since the Second World War?

GEORGE F. KENNAN: Yes, I think it certainly is as long as Gorbachev remains in power. I can't predict what would happen after he left, but it is a great turning point, it's the greatest turning point really, not only since the Second World War, but since the Russian Revolution.

MR. MAC NEIL: You wrote in your famous X Article that the characteristics of Soviet

*unedited

policy would be with us until the internal nature of Soviet power is changed. Are you confident that the internal nature of Soviet power is changing?

PROFESSOR KENNAN: Yes. Perhaps not in every respect but in most of the essential respects from our standpoint. That is, I think the ideological aspect to it when it comes to their foreign policies has really entirely disappeared. No one in Russia today dreams of trying to implement world revolution in our time, or even to stage any communist revolutions in any of the Western countries. This is utterly gone. There's no interest in it. There are no intentions that lead in that direction. That's one great change. But also their view of themselves is changing very rapidly and very essentially. They are beginning to realize that the sort of communism that developed, if you could call it that, under Stalin is simply not workable in any way, that this has got to be basically changed and they're reaching back actually into the Lenin period and beginning to question whether even all the principles of Lenin were correct ones, so I think these are very basic changes and the country is beginning to resemble more and more the normal great, traditional great power which we knew before the Russian Revolution.

MR. MAC NEIL: You also say in your 1947 article, you warned when there is something the Russians want from us, some features of their policy may be pushed into the background and you say, "There will always be Americans who will leap forward with gleeful announcements that the Russians have changed.". Do you have any anxiety that that might be what's happening now?

PROFESSOR KENNAN: No. These things were written about the Stalin regime and written some seven years I think before it came to an end, when it was right at the peak of its power, and they were relevant to that regime. And there too I would have been, I would have been suspicious of professions by Stalin and the men around him to have changed, as I say, and I would have thought we should look at that very very carefully. Today I think it is quite different and I would not apply very much of what I wrote at that time to the situation we have before us today.

MR. MAC NEIL: Well, if I can just remind you of a couple of other things you wrote just to see how different you think it is now, you said...and fundamentally it may have changed under Gorbachev...you said, one characteristic was, of that time in the Soviet Union, was an innate antagonism between the socialist and capitalist systems and that they would never sincerely assume that there would be a community of aims between us. You think that has changed? They now see that antagonism.

PROFESSOR KENNAN: I do think that that has changed.

MR. MAC NEIL: How?

PROFESSOR KENNAN: That they...there are, of course, some respects in which there will always be differences and conflicts of interest and of outlook between the two countries, but I think they realize, themselves, very well that we have common interests and extremely important ones which were not visible at all in 1945 to 1950.

MR. MAC NEIL: Another factor you mentioned was the infallibility of the Kremlin and of the Communist Party. Now that has not changed, has it? They're not admitting other centers of truth.

PROFESSOR KENNAN: They are beginning to. Gorbachev has said things which lead in that direction and the very freedom of expression which he has now permitted and which is simply being used and tremendously, intensively and extensively in Russia, that presupposes the uses of discussion, the uses of bringing adversarial points of view together and letting each be judged by the other. This is new in the Soviet Union. It existed in the old Russia, but it's new to the Soviet Union, and I think it's a very basic change. It's simply unbelievable what is occurring today in the Soviet press in the organs of opinion there. The diversity of opinion that has suddenly exploded, come out, is scarcely to be believed for anyone who knew the Russia in the time of Stalin.

MR. MAC NEIL: Well, if it has changed so much, how much can the United States and the West claim to have produced that change, create, cause that change, since you were one of the architects of the policy?

PROFESSOR KENNAN: I think only marginally and really to the extent that they, themselves, constituted an example of something entirely different. I think in that respect we have been very important and the other Western countries, the fact that there were countries and this was known in the Soviet Union where there was freedom of opinion, freedom of discussion, where there was not all uniformity, where ideas could be tested by exposure. All this was known even in the Stalin period and became known increasingly in the years after the war. And this I think has had quite an important effect, especially on the intellectuals, although I would not put it as the main cause of the change that has come.

MR. MAC NEIL: What is the main cause?

PROFESSOR KENNAN: The main cause was the realization on the part of many intelligent people in the Soviet Union in these recent years of the fact that the whole system was going down hill, that it was no longer competitive, that the capitalist countries were going far beyond it. There were many other points of weakness too which became apparent to them and that I think is the main reason for the change. The change, after all, has been a change inspired and carried out from the top, from the upper reaches of the political society, not really from the bottom. It's these people who saw how inadequate the system was and who have tried to take action to change it.

MR. MAC NEIL: You haven't mentioned the American and the Western military posture in all this as an agent of change in the Soviet Union, the competition for resources that it forced on the Soviet Union.

PROFESSOR KENNAN: Well, that yes, but only in that one respect, the competition for resources. While there too there was not much questioning, so far as I know, until quite recently of the necessity for maintaining these large armed forces, I think it has gradually become apparent to them that an undue part of their capacity for reinvestment has been going into their military industrial complex just as it has with us here, and that is another one of the reasons why they have come to feel that they have to have a different sort of relationship with the West.

MR. MAC NEIL: Quoting you again from 1947, you said, "The United States has in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power. Now do you see that as what has happened?

PROFESSOR KENNAN: Yes, I do belatedly, although I must say that some of this began very shortly after the death of Stalin in a small way and has grown ever since that time. Today I would say this describes the situation very well, but I don't think this was all...as I've said a few moments ago...I don't think it was all our doing. I think there were internal causes too that brought this about. However, we did have it in our power to influence but above all by our example, not by our preaching to them, but by the example we set in our own country we've had it in our power to influence the development of things in Russia, and I just wish that the example had been a little better than it has been.

MR. MAC NEIL: Meaning what?

PROFESSOR KENNAN: Our example.

MR. MAC NEIL: How might it have been better in your view?

PROFESSOR KENNAN: Well, I think some of the negative aspects of our own civilization

have also been apparent to them and they were ones which we could have done better to eliminate I think.

MR. MAC NEIL: As you were so prescient in 1947 and you so well projected what might happen, can you project now what course things will take in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev? Can Gorbachev succeed in this, in this endeavor?

PROFESSOR KENNAN: In my opinion, Gorbachev's reforms in concept were sound and correct and if carried through would lead to a very important improvement in Soviet Life. I don't know whether that's going to help them. It's hard to predict. This is a very very uncertain chancy moment in Soviet history, almost anything could happen. I think Gorbachev made two errors, errors of analysis really, and the people around him too who inspired him were also, if you could call it that, guilty of this. For one thing, they underestimated the extent of the damage which 20 years of Stalinist terror and another 20 years of Brezhnev's stagnation had done to Soviet society. You may say that's surprising, they were so close to it they should have seen this, but I don't think they really did. Few of us did. We knew that great damage had been done. We never knew the extent of it. By damage I mean moral damage, damage to the spirit as well as to the material circumstances of life. But you have today at the bottom in the lowest ranks of the population there I would say perhaps 30, 40 percent of the population. You have a deplorable and pathetic situation, these people, for they've lived all their lives under authoritarian discipline and control. They've been wholly deprived of even the idea that they could ever change their situation by their own individual initiative, and now where they are confronted with the possibility of what you might call freedom, they have no idea how to take advantage of it. This I don't think Gorbachev saw. I think he thought there would be a much more ready response. I could go on with that, but I don't want to belabor it.

MR. MAC NEIL: Can you...what is your hunch about the course that things are going to take under Gorbachev? I know you can't predict literally but...

PROFESSOR KENNAN: I think his position today is very precarious because he has had luck, had hard luck and a lot of things have gone adversely and he will be and is being blamed for them. On the other hand, he has a lot going for him. First of all, he has his reputation as a world statesman, which is well deserved. He has everything that it takes for this, this image and this reality. Besides that, he is a man who has a program. This program has been approved by the major organs of party and government in his country cannot easily be changed and everyone in Russia agrees that you can't go back to what existed before he came in. I know of nobody who doesn't agree with that. That being the case, it means that anyone who tries to replace him in the first place is going to look very pale against the international background compared to Gorbachev, but in addition to that, he is going to inherit all of Gorbachev's problems and find himself in the same difficult position that Gorbachev is today, and I think there are not there very many really who want to do that.

MR. MAC NEIL: What is the likelihood if Gorbachev were overthrown that he would be replaced by somebody more reactionary, that there would be something of a return to Stalinism?

PROFESSOR KENNAN: I think there would be something of a return not so much to Stalinism but to Brezhnevism, if you want to call it that, to the situation that existed in the 70's and the early 80's. I don't think anybody will be able again to lock up and silence the Soviet intelligentsia. They have been really let out of the prison, and are enjoying their freedom hugely and they have such a, built up such a tremendous volume of enthusiasm and enjoyment of it that I don't, I think it would be years before they could be silenced again. And I don't think anybody will try.

MR. MAC NEIL: Of all the problems confronting Mr. Gorbachev, the inertia of the system, the interest of many people in the status quo, the desire for autonomy in many of the nationalities, what is it that puts him at greatest risk, do you think?

PROFESSOR KENNAN: I think the hardest of the problems for him to solve will be those which are not in the nature of asking for independence from the Soviet Union but rather rivalries between certain of the non-Russian nationalities, and particularly the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis. This is a very troublesome problem, not one really of the retention of the unity of the empire because I don't think either of these wants to go outside it. On the other hand, what is happening in the Baltic states does bring up really the question of a demand for greater independence. I hope that it is not for total independence at this time, because that could provoke a very very serious crisis. And if anybody thinks that we would stand to gain by a real crunch of some sort, by real disarray and by forcing Gorbachev to take brutal measures against these people, I think he's making a great mistake. This has in it the makings of a crisis not just for the Soviet Union, but for all of Eastern and Central Europe and eventually for ourselves and we can only hope that these problems will be solved in a peaceful way. And that means, I'm afraid, in a gradual way calling for great patience on both sides.

MR. MAC NEIL: How do you evaluate Gorbachev as a historical figure?

PROFESSOR KENNAN: I think he is a most remarkable man. He has qualities that are extraordinary for anyone in his position. He has high intelligence, great courage, great firmness when challenged. He is not afraid to use all the organs, all the instruments of his power to protect his position when people threaten it, as I think they did two or three or four months ago. I think that he is something, in a rather primitive way, he is an idealist, that is, that he has ideals. He thinks that socialism should be a humane as well as a successful way of governing people. I'm not sure that he understands fully all the matters that he has been thinking about, but I'm very impressed with the things he has said about foreign affairs. He has great insight into certain very fundamental truths or what I believe to be truths about our present predicament in this world. He realizes perfectly well that war is no longer an option between great industrial powers. I think he also realizes very well that we all face an environmental crisis of enormous significance which may be quite imminent and that we've got to turn our attention to that and to other world problems. I think he fully understands that the cold war is obsolete, that whatever rationale it ever had is now largely undermined and non-existent. All of these are, to my mind, very remarkable insights and he has had the courage not only to recognize these things but to say them time and time again publicly. I give him great credit for this.

MR. MAC NEIL: How do you explain that the Soviet system which has put such a premium on conformity, on safety would produce a Gorbachev?

PROFESSOR KENNAN: You know, I really cannot explain it. Numbers of us who have known that country for a long time simply stand without explanation as to how a man with these qualities could have emerged from a provincial party apparatus in the North caucuses. I have asked this question of people in the Soviet Union. One thing that they said was that you must remember that he was a student of law at the Moscow University and they told me to my surprise, because I had never known it, that that law school had retained certain types of teaching and training, and training also in the mannerisms of the law which existed on almost no other place of legal instruction in Russia, and that may have had something to do with it. It is also true that he was a protege of Andropov, who came down there, as do many of the Soviet leaders to that area for reasons of health. And he, Andropov, picked him up. Well, Andropov, as we discover after his death again, I never knew it when he was alive, was a highly cultured man. And there was more culture in that, in Andropov's entourage than we ever suspected. These are only partial explanations and I don't...they are not fully adequate to myself. I think he's rather a miracle.

MR. MAC NEIL: Professor Kennan, thank you and we'll resume this tomorrow evening.

PROFESSOR KENNAN: Thank you. I appreciate the opportunity.

MR. MAC NEIL: Tomorrow night, George Kennan will discuss what he thinks U.S./Soviet policy should be in the years to come.

MR. LEHRER: Now Part 2 of our News Maker Interview with George F. Kennan. Few diplomats have had a greater impact on their country than George Kennan. While posted in Moscow in 1946, he was one of the first to note the changes that were turning Russia from wartime ally to expansionist competitor. A year later, his arguments were reprinted in Foreign Affairs Magazine under the byline X. In the X Article, Kennan argued that "The main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansionist tendencies." Containment has guided America's approach to the Soviet Union ever since. Two nights ago, Kennan told Robert MacNeil that under Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union is becoming more democratic at home and less of a threat abroad. Tonight he talks about how the United States should respond and what should replace the cold war policy of containment.

Professor Kennan, is the Soviet Union no longer a threat to the United States?

PROFESSOR KENNAN: In my opinion, it is not, not any more than any great power is a threat to any other and not any more than we are a threat to ourselves.

MR. MAC NEIL: Does that mean that containment of the Soviet Union is no longer necessary?

PROFESSOR KENNAN: In the sense in which that term was used in 1946 and '47, in my opinion, it is no longer necessary. I do not think that they are today indulging in any dreams or efforts of expansion behind...beyond the borders of their own power. And when I say that, I am including, of course, Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact. On the contrary, they are in some respects withdrawing and I think the plight in which they find themselves internally precludes now and for a good long time into the future any ideas of very aggressive policies that could be injurious to the other great powers.

MR. MAC NEIL: We are about to have a change of administration in the United States, an opportunity for fresh policies. What should replace containment?

PROFESSOR KENNAN: In our bilateral relations with the Soviet Union, I would say merely the restoration of what I would call a normal relationship. By normal, I mean mutual respect and restraint and common politeness in dealing with each other. But in the multinational sense that is looked at it in terms of our, the position of these two countries in the world at large, I should say it should be replaced first and foremost by an intensive and collaborative effort to forestall the environmental disasters by which the planet would now appear to be threatened and also of course to face up to the great problems of the third world, and not of the third world alone, because I think that even in the developed parts of the world there are numbers of unsolved problems in the way our societies are developing. But all of that should be looked at, and it should be looked at now in the collaborative sense, not in the sense of some great world conflict between one system and another. I think that is really is obsolescent. I would like to hope, of course, that the men around Mr. Bush and Mr. Bush, himself, saw things this way too and realized that the cold war is, has really been left in the past, that it has no substance as an approach to international problems today and that they would turn their attention to efforts which are more hopeful and more constructive than our military rivalry with the Soviet Union. And I would be pleasantly surprised if they consented to do that. I don't want to sound too pessimistic. Perhaps they will.

MR. MAC NEIL: Do you think this country politically and otherwise can adjust easily to the absence of cold war?

PROFESSOR KENNAN: No, and I'm sorry to say that. I realize there would have to be first of all an intellectual adjustment. And I'm afraid that there are a great many people in our country, I don't think they're a majority, but they are a very important minority, for whom the existence, at least in their world of images, the existence of some great

enemy of this country is necessary to their peace of mind and to their way of thought. But beyond that, of course, there is the fact that even the adjustment to a world in which we no longer needed to spend \$300 billion a year on defense, this would not be easy for us. I think it can be done. I think conversion can be made, and that we will be none the worse off for it. But it will be a very difficult effort for us to conceive of and to carry out.

MR. MAC NEIL: You mentioned in a recent article the existence of a body of people who need what you just described, an enemy who can only be exercised by military preparations...

PROFESSOR KENNAN: That's right.

MR. MAC NEIL: ...and that's become a political necessity to that. Can this country adjust psychologically to the absence of an enemy?

PROFESSOR KENNAN: I think only if it is given strong political leadership in making that adjustment. If it is encouraged in that state of mind which so many people have been in in recent years, then of course it will not adjust and that would be a great shame.

MR. MAC NEIL: But didn't the most symbolic leader, if not actual leader, of that kind of thinking, Ronald Reagan, himself, make the adjustment very quickly, and with that carry a lot of psychological baggage for the whole country?

PROFESSOR KENNAN: Yes, he did. And I greatly hope that Mr. Bush will carry on with that. I never felt that Mr. Reagan, with all due respect, had completely made this change. It seemed to me that to the very...up...down to the present time, perhaps partly out of force of habit, we have been allowed to wage war with the Soviet Union out of one pocket, at least intellectually and politically, and peace out of the other pocket, and that seems to me to be a contradictory, inconsistent sort of a policy and I hope that we could get over it. We'll probably never get over it entirely but I do hope that the change which has come in the last few years will be picked up and pursued by the new administration, and I think there is some possibility to that. I'm not very encouraged by certain of the appointments that Mr. Bush has made, but I'm sure that he is a very intelligent man and that he will see the necessity of some of this at least.

MR. MAC NEIL: The other danger you mentioned in that same article, the danger of this country not adjusting to the new situation, is the influence of the American media. You say...you talk about the tendency to over simplify and sensationalize. Why is that a danger in a democracy where even the most complicated issues have to be reduced to simple propositions?

PROFESSOR KENNAN: Perhaps that's the danger, itself. I do feel this, that we have missed in recent years and especially, but not exclusively since Mr. Gorbachev was there, for the last ten or fifteen years, we have missed a number of opportunities to respond in positive ways to initiatives mostly from the other side, and what I have missed here has been a really strong, critical voice from the press and the media pointing this out and helping the administrations to understand it, because it wasn't just the Reagan administration which I think was at fault in its early years in this respect, but the Carter one too before and some even before that. And, of course, I have to ask myself why has the press been so...why has it failed us so in this respect, and my answer to that really is one which I feel very strongly about, I think it is the inordinate influence of the advertisers and the advertising profession on all means of public communication in this country, practically all means, except perhaps the book. But everything else, there's a tendency for them to be taken over by the advertising interests and to reflect those interests in what they put out and by reflecting this reflection leads to a certain blandness and a lack of sharpness in critical judgment on the part of the media and the newspapers. This is my own personal view.

MR. MAC NEIL: Are you saying that has led to a prolongation, an unnecessary prolongation of cold war attitudes in this country?

PROFESSOR KENNAN: Yes, in the sense that it has led to an almost total absence of proper critical scrutiny of those attitudes. This has been left, this sort of thing, to very few of us on the outside, but I miss it in the great stretch of newspapers, television stations, and what not that extends all the way across the country. There has been, as I see it, a tendency on the part of the press to go more and more toward entertainment, less and less toward sharp political judgments and the same to some extent and understandably with the electronic media. And for this I don't blame the people who are involved in this. I do blame us for not seeing that this is not a proper basis for the control of media which are of such importance educationally and from the standpoint of intellectual and moral development as the ones we're taking about. I think that a lot of the decline in education in this country has been a reflection of this too.

MR. MAC NEIL: The cold war was born in Europe and many say that's where it will end in Europe. How do the two super powers dismantle their system of alliances, or do they, and what is the future shape of Europe?

PROFESSOR KENNAN: I'm not sure that they need to or should totally dismantle the alliances, but I think that they could do a great deal about shifting the emphasis of public attention and public fears, public hopes from the military field to other fields. I think they could get on if they wanted to, and the society if we wanted to with great improvements in the control of conventional weaponry and of nuclear weaponry. These are complicated subjects but I think we have great opportunities before us even now to do that. All that it takes really would be to lower the whole intensity of the nuclear arms race and the actual extent of it fiscally and to lead people to apply their minds to the other things that I mentioned a few moments ago to the more constructive and the more hopeful ones which lie in entirely different fields than military competition.

MR. MAC NEIL: What is the new international role of the United States after two generations of having as the kind of fulcrum of foreign policy the cold war and the competition with the Soviet Union?

GEORGE F. KENNAN: Our role is to take a more balanced view of ourselves, to realize that while there is a great deal that we can give to the rest of the world, particularly in the way of example, there is not as much that we can do to affect world events as we have fancied ourselves to be able to do in the past. We take a more modest view of ourselves and our capabilities. That's the main thing I think and to get our own house in order, first of all. That's...I've felt this for many many years and I've had occasion to say this even in the Stalinist time if you look at the end of the X Article and other things I've written, I've always said the most effective thing we could do to overcome these difficulties really is to put our own house in order and that is certainly as true if not more so today than ever was in the past. I mean, until we have conquered certain great problems, we have in this country tremendous problems, problems of poverty, problems of drugs, problems of crime, of education, we are not...we have to restrict our ideas of what we have to offer to others. Because I cannot emphasize this too much, you can influence other countries just the way that parents can influence children by example but by not by precept. It does no good for us to go out and preach and pose and say you ought to be like us until we have gotten further along. We are in a financial, in a highly precarious situation financially, it seems to me today, one that may catch up with us at any time, and then we have these great problems which we have really hardly touched.

MR. MAC NEIL: What tendencies do you see emerging in American political society, social political society, organizations to push or pull the United States and its posture in the world? I mean, for instance, the old historical tendencies were, was one of strong

desire to be isolated from foreign entanglements. A different role was thrust on the United States. What tendencies do you see emerging now?

PROFESSOR KENNAN: Well, I see the tendency and I hope I see it to a more balanced view which would say that yes, we are a great power, we have a great deal to offer, we have many responsibilities toward the remainder of the world, but not in the way of military intervention, military conquest, not in the way of the intimidation of other people. That's all I can say. I think we have over rated our influence in a number of parts of the world and I don't think we can correct this by military measures. I think what we've got to learn to do is to look very carefully at those parts of the world to use our influence tactfully, gently and through our example wherever we can, but we can't expect to control events in these other continents. We can only...one thing that we could do really here would be to work out a world view which was devoid of naivete about people, which was serious and realistic but which was oriented toward the overcoming of some of the world's greatest problems, over population, the exhaustion of our resources, of our non-renewable resources of energy and other resources in this world, the control of the pollution. These are the ways, the fields to which I think our attention should be turned and if they could be turned in those directions, I think we could offer a great deal because that's where our national genius such as it is would flower.

MR. MAC NEIL: Are you saying that things like the environment and the third world should take precedence in terms of American policy over disarmament, over arms control?

PROFESSOR KENNAN: No. I think that at the present stage they ought to go hand in hand with it. But as if and when we can make progress, real progress in arms control, then, of course, they should take precedence over it. I don't know when this will be. I'm troubled at the present time because I think we are not doing all that we could to promote arms control. I think that we on the strategic nuclear balance, we are held up by the defense initiative...

MR. MAC NEIL: The SDI?

PROFESSOR KENNAN: The SDI...and on the conventional balance, we are held up through the strange preoccupation of many people with the idea that the Russians would like to attack Western Europe, but are deterred only by our nuclear weapons. I think that is all wrong. I think that that rests on a faulty statistical basis. I think that the comparisons between the Warsaw Pact and the NATO Pact are wholly inadequate and even misleading. I think there are better ways to estimate the balance between the forces and I also think that calculations such as those which we usually find employed in discussions of this balance, calculations which ignore entirely the interests and the intentions of the other party are simply not useful and the time for that sort of thing has passed. We have to be more realistic than that in the future. If we could correct certain of these distortions and get on especially with the removal of the tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and with conventional arms control, then I think as that process proceeds, then by all means let us throw ourselves into the examination of other problems where we have a better chance of achieving something worthwhile.

MR. MAC NEIL: Professor Kennan, thank you very much for joining us.

PROFESSOR KENNAN: Thank you, sir. Appreciate it.

LAUCKS FOUNDATION, INC.
POST OFFICE BOX 5012
SANTA BARBARA, CA., 93150-5012

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